M. Anantanarayanan, O.C.J.:- The main ground upon which we are now disposing of this Original Side Appeal can be very simply stated. In E.P. No. 24 of 196o in O.S. No. 6 of 1952-53 of the District Court, Shimoga, there was an application (No. 1918 of 1962) before Srinivasan,J., on the Original Side under Order 21 rule 58, Civil Procedure Code, for raising the attachment of certain properties’ which was effected in execution of the decree. This application was preferred by One C.T. Senthilnathan, the claimant. Naturally enough, the learned Judge (Srinivasan, J.) addressed himself to the main question whether the claimant was holding the property under the judgment-debtor, or for the benefit of another person, or whether he was holding it in his own bona fide right The learned Judge was satisfied that the title prima facie and possession were with the applicant, in his own right and on his own account. The learned Judge, therefore, concluded that this property could not be validly attached and sold as the property of the judgment-debtor, liable to be proceeded against in execution of the decree. The learned Judge allowed the application and raised the attachment. The decree-holder has preferred this appeal from that judgment, under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Even apart from the merits, Sri Kesava Ayyangar for the claimant-(respondent-1) advanced the argument that such an appeal could not be allowed. According to him it is not even maintainable. But he was content to press the argument in the form that, in any event, Order 21, rule 63, Civil Procedure Code, could not be negated in this fashion, by the decree-holder. That rule specifically lays it down that if the claim or objection is allowed, the party against whom such an order is made (decree-holder) has to institute a suit to establish the right which he claims to the property. “ Subject to the result of such a suit, if any, the order shall be conclusive” , and the Legislature is explicit on this point. The argument, therefore, was that we should not, merely because of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, proceed into the merits of the controversy, and differ from the learned Judge (Srinivasan, J.) upon any conceivably different view of the facts. The argument, therefore, was that we should not, merely because of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, proceed into the merits of the controversy, and differ from the learned Judge (Srinivasan, J.) upon any conceivably different view of the facts. The affected party (decree-holder) has to be referred to the only remedy available to him in law, which is a remedy by way of suit. It must be immediately stated that in certain early decisions of this Court, the matter has come up for discussion, and that a view has been expressed, no doubt with considerable hesitancy, which does not seem to be in accord with the subsequent explicit views of the Judicial Committee and of the Supreme Court. It is sufficient for this purpose to refer to Venugopal Mudali v. Venkatasubbiah Chetty1, which noticed certain earlier decision of this Court also. The question arose in a different form in that case, because an appeal was actually entertained against the order on a claim petition passed by a single Judge of the High Court, and the Bench confirmed that order ; one argument advanced was that such a confirming judgment was without jurisdiction, in view of the explicit language or Order 21, rule 63, Civil Procedure Code. The learned Judges were exercised to come to a conclusion whether the general principle was that enunciated in Order 21, rule 63, Civil Procedure Code, and the specific provision of an exception was Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, or whether a reverse view should be taken. After noticing the prior authorities, such as Sabapathy Chetty v. Narayanaswami Chetty2, and Ravi Veeraghavulu v. Venkatanarasimha Naidu Bhadur3, Sadasiva Aiyar, J., expressed the view of the Division Bench with considerable hesitancy, that he thought that there was no warrant for interference with a long-standing practice, which was to allow such appeals, under the Letters Patent, or to reopen the question, when earlier decisions appeared to have sustained the point of view that such appeals could be maintained, notwithstanding the explicit terms of Order 21, rule 63, Civil Procedure Code. There the matter was permitted to rest, as far as this catena of decisions was concerned. But subsequently, the same principle came up for discussion, though in the context of other provisions of law, as part of the area of decision in the Privy Council Judgment in Secretary of State v. H.C.I. Society4. There the matter was permitted to rest, as far as this catena of decisions was concerned. But subsequently, the same principle came up for discussion, though in the context of other provisions of law, as part of the area of decision in the Privy Council Judgment in Secretary of State v. H.C.I. Society4. The Judicial Committee explicitly stated that, where there was such a provision for finality of decision specifically enacted by statute, it was intended to exclude any further appeal, and hence that it would prevail over some general provision as to appeals similar to that embodied in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent; the provision itself was not Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, but a distinct one. Again, in the Supreme Court decision in S. A. Industries (P.) v. Sarup Singh5, their Lordships had occasion to consider the same situation and principle, with reference to other facts. At page 1443 of the text there are explicit data to the effect that if a specific enactment makes an order of a single judge conclusive and final the appeal provided by the Letters Patent will not prevail over such a bar; it is only if there is no such bar, that the appeal lies under the Letters Patent vide: the observations in paragraphs 11 and 13 of the text, at pages 1446 and 1447 of the report. In this view, therefore, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the earlier view expressed by the Division Bench of this Court, that we have referred to, and certain still earlier decisions noted in that judgment, may no longer be sustainable, or liable to be regarded as expressing the correct position in law. However, it is not necessary for us to proceed further in this direction, for the simple reason that we do not now have before us the situation of the canvassing of the legality or otherwise of a judgment given by a Division Bench, in appeal from a judgment of a single judge, which itself allowed or dismissed a claim under Order 21, rule 58 read with rule 63, Civil Procedure Code. It is sufficient for us to note that, in this appeal it is always open to us to dismiss the appeal, by referring the appellant to his true remedy at all and the exclusive remedy provided by the statute namely, the remedy by way of a separate suit. Accordingly, we refer the appellant to this remedy, and dismiss the appeal. There would appear to be, no doubt, some difficulty about limitation, since the statute permits only one year from the date of order, for the institution of a suit. But that would depend on the further question whether the appellant could successfully claim that he has been bona fide pursuing another remedy in a Court, upon a misconception of his rights or of the processual law. Subject to satisfying the appropriate Court on this question of limitation, the appellant is referred to his remedy by way of a separate suit. This appeal is dismissed. The parties will bear their own costs. R.M. ------------- Appeal dismissed