Judgment :- 1. Two questions come up for consideration in this second appeal, the first being the more important one. The question is whether the failure to register under S.69 of the Partnership Act was a bar to the suit. The trial court held that it was not a bar, while the lower appellate court held that it was. 2. The appellants started a chitty as a partnership; but the partnership was not registered. The respondent was a subscriber to the chitty, who bid and received the prize money. He executed a hypothecation bond, evidenced by Ex. P-1, to secure the payment of future subscriptions. On 10th October 1957 by a special resolution evidenced by Ex. P-5 the partnership was dissolved; and thereafter, the suit giving rise to the second appeal was brought on Ex. P-1. It was then contended by the respondent that the suit was not maintainable, since the partnership was not registered. 3. The counsel of the appellants draws my attention to the Division Bench ruling of the Madras High Court in Shanmugha Mudaliar v. P. V. Rathina Mudaliar (AIR. 1948 Mad. 187). Gentle C. J., who spoke for the Court, observed that the intention of the legislature in enacting S.69 was only to inflict disability for non-registration during the subsistence of the partnership. Sub-section (3) of S.69 is in the nature of a proviso to sub-sections (1) and (2); and it enacts that the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall not affect, inter alia, "any right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm". It is clear from this that in the case of a dissolved firm the disability contemplated by the non-registration of the firm is not to apply. 4. The reason for this is made clear by Gentle C. J The registration of a partnership can be effected just before the suit is filed; and such registration will enable the partnership to maintain the action regarding any claim or transaction even prior to the registration. In other words, law does not impose any disability on unregistered partnerships acquiring property or dealing with third parties the only disability imposed is that no suit by an unregistered partnership in certain cases is maintainable. It is evident that after the dissolution of a partnership it can no more be registered. In other words, law does not impose any disability on unregistered partnerships acquiring property or dealing with third parties the only disability imposed is that no suit by an unregistered partnership in certain cases is maintainable. It is evident that after the dissolution of a partnership it can no more be registered. It follows that if the partnership is dissolved, for bringing a suit to realise the property of such dissolved firm non-registration of the firm will not be a bar. 5. The counsel of the respondent invites my attention to the Division Bench ruling of the Travancore-Cochin High Court in Kuruvilla Thomas v. Kuruvilla Ittan (ILR.1955 T. C. 317). The learned judges have interpreted in that decision S.42 of the Partnership Act. S.42 provides that subject to contract between the partners, a firm is dissolved if the term of the partnership is over, if the purpose of the partnership is over, on the death of a partner and by the adjudication of a partner insolvent These four clauses are subject to contract among the partners; and these clauses will not apply when there is a dissolution by act of the partners. The Travancore-Cochin decision has held that by the termination of a chitty the purpose of the partnership does not come to an end; and that the purpose can come to an end only after the non-prized subscribers are paid their dues by collecting amounts from the prized subscribers. It should be so, because the purpose of the partnership is not merely to close the chitty, if further work of collecting and distributing amounts remains. But, this does not mean that by agreement among the partners the partnership cannot be terminated. Partnership is the result of agreement among the partners; and it can be terminated also by agreement of the partners. To such a case of dissolution by agreement of the partners S.42 will not apply; and the decision of the Travancore-Cochin High Court can apply only to a case falling within S.42. To the case before me, since the dissolution was by special resolution and not by virtue of S.42, the Travancore-Cochin decision will not apply. 6. The next question, the less important one, is whether Act XXXI of 1958 applies. The lower appellate court has held that it applies; and I do not think there is any ground for differing from that conclusion. 7. 6. The next question, the less important one, is whether Act XXXI of 1958 applies. The lower appellate court has held that it applies; and I do not think there is any ground for differing from that conclusion. 7. The second appeal is ultimately allowed, the decision of the lower appellate court is set aside and the decision of the trial court is restored with the modification that the respondent will be entitled, in execution, to benefits of Act XXXI of 1958, if he is otherwise entitled to them. The appellants will get their costs in this court and in the lower appellate court. Allowed.