Judgment :- 1. This is an application for a writ of certiorari quashing Ex. C.1 order passed by the 1st respondent holding that the business of the Shrishaila Industrial & Spiritual Colony Charities, a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, Act XXI of 1860 (Central), has been discontinued and that under S.44 of the Indian Income-Tax Act, 1922 (before the amendment of 1938) the petitioners are jointly and severally liable for the tax due from the Society. For the assessment years 1950-51 to 1957-58 the society has been assessed to income-tax, and according to the Revenue the society discontinued business on 201 1957 and the petitioners who were members of the society on the date of the discontinuance of the business are liable for the arrears of the income-tax due for the years referred to above. The question whether the petitioners are liable for the tax for the period in question came up for consideration in O. P. 475/1962 and it was held that they are liable for the tax due from the society for the year 1957-58 only. There was an appeal from that decision and the judgment in the appeal is reported in Income-Tax Officer v Swamy Sachidanand 1964 K.L.T. 612. In that judgement it was held that the entire arrears of tax due from the society for the years 1950-51 to 1957-58 could be recovered from the petitioners if the society has discontinued business. The question whether the society discontinued business and if so, when, was directed to be decided by the Income-Tax Officer. Although the Income-Tax Officer has found in Ex. P.1 order that the society has discontinued business there is no finding in that order when the business was discontinued. 2. Mr. K. A. Nayar, appearing for the petitioners, contended that the society has not discontinued business and reliance was placed by him upon the statement in Ex. P.1 order to the effect that the society is in receipt of royalty from the trade mark owned by the society. It was submitted that the receipt of royalty from the trade mark was sufficient to constitute business and therefore the society has not discontinued business. In this connection petitioner's counsel referred me to The Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. The Korean Syndicate Ltd., 12 T.C. 181 and Commr. of E. P. T. v Lakshmi Silk Mills 195120 I.T.R. 451. It was submitted that the receipt of royalty from the trade mark was sufficient to constitute business and therefore the society has not discontinued business. In this connection petitioner's counsel referred me to The Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. The Korean Syndicate Ltd., 12 T.C. 181 and Commr. of E. P. T. v Lakshmi Silk Mills 195120 I.T.R. 451. In the additional counter-affidavit on behalf of the Revenue it is definitely stated on the basis of the letters sent by the trustee of the society that the society has ceased to carry on business from 20 11957, The Income-tax Officer has specifically adverted to this question and has come to the conclusion that "this factor alone will not give the colour that the business is being continued and that the society derives income from any business activity". I do not think that the conclusion is vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record so that I should interfere with the order in a proceeding under Art.226. 3. Petitioners' counsel also urged that the order of the Income-tax Officer refers to the business of the Society being carried on by some other person, and that S.44 has no application if the business is carried on by that person in succession to the society. The argument of counsel was that if a person carries on the business of the society in succession to the society, then S.44 would not be attracted. There is no finding in the order of the Income-tax Officer that anybody else has succeeded to the business of the society. Even if the business is being continued by some other person, unless there is a case of succession by that person to the business carried on by the society it cannot be said that the society has not discontinued to carry on the business. 4. The main contention of the petitioners was that under the Societies Registration Act, the members cannot be made liable for the debt of the society and therefore the petitioners are not personally liable for the arrears of income-tax due from the society. 4. The main contention of the petitioners was that under the Societies Registration Act, the members cannot be made liable for the debt of the society and therefore the petitioners are not personally liable for the arrears of income-tax due from the society. Reliance was placed upon S.6, 8 and 14 of the above Act, and it was contended that the society is capable of suing and being sued, of owning property, and that a judgment against the society can be executed only against the property of the society, and that therefore, the members of the society are not personally liable for the tax due from the society. S.6,.8 and 14 are as follows: 6. Every society registered under this Act may sue or be sued in the name of the President, Chairman, or Principal secretary, or trustees, as shall be determined by the rules and regulation of the society, and, in default of such determination, in the name of such person as shall be appointed by the governing body for the occasion: Provided that it shall be competent for any person having a claim or demand against the society, to sue the President or Chairman, or Principal secretary or the trustees thereof, if on application to the governing body some other officer or person be not nominated to be the defendant. 8. If a judgment shall be recovered against the person or officer named on behalf of the society, such judgment shall not be put in force against the property, movable or immovable, or against the body of such person or officer, but against the property of the society. The application for execution shall set forth the judgment, the fact of the party against whom it shall have been recovered having sued or having been sued, as the case may be, on behalf of the society only, and shall require to have the judgment entered against the property of the society. 14. The application for execution shall set forth the judgment, the fact of the party against whom it shall have been recovered having sued or having been sued, as the case may be, on behalf of the society only, and shall require to have the judgment entered against the property of the society. 14. If upon the dissolution of any society registered under this Act there shall remain after the satisfaction of all its debts and liabilities any property whatsoever, the same shall not be paid to or distributed among the members of the said society or any of them, but shall be given to some other society, to be determined by the votes of not less than three-fifths of the members present personally or by proxy at the time of the dissolution or, in default thereof, by such Court as aforesaid: Provided, however, that this clause shall not apply to any society which shall have been founded or established by the contributions of shareholders in the nature of a joint-stock company." 5. Petitioners' counsel also referred me to the decision in Gopala Menon v. Kalyani Amma 1964 KLT.166 and submitted that since the society has got a separate personality and is a-right-and-duty-bearing unit, it is a quasi-corporation independent of the members of the society. It was submitted that being a quasi-corporation the debts due from the society or arrears of tax for which the society is liable cannot be recovered from any of the members. So far as this case is concerned it may be stated that a Division Bench of this Court has decided in Income-tax Officer v. Swamy Sachidanand 1964 KLT. 612 that the petitioners are liable for the tax due from the society for the years 1950-51 to 1957-58. So far as this case is concerned it may be stated that a Division Bench of this Court has decided in Income-tax Officer v. Swamy Sachidanand 1964 KLT. 612 that the petitioners are liable for the tax due from the society for the years 1950-51 to 1957-58. Para.5 of that judgment runs as follows: "In the light of the contention of the Department that there has been a discontinuance of the business of the society all that is necessary is to affirm the direction in the judgment under appeal that the said question be investigated by the Income-tax Officer and amplify that judgment by saying that if there has been a discontinuance of the business of the society, then the respondents are jointly and severally liable for the payment of the tax in respect of all the assessment years with which we are concerned, namely, 1950-51 to 1957-58." Petitioner's counsel referred to the decision of Govindan Nair J., reported in Swami Sachidanand v. Second Addl. Income-tax Officer 1964 53 I. T. R.533 and contended that that learned judge has decided that the members of the society are not liable for the tax due from the society. I do not think, it is open to the petitioners to raise any such contention in view of the finding by the Division Bench that the petitioners would be liable for the arrears of tax due from the society for the years 1950-51 to 1957-58 if there has been a discontinuance of the business. The Division Bench also said: "Counsel for the respondents submitted that further questions (1) Is a society like the Shrishaila Industrial and Spiritual Colony Charities registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, an association of persons not liable to be taxed, under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, as contended by the respondents: and (2) Even if such society is liable to be taxed, can the tax liability be impressed on the members of the society so long as the business of the society has not been discontinued and S.44 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, is not attracted? will arise for consideration and that they may be left open for future determination. We do so." 6. So the further question which is left for consideration is whether the society is an'association of persons' and is therefore a unit for the purpose of assessment under the Income tax Act. will arise for consideration and that they may be left open for future determination. We do so." 6. So the further question which is left for consideration is whether the society is an'association of persons' and is therefore a unit for the purpose of assessment under the Income tax Act. It was contended on behalf of the Revenue that that question was also decided because the assessment for these years proceeded on the basis that the society is an'association of persons' and that as those decisions have become final, it is not open to the petitioners to question the validity of the assessments, in this proceeding on the ground that the society is not an'association of persons'. On the other hand it was submitted on behalf of the petitioners that in order to constitute an'association of persons' there must be some joint venture by all the members of the society and as in this case there is no evidence that the members of the society actively participated in any venture for which the society was constituted, the society cannot be said to be an'association of persons'. In Choodamani v. Commr. of Income-Tax 1959 35 I. T. R.676 this court had to consider the question when a body of persons would constitute an'association of persons'. It was held: "In order to assess a group of persons in the status of an association of persons, there must be some evidence of a joint venture or there must be something to show that the income was the result of some joint effort or a joint business. It roust be established on facts that they are in the nature of partners, that is, the established facts of the case must at least lead to an inference that the members of the group on their volition or freewill have joined in a venture with a view to earn profit. What is required before an association of persons can be liable to tax is not that they should receive income but that (hey should earn or help to earn income by reason of their association, and if the case of the Department stops short of mere receipts of income then the Department must fail in bringing home the liability to tax of individual as an association of persons." (See the Head Note at page 677) In Commr. of Income-Tax v. Indira Balakrishna 1960 39 I. T. R.546 the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the same question. At pages 550, 551 and 552 it is observed: "We now come to the main question in this appeal. What constitutes an'association of persons' within the meaning of the Income tax Act? It has been repeatedly pointed out that the Act does not define what constitutes an association of persons, which under S.3 of the Act is an entity or unit of assessment. Previous to the year 1924, the words of S.3 were 'individual, company, firm and Hindu undivided family'. By the Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act of 1924 (XI of 1924) the words 'individual, Hindu undivided family, company, firm and other association of individuals' were substituted for the former words. By the Income tax Amendment Act of 1939 (VII of 1939) the section was again amended and it then said: 'Where any Act of the Central Legislature enacts that income-tax shall be charged for any year at any rate or rates, tax at that rate or those rates shall be charged for that year in accordance with, and subject to the provisions of, this Act in respect of the total income of the previous year of every individual, Hindu undivided family, company and local authority, and of every firm and other association of persons or the partners of the firm or members of the association individually". By the same Amending Act (VII of 1939) sub-section (3) of S.9 was also added Now, S.3 imposes a tax 'in respect of the total income of every individual, Hindu undivided family, company and local authority, and of every firm and other association of persons or the partners of the firm or members of the association individually'. In the absence of any definition as to what constitutes an association of persons, we must construe the words in their plain ordinary meaning and we must also bear in mind that the words occur in a section which imposes a tax on the total income of each one of the units of assessment mentioned therein including an association of persons. The meaning to be assigned to the words must take colour from the context in which they occur. The meaning to be assigned to the words must take colour from the context in which they occur. A number of decisions have been cited at the bar bearing on the question, and our attention has been drawn to the controversy as to whether the words 'association of individuals' which occurred previously in the section should be read ejusdem generis with the word immediately preceding, viz., firm, or with all the other groups of persons mentioned in the section. Into that controversy it is unnecessary to enter in the present case. Nor do we pause to consider the widely differing characteristics of the three other associations mentioned in the section, viz., Hindu undivided family, a company and firm, and whether in view of the amendments made in 1939 the words in question can be read ejusdem generis with Hindu undivided family or company. It is enough for our purpose to refer to three decisions: In re B. N. Elias (1935-3 I. T. R.408); Commissioner of Income-tax v. Laxmidas Devidas (1937-5 I. T. R.584); and In re Dwarakanath Harischandra Pitale (1937-5 I. T. R.716). In In re B. N. Elias, Derbyshire, C. J. rightly pointed out that the word 'associate' means, according to the Oxford Dictionary, 'to join in common purpose, or to join in an action'. Therefore, an association of persons must be one in which two or more persons join in a common purpose or common action, and as the words occur in a section which imposes a tax on income, the association must be one the object of which is to produce income, profits or gains. This was the view expressed by Beaumont C. J., in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Lakshmidas Devidas, at page 589 and also in In re Dwarakanath Harischandra Pitale. In In re B. N. Elias, Costello, J., put the test in more forceful language, He said: 'It may well be that the intention of the Legislature was to hit combinations of individuals who were engaged together in some joint enterprise but did not in law constitute partnership. When we find that there is a combination of persons formed for the promotion of a joint enterprise... When we find that there is a combination of persons formed for the promotion of a joint enterprise... then I think no difficulty arises whatever in the way of saying these persons did constitute an association' We think that the aforesaid decisions correctly lay down the crucial test for determining what is an association of persons within the meaning of S.3 of the Income-tax Act, and they have been accepted and followed in a number of later decisions of different High Courts to all of which it is unnecessary to call attention. It is, however, necessary to add some words of caution here. There is no formula of universal application as to what facts, how many of them and of what nature, are necessary to come to a conclusion that there is an association of persons within the meaning of S.3; it must depend on the particular facts and circumstances of each case as to whether the conclusion can be drawn or not". Looking at the Memorandum of Association of the society it is clear that the society was formed for certain definite purposes, and if a person joins the society it is clear that he joins the society for the purpose of carrying out the objects set forth in that document. Here there is a combination of persons formed for the promotion of a joint venture, and if that venture results in the production of income, I see no reason why that combination of persons should not be assessed as an'association of persons.' However, it is unnecessary to express a concluded opinion on this question as the petitioners have not raised this contention, before the Income-tax Officer. Nor was any ground taken in this petition that the society is not an 'association of persons'. 7. It was lastly contended on behalf of the petitioners based on S.4(3) (1) of the Income-Tax Act that the object of the society being a charitable one the society is not liable to be taxed under the Act. This point was not raised in the writ petition or before the Income-tax Officer and therefore, I decline to entertain it. I dismiss the petition without any order as to costs. Dismissed.