Judgment Mahapatra, J. 1. This is a plaintiffs second appeal who brought a suit for a declaration that the lands described in Schedule I, appended to the plaint belonged to him on the basis of a registered patta granted by the Dumraon Raj in his favour on the 3rd April, 1948. He also prayed for the confirmation, or, in the alternative, recovery of possession of the lame land. His case was that originally one Ganga Dayal Dusadh was given the right to enjoy the usufructs of this land as gorait for giving services to the Dumraon Raj, and, after him it was given to Darpat Dusadh for the same purpose and then to Sarju Dusadh and after him, on resumption by the Dumraon Raj, the same benefit was given to Jira Kamkar, defendant No. 1. He defaulted in rendering service whereupon the Dumraon Raj resumed the land and settled it under the registered instrument with the plaintiff on the 3rd April, 1948, with an annual rental of Rs. 27-6-0 and on receipt of adequate nazrana. There were two sets of defendants. Defendants second party are the mortgagees from the defendants first party, namely, defendant No. 1. His main defence was that about 20 years ago he entered the services of Dumraon Raj and 4 or 5 years thereafter he had taken permanent settlement of this very land from the Dumraon Raj on payment of a salami of Rs. 500 and since then he has been in possession of this land on payment of rent to the Raj and obtaining rent receipts in lieu thereof. 2. The trial Court found that the defence case of permanent settlement was not proved and that the plaintiff was in possession on taking settlement from the Dumraon Raj. His possession was confirmed and a decree was passed in his favour. On appeal, the defendant was held to be in possession as a settlee from the Dumraon Raj, as he had pleaded. Against that, the plaintiff came in appeal to this Court in Second Appeal No. 1105 of 1955. The learned Judge, who disposed it of on the 10th September, 1958, set aside the finding of the lower appellate Court as recorded in favour of the defendant and the dismissal of the plaintiffs suit and remanded the whole case for disposal in accordance with law. The learned Judge, who disposed it of on the 10th September, 1958, set aside the finding of the lower appellate Court as recorded in favour of the defendant and the dismissal of the plaintiffs suit and remanded the whole case for disposal in accordance with law. He held that the view taken by the lower appellate Court about the rent receipts, Exts. A to A/6 marked on behalf of the defendant, was wrong inasmuch as they were not rent receipts but only showed payment of cess. The learned Judge observed as follows: "There is no option for me but to send the case back for a fresh consideration. The learned Subordinate Judge will consider the rant receipts (Exts. A to A/6) afresh and their effect upon the defence of defendant No. 1. If on a consideration of the evidence he concludes that there was a raiyati settlement with the defendants, the matter ends there. If, however, his conclusion is that the lands constituted goraiti jagir of the defendants, then the further thing he will have to consider is the nature of this goraiti jagir and whether or not the Dumraon Raj resinned this jagir. If defen-dant No. 1 did not cease to perform the services and the Dumraon Raj did not resume the Jagir, then, before resumption there will be no right of the Dumraon Raj to make a permanent settlement with the plaintiff. In the result, this appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge are set aside and the case is remanded for disposal in accordance with law. Costs will abide the result". 3. After remand, the appellate courts findings were that the defendant No. 1 had failed to prove his alleged settlement; the land was given to him by Dumraon Raj in lieu of remuneration for future service which he had ceased to vender, though he was still coming in possession of the land. Yet, the suit was dismissed because the court held that the landlord having not determined the grant by a notice to the defendant No. 1, did not have any right to settle the land with the plaintiff, as he purported to do, by the registered patta dated the 3rd April, 1948. Against this, the present appeal has been brought by the plaintiff 4. Against this, the present appeal has been brought by the plaintiff 4. Learned Counsels first contention was that it was wrong on the part of the lower appellate Court to think that the Dumraon Raj had no right to settle this land with the plaintiff when the defendant No. 1 was in possessioit of the same. He continued that since defendant No. 1 came in possession of this land as gorait and ceased to render service, for which he was allowed to enjoy the usufructs of the land by way of remuneration for such service, the landlord had the right to take back the land from his possession. Defendant No. 1 had neither heritable nor transferable interest or right in the land itself. He was entitled to appropriate and enjoy the usufructs of the land as long as he continued to render services for which such benefit was conferred upon him. When he ceased to do that service, he forfeited his right to further remuneration by way of appropriation of the usufructs of the land. No Interest in the land was created in his favour, according to the case of the plaintiff. In that view, even if he continued to be in possession after he ceased to render services and continued to enjoy the usufructs of the disputed land, the landlord had the right to transfer the interest in the land to some other person by a registered instrument, as he did in favour of the plaintiff on the 3rd April, 1948. In my view, there is much force in this contention of learned counsel. 5. The written statement clearly stated that the defendant was not a gorait, he did not come in possession of this land as a gorait, he was not required to render any service, he was not given the right to enjoy the usufruct of this land by way of remuneration for rendering gorait service to the landlord and that he had acquired occupancy right over the land because it was settled with him permanently, In view of this defence, it cannot be open to the defendant now to say that he had not refused to render service as gorait and did not, therefore, forfeit the right to enjoy the usufructs of this land or the possession thereof. 6. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents urged that in the remand order this alternative plea of gorait rights was available to the defendant. I do not think so. I have already quoted the relevant portion from the remand order. The learned Judge. while remanding the case, came to the findings, namely, that the lower appellate court was not right in coming to the conclusion that the defendant had proved that he had taken permanent settlement and was in possession in that capacity and that the so-called rent receipts, Exts. A to A/6, were not rent receipts. He made an open remand of the whole case and in the directions given to the court below he indicated how to proceed with the examination of the defendants plea. To find out if really the defendant had come in possession as a gorait, under the Dumraon Raj was another means of finding the truth or falsity of the defendants plea that the land had been settled with him permanently by the Dumraon Raj. It is only tn that light that question was to be gone into. In absence of the alternative plea in the written statement, the plaintiffs categorical assertion in the plaint that the defendant was in possession of the land to enjoy the usufructs thereof by way of remuneration for rendering gorait services to the Dumraon Raj and that he defaulted in rendering the service, must be taken as not controverted. Whatever that may be either on the rules of pleading or on evidence, the lower appellate court has now come to the conclusion that he came in possession of this land as a gorait and has been in possession thereof without rendering any services. The very fact that he put up another kind of title to this land, which is inconsistent with the goraiti jagir, amounts to a denial of rendering goraiti services to the landlord. It must, therefore, be taken, on the findings of the court below, that the plaintiffs assertion that the defendant had ceased to render services for which he was given this land to enjoy the usufructs by way of remuneration should be taken as established in this case against the defendant. It must, therefore, be taken, on the findings of the court below, that the plaintiffs assertion that the defendant had ceased to render services for which he was given this land to enjoy the usufructs by way of remuneration should be taken as established in this case against the defendant. We shall have to examine now in that context whether any notice was necessary to be given by the landlord before he could settle this land with the plaintiff, as held by the Court of appeal below. 7. Gorait Jagir necessarily does not import an interest in the land with the grantee. There may be cases in which such a grant may be made though not in lieu of past services, but for the future services. At the same time, there may be cases, as we think the present one if, where the grantor does not give any interest in the land to the grantee, but only allows him to enjoy the usufructs of the land during the period he renders a particular kind of service, such as gorait service. In the latter case, Sec.105 of the Transfer of Property Act does not come into play because it will not constitute a lease. There will be no question of determination of such a grant within the meaning of Sec.111 of the Transfer of Property Act by giving a notice or on the termination of the period of lease. In those cases, where the grantee is given, by way of remuneration, the right to enjoy the usufructs of the land, he is a mere licensee and the licensor can terminate it at his option. Where he wants to do so from his end, it is necessary that he will give notice within reasonable time to the licensee as to his intention to terminate the license. That license will be an arrangement by way of contract between the parties. If the licensee, wants to bring to an end that arrangement, either intimating the licensor that he does not want to render the service any further or by his conduct he refuses to render service or ceases to render service, then it is he, the licensee, who forfeits and brings to an end the contract and the license is terminated. If the licensee, wants to bring to an end that arrangement, either intimating the licensor that he does not want to render the service any further or by his conduct he refuses to render service or ceases to render service, then it is he, the licensee, who forfeits and brings to an end the contract and the license is terminated. In such a case there will be no necessity on the part of the licensor to give any notice to the licensee, and his (licensors) right to resume the land automatically accrues to him. In this connection I can refer to the case of Haji Fasihuddin V/s. Mohd. Habib. AIR 1960 Pat 486 , where a similar view was taken relying upon a previous Bench decision of this Court. Learned counsel for the respondents, however, placed before us four decisions in support or his contention that a notice was necessary to be given in the present case before the interest of defendant No. 1 In the land could be brought to an end by the landlord and before a new settlement could be made with the plaintiff by him. He first referred to the case of Radha Parshad Singh V/s. Budhu Dushad. (1895) ILR 22 Cal 938. This case was noticed and discussed in the case reported in AIR 1980 Pat 486. There, the service was sought to be dispensed with by the zamindar in which case notice was found to be necessary to be given by him before the land could be taken back. In the case of Nirmal Kumar V/s. Surjan Dusadh, AIR 1929 Pat 483 the land was not burdened with service, and, therefore, before it could be taken back by the landlord it was thought necessary that he should serve a notice on the other side. In the case of C. J. Shilling-ford V/s. Gena Tatma, AIR 1938 Pat 141. It was held that the zamindar had the right to take back the land given in lieu of service but with a notice. The same view was taken in the other case of Padmlochan Mahapatra V/s. Budhram, AIR 1949 Pat 85. It will be noticed that all these cases are not of the nature of the present case. It was held that the zamindar had the right to take back the land given in lieu of service but with a notice. The same view was taken in the other case of Padmlochan Mahapatra V/s. Budhram, AIR 1949 Pat 85. It will be noticed that all these cases are not of the nature of the present case. In those eases it was the landlord, the grantor, who wanted to bring to an end the service and, therefore, it was held necessary on his part to give a notice to the grantee before he could be deprived of the land. In those cases there was no fault or default on the part of the grantee. Besides, they were eases in which an interest in the land had been created with the grantee. 8. Where the grantee stops to render services to the grantor, he becomes liable to ejectment by the grantor on proof of his title. The position will be the same with a lessee from the grantor see the case of Achyya V/s. Hanumantarayudu, (1891) TLR 14 Mad 269. In that view, the present plaintiff, who had taken a valid settlement from the landlord, could maintain the suit for eviction of defendant No. 1. Mere possession without title cannot protect the defendant against ejectment. A trespasser has no right to a previous notice before he is sued for eviction. 9. For the reasons given above, the view taken by the lower appellate court that the Dumraon Raj had no right to settle the land with the plaintiff without serving a notice for termination of the arrangement made with the defendant in regard to the land in dispute cannot be held to be correct. The plaintiff must succeed in his suit and be given a decree for the declaration as well as for recovery of possession by ejectment of the defendants from the land. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court are set aside and those of the trial court are restored. There will be no order as to costs. S.N.P.Singh, J. 10 I agree.