SINHA, C. J. ( 1 ) IN this case, I am dealing with three matters. First is the appeal which has been preferred from the order of Basu, J. dated the 6th July, 1965, by the Managing Director, Hindusthan Cables Limited, secondly, the cross objection on behalf of the respondent No. 1, Sri Jatindra Kumar Das Chaudhury and thirdly, the application made by the respondent No. 1 for adding the Hindusthan Cables Limited and the Chief Engineer thereof as parties. ( 2 ) THE facts are briefly as follows : the respondent No. 1 was employed by the Hindusthan Cables Limited (hereinafter referred to as "the company") and was appointed Secretary of the Hindusthan Cables Employees' Co-operative Society, a society registered under the Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as "the society") since its inception in 1956. As a result of the report by the Auditor appointed by the Registrar, Co-operative Societies for the year 1960-61, the Managing Committee of the society was dissolved and an Administrator was appointed who took charge on the 1st February 1963. On 26th March 1963 the Administrator filed a claim against respondent No. 1 for recovery of Rs. 5,447. 33 paise before the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, under Section 86 of the Co-operative Societies Act (hereinafter referred to as the "said Act"), asking for a reference to arbitration. The Registrar referred the matter to Shri N. N. Kirthania, the District Auditor, for arbitration. The Arbitrator made an award dated 14th August, 1963, making the respondent No. 1 liable to the Society for a total sum of Rs. 4,860. 40 paise under two headings namely, insurance account and advance account. The said respondent then preferred an appeal under Section 134 of the said Act, which was heard by the Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Burdwan, who dismissed the appeal by his Order dated 21st January 1964. Thereafter, the award was being sought to be executed and on 24th April 1964 the respondent No. 1 made an application, under Article 226 of the Constitution in this High Court. ( 3 ) A Rule was issued which came to be heard before Basu, J. who decided the matter by his judgment dated 6th July, 1965. Thereafter, the award was being sought to be executed and on 24th April 1964 the respondent No. 1 made an application, under Article 226 of the Constitution in this High Court. ( 3 ) A Rule was issued which came to be heard before Basu, J. who decided the matter by his judgment dated 6th July, 1965. So far as the award is concerned, the learned Judge set it aside on two grounds, firstly that it was an incomplete award and secondly, the sharing of insurance commission between a person not licensed under the law and another was illegal and, therefore, void and unenforceable. In the meanwhile, criminal proceedings were started against the respondent No. 1 which was also challenged in the said application. The learned Judge held that the criminal proceedings were valid and competent. There is another point which is a point to be considered in this appeal, namely, a suspension order passed against respondent No. 1 by the Chief Engineer of the company dated the 26th March, 1964. On the 21st March 1964 notice was served on respondent No. 1 for taking disciplinary action and the respondent No. 1 was suspended. The point arose before the learned Judge in the Court below about the suspension order, and he came to the conclusion that as neither the company nor the Chief Engineer was a party, he could not make any order quashing the order of suspension. Now an appeal has been preferred against the said order by the Managing Director, Hindusthan Cables Limited. ( 4 ) THE point taken is that the learned Judge having held that an effective order quashing the order of suspension could not be made by him because the necessary parties are not present. He could not at the same time make a positive decision that the impugned order is ultra vires and bad. That the learned Judge has done so, appears from the judgment itself. After discussing the question, the learned Judge proceeds to say as follows :"in the absence of specific delegation, therefore, this power cannot be exercised by the Chief Engineer and the impugned order of suspension is ultra vires on this score. I cannot, however, quash this order of suspension by Certiorari in the instant proceedings because of the defect of party referred to be me already. " ( 5 ) IN our opinion, this objection ought to be sustained. I cannot, however, quash this order of suspension by Certiorari in the instant proceedings because of the defect of party referred to be me already. " ( 5 ) IN our opinion, this objection ought to be sustained. The question of the validity of the suspension order was expressly raised and the learned Judge decided that the matter could not be effectively adjudicated by him and he could not quash the order in the absence of the company and the Chief Engineer. This conclusion appears to be correct, because the respondent No. 1 was in the employ of the company and the Order of suspension was made on behalf of the company by the Chief Engineer. Obviously, no order could be made quashing the same in the absence of either the company or the Chief Engineer. But having come to this conclusion, the learned Judge should not have gone into the merits and make an express finding that the order was ultra vires. It appears from what I have cited above, that he did so and the appellant is entitled to argue that it might put him in great difficulty. The truth of his assertion is demonstrated by the fact that immediately after the making of the order, the respondent No. 1 has written a letter which was shown to us, to the effect that the learned Judge has held that the suspension order was invalid and, therefore, he should be allowed to resume work. There is a cross objection which has been filed on behalf of the respondent No. 1 and it is argued that there being want of jurisdiction, the order of suspension is a nullity and, therefore, it is void. Whether the order is void or not, the learned Judge having come to the conclusion that he could not quash order, should not have decided on the merits. Mr. Chakrovortty has taken a further point that the conclusions of the learned Judge, namely, that the proper parties were not there cannot be supported because under Standing Order 14 (d ). "managing Director" and "management" mean the company's Managing Director or any other person authorised to act on its behalf. I do not see how this affects the question at all. This does not amount in law to equate the Managing Director with the company for purposes of all legal action. "managing Director" and "management" mean the company's Managing Director or any other person authorised to act on its behalf. I do not see how this affects the question at all. This does not amount in law to equate the Managing Director with the company for purposes of all legal action. In our opinion, this point is without substance and must fail. ( 6 ) LASTLY, we come to the application made by respondent No. 1 for making the company and the Chief Engineer as parties. In our opinion, this application ought to be rejected as being belated. It appears that in the Court below, the matter had not been dealt with in the affidavits but it was after the trial of the application had begun that the question was raised about the non-joinder of necessary parties. Supplementary affidavits were allowed to be filed and on the 8th March 1965 the affidavit in opposition was filed, clearly taking the ground that the company and the Chief Engineer should have been made parties if this point was at all to be agitated. As against this the respondent No. 1 filed a reply stating that it was not necessary to make them parties, and at no time did he agree to the proposal make them parties or ever asked the Court to do so. In fact, he resisted the proposal. Now, that the order has been made, in our opinion, it is too late to ask that they should be made parties. In any event, the order being made in the absence of those parties, ought to set aside. Therefore, the order will be as follows :- (1) The application for addition of parties is rejected; (2) the cross objection filed by respondent No. 1 is dismissed; and (3) so far as the appeal is concerned, it will succeed in part to the extent that we set aside that part of the order of the learned Judge of the Court below in which he has held or expressed an opinion that the power of suspension cannot be exercised by the Chief Engineer and that the order of suspension is ultra vires. The order of the learned Judge must be read as stating that there was a defect of parties inasmuch as the company and the Chief Engineer had not been made parties, and, therefore, the point of suspension could not be decided in the application at all. ( 7 ) WE make it clear, however, that in this appeal our finding should be confined to the question of the suspension. We have not dealt with the merits nor with the validity of the award, save and except this restricted point, as the same has not been raised in this appeal but is the subject matter of appeal No. 525 of 1965. ( 8 ) THERE will be no order as to costs. Let a copy of the letter which has been handed over to us be kept on the record. Application rejected.