Judgment U.N.Sinha, J. 1. This appeal has been filed by the plaintiffs whose suit had been decreed by the trial court, whose judgment arid decree have been set aside by the court of appeal below. The plaintiffs had instituted Title Suit No. 340 of 1955 in the Court of the Munsif of Jamshedpur, for evicting defendant No. 5 from the disputed house, describing him as the tenant. The suit was decreed. Thereafter, the plaintiffs levied Execution Case No. 151 of 1960. Defendants Nos. 1 to 4 filed an objection in the execution case, alleging that they were in possession in their own right and that they were not liable to be evicted in execution of the decree obtained by the plaintiffs against defendant No. 5. That claim case was allowed. Hence the plaintiffs have instituted this suit for declaration of their title to and for delivery of possession of the disputed house, which is really a portion of a house, as described in schedule A of the plaint. 2. In order to appreciate the respective cases of the parties, the following facts have to be stated. The property had at one time belonged to one Bhagwan Das Agarwala. He had a son named Rameshwar Lal, who bad predeceased his, father. Although I have stated that the disputed house had belonged to Bhagwan Das Agarwala, the question whether it was his separate property or whether it had belonged to the joint family consisting of Bhagwan Das and his son will be considered hereafter. The plaintiffs alleged that Rameshwar Lal had adopted one Satyanarain Khirwal as his son. It was said that Bhagwan Das had died in or about 1945, leaving behind his widow named Mahadei, the widow of Rameshwar Lal named Jaidei, and Satyanarain Khirwal, being the adopted son of Ramesh Lal. According to the plaintiffs, after the death of Bhagwan Das, bis property had devolved upon Mahadei and Satyanarain, and for the payment of Bhagwan Das debts, Mahadei and Satyanarain sold the disputed property to the plaintiffs on the 4th September, 1952, for Rs. 12, 000. The disputed property was in actual occupation of a monthly tenant and it was alleged that defendant No. 5, named Basant Sao had entered into a fresh agreement with the plaintiffs to remain in possession as a monthly tenant under them. 12, 000. The disputed property was in actual occupation of a monthly tenant and it was alleged that defendant No. 5, named Basant Sao had entered into a fresh agreement with the plaintiffs to remain in possession as a monthly tenant under them. But, as this tenant had stopped paying rent, the plaintiffs had to institute Title Suit No. 340 of 1955, with the result already indicated. It was alleged that in the execution proceeding, defendant No. 1 bad produced a sale deed purported to have been executed by Jaidei and her daughters named Panna Devi and Rukmini Devi. That is to say, according to the plaintiffs they had purchased the property from Mahadei and Satyanarain, whereas the contesting defendants case was that they had purchased the property from Jaidei and her daughters. The case of the contesting defendants was that Rameshwar Lal had never adopted Satyanarain as his son and when Bhagwan Das had died, his property had devolved upon Mahadei and Jaidei. It was alleged that Satyanarain had set himself up as an adopted son of Rameshwar Lal in order to grab certain properties and it was alleged that Satyanarain had taken Mahadei to the house of his relations at Chaibassa and had got a sale deed executed and registered in favour of the plaintiffs on false representation, keeping Mahadei ignorant about the contents of the document. It was contended that the plaintiffs sale deed was vitiated by fraud and no consideration had passed. It was also alleged by these defendants that defendant No. 5 had vacated the suit premises and had made over possession to Jaidei in 1955, and after Mahadei had died in 1957, the defendants had purchased the disputed portion of the house for Rs. 10000, by a sale deed executed on the 16th January, 1960, by Jaidei aad her daughters. 3. The trial Court accepted the plaintiffs case of Satyanarains adoption as Rameshwars son and held that Mahadei and Satyanarain had right to transfer the property te the plaintiffs, who got possession of the same as transferees. The Court of appeal below has held that the plaintiffs have failed to prove that Satyanarain had been adopted by Rameshwar Lal as his son. The Court of appeal below has held that the plaintiffs have failed to prove that Satyanarain had been adopted by Rameshwar Lal as his son. Thereafter, the Court of appeal below has held that the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs had been executed by Mahadei for legal necessity and so the plaintiffs can follow her share, by bringing a suit for partition. The Court of appeal below hag stated, further, that Mahadei and Jaidei had taken widows estates as tenants-in-common and that the net result is that the plaintiffs have acquired title to the interest of Mahadei, if any, in the disputed property, which they can get partitioned under a regular partition suit. On this ground the decree of the trial Court has been set aside and the suit has been dismissed. 4. The learned Advocate General appearing for the appellants has contended that fee Court of appeal below has erroneously held that Mahadei had only a share in the disputed property, whereas it should have been held that the property had devolved exclusively on Mahadei under the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 (Act 18 of 1937), assuming that Satyanarain had not been adopted as a son of Rameshwar Lal. According to the learned counsel, on the death of Bhagwan Das in or about 1944 or 1945, the disputed property had gone to his widow, Mahadei under Sec.3(2) of the said Act. That is to say, it is contended that Mahadei had the same interest in the disputed property as Bhagwan Das had, after the latters death, and Jaidei had no interest at all. It is contended that the disputed property was Hindu Joint family property governed by Sec.3(2) of the Act and not a separate property of Bhagwan Das governed by Sec.3(1). Learned counsel for the contesting respondents has, on the other band, argued that the plaintiffs had not made out a case that the disputed property was joint family property of Bhagwan Das and his son at any time, and, therefore, the conclusions of the Court of appeal below cannot be assailed on this ground. Reference is made to paragraph 1 of the plaint by learned counsel for the respondents, where the disputed property has been said to have belonged to Bhagwan Das Agarwala. Reference is made to paragraph 1 of the plaint by learned counsel for the respondents, where the disputed property has been said to have belonged to Bhagwan Das Agarwala. But, it appears from the record of the case that the parties had proceeded on the footing that the property Had belonged to Bhagwan Das and his son Rameshwar as a joint family property. There is no indication in the plaint, that, according to the plaintiffs the property was separate property of Bhagwan Das at any stage. In paragraph 7 of the written statement filed by defendants Nos. 1 to 4, it was clearly mentioned that Bhagwan Das and his son were joint in mess and property. It was clearly mentioned that the disputed property originally belonged to Bhagwan Das and his son Rameshwar Lal. It was mentioned that the property was joint family property of Bhagwan Das and his son. Moreover, it was specifically mentioned that after the death of Rameshwar, his father possessed the property as the sole surviving male member of the joint family. That the parties and the Courts were proceeding on the footing that the disputed property was joint family property of Bhagwan Das and his son before the latters death is also clear from the Judgments of the Courts below. In paragraph 15 of the trial Courts judgment it is mentioned that it was an admitted fact that the suit premises had originally belonged to Bhagwan Das and his son, who were members of a joint Hindu Mitkashara family. In paragraph 13 of the judgment of the Court of appeal below, the learned District Judge has referred to this property as joint family property. My attention has been drawn to the evidence of defendant No. 1, examined as D.W. 10, recorded in paragraph 15, where thr witness stated that Bhagwan Das and his son, Rameshwar Lal were members of a joint Hindu Family and their properties were also joint. In view of the materials mentioned above, this Court must proceed on the footing that the disputed property had been joint family property of Bhagwan Das and his son, when the latter was alive. In that view of the matter, it must be held that Sec.3(2) of Act 18 of 1937 will apply and only Mahadei had interest in the disputed property after the death of her husband to the exclusion of Jaidei. In that view of the matter, it must be held that Sec.3(2) of Act 18 of 1937 will apply and only Mahadei had interest in the disputed property after the death of her husband to the exclusion of Jaidei. The judgment of the learned District Judge holding that Mahadei and Jaidei were tenants in-common of the disputed property is erroneous, in view of the Full Bench decision of this Court reported in AIR 1964 Pat 261 (FB). As the learned Judge has himself held that the sale deed executed in favour of the plaintiffs was for legal necessity exclusive title of the plaintiffs must be upheld. Learned counsel for the respondents has urged that even if it be held that Mahadei had exclusive interest in the disputed property and Jaidei had none, after the sale deed executed by Jaidei and her daughters in 1960 in favour of the contesting defendants, they can challenge the plaintiffs title based on their sale deed at 1952 on the ground that no title had passed from Mahadei to the plaintiffs. According to the learned counsel, Mahadei was a purdanshin illiterate lady and the plaintiffs have failed to prove that she had executed the sate deed in favour of the plaintiffs in question, knowing the contents thereof and understanding that the transaction was one of sale in favour of the plaintiffs for consideration. For the purpose of contending that Mahadei was a purdanishin illiterate lady, learned counsel for the respondents has referred to paragraph 8 of the judgment of the learned District Judge on appeal, where the learned Judge has described Mahadei as an illiterate purdanishin lady. But, it is clear that the learned Judge was mentioning Mahadei as an illiterate purdanishin lady in a different context altogether and no question was agitated before him to the effect that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that the transaction dated the 1th September, 1952 bad been explained to an illiterate and purdanishin lady in order to bind her by the transaction of sale. Considering the questions which have fallen under issues Nos. 5, 6 and 7, the trial Court has mentioned in paragraph 31 of its judgment that there was no evidence of Mahadei being an illiterate or purdanishin lady and that she was defrauded. Considering the questions which have fallen under issues Nos. 5, 6 and 7, the trial Court has mentioned in paragraph 31 of its judgment that there was no evidence of Mahadei being an illiterate or purdanishin lady and that she was defrauded. Learned counsel for the contesting respondents has referred to Exhibit 1 and has drawn my attention to the endorsement made by the registering authority thereon, stating that Mahadeis thumb impression had been taken by her identifier behind purdah. But, if endorsement can be looked into, it must be looked into as a whole and an earlier part of the same endorsement states that the registering authority had examined Mahadei, who had been identified to his satisfaction by Dulichand, and Mahadei had admitted execution of the document. From the endorsement appearing on Exhibit 1 it is not possible to hold that Mahadei was a purdanishin lady. Moreover, Chiranjilal (P. W. 10), husband of one of the plaintiffs has stated in paragraph 13 of his evidence that he had certain conversation with Mahadei, when she had told him that she would execute a deed at Chaibassa as her relations were there. This statement was elicited in cross-examination. It was also elicited in cross-examination, as recorded in paragraph 14 of the deposition of this witness, that it was not a fact that Mahadei had been defrauded and she did not know the contents of the deed. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that the parties had put forward any case in the Courts below to the effect that Mahadei was a purdanishin lady and it was incumbent on the plaintiffs to prove that she had been made aware of the contents of the sale deed said to have executed in their favour, before she had executed this deed. Under the circumstances, it is not possible to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents to hold that the plaintiffs have failed to prove their title based on a sale deed taken from a purdanishin illiterate lady. Lastly, it has been contended by learned counsel for the respondents, that in any event, on the finding that Satyanarain had not been adopted by Rameshwar Lal, only half interest in the disputed house had passed to the plaintiffs by the sale by Mahadei. Lastly, it has been contended by learned counsel for the respondents, that in any event, on the finding that Satyanarain had not been adopted by Rameshwar Lal, only half interest in the disputed house had passed to the plaintiffs by the sale by Mahadei. It is urged that Exhibit 1 had been executed by Mahadei and Satyanarain, and if Satyanarain had no title, only half interest in the property said to have been sold, had passed to the plaintiffs. I do not think that this contention is sound. Whatever was purported to have been sold by Exhibit 1 must have passed to the purchasers on payment of the entire consideration money to the vendors, even if Satyanarain had no title to convey. On the conclusion that Mahadei was the holder of the entire interest, the conveyance must be held to be of the entire property, and on the conclusion that the sale was for legal necessity, it must be held that the plaintiffs obtained good title by their purchase on the 4th September, 1952. 5. For the reasons given above, the judgment and decree of the Court of appeal below must be reversed. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment and decree of the Court of appeal below set aside and the decree of the trial Court restored. The appellants will be entitled to their costs of this appeal.