JUDGMENT G. C. Mathur, J. - Aftab Husain (respondent No. 1) filed an application under Sec. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act before the City Magistrate, Agra, who was the prescribed authority under the Act. By his judgment dated August 3, 1960, the prescribed authority allowed the application in part and gave directions to the petitioner to refund certain amounts to Aftab Husain. Against this judgment, the petitioner filed an appeal on September 26, 1960, before the District Judge, Agra, under Sec. 17 of the Act. By order dated December 23, 1960, the District Judge dismissed the appeal as time-barred. This order of the District Judge is challenged before me by the petitioner : 2. The relevant portion of Sec. 17 (1) reads thus: - "17 (1) - An appeal against an order dismissing either wholly or in part an application made under sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 15, or against a direction made under sub-Sec. (3) or sub-Sec. (4) of that section may be preferred, within thirty days of the date on which the order or direction was made, ........ before the District Court." 3. The appeal was filed by the petitioner against the direction given by the prescribed authority under sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 15, admittedly, more than 30 days after the direction had been given by the prescribed authority. The petitioners case before the District Judge was that Sec. 12 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1908 was applicable and that it was entitled to exclude the time required for obtaining a certified copy of the judgment of the prescribed authority. For this purpose, reliance was placed on Sec. 29(2) of the Indian imitation Act which is as follows: - "29(2) - Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period described therefor by the First Schedule, the provisions of Sec. 3 hall apply, as if such period were described therefor in that Schedule, and for the purposes of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law - (a) the provisions contained n Sec. 4, Secs. 9 to 18 and Sec. 22 shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special r local law and (b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply." 4. The learned District Judge held that he payment of Wages Act was a special law within the meaning of Sec. 9 (2) of the Limitation Act but he was of the view that the Payment of Wages Act was a complete code in itself in the matter of imitation and as such the provisions of Sec. 29(2) of the Limitation Act would not apply. This view taken by the District Judge is patent erroneous. The payment of Wages Act, though it prescribes limitation for filing an appeal, is not a complete code in the matter of limitation inasmuch as it makes no provisions such as are contained in the Indian Limitation Act. Shri A. K. Kirty appearing for respondent No. 1 has sought to support the order of he District Judge on two other grounds. 5. The first ground is that Sec. 29 (2) of the Indian Limitation Act, is not applicable as no period of limitation for an appeal under Sec. 17 of the payment of Wages Act is prescribed by the First Schedule to the imitation Ace and as such it cannot be said that the special law prescribes for the appeal a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the First Schedule. It is true that the First Schedule to the Limitation Act prescribes no period of limitation for appeals under Sec. 17 of the Payment of Wages Act. But, it has been laid down by the Supreme Court in Vidya Charan Shukla v. Khubachand Beghel, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1099 that when the First Schedule to the Limitation Act prescribes no time limit for a particular appeal but the special law prescribes a time limit to it, it can be said that, under the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, the appeal can be filed at any time but the special law, by limiting it, provides for a different period as while the former permits the filing of an appeal at any time, the latter limits it to the prescribed period. In identical circumstances, the Supreme Court held in this case that Sec. 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act would be applicable. In identical circumstances, the Supreme Court held in this case that Sec. 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act would be applicable. The first contention of Shri Kirty must therefore be rejected. 6. The second ground is that the appeal was filed against a direction given under sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act and not against an order and that, under Sec. 12(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, the time taken in obtaining a copy of the direction cannot be excluded. Sec. 12(2) of the Limitation Act reads thus: - "12(2) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, an application for leave to appeal and an application for a review of judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced, and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be reviewed, shall be excluded." 7. The argument is that the time taken for obtaining a copy of the order alone can be excluded and the time for obtaining a copy of the direction cannot be excluded. It is further contended that, in the Payment of Wages Act, the Legislature has made deliberate distinction between an order and a direction. I am unable to accept this contention of Shri Kirty. Under Sec. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act the dismissal of an application is called an order and the allowing of an application results in the giving of a direction to the employer. In my judgment, order and direction mean the same thing. Instead of saying that the prescribed authority may order the employer to refund the amount to the employee, the words "may direct the employer" have been used. The words "older" and "direction" are synonymous and mean the same thing. There is another consideration which has weighed with me in this interpretation. If the word order in Sec. 12(2) of the Limitation Act is held not to include a direction, the result would be that, in an appeal filed by an employee he would be entitled to the benefit of Sec. 12(2) which in an appeal filed by an employer, he would not be entitled to the benefit of sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 12 of the Limitation Act. Such an anomalous position could not have been intended by the Legislature. Such an anomalous position could not have been intended by the Legislature. I am of the opinion that the word order in Sec. 12(2) includes the word direction, as used in Sec. 15(3) and Sec. 17 of the Payment of Wages Act. 8. For these reasons, I have come to the conclusion that the petitioner was entitled to the benefit of Sec. 12 (2) of the Limitation Act and to an exclusion of the time taken in obtaining a certified copy of the order or direction of the prescribed authority in computing the period of Limitation for filing the appeal. I accordingly allow this writ petition quash the order of the District Judge Agra, dated December, 23, and direct the District Judge to re consider the question of the maintainability of the appeal in the light of the observations made above. I will determine what time was actually taken in obtaining the certified copy of the order or direction of the prescribed authority and then apply Sec. 12(2) of the Limitation Act the case. Parties will bear their own costs of this petition.