Kapoor ( 1 ) THIS is a revision petition by th plaintiff, Krishan Kumar Grover, who had filed a suit in the Court of a Subordinate Judge at Amritsar for partition of property and for rendition of accounts against the defendants. Issues were framed and certain issues were treated as preliminary issues out of which issue No. (1) was "whether the plaint is properly stamped?"the plaintiff had paid Court-fee of Rs. 19. 50 np. for partition of properties under article 17 (b) of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act and had valued the plaint at Rs. 200. 00 for rendition of accounts but had fixed the value of the plaint for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 20,000. 00 The trial Court was of the view that the plaintiff should have paid ad valorem court-fee on the sum of Rs. 57,256. 00 which was found by the trial Court to be the value of the share claimed by him of the various properties involved. The plaintiff was allowed time up to 31st May 1962, to make up the deficiency of the Court-fee. Against this order the plaintiff came to this Court in revision and further proceedings in the trial Court have been stayed pending the decision of this revision petition. ( 2 ) MR. Krishan Lal Kapur on behalf of the defendant-respondents has taken up a preliminary objection to the effect that the impugned order is not one falling under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and this revision petition is not competent. In support of his contention he has relied upon Harbans Lal Khosla v. Mohan Lal Sanon. In that case, Falshaw J" (as he then was) held that where the Court does not accept the plaintiff s valuation of the suit and direc"s the plaintiff to amend the plaint by valuing his suit in a particular manner for purposes of court-fee, the order even if wrong in law is not open in revision under section 115. In that case, Falshaw J" (as he then was) held that where the Court does not accept the plaintiff s valuation of the suit and direc"s the plaintiff to amend the plaint by valuing his suit in a particular manner for purposes of court-fee, the order even if wrong in law is not open in revision under section 115. In that case it was brought to the notice of the Court that on the plaintiff having failed to pay Court-fee as required by the trial Court his plaint had been rejected and the learned Judge observed that an order of the kind before him was one in which the High Court will be reluctant to interfere since if only one further step was taken and the plaintiff having failed to value the suit properly and pay the necessary court fee, the plaint was rejected, that order was appealable and hence there did not appear to be any reason why the plaintiff should be allowed to challenge the preliminary order in revision. ( 3 ) MR. Krishan Lal Kapur further brought to my notice that this case had been followed by Mehar Singh J. in an unreported case Gurinukh Singh v. Ram Nath, Civil Revision petition No. 647 of 1960 decided on 17th April, 1961, and that the Hon ble the Chief Justice had reiterated his view in two recent cases Ram Dhari v. Fateh Chand, Civil Revision petition No. 44 of 1962 decided on 20th September, 1983 and National Bank of Lahore Ltd. . v Punjab Ceramic Supply Co. Civil Revision Petition No. 505 of 1962 decided on 29th November, 1963. ( 4 ) ON the other hand counsel for the petitioner has pointed out an earlier decision of trus Court in Anguri Devi v. Gurnam Singh, in which a contrary view was taken and it WAS laid down that an order demanlag additional Court-fee was revisable under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code as in such cases there is a refusal to exercise jurisdiction in the matter and try the case on the merits unless additional Court-fee demanded is paid. This case does not appear to have been brought to the notice of the learned Judges dealing with the cases relied upon by Mr. This case does not appear to have been brought to the notice of the learned Judges dealing with the cases relied upon by Mr. Krishan Lal Kapur, and learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in view of this conflict it is desirable that the matter be decided by a larger Bench. He has reinforced his argument by reference to decisions of Full Benches of Bombay, Madras, Nagpur and Patna High Courts-Shankar Maruti Girme v. Bhagwani Gunaji Girme, Rarnkhelawan Sahu v. Bir Surendra Sahi, Balaji Dhumnaji Koshti v. Mst. Mukta Bai and Chitalapati Murthiraju v. Chintalapati Subbarajit. In all these cases it was held that a revision petition lies to the High Court at the instance of the plaintiff challenging the decision of the lower Court calling upon him to pay additions I Court-fee. In the decisions by Madras, Patna and Nagpur High Courts it was added that a petition for revision would not lie when a defendant has unsuccessfully challenged the adequacy of the stamp affixed by the plaintiff. ( 5 ) MR. Krishan Lal Kanur then argued that the matter had been set at rest by the Supreme Court in Rathnavarmaraja v. Smt. Vimla, a case which was REFERRED TO in Ram Dhari v. Fateh Chand also. The position in Rathnavarmaraja s case was that it was the defendant who was challenging the decision on the question of court-fee payable and their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the defendant who may believe and even honestly that proper court-fee had not been paid by the plaintiff had still no right to move the superior Court against the order adjudging court-fee payable on the plaint. It was added that whether proper court-fee is paid on a plaint is primarily a question between the plaintiff and the State. Thus the question whether the plaintiff has a right to go up in revision to the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the decision demanding additional court-fee was not before their Lordships of the Supreme Court. In a very recent case, Major S. S. Khanna v. Brig. Thus the question whether the plaintiff has a right to go up in revision to the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the decision demanding additional court-fee was not before their Lordships of the Supreme Court. In a very recent case, Major S. S. Khanna v. Brig. F. J. Dhillon, the Supreme Court considering the scope of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code observed that the term case in the expression any case which has been used in section 115 includes a part of a case and accordingly the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court may be exercised irrespective of the question whether an appeal lies from the ultimate decree or order passed in the suit. Learned counsel for the petitioner has, therefore, argued that the consideration, that it would be open to the plaintiff not to pay the additional Court-fee and then after his suit has been dismissed to come to this Court by way of appeal, is by itself not sufficient to exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain and hear the revision petition from the order demanding additional Court-fee. ( 6 ) IN view of the conflict of the authorities learned counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the question as to the competency of this revision petition be REFERRED TO a larger Bench. Similar questions arise not infrequently and it appears to me desirable to get an authoritative pronouncement en the point. I would, therefore direct that the case may be laid before the Hon ble the Chief justice for the constitution of a larger Bench for the decision of the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents. ( 7 ) KRISHAN Kumar Grover instituted a suit against his mother, tw3 brothers and three sisters for rendition of accounts and partition of property including movable and milmovable property which he valied at Rs. 20,0301- for purposes of jurisdiction and Rs. 200. 00 for purposes of court-fee. Objection was taken pv the defendants to the valuation of the suit and eventually the plaintiff was ordered to pay an ad valorem court-fee on Rs. 57/256. 00 and allowed time to make good the deficiency. He challenged that order in revision and obtained stay of proceedings in the lower Court before any order rejecting the plaint for non-compliance was passed. 57/256. 00 and allowed time to make good the deficiency. He challenged that order in revision and obtained stay of proceedings in the lower Court before any order rejecting the plaint for non-compliance was passed. The case came before 15. B. Capoor, J. on the 28th of January 1931 and he has referred the question whether an order of this kind is subject to interference by this Court under section 115, Civil Procedure Code to a larger Bench because as far as this Court was concerned the view I had expressed in Harbans Lal Khosla v. Mohan Lal Sanon and reiterated in a number of subsequent cases to which reference has been made. as was in conflict with the view expressedby Harnam singh J. in Anguri Devi v. Gurnam Singh and there are a number of decisions of other Courts including Full Benches of Bombay, Patna, Nagpur and Madras High Courts in which it has been held that the High Court can interfere in revision on a petition filed by a plaintiff who has been ordered to make good a deficiency in court-fee though not at the instance of a defendant whose objection to the plaintiff s valuation of the suit has teen rejected by the trial Court. ( 8 ) I find that it will be necessary to refer the matter to even a larger Bench since my learned brother and I do not appear to be altogether in agreement on the matter. The weight of the authorities is undoubtedly on. the side of the plaintiff, but I am still of the opinion at this stage that insufficient consideration has been given to the main ground on which I have been of the opinion that the Court should not interfere in revision in such cases. This is that when an order calling on a plaintiff to pay the extra court-fee which the Court finds to be due is passed and a time fixed for making good the deficiency, the consequential order which must be passed if the deficiency is not made good is an order rejecting the plaint, which is an apealable order and the terms of section 115 make it quite clear that the revisional powers of the Court are not intended to be used where there is a right of appeal. The main ground on which a distinction has been drawn by the Courts in the case of a defendant who wishes to challenge an order upholding the plaintiff s valuation of the suit is that the amount of court-fee paid is a matter between the plaintiff and the State and is not the concern of the defendant at all, and that, according to the law, once the plaintiff s valuation of the suit had been upheld by the trial Court the defendant cannot even raise this point in an appeal if the plaintiff s suit is decreed, whereas the plaintiff can appeal against an order rejecting his plaint as insufiicietly stamped. Such being the case it seems to me that when the plaintiff has this right of appeal he ought not to be allowed to use section 115 in order to save himself the trouble of ifliling an appeal, and the decision of these matters in revision would virtually have the affect of making the right of appeal against an order rejecting the plaint as insufficiently stamped a dead letter. For these reasons I am of the opinion that the matter must come before a Full Bench. ( 9 ) I agree that the matter be REFERRED TO a Full Bench for decision. ( 10 ) THE question for decision before the Full Bench is whether a revision petition under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is competent at the instance of a plaintiff against an order holding that additional court fee is payable on the reliet claimed and directing him to pay the additional court-fee on his plaint within the time specified by the Court. ( 11 ) THIS question arose brfore a Single Judge in Civil Revision No. 334 of 1962, Krishan Kumar Grover v. Shrimati Parmeshri Devi. The plaintiff had filed a suit in the court of a Subordinate Judge at Amritsar for partition of the property and rendition of accounts against the defendants. Issues were framed and certain issues were treated as preliminary and issue No. 1 was whether the plaint is properly stamped. The plaintiff had under article 15 (b) of Schedule 2 of the Court Fees Act paid court fee of Rs. 19. 50 np. for partition of properties and had valued the plaint at Rs. 200. 00 for rendition of accounts. The plaintiff had under article 15 (b) of Schedule 2 of the Court Fees Act paid court fee of Rs. 19. 50 np. for partition of properties and had valued the plaint at Rs. 200. 00 for rendition of accounts. The value of the plaint for purposes of jurisdiction was fixed at Rs. 20,000. 00 The trial Court finding that Rs. 57,2561- was the value of the shares claimed by the plaintiff in the various properties involved, hell that he should have paid ad valorem court-fee on the sura of Rs. 57,2561- and it allowed him time up to the 31st May, 1962, to make up the deficiency of the court-fee. This was the order impugned in the revision petition and pending its decision further proceedings in the trial Court have been stayed. ( 12 ) ON account of the conflict of authorities on tha above legal question, it was REFERRED TO a larger Bench and the Division Beach, before which the reference came up, has vide its order dated the 27th April, 1964, considered it advisable that the matter be decided by the Full Bench. ( 13 ) SECTION 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the scope of which has to be considered, is in the following terms :- "115, The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears- (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with meterial irregularity, the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit". ( 14 ) THE Privy Council has in numerous cases, the latest being Joy Chand Lal Babu v. Kamalaksha Chaudhury ami others , held that a subordinate court does not act illegally or with material irregularity simply because it decided wrongly a matter within its competence. The Court has jurisdication to decide a case wrongly as well as rightly. ( 14 ) THE Privy Council has in numerous cases, the latest being Joy Chand Lal Babu v. Kamalaksha Chaudhury ami others , held that a subordinate court does not act illegally or with material irregularity simply because it decided wrongly a matter within its competence. The Court has jurisdication to decide a case wrongly as well as rightly. Neveitheless, if the erroneous dicision results in the subordinate court exercising a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or failing to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, a case for revision arises under sub-section (a) or sub-section (b) and subsection (c) can be ignored. ( 15 ) IT has now to be seen whether the order of the subordinate court calling upon the plaintiff to pay by a certain date the additional courtfee on the plaint, which in its view it should properly bar, is (1) "a case decided" by that court and (2) has occasioned a failure io exercise the jurisdiction vested in the court. So far as the first point is concerned, it has now been settled by the Supreme Court in Major S. S Khanna v. Brig. F. J. Dhilloti, that the expression "case" is a word of comorehensive import ; it includes civil proceedings other than suits, and is not restricted by anything contained in the sectionto entirety of the proceedings in a civil court. Where in an interlocutory order the subordinate Judge holds that the suit Filed by the plaintiff is not maintainable, the decision having a direct bearing on the rights of the plaintiff to a decree must be regarded as a "case which lias been decided". The same principle should apply to a case in which the subordinate Judge decides that the court would not proceed further with the case until additional court-fee on the plaint has been paid by the plaintiff because that decision also has a direct bearing on the rights of the plaintiff to a decree. The same principle should apply to a case in which the subordinate Judge decides that the court would not proceed further with the case until additional court-fee on the plaint has been paid by the plaintiff because that decision also has a direct bearing on the rights of the plaintiff to a decree. ( 16 ) IF the plaintiff does not comply with the order of the court by the date specified, the next step which the court would take and has to take is stated in rule 11, Order 7, of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that in a case where the relief claimed is under valued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so, the plaint shall be rejected. No doubt in the definition of "decree" as contained in clause (2) of section 2 of the Code, a decree shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the order rejecting the plaint on account of the plaintiff having failed to correct the valuation decided by the court within the time fixed by it is appealable, but the fact that an appeal lies from the ultimate decree or order passed in the suit is by itself not enough to shut out the original jurisdiction of the High Court. This has been made clear by the Supreme Court in Major S S. Khanna v. Brig. F. J. Dhillon and it has been observed that once it is granted that thre expression "case" includes a part of a case, there is no escape from the conclusion that revisional jurisdiction of the High Court may be exercised irrespective of the question whether an appeal lies from the ultimate decree or order passed in the suit. If an appeal lies against the adjudication directly to the High Court or to another Court from the decision of which an appeal lies to the High Court, it has no power to exercise its revisional jurisdiction but where tha decision itself is not appealable to the High Court directly, or indirectly exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court would not be deemed excluded. ( 17 ) FOR the determination of the second question viz. ( 17 ) FOR the determination of the second question viz. whether an order of the nature in question occasions failure to exercise jurisdiction it, would be helpful to see what is tha real nature and peculiar characteristic of an order calling upon the plaintiff to pay additional court-fee as a result of the finding that his claim has been undervalued. This is not a finding upon the merits of the case between the parties but is an administrative finding though judicially perforrned A. S observed by the Supreme Court in Sri Rathnavarmaraja v. Smt. Vimla the question, whether proper court-fee is paid on a plaint, is primarily a question beween the plaintiff and the State. These observations were made in an. appeal by the defendant from orders made in revision by the High Court; of Myso e affirming substantially the order of the trial Court a, to the court-fee payable on certain reliefs claimed by the plaintiff. Their Lordships held (at page 1300) that the Court-fees Act was enacted to collect revenue for the benefit of the State and not to arm a contesting party! with a weapon of defence to obstruct the trial of an action and their Lordships were unable to appreciate what grievance the defendant could make by seeking to invoke the re visional jurisdiction of the High Court on the question whether the plaintiff had paid adequate court-fee on his plaint. The defendant who may believe and even honestly that proper court-fee has not been paid by the plaintiff has stall no right to move the superior courts by appeal or in revision against the order adjudging pay ment of court-fee payable on the plaint. The matter before the Supreme Court was the converse of the one giving rise to the present reference. The Subordinate Judge, instead of staying his hands and refusing to exercise jurisdiction had actually proceeded with the case. The matter before the Supreme Court was the converse of the one giving rise to the present reference. The Subordinate Judge, instead of staying his hands and refusing to exercise jurisdiction had actually proceeded with the case. On the other hand, where by its decision on an administrative matter as to revenue between the plaintiff and the State, the Court on account of its finding, that additional court-fee is payable declined to proceed further with the case until that payment is made, it may properly be held that by its discretion on an administrative matter the court has failed to exercise the jurisdiction for which civil courts have been set up, that is, to settle disputes of civil nature between the parties and to administer justice according to the laws of the land. The condition laid down in clause (b) of section 115 of the Code is, therefore, satisfied. ( 18 ) COMING now to the authorities of various High Courts, I might first refer to Smt. Anguri Devi v. Gurnam Singh in which Harnam Singh J. held that an order demanding additional court-fees is revisable under section 115, as in such cases there is a refusal to exercise jurisdiction in the matter and try the case on t^e merits unless additional court-fee de manded is paid. The learned Judge cited Ratnavelu Pillai v. Varadaraj Pillai in support of his viw aid there is no further discussion of the question. A contrary view was expressed by Falshaw J. (as he then was) in Dr. Harbans Lal Khosla v. Mohan Lal Sanon and has been reiterated by the learned Chief Justice in Ram Dhari v. Fateh Chand and others (Civil Revision No. 44 of !962 decided on the 20th September, 1963) and National Bank of Lahore Limited v. Messrs Punjab Ceramic Supply Co. , and others (Civil Revision No. 505 of 1962 decided on the 29th November, 1963 ). His view has been adopted by Mehar Singh J in Gutmukh Singh v. Ram Nath" (Civil Revision No. 647 of 1960 decided on the 17th April, 1961 ). It is unfortunate that the judgment in Smt. Anguri Devi v. Gurnam Singh was not brought to the notice of the learned Judge when the counsel addressed arguments before him in Dr. Harbans Lal Khosla "v. Mohan Lal Sanon or at the hearing of the revision petition. It is unfortunate that the judgment in Smt. Anguri Devi v. Gurnam Singh was not brought to the notice of the learned Judge when the counsel addressed arguments before him in Dr. Harbans Lal Khosla "v. Mohan Lal Sanon or at the hearing of the revision petition. However, after the date of the reference of the instant case by the Single Bench, an identical question has been considered by the Circuit Bench of this Court at Delhi in Sheet Kumar v. Aditya N arain and another decided on the 22nd April, 1964 Mabajan J. , who delivered the judgment and with whom Dua J. agreed, reviewed the case law and held that the decision of Falshaw J. could not be sustained either in principle or in authority. ( 19 ) IN Dr. Harbans Lal Khosla v. Mohan Lal Sanon it was considered that whether the decision of the lower court for proper valuation of the suit is right or wrong, this court should not interfere as none of the conditions laid down in the three clauses of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been satisfied. This question has bean sufficiently discussed above and reasons have b. "an given for the view that an order holding that the plaint had been under valued and calling upon the plain tiff to pay additional court -fee by a certun date operates as failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in the Court by law The further reason given by the learned Judge was that the High Court should be particularly reluctant to interfere since if only one further step is taken and, the plaintiff, having failed to value his suit properly and pay the necessary court-fee, the plaint is rejected, that order is appealable and so there was no reason why the plaintiff should be allowed to challenge the preliminary order in revision. This view can no longer be sustained on account of the decision of the Supreme Court in Major S. S. Khanna v. Brig. F. J. Dilln. It must, however, be mentioned that in Dr. Harhans Lal Khosla s case it was brought to the notice of the learned Judge that the plaintiff had actually failed to pay the court-fee and his plaint had been rejected and thus a right of appeal had accrued to the plaintiff. F. J. Dilln. It must, however, be mentioned that in Dr. Harhans Lal Khosla s case it was brought to the notice of the learned Judge that the plaintiff had actually failed to pay the court-fee and his plaint had been rejected and thus a right of appeal had accrued to the plaintiff. ( 20 ) COMING now to the authorities of other High Courts, they would appear to be practically unanimous in favour of the view taken by the Division Bench of our Court in Sheel Kumar v. Aditya N arain and another" as to the revision petition being competent under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Some decisions of the Calcutta High Court are Ram Rup Das v. Mohunt Sujaram Das and Sailendra Nath Kundu v. Surendra Nath Sarkar and others. In Mahadeo Gopal Pandse and others v. Hari Waman Bhate and another", it was field by the Division Bench that an order demanding court-fees in excess of what the plaintiff has paid is virtually a refusal to exercise jurisdiction, and as such, if it is erroneous the High Court will interfere with it in revision. This case was relied upon by the Full Bench of the same Court in Shankar Maruti Girme v. Bhagwant Gwnaji Girme and others" (at page 260 ). In Kulandai Pandichi and another v. Indran Ramaswami Pandin Thevan a Division Bunch of the Madras High Court after review ing the previous case law held at page 417 that where a Judge, on an erroneo is view of the Court-fee payable, refuses to proceed with the suit until the proper Court-fee is paid, he fails to exercise jurisdiction, as a party is entitled to have his case tried if he paid the Court-fee, Hence the order was revisable. The learned Judges observed that while the Courts would generally not interfere in revision where an equally efficacious remedy was open to the party, they hid in several cases interfered where the remedy by way of appeal would entail unnecessary hardship on the party, involve multiplicity of proceedings or would not give the party as complete and efficacious a relief as interference with an interlocutory o"der and the case sacisfied the requirements of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A Full Bench of the same Court in Chintalapati Murthiraju v. Chintalafiati Subbarajw mi others affirmed the same principle holding that the insistence on the payment of the additional court-fee amounted, in the circumstances, to a refusal to exercise juriadiction. The mere fact that an appeal would lie later from the consequential order passed by the Subordinate Judge if the stamp-fee were not paid w. is no ground for refusing to entertain the petition. The only decision of the Allababal High Court cited at the Bar was Lakshmi Narain Rai v. Dip N arain Rai" which again decided in favour of the plaintiff-petitioner as to the competency of the revision petition against the order calling upon him to pay additional court-fee on the plaint. The Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Rarnkhelawan Sahu v. Bir Surendra Sahi and others" held firstly that the superior court will interfere in revision where the jurisdiction is derived from statute e. g the Court-fees Act, and the matter is one of construction of the statute, for instance, the particular category into which the suit falls and the proper court-fee payable on it, and secondly, that in deciding the question of court fee, the Court is deciding an issue as between the Crown and the plaintiff; and should its decision be adverse to the plaintiff, it amounts to a decision to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction to try the issue as between the plaintiff and the defendant and so that decision is subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. I have reserved to the last for consideration the point of reference in Balaji Dhurntaji Koshti v. \lt. . Mukta Bai because it contains a very illu minating discussion of the point under consideration. They observed as follows :- "a party comes to Court and having paid the proper fee and having punctiilous observed all the other rules imposed upon him asks the Court to decide his case and settle the dispute between his opponent and himself. What does the Court do ? It refuses to hear him. It refills to boo1k at his case. Instead of investigating his grievances it decides something quite different and enters into a question not between him and his opponent but between him and the Crown. What does the Court do ? It refuses to hear him. It refills to boo1k at his case. Instead of investigating his grievances it decides something quite different and enters into a question not between him and his opponent but between him and the Crown. Is that not a refusal to exorcise jurisdiction Or alternatively is it not a grave defect in procedure to refuse to proceed with a claim or an appeal on a plaint or a memorandum which is properly stamped? their Lordships of the Privy Council decided in Rachappasubrao v. Shidappa Venkatrao at page 518- the Court-fees Act was passed not to arm a litigant with a weapon of technicality against his opponent, but to secure revenue for the benefit of the State. This is evident from the character of the Act, and is brought out by section 12, which makes the decision of the first Court as to value final as between the paties, and enables a Court of Appeal to correct any error as to this, only where the first Court decided to the detriment of the revenuetherefore they refund to allow a defendant to utiliise the provisions of the Act to obstruct his opponent, and refused to entertain his objection raised for the first time in aopeal that theCourt had no jurisdiction to proceed upon an insufficiently stamped plaint. It is clear then that a question of this kind is only a side-issue. Tt is not in ter partes and does not invalidate a decision simply because the plaint i or the mamorandum of appeal was under-stamped. Of course Courts undoubtedly have jurisdiction to determine the amount of court fees payable and to reject the memorandum of appeal if it is insufficiently stamped, and so it is possible that the High Court has no power of interference under section 115 (a ). Can it then invoke clause (c)? Here also the matter is circumscribed by the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeve Ayyar The illegality or irregularity must in some way affect either jurisdiction or at least the procedure of the Court as is explained in Sheo Prassd Bungshidhur v. Ramchander Harihar and Denidis v. Nil/unit hrao"*. But is that not just what the order in the present case does? What exactly does it mean? But is that not just what the order in the present case does? What exactly does it mean? It makes the payment of a certain sum of money a condition precedent to the hearing of the case. However, much the Court may have jurisdiction to make such an order if the effect of it is a refusal to proceed to trial at all in circumstances when the Court is bound to do so, it must, we think, be regarded as an irregularity which effects either jurisdiction or procsdure within the meaning of clause (c) and within the meaning of their Lordships decision; and inasmuch as it is not merely incidental and interlocutory but but finally and effectively shuts the plaintiff out from all hope I, of redress in the suit itself the error must be regarded as material. " With these observations I respectfully agree. ( 21 ) MR. K. L Kapur, on behalf of the defendant-respondent urged that the order of the Subordinate Judge merely specified a date by which the additional court-fee hid to be paid and did not itself provide that in case the order was not complied with by that date the plaint would be dismissed, and he put up a hypothetical supposition that in between the date of the order and the date specified in it an application for review may be made to the Subordinate Judare or he may on reconsideration change his mind. It is. however, taking a very shallow view of the I matter to confine oneself strictly to the terms of the order and not to the necessary consequence which would follow on account of the mandatory provisions in rule 11, Order 7 of the Code. Mr. Kapur has adopted the arguments which prevailed with Burn J. in K. Manaithunainatha Desikar v. Gopala Chetfiar who observed that an order which bv itself does not fall within the terms of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be revised by the High Court merely because it is bound to be followed by some other order which may be without jurisdiction. The learned Judge also observed that if the plaintiff made good the deficiency no question of rejection of his plaint would arise and even if he did not, it was not beyond the bounds of possibility that the learned Subordinate Judge might discover that he had made a mistake in the order now under appeal and might cancel his demand for extra court-fee. These are all, however, extraneous considerations and it is not to be presumed that Judges might exercise a power of review where no review was legally open. Some of these arguments had already been disposed of by a Division Bench of the Madras Court in Kulandai Pandichi and another v. Indran Ramaswami Pandia Thevan where it was observed that it was difficult to see how the mere addition of the consequence which would under rule 11, Order 7, Civil Procedure Code, follow from the non-payment of the Court-fee demanded would make any difference as the same consequence would follow even if the order was silent as to what was to be done in the case of non-payment. The possibility of the plaintiff complying with the order thus giving rise to an appeal was also considered as not necessary ruling out the right of revision, As a matter of fact the Full Bench of the Madras Court in Chintalapati Marthiraju v. Chintalapati Subbaraju had to observe that the decision of the three Division Benches had in effect repudiated the opinion which found favour with Burn J. and these decisions were final so far as the learned Judge was concerned. It is, therefore, futile to refer to the opinion of that learned Judge. ( 22 ) MR. K. L. Kapur also REFERRED TO the decision of Gajendragadkar J. (as he then was) in Shree Bajwa Ganesh Oil and Rice Pulse Mills v. Parikh Occhavlal Amratlal in which the matter arose from the order of a Civil Judge, Senior Division, in a suit in which court fee was ordered to be paid on set-off claimed by the defendant and a revision was preferred against that order. It was held that the fin lings recorded by the trial Judge on any of the issues could be challenged by the aggrieved party before a Divisional Bench of the High Court. It was held that the fin lings recorded by the trial Judge on any of the issues could be challenged by the aggrieved party before a Divisional Bench of the High Court. it the High Court were to decide the point of Court-fees at this stage, it would not be fair to the party, that may be aggrieved by this order, because a revisional application is heard by a Single Judge. Besides, the finding on the question of court-fees would not affect the question of jurisdiction of the Court in the case. Therefore, it would not be in the interest of the defendant that the merits of the order should be considered and decided finally in a revisional application. Even it the defendent pays Court fees under compulsion of the order, it would be open to him to take the point in appeal that the order was wrong and that the Court-fees paid by him should be refunded. That being so, the revision applicition was not entertained. With regard to this decision I would only say, with the utmost respect, that in so far as it may be construed as holding that the finding on the question of court-fees would not affect the question of jurisdiction of the Court, it is contrary to the view of the Full Bench of Bombay High Court (to which the learned Judge was a party) in Shankar Matuli Girme v. Bhagwant Gumiji Girme. ( 23 ) IN the end Mr. K. L. Kapur REFERRED TO certain observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Major S. S. Khanna v. Brig F. J. Dhilon to the effect that even if the conditions laid down in section 115 of the Code are satisfied, the High Court would not necessarily interfere with the discretion of the subordinate court as the exercise of this jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code is discretionary. These are, however, matters touching the facts of the particular case with which weare not concerned in this reference, confined as it is to a purely legal question. ( 24 ) FOR the reasons given above, the answer to the question under reference as posed in the opening paragraph of this judgment must be in the affirmative. The case will now go to the Single Bench for decision. ( 24 ) FOR the reasons given above, the answer to the question under reference as posed in the opening paragraph of this judgment must be in the affirmative. The case will now go to the Single Bench for decision. ( 25 ) I concur in the answer proposed and fully agree with the reasoning and the conclusion of my learned brother Capoor J. I may, however, add a few words on the scope of section 115, Code of Civil Procedure, as I construe it on the statutory language. ( 26 ) SECTION 115 of the Code empowers the High Court to call for the record of any case decided by any subordinate Court in which no appeal lies to such High Court and to make suitable orders if such subordinate Court appsars to have exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or to have failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested, or to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. This section which has been in existence from the inception of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1903, though the history of this provision can in a way be traced back to 1879 and in part even to anearlier point of time, was obviously designed to reserve to the High Court, to a somewhat restricted degree, kind of supervisory power, to an extent similar to what is now reserved to the High Court, by Article 227 and perhaps, from one point of view, also by Article 226 of the Constitution for the porpose of giving relief to an aggrieved suitor against grave injustice and hardship caused by serious jurisdictional or similar infirmity. Two of the the basic limitations of this power are that it can be exercised only over the Courts subordinate to the High Court and where no appeal lies thereto. ( 27 ) IT is contended that if an order determining the amount of Court -fee is interfered with on revision, it would render nugatory or a dead letter the right of appeal from the subsequent final order rejecting the plaint. ( 27 ) IT is contended that if an order determining the amount of Court -fee is interfered with on revision, it would render nugatory or a dead letter the right of appeal from the subsequent final order rejecting the plaint. This contention appears to me to be too feeble to claim acceptance for the purpose of depriving the High Court of its statutory juridiction under section 115 and also for depriving an aggrieved suitor Hi his right to seek justice from the High Court on revision against an order which otherwise plainly falls within the purview of this section. An order rejecting a plaint is only to be deeded to be a decree under sectlon (2) of the Code and, therefore, in common with all decrees, subject to appeal in appealable cases. It is noteworthy that under section 105 of Code every non-appealable order, affecting the decision of the case, pen to challenge in appeal from the final decree. Now if the above rgument were to prevail then apparently in no case in which a appealable decree can ultimately be passed, can the High Court all for the record pertaining to an interlocutory order, or entertain devision against an interlocutory order, and the High Court test with hold its hands on the simple ground that the order impeached is interlocutory. This legal position seems to me to be quite unacceptable, for, it can be sustained neither on principle nor on authority. Indeed, the scheme of the Code read as a whole would also seem to negative such legislative intendment. Though a suit may be "a case" and the proceedings analogous to a suit may also be "cases", nevertheless, there may, according to the scheme of the Code, be "cases" within "cases", and the expression "cases" as used in section 115, construed in the background of the object and purpose of this section and the entire scheme of the Code, is plainly designed and intended to cover interlocutory orders; at least it does not exclude interlocutory orders merely because they are interlocutory. ( 28 ) THE case of a defendant seeking revision of an adverse order on a question of court-fee is, from every relevant point of view, distinguishable from that of the plaintiff seeking similar relief, in that, in the case of the plaintiff the impugned order has the practical effect of refusal by the Court to proceed with the trial of his suit until and unless be pays more court-fee. Dictates of justice in his case must speak in a tone different from the case of a defendant who merely wants the plaintiff to pay more court fee to the State. To equate these two cases is to ignore and miss the plain basic distinction between the effect of the two orders on the parties to whose prejudice they may respectively operate. ( 29 ) I may here appropriately repeat, what is often apt to be forgotten, ignored or missed, that the Code of Civil Procedure is designed and intended to facilitate justice and furthur its ends. Section 115, like other provisions of the Code, has, therefore, to be construed in this back ground so that if a case is covered by the language of the section and there is no other material legal infirmity, the High Court s jurisdiction should not be shut out, and the aggrieved party should get speedy justice in accordance with law without further avoidable delay, expense or hardship. To construe and interpret section 115 in the manner suggested by the respondent appears cleirly to ignore, or at least to give insufficient consideration, to this fundamental background. From whichever point of view we iniv consider the qqestion the respondent s contention is not easy to sustain. ( 30 ) I also agree.