JUDGMENT H.R. Kriahnan, J. Though numbered as a civil revision, this case really arises out of a reference made by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate u/s 146(1), Code of Criminal Procedure to the civil Court in a case where he was unable to decide which of the two contesting parties was in possession and had accordingly to make an attachment. The only question to which we have to address ourselves is whether the notion of pecuniary competency is involved in the description-"a civil Court of competent jurisdiction" in Section 146(1), Criminal Procedure Code. The matter is of general importance because situations of this nature arise quite frequently in the Magistrates' Courts all over the country. Another point is that a similar phrase occurs in Sub-section (1-E) and as will be presently shown, may not mean the same thing as it does in Sub-section (1). It is difficult to avoid the impression that the use of similar phrases in both the Sub-sections is likely to cause some confusion: it has accordingly to be explained. The purpose of a reference under Sub-section (1) is not to get a decision of the controversy in a full-dressed hearing but to enable the Magistrate to get the advice of a civil Court on a problem which is by its very nature of a kind with which a civil Court is more familiar than a Magistrate. Again, the focus of attention is not title but possession. Accordingly, under Sub-sections (1) and (2) the referee civil Court has to make a summary inquiry on the question of possession and report its decision to the Magistrate who shall dispose of the proceedings before him in conformity with this report. By its very nature the limited problem before the civil Court enquiring into the reference under Sub-section (1) is not anything capable of a precise pecuniary valuation; further, unless the context indicates otherwise the notion of pecuniary jurisdiction is foreign to the framework of the Criminal Procedure Code; accordingly we have to read this Sub-section as one enabling the Magistrate to obtain what might be conveniently called "expert advice" on the problem of possession. So it is open to him to make the reference to any civil Court which by its location has jurisdiction over the subject matter whether or not it is competent in pecuniary jurisdiction. So it is open to him to make the reference to any civil Court which by its location has jurisdiction over the subject matter whether or not it is competent in pecuniary jurisdiction. In the instant case, for example, the present applicant - one of the parties to the dispute - urged before the, Magistrate that the property was worth much more than Rs. 5,000 which is the limit of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Civil Judge Class II and prayed that the reference might be made to the Additional District Judge. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate did not, and rightly in my opinion, investigate what the real value of the property was but held that "the competent jurisdiction" in this Sub-section is not pecuniary but only territorial. In view of what we have said earlier this is a correct understanding of the phrase it being remembered the enquiry is purely for the sake of advising the Magistrate on the matter of possession. Several High Courts have given their decisions in this regard. In Bodh Narain Prasad Vs. Deo Narain Singh and Others, for example, (which is the decision of a Divisional Bench) it is pointed out that the reference is neither a suit nor a proceeding u/s 145, CPC Code; accordingly no question of pecuniary jurisdiction in the manner mentioned in Section 6 can arise; The same High Court has in a later ruling in Ramdutta Trivedi Vs. Shambhu Nath Sinha and Another, reiterated the position: The value of the property involved in the proceeding does not affect the jurisdiction of the civil Court to which the proceeding is referred. Even after it is referred to the civil Court the proceeding retains its character as a criminal proceeding. Hence it is not necessary for a civil Court to have pecuniary jurisdiction before it can entertain the reference under that section. The Allahabad and Rajasthan High Courts have taken the same view. For example in Sri Sheonath Prasad Vs. City Magistrate, Varanasi and Others, it is held: The provisions of the CPC relating to the institution of suits does not apply to proceedings under Sections 145 and 146 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Allahabad and Rajasthan High Courts have taken the same view. For example in Sri Sheonath Prasad Vs. City Magistrate, Varanasi and Others, it is held: The provisions of the CPC relating to the institution of suits does not apply to proceedings under Sections 145 and 146 of the Criminal Procedure Code. What is mentioned in the CPC in order to determine which would be the Court of competent jurisdiction for the purpose of instituting or deciding a case of a civil nature can be of no help in determining what the expression "Court of competent jurisdiction" occurring in Section 146, Code of Criminal Procedure means. Similarly in Abdul Sattar and Another Vs. Jankivallabh and Another, it was pointed out that the pecuniary jurisdiction was of no consequence; but the Court should have territorial jurisdiction. In principle it would be open to the Magistrate to seek the advisory report (because it is nothing else) of any civil Court with territorial jurisdiction; still in accordance with the established practice he should seek the advice of the Court of the lowest status among them which would happen to be that of the lowest pecuniary jurisdiction. It might happen that such a Court would be called upon to enquire and to advice in regard to the possession of a subject-matter about which if it were the regular suit or proceeding u/s 141, CPC it may not be competent. The anomaly is only apparent. In the instant case, that is u/s 146(1), Criminal Procedure Code, the civil Court is not really deciding on any title. It is only giving advice on possession and even that in a proceeding which continues to be one under the Criminal Procedure Code. There is one point of view possible which can be conveniently explained here. In some of the judgments Section 146(1) or (1-B) are expressly mentioned while in others the mention is of Section 146 generally though the context would narrow it to Sub-sections (1) and (1-A). It is to be noted that the "Court of competent jurisdiction" in Sub-section (1-E) is not the same as the "civil Court of competent jurisdiction" in Sub-sections (1) and (1-A). This last Sub-section runs thus: (1-E) An order under this section shall be subject to any subsequent decision of a Court of competent jurisdiction. It is to be noted that the "Court of competent jurisdiction" in Sub-section (1-E) is not the same as the "civil Court of competent jurisdiction" in Sub-sections (1) and (1-A). This last Sub-section runs thus: (1-E) An order under this section shall be subject to any subsequent decision of a Court of competent jurisdiction. The omission of the word "civil" is obviously intentional because such a Court may be what in a narrow sense is called a "revenue Court". That would of course depend upon the laws of the State concerned. What is of basic significance is that the decision envisaged in Sub-section (1-E) is a decision in a regular suit or proceeding with a finality attached to it would be a regular civil proceeding for declaration of title and as such if it is a civil Court it would be one competent both in territorial and in pecuniary jurisdiction. Thus in the one case, that is, under Sub-sections (1) and (1-A) it is competent for the civil Court to give advice irrespective of its pecuniary jurisdiction; in the other case, that is, suit or similar proceeding under Sub-section (1-E) the Court whether "Civil" or "Revenue" should be competent in all respects. Accordingly the application in revision is dismissed. In the special circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Final Result : Dismissed