JUDGMENT Krishnan, J. 1. This is an appeal under the Letters Patent by the legal representative of a decree-holder from the judgment of a Single Bench, ... holding that their prayer to continue prosecuting the execution originally levied by their deceased predecessor-in-interest was time barred in terms of Article 181 of the Old Limitation Act (Art. 137 of the new Act). The question for decision are, (1) whether the original execution No. 57 of 1932 before the District Judge was still pending when in 1960 the legal representatives sought leave to proceed with it; (2) whether in view of the new Madhya Pradesh Civil Courts Act "the Court which passed the decree", which as such could give leave to successors to continue with the execution case, was that of the District Judge or the Civil Judge Class I, if any, at that station; (3) whether an application by the legal representatives to continue with the execution case is one covered by Order 21, Rule 16 CPC; (4) finally, whether the requirements for the legal representatives' prayer are already fulfilled by the Vakalatnama filed and oral representation made on their behalf before the Revenue Court sometimes in 1959 itself; (5) whether or not such a prayer comes under that rule it is at all a prayer made under the Civil Procedure Code for which the rule of limitation is contained in the old residuary Article 181 or whether there is no limitation at all. 2. A mere narration of the facts of this case will show that whatever the results of this Letters Patent Appeal it is undoubtedly a hard one brought about in part by the legal representatives' own indifference to the consequences of delay; and to some degree by the Courts keeping an execution case as it were in cold storage for nearly 27 years. Any way, the law of limitation is hard; if it is found that the party benefited by the limitation has played any tricks or indulged in devices, we can in appropriate circumstances condone the delay. But that is not the position here; and the litigant, having gone to sleep because the Court's have been slow has still to take the consequences. 3. Long ago sometime in 1931, one Mayachandsa, obtained a preliminary decree for sale of some mortgaged property. But that is not the position here; and the litigant, having gone to sleep because the Court's have been slow has still to take the consequences. 3. Long ago sometime in 1931, one Mayachandsa, obtained a preliminary decree for sale of some mortgaged property. This decree became final after the lapse of the period of grace and the decree-holder took steps for the sale of the property. Under the law in force at that time the actual sale of agricultural properties in execution could be made only by the revenue authorities and therefore the decree was transferred to the Subha (Collector) of Khargone in 1932. It took the latter about 6 years to transfer the proceedings to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Mandleshwar, where it was numbered 1389 of 1938. The District Judge himself as the executing Court waited for the usual report from the transferee Court but soon got tired and passed an order-which seems to have been typical, "consigning the case to the record room" ,the significance of which has been elucidated in a number of decisions. It appears a sale had been held but objections were taken before the superior Courts and the case went up and down for about twenty years till in 1957 the sale had been, set aside and the Collector was preparing to send the record back with the usual certificate of non-satisfaction. 4. At this stage Mayachandsa himself died it being common ground that the date of death was the 4th June 1957. Sometime later the legal representatives namely, the present appellant-widow and respondent No. 5 (proforma) daughter-filed a Vakalatnama in the Revenue Court which at best had the status of the transferee Court in execution. There is some vagueness about the date on which it was done; but it was well before August 1959, that is to say, well within the three years after the death of Mayachandsa; real question is whether this was really a prayer to continue the executive, and whether it was sufficient to submit it in the transferee Court and not the one which has passed the decree. The Revenue Court itself held by its order dated 29th August 1959 that it had no jurisdiction and sent the entire case back to the District Judge. The Revenue Court itself held by its order dated 29th August 1959 that it had no jurisdiction and sent the entire case back to the District Judge. Incidentally, the new Madhya Pradesh Civil Courts Act had come into force and suits of this pecuniary valuation would normally be triable by a Civil Judge Class I and not the District Judge. However, at that time there was no Civil Judge Class I and the District Judge accordingly dealt with the matter. It, was now in his Court on the 7th July 1960, that is to say, three years, one month and three days after the death of Mayachandsa that a prayer was made by the legal representatives seeking leave to continue the execution. 5. The judgment-debtors took the position among other grounds that this leave application was one under Order 21 Rule 16 CPC this being the only provision in the Code under which the successors or the assignees of the decree holder could at all continue with the execution. For this the limitation is provided in the residuary Article 181 (old) and as it had been exceeded and as there was no justification the prayer was time-barred. There were some other grounds raised by the judgment-debtors; but we are not concerned with them at this stage. The reply of the legal representatives was, firstly, that there being no question of abatement there was also no question of limitation; within reasonable time it was open to the legal representatives to continue with the execution case the prayer being not under Order 21 Rule 16 CPC but one for exercise of inherent jurisdiction. The executing Court having held that the prayer of the legal representatives was time barred. They came up in appeal and the Single Bench having considered the entire matter held that it was a petition under Order 21 Rule 16 CPC with a three-year limitation; that being exceeded, the execution had to be struck off as time barred. The Single Bench was not prepared to accept that the measures taken on behalf of the legal representatives before the Revenue Court were sufficient for the purposes of that rule. From this the legal representatives have come up under the Letters Patent. There was no need for a certificate as it was a decision by the Single Bench in a first appeal. Question No. 1. 6. From this the legal representatives have come up under the Letters Patent. There was no need for a certificate as it was a decision by the Single Bench in a first appeal. Question No. 1. 6. It seems to have been suggested before the executing Court that S. 48 was attracted because as long ago as 1938 the execution case itself had been disposed of. It is unnecessary to expand upon this because all that had happened in 1938 was just the consigning of the file to the record room, because it was found there was no useful purpose served by keeping the case on the open file awaiting the report from the revenue authorities Such an order does not amount to disposal of the execution case as has been held by different Courts including the Supreme Court in Pentapati China Venkanna Vs. Pentapati Bangararaju AIR 1964 SC 1454 . This question has been dealt with at some length in the judgment in Daulatrao Vs. Shafi Ahmad Misc. A. No. 160 of 1960 Indore Bench: decided 8-7-1966, by one of us and the reasoning need not be repeated. Thus in 1959 when the Revenue Courts sent their certificate of non-satisfaction the execution case No. 57 of 1932 which had never been dismissed was rightly taken up for disposal. It was still pending. Question No. 2. 7. It has been urged there that the District Judge, Mandleshwar was not the proper Court for proceeding with the execution case in 1959. Certainly in 1932 and for many years after it cases of this pecuniary valuation were within the jurisdiction of the District Judge; but under the recent Madhya Pradesh Civil Courts Act the Court competent to deal with the suits of this valuation would be the Civil Judge Class I. It has also been provided in this Act that pending suits and cases in execution should be deemed to have been transferred to such of the Courts as would under the new Act be competent to deal with them in pecuniary jurisdiction. However, as shown by the order of the District Judge it appears that there was no Civil Judge Class I at that station at that time and by sheer necessity of the case the District Judge himself had to take the execution case in his file. It is accordingly unnecessary to say anything more in this regard either. However, as shown by the order of the District Judge it appears that there was no Civil Judge Class I at that station at that time and by sheer necessity of the case the District Judge himself had to take the execution case in his file. It is accordingly unnecessary to say anything more in this regard either. The District Court was for this purposes the Court that passed the decree. Question Nos. 3 and 4. 8. This relates to the applicability of Order 21, Rule 16. The portion of this rule which is to be examined for our purpose is the following :- "Where a decree or the interest of any decree-holder in a joint decree is transferred by assignment in writing or by operation of law, the transferee may apply for execution of the decree to the Court which passed it and the decree may be executed in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as if the application were made by such decree-holder." There is a proviso regarding notice to the assignor and the judgment debtor; but we are not concerned with it here. Here we are dealing with a case of assignment by operation of law and with an execution case already pending. There was originally some difference of opinion between the different High Courts as to whether in such a situation the successor assignee could continue with the pending execution case or should after letting a pending case be disposed of apply de novo. But it is now accepted that it is open to the assignee to seek leave of the executing Court in the pending execution case itself to take all the steps that the decree-holder himself could have taken. The prayer certainly is not one for substitution properly so called, for the very simple reason there is no abatement in execution which has been expressly provided in Order 22, Rule 12. All that has to be done is for the successor of the assignee to apprise the executing Court of the state of affairs and, as the case may be, either file a fresh application with all the usual particulars or if the application by the assignor-decree-holder is still pending, to seek leave to continue with it. All that has to be done is for the successor of the assignee to apprise the executing Court of the state of affairs and, as the case may be, either file a fresh application with all the usual particulars or if the application by the assignor-decree-holder is still pending, to seek leave to continue with it. The executing Court in its turn will examine the exact position in respect of the assignment, and after hearing the judgment-debtor and the assignor if it is an assignment other than by operation of law and after protecting the interests of the joint decree-holders if any, permit the assignee to levy execution as if he were the decree-holder himself. 9. Such a petition or fresh application, as the case may be, is essential; without it the successor assignee can do nothing. For example, in the case reported in Paddisetti Rangayya Setti Vs. Guduru Vankata Subba Reddi AIR 1937 Mad 605 , it was pointed out:- "Until the transferee has taken steps under Order 21, Rule 16, Civil Procedure Code, for sanction to execute the decree, the executing Court cannot recognise any other person than the decree-holder on record." Further, the words "may apply in execution of the decree to the Court which passed it" do not necessarily imply that it should be an application de novo. What is implied is firstly, that there should be a clear prayer by the assignee that he wants to proceed with the execution and realize the benefit which the assignor could have done, and secondly, such a prayer should be made not to any Court, such as the one to which the decree has been transferred-for execution, but to the Court itself that made it. Naturally, when there is an execution case already pending it would be a petition in course of that proceeding mere by apprising the decreeing Court of the happening which has led to the assignment either in writing or by operation of law and seeking leave to proceed with the same application. But in the absence of any pending execution case, the prayer should be accompanied by the full table of particulars necessary for an application in execution. 10. The contention of the respondent-judgment-debtors has been that an application for leave to enable the successor or the assignee to continue with the execution should be made in the Court that passed the decree. 10. The contention of the respondent-judgment-debtors has been that an application for leave to enable the successor or the assignee to continue with the execution should be made in the Court that passed the decree. In support of this they have cited the rulings in Brij Mohandas Vs. Sadhiv Laxman AIR 1940 Bom 5 and Kothandarama Ayyar Vs. Swaminatha Sastrial AIR 1944 Mad 363 . But those rulings have no application in the instant case. Whatever the position in those States we have in Madhya Pradesh a local amendment which was in force at the relevant time to the effect that such applications could be made either in the Court that passed the decree or any other Court in which it had been sent for execution. 11. What really happened in the Court of the Collector is clearly evidenced by the proceedings dated 1-7-1959 and 29-8-1959. On the earlier date Counsel for the decree-holder Shri Moyde wanted time for steps to be taken on behalf of the heirs ("warison kid karwai karne hetu"). We know nothing more than that a Vakalatnama had been filed on behalf of the successors. Nothing happened till the next date, that is, 29-8-1959 when the Collector passed this order:- "Counsel Vimalchand (for the judgment-debtor) states that till now no steps have been taken for the substitution of the heir in the civil Court. ("2 waris kayam kiye jane babad") This is to be examined because it is said that the decree-holder died nearly three years ago. After his death the heirs were not substituted. This Court is not competent to give any decision on this point. So I direct that this may be done in the original Court to which the record is being sent." Whatever the propriety or correctness of the transferee Court assuming that it could not effect what it called "substitution", the party was clearly directed to go to the original Court, that is, the Court passing the decree. Even at that stage the prayer for continuation with the execution had not been actually filed in the transferee Court itself. In the original Court the application was made more than a year latter and as already mentioned, more than a month out of time. But on these facts we have to hold that no application was made to the transferee Court either. Question No. 5:- 12. In the original Court the application was made more than a year latter and as already mentioned, more than a month out of time. But on these facts we have to hold that no application was made to the transferee Court either. Question No. 5:- 12. It is urged by the appellant that she was entitled to seek leave to continue with the execution by a petition of, "a ministerial nature" or one for exercise of inherent powers without reference to Order 21 rule 16. The appellants seem to be thinking of section 146 CPC. She also seems to believe that once the assignee has stepped into the shoes of the decree holder no petition properly so called would be necessary but a mere information to the executing Court would do. Since this has been developed at some length before us it is necessary to show that it is fallacious. The word "decree holder" has been defined in section 2 (3) of the Code as:- "Any person in whose favour a decree has been passed or an order capable of execution has been made." We should assume that the Legislature has purposely omitted to make any reference to a successor-in-interest or assignee. On the basis of the definition alone the assignee or successor will not be able to execute the decree; for that one has to go to other express provisions, which is certainly Order 21 rule 16 section 146 will not be appropriate. For it runs:- "Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any law for the time being in force, where any proceeding may be taken or application made by or against any person, then the proceeding may be taken or the application may be made by or against any person claiming under him." The point to note is that this section comes into operation only in the absence of any express provision enabling or binding the successor or the assignee. In fact the express provision in Order 21 rule 16 in this regard excludes the operation of section 146. Nor are we prepared to accept the loose statement that apart from this provision the successor' or assignee can make a prayer of a "ministerial" nature to do what the predecessor or assignor was competent to do. There is nothing mechanical or automatic in this process. Nor are we prepared to accept the loose statement that apart from this provision the successor' or assignee can make a prayer of a "ministerial" nature to do what the predecessor or assignor was competent to do. There is nothing mechanical or automatic in this process. It is a judicial matter and the Court executing the decree has to hold an inquiry, summary in certain circumstances but in inquiry all the same, after nothing the persons concerned. For this Order 21 rule 16 is the only provision. Either the successor or assignee proceeds under it or does not continue with execution. In principle we would hold that where the Legislature has made an express provision enabling a party to do a thing it has to do it in that manner or not to do it all. Thus a prayer in what ever form made by the assignee or successor to continue with the execution is one under Order 21 rule 16. This matter has been touched upon in the recent ruling of the Madras High Court K.N. Sampath Mudaliar Vs. Sakunthala Ammal ILR 1964 (II) Madras 368;- "The true principle is that a decree cannot be executed by anybody other than the decree-holder except by an assignee who satisfies the requirement of Order 21 rule 16. Section 146 Civil Procedure Code cannot have the effect of over-riding this provision." 13. Once we find that the appropriate provision is a rule in the Civil Procedure Code there is limitation. It is not the intention of the Legislature that such express provisions can be invoked after the lapse of any number of years. This is almost obvious; but a reference has been made to the Patna Judgment reported in Laxminarayan Vs. Dipen Rai AIR 1950 Pat 290 . There the position was materially different. A party had applied for the setting aside of a sale under Order 21 rule 90 and having failed at the first instance had gone up in appeal. At this stage the appellant having died his successors sought to proceed with the appeal. The High Court held that the appeal did not abate because these proceedings were in execution and Order 22 rule 12 was attracted. There was also no express provision in the Code enabling the successors to continue the proceedings under Order 21 rule 90 or the appeal from orders under the rule. The High Court held that the appeal did not abate because these proceedings were in execution and Order 22 rule 12 was attracted. There was also no express provision in the Code enabling the successors to continue the proceedings under Order 21 rule 90 or the appeal from orders under the rule. Accordingly the Court held that it was within the filed of inherent powers of the Court "which it can exercise at its discretion if it is satisfied that the application was filed within reasonable time". The point of distinction is that where we have an express statutory provision limitation will be attracted while where it is a case of inherent power the test is of reasonable time. The instant case comes under the former heading. 14. It follow straightway that limitation is the one prescribed in the old Article 181, that is, three years from the date of the relevant happening which here is the death of Mayachandsa. The application made in the Court that passed the decree was out by one month and there was no step in aid. Actually there has been no prayer under section 5, Limitation Act, nor do we have any doubt that any such prayer would have been turned down. The successors not only bad immediate knowledge of Mayachandsa's death but also felt that something had to be done. However, for a long time they would do nothing in the proper Court. Thus the application for leave to proceed with the execution was time barred. Certainly it is a hard case; but the hardship has been brought about by the negligence of the successors. Possibly they had lost the sense of urgency because this execution had been left pending for 27 years; but this cannot be a ground for condonation of the delay. 15. In the result we find no reason to differ from the view taken by the Single Bench and accordingly dismiss the appeal under the Letters Patent. However, in view of the special circumstances we would make no order as to costs.