Judgment :- 1. This C. M. A. has arisen in a suit for injunction to restrain apprehended trespass on the plaintiffs' land by the defendants who are adjoining proprietors on the north. The Munsiff found that a fence on the southern side of the disputed land had been in existence before the institution of the suit and that apparently showed that the defendants were in possession of the disputed plot as part of their land and therefore refused injunction. The lower appellate Court, without entering a finding on possession, remitted the suit, pointing out that the plaintiffs are entitled to a presumption of possession as declared in Damodara Panicker v. Ayyappankutty (1962 KLT. 637) and Achuthan Unni v. Vally (1962 KLT. 1010). Hence this C. M. A. 2. Counsel for appellants brought to my notice that the decision in 1962 KLT. 1010 has been reversed by a Division Bench in A. S. No. 544 of 1962 (since reported in 1966 KLT. 86). The dicta in 1962 KLT. 637 and 1010 are to the effect that when possession of adjoining plots of land, surveyed and therefore having fixed boundaries, is admitted to be with the respective proprietors and the dispute is about the shift of a temporary fence over a narrow strip at the mutual boundary "2 to 3 feet wide" in the former case and "on the average 2 links wide" in the latter it would be difficult to prove actual possession of so narrow a strip as such, and that the rule, where positive proof is impracticable, is to presume possession with the person of title, as in the case of waste lands, jungle lands, submerged lands etc. I must confess that, in laying down that dictum, I was pursuing a mode of judicial approach that later found expression in the speech of Viscount Radcliffe in Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. v. Shatwell (1965 Appeal Cases 656 at 675): "My Lords, it sometimes helps to assess the merits of a decision, if one starts by noticing its results and only after doing that allots to it the legal principles upon which it is said to depend." 1 am afraid that even in case of an admitted possession, if the possessor is asked to give positive proof of his possession of a square yard of the land at its middle he will be at a loss; and the difficulty of proof would be more if the square yard is at an extremity of the land. When possession of a piece of land that has definite boundaries as in the case of a surveyed land is admitted and the area in dispute falls within its boundary and is so small as to be difficult of positive proof of independent possession, the aforesaid presumption rebuttable and not conclusive comes, in my opinion, to operate. Law never contemplates the impossible to be done. As has been held in Hafiz Mohammed Fateh Nasib v. Sir Swarup Chand Hukum Chand (AIR. 1948 P. C. 76) proof of possession of land does not mean positive proof of actual physical possession of every square inch of the land but only of such dominion over the property as would justify the inference of possession of the whole. 3. The decision in A. S. No. 544 of 1962 (since reported in 1966 KLT. 86) apparently follows the dicta in 8 M. I. A. 199 and 211. A. 39. In Maharajah Koowur Baboo Nitrasur Singh v. Baboo Nund Loll Singh (8 M. I. A. 199) the suit was for recovery of "seven hundred beegahs" of land and in Lukhi Narain Jagadeb v. Maharaja Jodu Nath Deo (211. A. 39) the area in dispute was "about eighty acres in extent". A. 39. In Maharajah Koowur Baboo Nitrasur Singh v. Baboo Nund Loll Singh (8 M. I. A. 199) the suit was for recovery of "seven hundred beegahs" of land and in Lukhi Narain Jagadeb v. Maharaja Jodu Nath Deo (211. A. 39) the area in dispute was "about eighty acres in extent". It is incorrect to say that the latter case was not one in ejectment; for, the judgment of the Privy Council reads: "...The Subordinate Judge gave effect to the report and decreed that the plaintiff do recover possession of these forty acres as shown in the map prepared by the amin...the District Judge adhered to the boundary first laid down by the amin, and affirmed the judgment of the Subordinate Court... Their Lordships will, therefore, humbly advise Her Majesty to reverse the judgment appealed from, and to restore the judgment of the District Judge." It is obvious that the areas in dispute in the above-cited Privy Council cases were very extensive and therefore capable of positive proof of independent possession apart from the adjoining lands. But the narrow strip that was in dispute in 1962 KLT. 1010 was only "1 and 1/8 cents in extent", with a width of 2 links on the average, in regard to which specific acts of possession, apart from the possession of the survey number which comprised it, could hardly be expected to be proved by witnesses or documents. To me, it appears very unfortunate that the above aspects were not noticed by the Division Bench which reversed the decision in 1962 KLT. 1010. It is still more, unfortunate that that Division Bench, after noticing a pertinent dictum in the decision in 211. A. 39, brushed it aside as of no application to the case observing (incorrectly as pointed out above): "This case (211. A. 39) furnishes an instance of a boundary dispute as distinguished from a case of ejectment". Anyhow as the decision in 1962 KLT. 1010 stands now reversed by a Division Bench and the dictum in 1962 KLT. 637 is no more authoritative in the light of that reversal, the reliance placed on them by the Court below has to be undone. 4. The remit ordered, being largely dependent on the dicta in 1962 KLT. 637 and 1010, has also to be discharged. 1010 stands now reversed by a Division Bench and the dictum in 1962 KLT. 637 is no more authoritative in the light of that reversal, the reliance placed on them by the Court below has to be undone. 4. The remit ordered, being largely dependent on the dicta in 1962 KLT. 637 and 1010, has also to be discharged. I, therefore, allow this C. M.A. and direct the Subordinate Judge to restore the appeal A. S. No. 759 of 1962 to file and dispose it afresh on its merits. The costs of this C. M. A. will be costs in the cause at the discretion of the Court below. Allowed.