JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - The defendant is the appellant. The appeal arises out of an application under Sec. 332 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The respondent prayed for possession of plot Nos. 117, 120, 133 and 134. 2. One Jhammal was admittedly the tenant of these plots. He died, according to the appellant, on 14-2-1943 and, according to the respondent, on 15-2-1944. Jhammal on his death was succeeded by his widow Smt. Budhani. She filed a suit for ejectment of the present respondent, Parshotam, under Sec. 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act treating him to be a trespasser. The suit was brought on 12-12-1945 and the same was decreed by the revenue court on 13-7-1949. Parshottam's appeal against this decree was dismissed on 22-2-1950. Smt. Budhani got possession delivered to her on 14-4-1950. She obtained a bhumidhari Sanad in respect of those plots on 23-5-1950. She then sold these plots to Achhaiber (the present appellant), Ram Nath and Chhabinath. These transferees obtained possession on 22-9-1952. 3. The same day i.e. on 22-9-1952 Parshottam came to court under Sec. 232 read with Sec. 20 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. He claimed that he had become an adhivasi and as such was entitled to regain possession of the plots. This application was contested by Smt. Budhani and her transferees. The trial court inter alia framed two issues, firstly, whether Smt. Budhani has become the bhumidhar of the plots and secondly, whether Parshottam was the adhivasi thereof. It held that Parshottam had not acquired adhivasi rights. It dismissed the application on 27-1-1953 on this finding, without recording any findings on the other issues. Parshottam went up in appeal. The Additional Commissioner held that Parshottam had become an adhivasi under Sec. 20(b) (1) of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. It reversed the decree and allowed the application. Smt. Budhani filed a second appeal before the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue held that Parshottam had acquired adhivasi rights and that Smt. Budhani had also become bhumidhar of the land and that as the rights of an adhivasi and a bhumidhar are in conflict and the latter rights are undoubtedly higher, they would prevail over the former. It further held that the case raised an issue of title i.e. bhumidhari rights, and the trial court was not competent to decide the matter itself. It further held that the case raised an issue of title i.e. bhumidhari rights, and the trial court was not competent to decide the matter itself. It should have taken action under Sec. 332 by referring the issue of title to the relevant civil court. It allowed the appeal on 23-2-1954, set aside the decree and directed the trial court to take action as required by Sec. 332. 4. In pursuance of this direction the trial court referred the issue of bhumidhari rights to the civil court. The Civil court returned its finding on 1-10-1955 to the effect that Smt. Budhani had become the bhumidhar for the plots. The trial court held that Purshottam had entered in occupation of the plots in 1351 fasli which began on 1st July 1943, and that Jhammal was alive at that time, he having died on 15-2-1944. It found that Parshottam was recorded as an occupant in 1356 Fasli and had become an adhivasi under Sec. 20 (b) (1) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. His application for possession under Sec. 232 of that Act, was, consequently, allowed. The lady went up in appeal. The appeal lay to the civil court in view of Sec. 332/ (4) of the Act. The learned Civil Judge came to a different conclusion as to the date of death of Jhammal. He held that he had died on 14-2-1943. The learned Civil Judge further held that Parshottam's occupation of land began before 1349 fasli i.e. during the life time of Jhammal. It confirmed the trial court's finding that Parshottam had become an adhivasi and dismissed the appeal. 5. Aggrieved, defendant Achhaiber has come to this Court in Second Appeal. In the suit under Sec. 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act one of the issues raised was whether the suit was time barred. The appeal judgment dated 22-2-1950 in that suit states the position as follows: "The position is like this that the plaintiff's claim becomes time-barred, if the defendant is held to be in possession from 1349 fasli, but the claim becomes within time in possession of the defendant is taken to have started from 1351 fasli." 6. The learned Additional Commissioner then went on to discuss the evidence and ultimately held that Parshottam's possession commenced from 1351 fasli. Consequently, the suit was held to be within time. The learned Additional Commissioner then went on to discuss the evidence and ultimately held that Parshottam's possession commenced from 1351 fasli. Consequently, the suit was held to be within time. That suit was between Parshottam and Smt. Budahni who are the parties to the present litigation also. Under the doctrine of res judicata the judgment of the Additional Commissioner dated 22-2-1950 would operate; see (1) The decision that Parshottam did not acquire any hereditary tenancy rights because his possession started from 1351 fasli would be binding between the parties in the present case. The learned Civil Judge had, hence, no jurisdiction to adjudicate again as to when Parshottam entered on the land. In the present litigation it will have to be taken that his possession commenced from 1351 fasli. 7. On the finding that Jhammal died on 14-2-43 and that Parshottam's possession commenced from 1351 fasli when the widow was the tenant, Parshottam cannot be held to have become an adhivasi. He will become an asami under Sec. 21 (b) of the Act. An asami cannot claim possession under Sec. 332. The present application for possession is hence, not maintainable. 8. For the respondent it is urged that in a case under Sec. 232 no second appeal was provided in 1954 and as such the Board of Revenue was incompetent to entertain and decide the second appeal filed by Smt. Budhani and her transferees. The provision for a second appeal came into existence in 1956 under the U.P. Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 18 of 1956. Assuming this is so, it will only affect tire right of the parties to file a second appeal. The Board of Revenue had ample powers to deal with the matter under Sec. 333 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The Board of Revenue had the Revisional power to call for the record of any suit or proceeding and to pass such orders in the case as it thinks fit, if the subordinate court appears to have exercised the jurisdiction not vested in it in law or to have failed to exercise the jurisdiction so vested or to have acted in the exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. The Board of Revenue upon an examination of the matter came to the conclusion that the trial court could not have proceeded to decide the suit on the merits itself but should have acted according to Sec. 332, namely, it should have referred the issue of title to the civil court and should have decided the case in accordance with the findings returned by the civil court. In this view the case clearly fell under Cl. (c) of Sec. 333 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act as the trial court had committed a procedural error in deciding the case, and acted illegally and with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The judgment of the Board of Revenue and the consequently proceedings cannot, therefore, be held to be without jurisdiction. 9. The second submission urged by the learned counsel for the respondent, is that no second appeal lies against the decision of the lower appellate court and as such the present appeal is incompetent. It is urged that an issue of title having been referred to the civil court, an appeal lay from the decision of the trial revenue court to the relevant civil court under sub-Sec. (4) of Sec. 332. That provision did not provide for a second appeal. Sub-Sec. (4) of Sec. 332 runs as follows :- "An appeal from a decree of the revenue court in a suit or proceeding in which an issue regarding title has been decided by the civil court under sub-Sec. (2) shall lie to the civil court which having regard to the valuation of the suit has jurisdiction to hear the appeal from the decree to which an issue of title has been referred." 10. A Division Bench of this Court in Jamuna Das v. Gulab Rani, 1965 ALJ 616, has, after a review of the provisions and of the relevant authorities, held that a second appeal lies to the High Court against the appellate decree of a civil court passed under sub-Sec. (4) of Sec. 332. Learned counsel for the respondent seeks to distinguish this authority on the ground that in that case the proceedings had commenced by a suit, which alone under the Civil Procedure Code gives rise to a decree. The present proceedings, on the other hand, have commenced by an application under Sec. 232. Learned counsel for the respondent seeks to distinguish this authority on the ground that in that case the proceedings had commenced by a suit, which alone under the Civil Procedure Code gives rise to a decree. The present proceedings, on the other hand, have commenced by an application under Sec. 232. The adjudication of an application is not a "decree" as defined in the Civil Procedure and hence it will not attract the provisions of a second appeal made under the Civil Procedure Code. Sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for a second appeal. Under this section an appeal shall lie to the High Court, from every decree passed in appeal by a court subordinate to the High Court, on the grounds mentioned in this section. If an appellate court passed a decree, a second appeal would lie under Sec. 100, C. P. C. The question is whether the appellate judgment in the instant case culminated in a decree or was it merely an order as contended for by the respondent. 11. The opening clause of Sec. 332 is significant. It says that an appeal from a "decree" of the revenue court in a suit or a proceeding .... shall lie to the civil court. It, thus, contemplates a decree, both in a suit as well as in a proceeding. A proceeding commencing on an application will, under this provision, give rise to a decree. The decision of the revenue court in a proceeding is a decree for purposes of an appeal under sub-Sec. (4). The definition of a "decree" in the Civil Procedure Code will not be applicable to an adjudication by the revenue court, in order to determine whether its judgment culminates in a decree or an order. It would be treated a decree in view of the clear provisions of sub-Sec. (4). 12. The decision of an appeal against a decree, gives rise to a decree. The trial court's decree merges in that of the appellate court. There is no provision in the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act or in the Civil Procedure Code to render a decision of an appellate court against a decree of the trial court, anything, except a decree in itself. The decision of the lower appellate court in the instant case, therefore, was a decree so as to attract Sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The decision of the lower appellate court in the instant case, therefore, was a decree so as to attract Sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The present second appeal was consequently competent. 13. The next submission of the learned counsel for the respondent was that the finding of the Board of Revenue that Parshottam was an adhivasi is final and must be given effect to. The Board of Revenue had also held that the bhumidhari rights of Smt. Budhani will prevail over the adhivasi rights of Parshottam. The respondent Parshottam can, therefore, derive no benefit from the views expressed by the Board of Revenue. In any event, the Board of Revenue had set aside the decree and remanded the matter to the trial court for decision afresh in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 332 of the Act. It had not directed that its findings on the rights of the parties shall be accepted after remand. It could not be. The Board of Revenue could not decide the rights of the parties itself and yet remand the matter for fresh adjudication on the same points. The views expressed by the Board of Revenue as to the rights of the parties were mere passing observations and have no value, in view of the ultimate order of remand passed by it. 14. The last submission for the respondent was that the finding about the date of commencement of Parshottam's possession is one of fact and is binding in a second appeal. The adjudication of this point was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The finding was, therefore, without jurisdiction. 15. In the result, the position is that Smt. Budhani had become the bhumidhar and she could validly transfer her rights in the land. Parshottam had become an asami, Sec. 232 of the Act provides for a claim for possession by an adhivasi. Parshottam not being an adhivasi, his application for possession was not maintainable. 16. The appeal thus succeeds and is allowed. The decree is set aside and Parshottam's application for possession is dismissed. But the parties shall bear their own costs in all courts. Appeal allowed.