ORDER Shivdayal, J. 1. The only question in this revision is whether the offence punishable under section 326, Penal Code, is "an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life" within the meaning of section 497 (I), Criminal Procedure Code. 2. The respondent was arrested for an offence under section 326, Penal Code. The Magistrate 1st Class, Khurai, admitted him to bail. The State challenged that order as without jurisdiction. The learned Additional Sessions Judge did not accept the contention of the State. The State then preferred this revision. 3. Under section 497 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, an accused may be released on bail even when he is accused or is suspected of the commission of any non-bailable offence, but this discretionary power is subject to the condition that if there appears reasonable ground for believing that be has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, he shall not be so released. Two rival interpretations arise. One is that the exclusion relates only to those offences punishment for which is "death or imprisonment for life" (the phrase to be read as a whole). To put it differently, the "or" in the expression "punishable with death or imprisonment for life" is conjunctive. The expression refers to an offence which is punishable with death and Imprisonment for life, in the alternative. An offence which is punishable only with imprisonment for life but not with death is outside its purview. The other interpretation is that the word "or" in the expression "punishable with death or imprisonment for life" is disjunctive so that an offence which is punishable either with death or with imprisonment for life is covered by it. 4. Having regard to the scheme of sections 496, 497 and 498, Criminal Procedure Code, it is quite clear to me that offences punishable with death or punishable with imprisonment for life were intended to be excluded from the ambit of the powers of Magistrates to grant bail. The Code of Criminal Procedure categorises offences as bailable and non-bailable. In the case of an offence which is described as bailable in Schedule II, of the Code, the accused is, as a matter of right, entitled to bail. The Code of Criminal Procedure categorises offences as bailable and non-bailable. In the case of an offence which is described as bailable in Schedule II, of the Code, the accused is, as a matter of right, entitled to bail. Non-bailable offences may be sub classified as (1) those offences for which sentence of death may be awarded, or sentence of imprisonment for life may be awarded; (2) those offences for which death cannot be awarded as sentence, nor imprisonment for life can be awarded as sentence. Under section 497. Criminal Procedure Code, a Magistrate has discretion to grant bail when the accusation or suspicion is of an offence falling under the latter category but not the former. Regarding the former category, posers are given not to Magistrates but to the High Court and a Court of Sessions under section 498, Criminal Procedure Code. 5. If the first interpretation was true, an offence for which death alone is the punishment would be outside the exclusion. For instance, the offence under section 303, Penal Code, is punishable with death only. That section enacts : "Whoever being under sentence of imprisonment for life commits murder shall be punished with death." There is no alternative punishment of imprisonment for life prescribed under that section. It is an aggravated offence of murder. Under section 302, Penal Code, the sentence which may be awarded to the guilty offender is death or imprisonment for life. If the offence under section 102, Penal Code is outside the ambit of the Magistrate's powers under section 497, Criminal Procedure Code, it is impossible to accept that an offence under section 303, Penal Code will be within the purview of that section. If the Magistrate has no power to grant hail to a person who is accused or suspected of the commission of an offence of murder punishable under section 302, Penal Code, he certainly docs not possess the power to grant bail to a person who is accused or suspected of commission of an offence punishable under section 303, Penal Code. 1 his illustration makes it amply clear that in the case of an offence which is punishable with death only, the Magistrate has no power to grant bail under section 497 (1), Criminal Procedure Code. 1 his illustration makes it amply clear that in the case of an offence which is punishable with death only, the Magistrate has no power to grant bail under section 497 (1), Criminal Procedure Code. For the same reason, he has no power to grant bail in the case of an offence which is punishable with imprisonment for life only. 6. For these reasons the second interpretation accords with the scheme, the intention and the wording of the section. 1 must, therefore, bold without the slightest hesitation that in section 497, Criminal Procedure Code the word "or" in the phrase "death or imprisonment for life" is disjunctive, so that all offences for which imprisonment for life may be awarded are outside the powers of a Magistrate in the matter of grant of bail. As the offence under section 326, Penal Code, is punishable with imprisonment for life, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to grant bail to a person who is accused or suspected of the commission of an offence under that section. 7. It is true that the first interpretation found favour with Doyle. J., in Muhammad Eusoof v. Emperor ILR 3 Rang. 53=AIR 1926 Rang 51 and that decision was followed in Tularam v. Emperor 14 MPLC 9 = AIR 1927 Nag. 53, by Kinkhede, AJC., and it was held that the expression 'death or transportation for life" in section 497, Criminal Procedure Code, did not extend to an offence punishable with transportation for life only and was limited to those offences for which death and transportation for life were alternative sentences. But the Rangoon case was overruled in Emperor v. Nga San Htwa AIR 1927 Rang. 205 (FB). Doyle, J. had himself referred that case to the Full Bench when he realised, on reconsideration, that the decision in Muhammad Eusoof (supra) was erroneous. The Nagpur decision was also dissented from in Emperor v. Mt. Janki AIR 1923 Nag 130. (In all those decisions the expression "transportation for life" appears as they were decided before the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, No. 26 of 1955). 8. The revision is allowed. The bail granted to the respondent by the Magistrate 1st Class, Khurai, is cancelled. He shall surrender forthwith. A non-bailable warrant shall issue. Notice shall also be issued to the surety to produce the accused forthwith before the competent Magistrate. 8. The revision is allowed. The bail granted to the respondent by the Magistrate 1st Class, Khurai, is cancelled. He shall surrender forthwith. A non-bailable warrant shall issue. Notice shall also be issued to the surety to produce the accused forthwith before the competent Magistrate. After the typescript was placed on the table, Shri Shrivaitava, learned counsel for the respondent-accused submits that the order of the Additional Sessions Judge may be treated as one under section 498, Criminal Procedure Code. In my opinion this request cannot be accepted. The Additional Sessions Judge did not apply the tests which have necessarily to be applied while considering an application under section 498, Criminal Procedure Code. See State v. Captain Jagjit Singh AIR 1962 SC 253