JUDGMENT B.N. Nigam, J. - Paras Nath Shukla has filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking a writ of certiorari quashing the judgment and orders dated 16-01-1964 and 30-5-1964, copies being Annexures l and 3, respectively. 2. In the petition I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Junior Standing Counsel. 3. The petitioner states that he is Pradhan of Gaon Sabha, village Ugu, Pergana Safipur, district Unnao. On 10-5-1963 the petitioner was placed under suspension. Seven charges were served on the petitioner. Subsequently the Additional Sub-Divisional Officer served three additional charges against the petitioner. The petitioner was given no opportunity for inspection of documents to be relied upon against him. The main objection, however, is contained in paragraph 9 of the petition wherein it is asserted that the powers under Sec. 95 (1) (g) of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act (U.P. Act 26 of 1947) have been delegated only to the Sub-Divisional Officer and neither to the Collector or the Deputy Commissioner nor even to the Additional Sub-Divisional Officer. The petitioner was removed by order dated 16-1-1964. He filed an appeal. The appeal was dismissed. 4. No counter affidavit has been filed but the learned Junior Standing Counsel has appeared in support of the orders passed by the District Magistrate. 5. In view of my decision in Jai Raj Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Writ Petition No. 269 of 1964, D/d. 31.3.1966. I hold that the Additional Sub-Divisional Officer cannot exercise the powers under Sec. 95(1) (g) of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act. 6. The learned Junior Standing Counsel has, however, urged that in the present case there has been a merger of the order passed by the Additional Sub-Divisional Officer in the appellate Courts order and that as the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner to hear the appeals against orders passed under Sec. 95 (1) (g) of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act is not questioned, it must be held1 Writ Petition No. 269 of 1964, decided on 31-3-1966 91 that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief unless he can prove any prejudice either in the procedure or because of the fact that the charges against him were considered by the Additional Sub-divisional Officer instead of being considered by the Sub-divisional Officer. 7. 7. The question, therefore, is whether an order without jurisdiction can be said to merge in the appellate order or whether the defect continues and the order must be quashed. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred me to a decision of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Collector of Customs, Madras v. A. H. A. Rahiman, A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 496. The passage relied upon occurs in para. 22 at page 503 of the report. Citing a passage from the judgment of Denning L. J.:- "So far as the decision of the appeal Tribunal is concerned, it seems to me that, once the port managers order is found to be a nullity, it follows that the order of the appeal Tribunal is also nullity. The appeal Tribunal has no original jurisdiction of its own; it cannot itself make a suspension order; it can only affirm or disaffirm a suspension order which has already been made. If none has been made because it is a nullify, the Tribunal can do nothing. It cannot make something out of nothing any more than anybody else can." 8. Their Lordships expressed agreement with what had been stated by the learned single Judge in stating: - "If the order of the Collector was one passed with jurisdiction then there might be some basis for the argument that it got merged in the appellate order. But if that order was a nullity in that procedure dictated by natural justice was not followed, there was no order which could be the subject and (of?) confirmation by the appellate authority." 9. It may not be possible for me to go to the whole length of this observation but I most respectfully agree with the view at least in the case when the order of the original Tribunal is completely without jurisdiction, it will not merge in the appellate order. 10. Certain observations in para. 11 of the case of State of U.P. v. Mohammad Nooh, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 86 given below support the same view : - "Of an inferior Court or tribunal of first instance acts wholly without jurisdiction or patently in excess of jurisdiction. . . . 10. Certain observations in para. 11 of the case of State of U.P. v. Mohammad Nooh, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 86 given below support the same view : - "Of an inferior Court or tribunal of first instance acts wholly without jurisdiction or patently in excess of jurisdiction. . . . the superior Court may, we think, quite properly exercise its power to issue the prerogative writ of certiorari to correct the error of the Court or tribunal of first instance even if an appeal to another inferior Court or tribunal was available and recourse was not had to it or if recourse was has to it, it confirmed what ex facie was a nullity for reasons aforementioned." 11. It would thus appear to me that since the order of the Additional Sub-Divisional Officer was a nullity the principle of merger in the appellate Courts order will not lend validity to it and the order may be struck down by a writ of certiorari and further that in a writ petition the complete lack of jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal (even when the order was confirmed in appeal) may be urged as a reason for quashing both the inferior tribunals order as well as that of the appellate Court. 12. No other point has been pressed before me. 13. I, therefore, accept this writ petition and direct the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the orders dated 16-1-1964 and 30-4-1964, copies being Annexures 1 and 3. 14. The petition is allowed with costs against the opposite parties.