Judgment :- 1. Three landlords filed applications for evicting the petitioners, from the three rooms of the building in question belonging to them and taken on rent by the 1st petitioner, before the 6th respondent as B. R. C. Nos. 27, 28 and 32 of 1963. Certain common grounds were alleged by the landlords for directing the petitioners to put the landlords in possession, and therefore these applications were tried together with the consent of all the parties. The grounds in the applications for evicting the petitioners were: (1) that the building needs reconstruction and the landlords bonafide require it for that purpose, (2) that the tenants have materially and permanently destroyed the value and utility of the building, and (3) that the 1st petitioner has transferred his right or sublet the rooms to the 2nd petitioner without the consent of the landlords. 2. The Rent Control Court on a consideration of the evidence came to the conclusion that the landlords were entitled to recover possession of the building for the reason that the building needs reconstruction and that the petitioners committed acts of waste materially and permanently affecting the value of the building. The appellate court confirmed the order; the revision filed by the petitioners was also dismissed. The petitioners have filed this writ petition for quashing these orders. 3. The main submission of the petitioners' counsel was that there was no waste as alleged by the landlords, that the building did not need any reconstruction and that there was no sub-letting or transfer by the 1st petitioner to the 2nd petitioner. 4. As regards the first point the finding of the Rent Control Court is to the effect that the 1st petitioner has removed the glass shutters of the windows of the 3 rooms and that would constitute waste. The court came to this conclusion solely on the basis of the judgment in appeal of the Subordinate Court in a suit instituted by the landlord in B. R. C. 32/63 as O. S.619/62 of the Munsiff's Court, Quilon to restrain the 1st petitioner by an injunction from removing glass shutters of the room belonging to him. The Munsiff's Court passed a decree refusing the injunction. There was an appeal from the decision. The judgment of the appellate court is marked Ex. P.2. The Munsiff's Court passed a decree refusing the injunction. There was an appeal from the decision. The judgment of the appellate court is marked Ex. P.2. There it was found that the glass shutters belonged to the plaintiff landlord, and that the 1st petitioner has no right to remove them and restrained him by an order of injunction from removing the same. It is stated that there was a further appeal to the High Court against this decree and this Court confirmed the decree of the lower appellate court on the ground that the glass shutters belonged to the plaintiff-landlord and therefore the 1st petitioner has no right to remove the same. Although the Rent Control Court found on the other evidence adduced in the case that the glass shutters did not belong to the landlords, the court was of the view that it was concluded by the judgment in appeal of the Subordinate Court, and that it cannot come to a different conclusion based on the other evidence in the case. The Court therefore found that the 1st petitioner has committed an act which permanently and materially reduced the value and utility of the building. The court also found that the 1st petitioner has demolished the wall which separated the rooms involved in B. R. C. 27 and 28 of 1963, and that that would constitute an act of waste. The appellate court upheld the contention of the landlords and entered findings substantially the same as those rendered by the Rent Control Court. In the revisional court these findings were upheld. It was contended that even on the basis of these findings, there was no waste committed. The submission was that the removal of the wall separating the two rooms involved in B. R. C. 27 and 28 of 1963 was not an act of waste as that did not permanently or materially reduce the utility or the value of the building. On the other hand respondents 1 to 5 submitted that since the wall demolished was the boundary separating the two rooms the demolition of the wall would constitute an act of waste permanently and materially reducing the value and utility of the building. Counsel for the petitioners relied upon the rulings in Govindaswami Naidu v. Pushpalammal AIR. 1952 Madras 181 and Patel Md. Counsel for the petitioners relied upon the rulings in Govindaswami Naidu v. Pushpalammal AIR. 1952 Madras 181 and Patel Md. Siddiqu v. H. H. The Prince of Arcot Endowment by its agent Abdul Hameed Khan 19621 M. L.J. 97, and submitted that the question whether the demolition of a wall materially and permanently reduces the value of a building depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and that no universal rule can be laid down that demolition of a wall would always constitute waste. In 1962-1 M. L. J. 97 it was held that it cannot be laid down as a rule of law that demolition of any wall in a building must necessarily be deemed to be an act of waste which is likely to impair materially the value and utility of the building and that it is the duty of the court to see whether there is sufficient evidence on record to show that the tenant has committed such acts of waste as to impair the value or utility of the building. Judged by this test, I am not satisfied that by removing the wall the first petitioner committed an act of waste which materially and permanently impaired the valve or utility of the building. The motive with which the wall was removed was only for the convenience of the trade carried on by the petitioners. There is no evidence to show that there has been any damage to the building by the removal of the wall. For the support of the roof pillars have been constructed. The boundary between the two rooms is easily ascertainable. Then the question is whether the removal of shutters from the rooms involved will constitute an act which permanently and materially impaired the value or utility of the building. It may be recalled at this moment that the 1st petitioner removed the shutters after the decision of the Munsiff's Court in O. S.619/62 holding that the plaintiff, the landlord in B. R. C. 32 of 1963, who instituted that suit was not entitled to restrain the 1st petitioner from removing the same on the ground that the 1st petitioner had the ownership of the shutters. The removal of the shutters in such a circumstance under a claim of right declared by a competent court cannot be deemed to be an act of waste committed to impair the value or utility of the building. Moreover, it is easy to replace the glass shutters in the rooms. Therefore I cannot say that the act of removing the glass shutters from the building is an act of waste. On the basis of the appellate judgment in O. S.619/62, no conclusion can be drawn as regards the removal of the shutters from the rooms involved in B. R. C. 27 and 28 of 1962. For these reasons, I am unable to hold that the 1st petitioner committed any act of waste which destroyed the building or any room therein or materially and permanently reduced its utility. 5. The far more important question in this case is whether the authorities below are right in their conclusion that the building needed reconstruction, that the landlords bona fide required the building for the purpose of reconstruction, and that the demand thereof is not a pretext to evict the tenants. It was submitted on behalf of the petitioners that the finding of the Rent Control Court that the building needs reconstruction was mainly based upon extraneous consideration, and therefore the finding is vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record. It was argued that the findings of the Rent Control Court as well as the appellate authority were based more on a consideration of the condition of the locality of the building than on the actual condition of the building itself, and that it was wrong. The Rent Control Court arrived at the finding on the basis of the following observations in ILR.19641 Kerala 254. The Rent Control Court arrived at the finding on the basis of the following observations in ILR.19641 Kerala 254. "On the other hand, the stand taken by the landlord is that a conclusion on the question as to whether a building is in such a condition that it needs reconstruction, is to be arrived at not merely on the basis of looking at the building alone or taking into account the actual physical condition of the building alone but having due regard to the various other circumstances namely the area where the building is situated, the nature of the developments that are taking place in the area etc." I think, it was open to the Rent Control Court to take into account these various circumstances. That has been held in Narayanan Nair v. First Addl. District Judge (ILR.19641 Kerala 254). It cannot, therefore be said that the Rent Control Court, the appellate or revisional authority committed an error of law in taking into consideration the various circumstances mentioned in their orders. Mr. Ramunni Menon submitted relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Neta Ram v. Jiwan Lal (AIR. 1963 SC. 499) that such considerations are irrelevant and should not have influenced the authorities below. On going through the ruling I am unable to find that any such principle was laid down in that ruling. On the other hand, it is clear from the observations of the Court in Para.8 of that judgment that the Court considered these circumstances also as material for deciding the question whether a building needs reconstruction, and that the landlord really requires it for the purpose. Para.8 runs thus: "Reading these provisions as a whole, it is obvious that if the landlord's need be genuine and he satisfies the Controller, he can obtain possession of the building or the land, as the case may be. If, however, he does not re-erect the building and puts it to any other use or lets it out to another tenant, the former tenant can apply to be put back in possession. Clause (b) clearly shows both affirmatively and negatively that the landlord must satisfy the Controller about his claim, before he can obtain an order in his favour. The Controller has to be satisfied about the genuineness of the claim. Clause (b) clearly shows both affirmatively and negatively that the landlord must satisfy the Controller about his claim, before he can obtain an order in his favour. The Controller has to be satisfied about the genuineness of the claim. To reach this conclusion, obviously the controller must be satisfied about the reality of the claim made by the landlord, and this can only be established by looking at all the surrounding circumstances, such as the condition of the building, its situation, the possibility of it being put to a more profitable use after construction, the means of the landlord and so on. It is not enough that the landlord comes forward, and says that he entertains a particular intention, however strongly, said to be entertained by him. The clause speaks not of the bona fides of the landlord, but says, on the other hand, that the claim of the landlord that he requires the building for reconstruction and re-erection must be bona fide, that is to say, honest in the circumstances. It is impossible, therefore, to hold that the investigation by the Controller should be confined only to the existence of an intention in the mind of the lord to reconstruct. This intention must be honestly held in relation to the surrounding circumstances. In our opinion, the interpretation placed by the Punjab High Court (in the decision of Gosain, J.) puts too narrow a construction, and leaves very little for the Controller to decide. It is well-known that Rent Restriction Acts were passed in view of the shortage of nouses and the high rents which were being demanded by landlords." 6. The next contention of counsel was that Ext. P-2 plan and the sanction of the Municipality would show that the proposed building cannot be constructed in the site of the old building. It was submitted that as a building of the nature visualised in Ex. P-2 plan cannot be constructed on the property, the landlords do not bona fide require possession of the building for reconstruction. Counsel relied on the evidence of pw. 1, the Commissioner, and said that the area of the site in question is not sufficient to accommodate a building of the nature shown in Ex. P-2 plan, and therefore, the requirement of the landlords of the building for the purpose of reconstruction is not bona fide. Counsel relied on the evidence of pw. 1, the Commissioner, and said that the area of the site in question is not sufficient to accommodate a building of the nature shown in Ex. P-2 plan, and therefore, the requirement of the landlords of the building for the purpose of reconstruction is not bona fide. Looking at the site of the present building and Ex. P-2 plan, I am unable to see how the argument of the petitioners' counsel can be countenanced. The revision authority in Para.21 of its judgment has dealt with this question. That authority has come to the conclusion that the contention of the tenants that if 4 feet is left free on the road front, no building as envisaged in Ex. P-2 plan having a width of 19 9 feet, can be constructed, is without any merit. The authority says: Ex. P. 2 shows that including the 4 feet wide verandah on the front this building is having a width of 19-9 feet. From the plan of the existing buildings attached thereto it is seen that the existing building is having the width, viz., 19.9 feet and it leaves 4 feet open space from the road margin. So a building 15.9 feet wide having a 4 feet wide verandah in addition on the road side, is capable of being constructed in the site belonging to these three owners, yet having an open space of 4 feet width on the road side." It was submitted by Mr. Ramunni Menon that this calculation is based upon the inadmissible evidence furnished by the plan of the existing building submitted by the landlords, and is therefore misleading. He relied upon the report and evidence of the Commissioner to substantiate his contention that the building of the nature as envisaged in Ex. P-2 plan cannot be constructed on the plot. It is not open to this court to go into that question when the revisional authority has come to the conclusion that it is possible to construct a building of the size envisaged in Ex. P-2 plan on the plot in question. It is a pure question of fact. 7. The authorities below have also found that the building needs reconstruction as it is in a dilapidated condition. Counsel for the petitioner argued that it is impossible to construct a building of the size mentioned in Ex. P-2 plan on the plot in question. It is a pure question of fact. 7. The authorities below have also found that the building needs reconstruction as it is in a dilapidated condition. Counsel for the petitioner argued that it is impossible to construct a building of the size mentioned in Ex. P-2 plan without demolishing the southern and western walls which belong to the neighbouring owners, and therefore it is not possible for the landlords to construct a a new building. I am not satisfied that this is an insuperable obstruction to the construction of the proposed building. It is open to the landlords either to make arrangements with the neighbouring owners or to give them compensation for any damage which they may sustain on account of the reconstruction. In these circumstances, I think, the conclusion of the authorities below that the building needs reconstruction, and therefore the landlords are entitled to evict the petitioners must be upheld. 8. The question whether the leasehold interest in the property is now possessed by the petitioners in partnership and if so what is its effect need not be considered by me in view of my finding that the landlords are entitled to recover possession of the building on the ground that the building needs reconstruction. I do not therefore decide that question. 9. I dismiss the writ petition, but in the circumstances without any order as to costs. The petitioners are given two months' time to vacate the building. Dismissed.