JUDGMENT This appeal arises out of an order passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kanyakumari at Nagercoil (District Judge of Kanyakumari), dismissing the petition of the appellant, for the grant of compensation for the death caused to his daughter in a motor vehicle accident on 8th May, 1963 at Kannikulam Parayadi Junction in the Nagercoil-Tiruvandrum Main Road. The vehicle involved in the accident is a pleasure car belonging to the first respondent. The vehicle was driven by R.W.1 at the time of the accident, while R.W.1 was driving the car, he had to overtake a lorry and in the act of doing so, he dashed against a P.W.D. tin, which, in turn dashed against the girl sitting on a parapet wall nearby causing injuries to the girl who succumbed to the injuries later. The father of the deceased girl filed a claim petition before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Nagercoil, both against the owner of the vehicle and the Insurance Company, contending that the driver of the vehicle was driving at a terrific speed and that he was culpably negligent in overtaking the lorry and causing the accident which ended in the death of the daughter of the appellant. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal held that the driver of the Motor Vehicle was not negligent, that it was purely a case of an unfortunate accident, that there was no rashness and negligence on the part of the motor vehicle driver, and that therefore the father of the deceased girl was not entitled to any damage. In this appeal by the father of the deceased girl, the only point that arises for consideration is whether there was any culpable negligence on the part of the driver of the car, at the time of the accident. Evidence was adduced that on the date of the accident it was drizzling, that the driver of the car sounded the horn and, on taking the signal from the lorry driver, he overtook the lorry and while overtaking the lorry the car skidded and dashed against a P.W.D. tin and that the tin hit at the deceased girl sitting on a parapet wall. P.W.2 deposed that the car was running with speed but he could not say at what speed. P.W.2 deposed that the car was running with speed but he could not say at what speed. The driver of the car also deposed that he applied the brake when he found the lorry driver driving towards the side of his car, at the time of overtaking, and that when he got down he saw the girl falling down with injuries. The driver of the car was arrested and charged but acquitted in the criminal case. It is true that there is a duty on the part of the driver of a motor car to observe the ordinary care or skill towards persons using the highway, whom he could reasonably foresee as likely to be affected. The negligence must be so great that the offender had a wicked mind in the sense of being reckless or careless whether death occurred or not. But negligence does not mean, even for criminal negligence, absolute carelessness or indifference but want of such a degree of care as is required in particular circumstances. Accident has been defined in Fenton v. Thorley & Co., L.R. (1903) A.C. 443., as an unlooked for mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or designed, and also as any unintended and unexpected occurrence which produces hurt or loss, or such hurt or loss apart from its cause especially if the cause is not known-See Bingham's Motor Claims Cases, fifth edition, page 15. Further, it is true that the father of the deceased girl need not prove his case by direct evidence. He may prove his case by indirect or circumstantial evidence. In Charlesworth on Negligence, it is said at paragraph 97 : “The facts, however, must be such as to put the matter beyond a mere surmise or conjecture; they must lead to an inference which is a reasonable deduction from the facts actually observed and proved. ‘If the evidence establishes only that the accident was possibly due to the negligence to which the plaintiffs seek to assign it, their case is not proved. To justify the verdict which they have obtained the evidence must be such that the attribution of the accident to that cause may reasonably be inferred. ‘If the evidence establishes only that the accident was possibly due to the negligence to which the plaintiffs seek to assign it, their case is not proved. To justify the verdict which they have obtained the evidence must be such that the attribution of the accident to that cause may reasonably be inferred. If a case such as this is left in the position that nothing has been proved to render more probable any one of two or more theories of the accident then the plaintiff has failed to discharge the burden of proof incumbent upon him. He has left the case in equilibrium, and the Court is not entitled to incline the balance one way or the other.‘” Applying the above principles to the facts of the instant case, I am of the view that the driver of the motor car cannot be charged with negligence. There is no evidence to show that the driver was driving the vehicle recklessly which would amount to rash and negligent act on the part of the driver. When he saw the lorry, he sounded the horn, got his permission for overtaking the lorry and while he was thus overtaking the lorry the unfortunate and inevitable accident occurred. Blackburn, J., in Fletcher v. Bylands, L.R. (1866) 1 Ex. 265,286, said. “Traffic on the highway, whether by land, or sea, cannot be conducted without exposing those whose persons or property are near to it to some inevitable risk; and that being so, those who go on the highway or have their property adjacent to it, may well be held to do so subject to their taking upon themselves the risk of injury from that inevitable danger.” The same author in Charlesworth on Negligence, again quoting from decided cases, said at paragraph 1181 : “Inevitable accident is that which the party charged with the damage could not possibly prevent by the exercise of ordinary care, caution, and maritime skill; I know no distinction as regards inevitable accident between cases which occur on land and those which occur at sea.” On a review of the facts in the instant case, I feel that the accident was an inevitable accident for which the respondents could not be held liable. In the view I have taken, the other point regarding the ownership of the car does not arise for consideration. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. In the view I have taken, the other point regarding the ownership of the car does not arise for consideration. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. The parties will bear their own costs throughout. R.M.-----Appeal dismissed.