JUDGMENT 1. THERE is a ferry service known as Budge-Budge Ferry. A service as this conveys passengers, with their belongings in a boat across the Gunga, from Chitraganj in the district of 24-Parganas, on the south, to Bauria in the district of Howrah, on the north. 2. ONE Kishori Mohan Ghose (for short, Kishori hereafter) a and, his predecessors have been, running this fray for years from 1922 or thereabouts, formerly under the District Board, 24-Parganas, and then under Zilla Parishad 24-Pgs. Subject to periodic bids as the settlement of the ferry service was, an auction was held on April 10, 1962, for leasing it out. And Kishori was the highest bidder. So, for a term of about three years from April 10, 1962, to March 31, 1965, he had had the lease to run the ferry at a rent of Rs. 18,250 a year which, indeed, was his bid - the highest. As the financial year 1965 was about to close - with the closing of which Kishori's term was to expire -another auction was held, after the usual preliminaries, on February 23, 1965, when the bid of Rs. 50.000 a year by one Amir All Mullick (for short Amir hereafter) was the highest. Kishori was a participant too, but an unsuccessful one, in that auction. So, for the next three years from April 1, 1965, to March. 31, 1968, Amir was to run the ferry, in the normal course of events. But events moved in another way. This is the month of July 1966. Kishori, out bidden though he was in the auction of February 23, 1965, still runs the ferry. Amir, the highest bidder though he then was, does not. 3. TO know why this has been so is to not at the very root of what this litigation is like. On March 29, 1965, only two days remained for the lease of Kishori, the unsuccessful bidder in the auction of February 23, 1965, to run out. And that very day (March 29, 1965) he raised an action in the sixth court of the munsiff at Alipore. The relief he prayed the court for was a decree fur a permanent injunction restraining Amir, the solo defendant then, wrongly described as Sheik Amir Ali Molla, from disturbing in any way Kishori's possession of the ferry. Without more, it is apt to strike a prudent man: what possession ? The relief he prayed the court for was a decree fur a permanent injunction restraining Amir, the solo defendant then, wrongly described as Sheik Amir Ali Molla, from disturbing in any way Kishori's possession of the ferry. Without more, it is apt to strike a prudent man: what possession ? Two days more, and his possession would be no more. But in the plaint of Kishori's suit instituted on March 29, 1965, it has been averred that there is a lot more. So, what the plaint bears needs looking into. 4. HERE is what the plaint unfolds, omitting the introductory averments about what the Budge-Budge ferry is, who it was settled within the past, etc.- averments this judgment opens with : A. On January 25, 1965, the Zilla Parishad, 24-Parganas, issued a notification through its Zilla Bastukar (district Engineer) proclaiming inter alia that fresh auctions would be held on February 23 and 24, 1965, for leasing out different ferries (including the Budge-Budge ferry) for a term of three years from April 1, 1965, to march 31, 1968. Besides the terms mentioned in the aforesaid notification, other terms would be in accordance with the notification dated February 1, 1962, issued for the settlement of the ferries for the prior period of 1962-65, during which Kishori was the lessee. One such term was the rate of tolls in the Budge-Budge ferry at 9 paise a person. But the auction for the ferry in controversy was held on February 23, 1965, on the basis of the rate of tolls at 12 paise a person with a load of not more than 40 kilograms : a rate which was never published. And what has been the consequence of this ? Let the averment in the plaint answer it : "and consequently the highest bid in respect of the said ferry has reportedly been rupees fifty thousand only and the said ferry is proposed to be shouted with the defendant, the maker of the said highest bid, for a period of three years on and from the 1st April 1965. " : paragraph 11. B. This is but one consequence of "the sudden chancy" in the rate of tolls. There are a few more: (i) Kishori did participate in the auction of February 23, 1965, but "could not make such bids as he would otherwise have been able to do. " : paragraph 11. B. This is but one consequence of "the sudden chancy" in the rate of tolls. There are a few more: (i) Kishori did participate in the auction of February 23, 1965, but "could not make such bids as he would otherwise have been able to do. ": paragraphs 10 and 13 ibid. (ii) The Zilla Parishad had no power to hold the auction it did on February 23, 1965, without a prior notice of the new rates: paragraph 15 ibid. (iii) This has rendered the aforesaid auction "totally void and absolutely inoperative" : paragraph 16 ibid. C. The acceptance of the highest bid at Rs, 50,000 (no reportedly here as in the extract quoted under A above)by the Zilla Parishad "is void, illegal, arbitrary, and is also vitiated by fraud and collusion and misrepresentation," because of grounds which are a mere repetition of what goes before and turns round non-publication of the increase in the rate to tolls, to which may be added violation of the principles of natural justice and the veiled insinuation that Amir knew, and that Kishori with "some other participants' knew not, the sudden change in the rate on February 23, 1965: paragraph 18 read with paragraph 14 ibid. D. The Zilla Parishad "threatened kishori on March 27, 1965, to dispossess him of the ferry so that the Parishad and Amir could take possession thereof on April 1, 1965. Should that happen, Kishori's "vested right will be lost forever. "Hence the suit for a permanent injunction to save kishori from "an irreparable injury,": paragraph 21 ibid. This then is the theme and thread of the plaint, so wordy, but in reality, so jejune, for the purpose of an interlocutory relief in the shape of an ex parte ad interim temporary injunction. Stripped of its verbiage, the plaint dated March 29. 1965, magnifies the right of the plaintiff Kishori to run the ferry up to March 31, 1965 to be "a vested right. " The learned munsiff failed to see the obvious. Stripped of its verbiage, the plaint dated March 29. 1965, magnifies the right of the plaintiff Kishori to run the ferry up to March 31, 1965 to be "a vested right. " The learned munsiff failed to see the obvious. If he had been far too uncritical of the plaint, he showed himself no better in his appreciation of Kishori's employee, brajendra Kumar Mandal's affidavit dated March 30, 1965, under Order 39, rules 1 and 2, and section 151 of the Procedure Code - an affidavit which is merely a rehash of the plaint Result : he granted an ex parte ad interim temporary injunction on March 30, 1965 though Kishori, on his own showing, the mass of irrelevance (for the purpose of an or parte injunction) in his point and the connected affidavit excised, could not run the ferry not for more than forty-eight hours from that day : March 30, 1955. An injunction as this aided and abetted by law's delay, at once put Kishori into a strategic position. On and from April 1, 1965, he could run the terry no more, as his lease would be no more too. But he is mailing it to this day though some sixteen, months have rolled by since then. Truly has it been said a lax practice in granting such injunction is an open invitation to blackmail. 5. TO continue noticing the carriage of this interlocutory matter, Amir appealed against the grant of an ex parte injunction on April 30. 1965. A learned subordinate judge reversed the munsif on May 28, 1965, holding inter alia- (i) that in no view Kishori's right to hold the ferry could be extended beyond March 31, 1965 ; (ii) that Kishori acquired ipso facto no fresh right to continue in possession of the ferry ; and (iii) that should Amirs lease go down as invalid, there would have to be a fresh auction followed by a fresh lease. 6. KISHORI moved this Court against this appellate order of reversal and obtained a rule which was discharged by P. N. Mookerjee. J. on July 1, 1965. On July 27, 1965, the munsif received the record of the suit from this Court. On August 26, 1965. 6. KISHORI moved this Court against this appellate order of reversal and obtained a rule which was discharged by P. N. Mookerjee. J. on July 1, 1965. On July 27, 1965, the munsif received the record of the suit from this Court. On August 26, 1965. Kishori applied for amendment of the plaint by insertion of a new paragraph - paragraph 18a - thereto, the gist of which is : his lease dated April 30, 1962, from April 10, 1962, to March 31, 1365, was executed by the then Chairman of the District Board, 24-Parganas, qua the lessor. But the true lessor should have been the Board, a statutory body. Ergo, no valid and binding lease was there and his interest in the ferry had not come to an end by the efflux of time provided for in the lease. More, his must be deemed a monthly lease Tinning still. Again, the alleged lease in favour of Amir, executed by the Chairman of the Zilla Parishad is not a valid and binder lease either. It is not, because such execution infracts the mandatory provisions of the Zilla Parishad Act, 1963 and the rule made there under. 7. ON September 7, 1965, the munsif allowed the amendment as prayed for. But the plaint has yet to be amended. 8. ON September 22, 1965, the learned munsif granted a temporary injunction. Amir appealed again on March 31, 1966, another learned subordinate judge upset the order of the munsif and rejected Kishori's prayer for a temporary injunction. Against this appellate order of reversal, Kishori moved this court under section. 115 of the Procedure Code on April 4, 1966, and obtained a rule, the present one, which is now for my decision. 9. IN the realm of facts, two other matters remain to be noticed. One, the affidavits filed in this revisional case disclose an earlier attempt made by Kishori to get the result of the auction of February 23, 1965, stayed. He moved this court under article 226 of the Constitution against the Zilla parishad and its district Engineer. He obtained a rule: Civil Rule 215 (W) of 1965, but no stay. That was on March 16, 1965, as I satisfy myself from the record of that rule. So, what Kishori failed to obtain then, he did obtain fourteen days later, namely, on March 30, 1965, by an ex parte ad interim injunction. He obtained a rule: Civil Rule 215 (W) of 1965, but no stay. That was on March 16, 1965, as I satisfy myself from the record of that rule. So, what Kishori failed to obtain then, he did obtain fourteen days later, namely, on March 30, 1965, by an ex parte ad interim injunction. Two, the Zilla Parishad applied before the munsif on April 19, 1965, for being added as a party. The munsif was good enough to notice it in some of his orders in the order-sheets, but then completely lost sight of it. On December 3, 1965, the Zilla Parishad moved another petition with the same prayer, making a point of the fact that its earlier petition of April 19, 1965, to that end was neither heard nor decided. Then only, and that too on December 17, 1965, the munsif added the Parishad as a party defendant, months after he had decided the injunction matter. That is how the Parishad came to be "subsequently impleaded", as Kishori avers in paragraph 1 of his petition under section 115 in this court, but without any detail showing that the parishad added itself : on the contrary, attempting to give an impression that Kishori got the Parishad added. 10. THESE are the bare bones of the story of various proceedings had so far. And to recite the facts, as I have done, it to be convinced that kishori had, prima facie, nothing like a fair question to raise. Grant all the infirmities he alleges about the auction of February 23, 1965, and the steps preceding as well as succeeding it. So what ? That will not prolong his lease dated April 30, 196, (vide paragraph 18a to be added, and not yet added, to the plaint), a minute beyond the last minute of March 31, 1965. So, prima facie he has no right to run the ferry beyond that date. Necessarily therefore he has no fair prima facie case either in support of the extravagant right he claims. Say, - and it has been said-, if the infirmities Kishori alleges are there, Amir All will go down. Let him. What is that to Kishori ? Amir's fall will not make him rise and thrive, though his lease is no more. Whatever may befall Amir, Kishori was, and is, a right less one after March 31, 1965. Say, - and it has been said-, if the infirmities Kishori alleges are there, Amir All will go down. Let him. What is that to Kishori ? Amir's fall will not make him rise and thrive, though his lease is no more. Whatever may befall Amir, Kishori was, and is, a right less one after March 31, 1965. Your adversary's vice will not make you virtuous. Your adversary's lack of right will not make you full of right. These are matters not so much of law as of common sense and common honesty too. Hence, so much noise over so little, and what is worse still, the triumph of noise over common sense and common honesty, appears to be as surprising as painful. One without even the semblance of a right to run the ferry after March 31, 1965, is still running It: fide paragraph 10 of the petition under section 115. 11. THE ushering of a "deeming" monthly lease in favour of Kishori (sought to be, and not yet, added to the plaint by paragraph 18a) has not been overlooked. Mr. Ranjit Banerjee, arguing for Kishori has relieved me of my task in dwelling on the utter hollowness or perfect validity of such a belated move. Because, far from relying on such a "deeming" monthly lease, he abandons it altogether. He concedes, it cannot be pressed. Indeed, he does not mention it even in his opening address. But when Mr. Basanta Panda, arguing for Amir, comments on it still, I interject : why argue on a case Mr. Banerjee does not oven touch ?' At this stage, Mr. Banerjee makes the concession I have just referred to. 12. ACTUAL or threatened violation of the right claimed necessarily bulks large in an interlocutory injunction ; no less some act on the part of the petitioning party's adversary productive of irreparable injury. That is what Kishori is after too. (See paragraph 5 : D ante), But when the very right claimed does not prima facie exist, when no fair prima facie case support of such right is there, no violation, actual or threatened, of such a prima facie nonexistent right can be there too. In the circumstances, repetition of irreparable injury in the plaint and the affidavit is proof of little save the absence of irreparable injury. In the circumstances, repetition of irreparable injury in the plaint and the affidavit is proof of little save the absence of irreparable injury. What does him injury is his own lease dated April 30, 1962, dead on the last moment of the last day of March 1965 and incapable of being brought back to life a moment beyond that, no matter what the irregularities and illegalities are on this side of March 31, 1365. Now to the test of present possession which weighs with the learned munsif and which Mr. Banerjee also emphasizes before me, To me, however, such possession is nothing but the possession of one prima facie having no manner of right to possess beyond March 31, 1965. If Kishori is where he is, beyond that date, it is not by virtue of any right he has, but by the vice of recklessness with which a junior and necessarily inexperienced munsif granted, on the day following the date the suit was instituted, an ex parte, ad interim, temporary injunction. That has proved to be the small end of the wedge, leading to the big fact of possession remaining with Kishori to this day. Denuded of the gravely erroneous judicial protection given to such possession beyond March 31, 1965, by the ex parte injunction of March 30, 1965, it comes out in its true colour and becomes the possession of a rank trespasser. Surely such possession cannot count when the court is called upon, in exercise of its sound discretion, to grant an interlocutory injunction. 13. MR. Ranjit Banerjee has taken the trouble of referring to some cases as if they had any bearing on this sort of possession. (1) Mussammat Sundar and Mussammat Parbati, (1889) LR 16 1a 186, finds Baldeo Sahai's two litigating widows' possession, no procured by force or fraud, but lawfully attained and peaceably maintained - a possession which, it is held, they are entitled to continue against all comers, except those who can plead a preferable title, find also to divide between them. In the case in hand, Kishori's possession after March 31. 1965, is possession attained by blindfolding an inexperienced judge. And his is a title preferable to Amir's It has only to be stated in order to be rejected. He is one without any manner of a right to hold the ferry beyond March 31. 1965. In the case in hand, Kishori's possession after March 31. 1965, is possession attained by blindfolding an inexperienced judge. And his is a title preferable to Amir's It has only to be stated in order to be rejected. He is one without any manner of a right to hold the ferry beyond March 31. 1965. And no reckless ex parte injunction can convert a rightists one into a rightful one. But Amir is one who made the highest bid Rs. 50,000 a year, deposited a moiety thereof : Rs. 25,000 down, (vide condition No. 3 of the notification dated February 1, 1962), and executed an ijara, a bilateral one executed too by the Zilla Parishad's chairman Bijesh Chandra Sen, on March 29, 1965, and put to registration on March 31 following. (See page 80 of file C/2 of the record of the suit, for the firhisti, followed by the certified of Amir's ijara a document which was filed on September 16, 1965 : fide the date seals on the firhisti and the certified copy of the ijara, as also order No. 30 dated September 16, 1965 ). This payment of Rs. 25,000 is recited in the ijara of Amir, as the payment of a moiety of Kishori's bid in the earlier auction (Rs. 9,125, half of Rs. 18,250) was recited in his ijara, annexure C to the affidavit on his behalf in the trial court so, whose is a preferable title here ? Kishori's or Amir's ? It is a case of no right versus considerable right at any rate. It is a competition between a trespasser, crafty and fleet of foot, and another with a vast deal of a right, though, say, not with a perfect title. This sort of possession of Kishori cannot be equated with the possession of the two litigating widows of Baldeo Sahai in the Privy Council decision which does not, therefore, reach the case in hand. 14. BY parity of reasoning, (2) Ismail Ariff v. Mahomed Ghouse. 1893 LR 20 IA 99, is inapplicable too. There Ariff was in complete possession of the property for six years. Ghouse was a mere trespasser having had no more right to interfere with it than a coolie in the street. 14. BY parity of reasoning, (2) Ismail Ariff v. Mahomed Ghouse. 1893 LR 20 IA 99, is inapplicable too. There Ariff was in complete possession of the property for six years. Ghouse was a mere trespasser having had no more right to interfere with it than a coolie in the street. And what prevailed was Ariff's possession by virtue of which he could have recovered possession even from one who might be able to prove a title, and, a fortiori, therefore, ho could have, and had, his right declared against Ghouse, a mere trespasser who is who in the case before me ? It is idle to compare Kishori with Ariff. Ariff, because of his previous complete possession, had the right to remain in possession. And kishori had no manner of a right to remain in possession beyond March 31, 1965, when his ijara had come to an end, his and his predecessors 43 years' previous possession (as he says)notwithstanding. If he has to be compared at all, he has to be compared with the trespasser of a Ghouse. Equally, if not still more, inapplicable is (3) Perry v. Clissold, decided by the Privy Council on December 14, 1906, and came into the reports in 1907 : 1907 AC 73. Resumption of land, the rightful owner of which was unknown, but possession of which was with Frederick Clissold for ten years, during which he had exercised peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership in the assumed character of owner, led to the question if he had (on resumption) a prima facie case for compensation within section 13 of the relevant Australian Law. It was held, he had. Because, he was not a mere trespasser, but had a possessory title, a perfectly good one against all the world but the rightful owner, and, more, in the process of becoming absolute against him too by the statute of limitation. And here ? It was held, he had. Because, he was not a mere trespasser, but had a possessory title, a perfectly good one against all the world but the rightful owner, and, more, in the process of becoming absolute against him too by the statute of limitation. And here ? Kishori's right was completely extinguished on expiry of March 31, 1965, with Amir, possessed of a considerable right, ready to take over from kishori, which he could not do, only because of an extravagant ex parte injunction, though upset in appeal, the appellate order being upheld in revision, but the mischief of which continues to this day, because of that, followed by a temporary injunction again, though not ex parte, also upset in appeal, and in revision against which (the appellate order) I am rendering this judgment. Therefore, Frederick Clissold's possession cannot be Kishori's possession. The two are poles asunder. Perry v. Clissold, (supra). (4) Armory v. Delamirie, 1 Smith LC 385, (5) Asher v. Whitlock, Law Rep. 1 QB 1, and all of that class can do little good to Kishori, laying down, as they do, that the finder of a jewel or a person in possession of a property, without any other title, acquires no ownership, but yet can keep it against all the world save the rightful owner, Kishori, with his ijara and right extinct, and forestalling his immediate expulsion by an ex parte injunction unknown to law, comes no where near such a one, 15. THUS, the test of present possession, which has surely to be taken into reckoning in an interlocutory injunction, cannot avail Kishori. But Mr. Banerjee's contentions are not exhausted yet. He sees lack of title in Amir, because of execution of his ijara (paragraph 19 ante) by the chairman only, on behalf of the Zilla Parishad though rule 132 of the Zilla Parishad's Rules 1964 provides, in so far as it is material here : "any transfer of immovable property vested in a Zilla Parishad shall be made by an instrument under the common seal of the Zilla Parishad signed by the Chairman and two of its members. " one answer to such a contention is what I have stated in paragraphs 14 and 15 ante : that for the purpose of this interlocutory injunction it matters not how weak is your adversary's title. " one answer to such a contention is what I have stated in paragraphs 14 and 15 ante : that for the purpose of this interlocutory injunction it matters not how weak is your adversary's title. That will not prolong your lease a minute beyond March 31, 1965. What matters is that prima facie you have no manner of a right and therefore no fair question to raise. 16. THAT is a good enough answer so far as this interlocutory matter goes. But I owe it to Mr. Banerjee to notice his contention, on the high authority of Sir Asutosh Mookerjee and Sir Nalini Ranjan Chatterjea, in (6) Mathura Mohan Saha v. Ram Kumar Saha and Chittagong District Board, (1915) 20 CWN 370, that when the statutory instrument requires an instrument to be signed by the chairman, and two members of the Zilla Parishad, the signature by the chairman only (as here) will not make it a valid instrument. In Mathura Mohan's case (supra), was found the infraction of the relevant statutory rule, namely, rule 103, prescribing inter alia the signatures by the chairman and two other members of the District Board. It must not be overlooked, however, that there the persons with the imperfect document of title were the plaintiffs. As Sir asutosh Mookerjee observed : "the appellants come into court as plaintiff's and must succeed on proof of a valid title. " if Amir had come to court as plaintiff, suing the Zilla Parishad for declaration of his title to run the ferry under the Parishad, he would have perhaps found himself in the same predicament as Ramsundar Saha, and on his death, his three sons, the appellants there, found themselves with no enforceable title at the commencement of the suits. But here the outlook is completely otherwise. Amir is the defendant, say, with some right, at any rate, but no enforceable title, pitted against the plaintiff Kishori with no manner of a right beyond March 31, 1965. It is therefore plain to be seen that in an interlocutory injunction the scales shall tilt in favour of Amir. (7) Akshoy Kumar Banerjee v. The Municipal Commissioners of Tollygunge municipality, (1942) 46 CWN 393, another case Mr. Banerjee relies upon, shows infraction of section 103, sub-section 3, of the Bengal Municipal Act 15 of 1932, there having been no contract in writing, signed or sealed. (7) Akshoy Kumar Banerjee v. The Municipal Commissioners of Tollygunge municipality, (1942) 46 CWN 393, another case Mr. Banerjee relies upon, shows infraction of section 103, sub-section 3, of the Bengal Municipal Act 15 of 1932, there having been no contract in writing, signed or sealed. But it merits like treatment. So does (8) H. Young and Company and The Mayor and corporation of Royal Leamington Spa, (1883) 8 AC 517, holding that sub-section 1 of sec. 174 of the Public Health Act, 1875, enacting how certain types of contracts are to be made, is obligatory, and not merely directory. Let me state at the risk of repetition that even if Amir has no manner of a title, that will not make the dead lease of Kishori run beyond March 31, 1965. The auction of February 23, 1965, going down, there shall have to be another auction the result of which will bring in another lessee, Kishori as an old lessee is no more and can be no more beyond March 31, 1965. Mr. Panda sees here no lease and therefore no relationship of landlord and tenant, but a licence only. In support of such contention, he cites (i) (9) Prohald Patni v. Sasadhar Rai, (1910) 18 CWN 994, where Jenkins, C. J., and Doss, J. hold that the sum payable under the contract to run a ferry, though called a lease of a ferry, is not rent; (ii) (10) Rachhea Singh v. Upendra Chandra Singh, 1899 ILR 27 Cal. In support of such contention, he cites (i) (9) Prohald Patni v. Sasadhar Rai, (1910) 18 CWN 994, where Jenkins, C. J., and Doss, J. hold that the sum payable under the contract to run a ferry, though called a lease of a ferry, is not rent; (ii) (10) Rachhea Singh v. Upendra Chandra Singh, 1899 ILR 27 Cal. 239, where Rampini and Handley, JJ., hold that, to ferry tolls, the provisions of the rent law governing agricultural land are not applicable; (iii) (11) Stats of Bihar v. Ram Bharosa Singh, 1956 SCA 762, where chandrasekhar Aiyar, J, speaking for the court, lays down the law to the effect that, when rule 7 (d) made by the District Magistrate, Patna, under the rule making power conferred on him by section 15 of the Bengal Ferries Act 1 of 1885, proscribes the maximum period of a lease for the Patna-Ganga ferries as three years at a time, it is not open to him to withdraw the tolls from the public auction at his sweet will and pleasure, in spite of his having notified the holding of such an auction sometime before the expiry of the current three-year lease; (iv) (12) Narendra Prasad Singh v. State of West Bengal, better known as Rajmahal-Manick chowk Ferry case, (1958) 63 CWN 158, where Chakravartti, C. J., explains, Lahiri, J. (as his Lordship then is) agreeing, the true scope of section 9 of the Bengal Ferries Act ; and (v) (13) Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. R. N. Kapoor. AIR 1959 SC 1262 , where Subba Rao, J. (as his Lordship then is) refers to certain well-established propositions by which one can tell a lease from a licence. I have been left wondering if some of these cases have the remotest relevance to the point for decision before me. But let that be left alone. Because the view I have taken of this interlocutory injunction before me should necessarily make me very, very slow to express any opinion on this aspect of the cause ; the more so, as such expression of opinion may prejudice the parties and embarrass the courts below. More, it is hardly necessary to enter into the topic. Because the view I have taken of this interlocutory injunction before me should necessarily make me very, very slow to express any opinion on this aspect of the cause ; the more so, as such expression of opinion may prejudice the parties and embarrass the courts below. More, it is hardly necessary to enter into the topic. Because, be it a lease or a licence, Kishori has no manner of a right to hold the ferry beyond March 31, 1965, and cannot therefore get the temporary injunction he prays the court for. 17. BY parity of reasoning, it will be a profitless task to consider whether the franchise of a ferry is not necessarily appurtenant to land [ (14)Nityahari Roy v. Dunne, 1891 1lr 18 Cal. 652, a case Mr. Panda cites] or the ferry is a species of immovable property too [ (15) Jnan Chand Chugh v, Jugol Kishore Agrawal, AIR 1960 Cal. 331 , and (16) Maharana Fattehsangji jaswatsangji v. Dessai Kallianraiji, hekoomatraiji, (1873) 1 IA 34, cases Mr. Banerjee cites, the latter holding a hereditary right to toda giras, a species of blackmail, a sum paid to a powerful neighbor or turbulent inhabitant of the village as the price of forbearance, protection and assistance, by an inamdar out of the rents of a village is an interest in immovable property within the then statute of limitation. ] 18. MR. Banerjee sees lack of title in Amir in another way too, just on the line of averments in the plaint, summarized in paragraph 5 ante : A, B and C. A sudden change in the rate of tolls from 9 paise a person etc. as announced on January 25, 1965, (on the basis of the notification of February 1, 1962) to 12 paise a person etc. on February 23, 1965, the very date of the auction, means non-publication of the rate of tolls on the foot of which the public auction was held. And such non-publication in turn means infringement of rule 192 read with rule 177 of the Zilla Parishad's Rules again. Once that is that Mr. Banerjee concludes, the public auction of February 23, 1965, fails, and along with it fails Amir's title. Inadequacy of materials apart to come to a firm prima facie finding in favour of Kishori, my answer is the same : paragraph 14 ante. Once that is that Mr. Banerjee concludes, the public auction of February 23, 1965, fails, and along with it fails Amir's title. Inadequacy of materials apart to come to a firm prima facie finding in favour of Kishori, my answer is the same : paragraph 14 ante. Let the public auction of February 23, 1965, fail But that will not restore to life the lease of Kishori destined to die, and in fact, dead, on the last moment of the last day of March 1965. His possession through a fluke beyond March 31, 1965, because of an ex parte injunction, which militates against the rudimentary principles of elementary law, appears to be beneath notice in a court of law, in an interlocutory matter, of all matters. Mr. Banerjee refers me to (17) Chandidat Jha v. Padmanand Singh bahadur, 1895 ILR 22 Cal. 459, and stresses the distinction which exists between the case of an injunction and that of a receiver. Be it one or the other, it must be shown that the property must be preserved from waste or alienation. But if you want to have a receiver, a good prima facie title has to be made out; whereas if all you want is an injunction, suffices it to show that the petitioning party has a fair question to raise as to the existence of the right alleged. Kishori is the petitioning party here. Prima facie, the right he alleges does not exist. A fortiori, therefore, he has not, he cannot have, a lair question to raise as to the right he does allege. Mr. Banerjee will not let the matter rest here. He contends that the very fact that the hearing of this civil revision case before me took quite a good time shows "a triable issue," as he puts it. Whatever the expression : a friable issue or a fair question to raise as to the existence of the right alleged, it does not matter which, the length of a hearing is no measure of the strength of the case. For, there are cases which are more in length than in strength. The present case, I am afraid, is one such. 19. THE last case to be reviewed is (18) The Great Western Railway company v. The Birmingham and oxford Junction Railway Company and others, (1904) 41 ER 1074. Mr. Banerjee goes by. For, there are cases which are more in length than in strength. The present case, I am afraid, is one such. 19. THE last case to be reviewed is (18) The Great Western Railway company v. The Birmingham and oxford Junction Railway Company and others, (1904) 41 ER 1074. Mr. Banerjee goes by. The principle, an ancient one, this ancient authority of 1848 lays down is that if a substantial question between the parties is there, the title to the injunction may be good, even though the relief prayed for may ultimately fail. But, unfortunately for Kishori, upon the whole of the materials I have had put before me and I see on my own, it is impossible for me to find prima fade that there is a substantial question between the parties here. Indeed, in the case under review, the defendants fail in sewing that the plaintiffs have no title to any part of the relief and protection they ask. Result : the injunction was sustained. But, in the case in hand, the defendant Amir has shown what the defendants in Great Western Railway Company's case, (supra), failed to, Result: refusal of the injunction must be sustained. Certainly it is not the law that an injunction is to be had for the mere asking. 20. IN the result, the rule fails and do stand discharged with costs. Hearing fee - five gold mohurs. Nothing I have said here will affect the decision of the suit at and during the trial which will proceed untrammelled by any expression of opinion of mine in the foregoing lines. 21. LET the records be sent down with the utmost expedition. 22. THE records reaching the court below, the suit be brought to trial and decided with the utmost expedition too.