Judgment N.L.Untwalia, J. 1. In money Execution Case No. 64 of 1951, pending in the Court of the Munsif, first Court, at Kishanganj, some property was sold on the 9th September, 1952. Delivery of possession seems to have been finally effected on the 6th March, 1955. Later on, it was detected that forgeries had been committed by making interpolations in regard to the area of some land sold in the writ of delivery of possession and the sale certificate. The learned District Judge of Purnea directed an enquiry into the matter under Sec. 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code, hereinafter called the Code. The enquiry in the first instance was by the Munsif, second Court, but it was found that that Court had no jurisdiction to make the enquiry in the case. Subsequently, in Miscellaneous Case No. 35 of 1963, the enquiry has been made by Munsif, first Court. He has held by his order dated the 27th July, 1963, that prima facie the petitioner, who was a pleaders clerk working in the case and Tafazzul Hussain, Opposite Party No. 2, had jointly committed the forgeries and thereby had committed the offence punishable under Sec. 466 of the Indian Penal Code. He has, therefore, lodged a complaint against the said two persons before the learned Sub divisional Magistrate, Kishanganj, for their prosecution for the commission of the aforesaid offence. 2. Both the persons filed Criminal Appeal No. 11 of 1963 before the learned Sessions Judge of Purnea. The appeal has been dismissed. Since the matter is concerned with the commission of the alleged forgeries in documents relating to a civil proceeding, a civil revision application under Sec.115 of the Civil Procedure Code has been filed by Sheikh Mehar Ali, the pleaders clerk only, in view of the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Deonandan Singh V/s. Ramlakhan Singh, AIR 1948 Pat 225. 3. Mr. 3. Mr. S. B. Sanyal, appearing in support of the rule, in the first instance, submitted the following three points : (i) that the petitioner was not a party to the proceeding and hence an enquiry under Sec. 476 of the Code in view of the provisions of law contained in Sec.195(1)(c) was incompetent; (ii) that the alleged forgery was committed or seems to have been committed after the disposal of the proceeding for delivery of possession, and, therefore, again in terms of Sec.195 (1) (c) of the Code no complaint can be filed by a Court on the basis of an enquiry under Sec. 476 of the Code ; and (iii) that an offence under Sec. 466 of the Indian Penal Code is not one which is covered by the provisions of Sec.195 (1) (c) of the Code. 4. Mr. Sanyal, however, fairly did not insist in pressing his third point when it was pointed out to him that what is mentioned in Sec.195 (1) (c) is "any offence described in Sec. 463" and Sec. 463 merely defines forgery, the punishing section occurs thereafter including Sec. 466. He also withdrew his first point realising his difficulty that Opposite Party No. 2, being the auction-purchaser, was a party to the proceeding, for delivery of possession and that being so, in view of the decision of this Court in the case of Raghosaran Bharathi V/s. Gobar-dhan Ojha, AIR 1962 Pat 282 , of the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Navinchandra Chandulal V/s. Jaswantlal Bapalal, ILR (1960) Bom 888, and of the decision of the Guirat High Court in the case of the State V/s. Bhikhubhai, AIR 1965 Guj 70 , an enquiry under Sec. 476 of the Code, even against the petitioner, who was not a party to the proceeding, was necessary and Justified, as the charge of forgery was against the petitioner as also against the auction-purchaser, who was a party to the proceeding. 5. Learned counsel, however, pressed with vehemence his second point. There are two simple answers to this question. Firstly, after the perusal of the orders of the Court below and even on perusing of some of the relevant documents in the case, it is not clear as to at what point of time exactly the forgery was committed or is alleged to have been committed. There are two simple answers to this question. Firstly, after the perusal of the orders of the Court below and even on perusing of some of the relevant documents in the case, it is not clear as to at what point of time exactly the forgery was committed or is alleged to have been committed. This was a question of fact. The decision of this point depends upon the determination of this question of fact. The trial Court gave the finding, in substance, that the offence was committed, that is to say, by producing the forged documents in the proceeding when it was pending although it used the expression "in relation to the proceeding the expression found mentioned in Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Sec.195 of the Code. The point was not re-agitated in the Court of appeal below and no finding, either way, has been recorded by it. Reading the relevant papers in the case, I am inclined to think, although I could not be certain on this question of fact, that the forgery was committed before this final delivery of possession was given on 6-3 1955. That being so, primarily I find that an enquiry under Section 476 of the Code was called for and the complaint has been lodged by the Court of first Munsif rightly after a proper enquiry. 6. Even assuming in favour of the petitioner that the forgery was not nor was alleged to have been committed in the sense of producing or giving in evidence the forged documents during the pendency of the proceeding for delivery of possession under Order 21, Rule 95 of the Civil Procedure Code, but it was committed, whoever might have done it, after the proceeding came to an end by effecting delivery of possession on 6-3-1935. I do not feel persuaded to quash the criminal proceeding, which has been launched against the petitioner on the complaint of the Court of the first Munsif. Sec.195 puts an impediment in the way of the Sub-divisional Magistrate in taking cognizance of an offence in accordance with the general procedure provided in Sec.190 of the Code, that is to say, Sec.195 prohibits the taking of cognizance of an offence of the kind mentioned in Sec.195 (1) unless the complaint has been filed by the authority or the Court mentioned therein and after following the procedure prescribed in the Code. Sec.195 of the Code does not debar the Sub-divisional Magistrate from taking cognizance of an offence under the general procedure provided, say, in Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of that section, that is to say, upon receiving the complaint of facts which constitutes such offence. Here, the Presiding Officer of the Court of the first Munsif at Kishanganj has lodged the complaint. The Sub-divisional Magistrate is competent to take cognizance of the offence under Sec.190 (1) (a) of the Code even though the case did not strictly warrant the following of the procedure as provided in Sec. 476 read with Sec.195 (1) (c) of the Code. Mr. Sanyal, in answer to this alternative view of mine, submitted that taking cognizance of an offence under Sec.190 (1) (a) upon receiving a complaint by the Court, brings about two infirmities of procedure in the case, namely, (i) that under the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Sec.202 of the Code, a further enquiry into the matter cannot be directed to be made and that the Presiding Officer, namely the Munsif, 1st Court, being an ordinary complainant in the case ought to Dave been examined on solemn affirmation under Sec.200 of the Code. I do not find much substance in either of these objections. Directing an enquiry under Sec.202 of the Code is not mandatory. In any view of the matter, on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, it would have been quite unnecessary to order an enquiry under Sec.202 of the Code. It has been pointed out in many decisions including those of this Court that non-examination of a complainant on solemn affirmation under Sec.200 of the Code is a mere irregularity of procedure and is not an illegality of the kind which vitiates the whole trial. Therefore, on the assumption, although as I have indicated above, not accepting this argument, that the complaint filed by the Court of the first Munsif in this case is not really a complaint on the basis of a just proper and legal enquiry under Sec.176 of the Code, on the facts of this case non-examination of the Presiding Officer on solemn affirmation is of no consequence. The facts mentioned in the orders of the two Courts below and also as they appear from the documents in which interpolations have been made, are so glaring that I do not feel that I shall be aiding justice in quashing the present proceeding on the technical ground which is just being discussed, as I was asked to do on the basis of the Calcutta decision in the case of Girija Nanda Kili Mitter V/s. Emperor, AIR 1921 Cal 433, exercise of the revisional powers of this Court, be they under Sec.115 of the Civil Procedure Code as is the view of the Full Bench decision of this Court referred to above, or under Section 439 of the Code, as is the view of some other High Courts on this point. 7. Mr. Sanyal also drew my attention to my decision in the case of Akloo Prasad V/s. Nandan Prasad, AIR 1960 Pat 310 , and of the decision of the learned single Judge of the Madras High Court in the case of Subbarayudu V/s. Gopayya, AIR 1932 Mad 290 , to persuade me to quash the present proceeding on the technical ground pressed by him. There is a clear distinction between the facts of the instant case and those of the two cases as in both the cases the first Court had refused to file a complaint and the appellate Court had directed to do it in exercise of its powers under Sec. 476-B of the Code. That being so, it is obvious that that power can be exercised by the appellate Court only when the proceeding was a proper and legal one under Sec. 476 of the Code and not otherwise. However, in the instant case, the first Court itself has lodged the complaint and the lower appellate Court has merely dismissed the appeal. 8. In the result, the application fails and is dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.