JUDGMENT Krishnan, J. 1. This is an appeal by the State and three of its officers, the defendants in a suit before the Third Additional District Judge Indore, brought by the respondent a retrenched employee of the Madhya Bharat Government in the Police Department, for a declaration that the order retrenching him from service was really an order of punishment and was invalid and illegal for repugnance to Article 311 of the Constitution, and further claiming that he should be declared to be still in the service of the successor Government and to be entitled to the pay and privileges of that post. There was a claim for the arrear pay. 2. The trial Court granted the decree against all the defendants making the declaration desired and decreeing against defendant No. 1, that is the State of Madhya Pradesh arrear pay from a date beginning three years immediately before the suit. 3. The peculiar feature in this case is that the same plaintiff had come up with a writ petition (Misc. Civil Case No. 80 of 1956 decided on 22-10-59) praying for a direction that the Government should not implement its order of retrenchment but maintain him in service. That application was dismissed primarily on the ground of delay. On the merits the petitioner had alleged that his removal was really a punishment and as the procedure prescribed by Article 311 had not been followed it should be set aside. The State for its part had pressed only one ground in that case namely, the alleged consistently bad record and the consequent unfitness of the employee to be retained in the service. It is certain that there was another ground also, namely, this Government Servant is not having the minimum prescribed qualification of being at least a matriculate. That, however, was not mentioned in the return though it appears there was some mention of this during the argument still all references to it in that case are perfunctory and casual. After the dismissal of the writ petition the petitioner had filed this suit, as could be expected making use of the decision by the High Court that the ground that was taken by the Government in that proceeding was one for punishment and inadequate for Article 311. After the dismissal of the writ petition the petitioner had filed this suit, as could be expected making use of the decision by the High Court that the ground that was taken by the Government in that proceeding was one for punishment and inadequate for Article 311. Though the trial Court held and rightly in my opinion that this decision on the writ petition was not res judicata, it was however guided by it as a "precedent" and held that it was a case of dismissal by way of punishment and not removal on retrenchment as it purported to be; accordingly it allowed the present suit in the manner already set out. 4. The central question for decision here is whether in a case like this when there is more than one ground upon which the servant is removed or retrenched, it is in principle impossible to separate them and assess the legal validity of the one without reference to the obvious invalidity of the other Secondly, whether on the facts of this case such separation is possible and if so, the application of the valid ground for retrenchment has been so coloured by the invalid as to become really un-separable. In addition to the central question there was before the trial Court the problem about the territorial jurisdiction, and of limitation, and as has been loosely used of "res judicata" with reference to the High Court's decision on the writ petition. 5. The facts of the case are the following. The plaintiff was appointed as long ago as 1934 as a police constable in the State of Gwalior. He was not qualified in the manner we understand and it is common ground that he was not at that time even a matriculate and had not since acquired that educational qualification a fact of great significance as will be seep presently. He rose up in service and by 1948 shortly before the merger of the Gwalior State in the United State of Madhya Bharat had risen to the rank of Sub-Inspector. From that time till certain happenings in 1952 he was in the list of the "provisionally absorbed servants" whose cases were being investigated in accordance with a set of rules described as "Retrenchment Terms" issued with notification of the 15th December 1948 as revised by the notification No. 180/VII/G/EM dated 9th July 1949. From that time till certain happenings in 1952 he was in the list of the "provisionally absorbed servants" whose cases were being investigated in accordance with a set of rules described as "Retrenchment Terms" issued with notification of the 15th December 1948 as revised by the notification No. 180/VII/G/EM dated 9th July 1949. In brief this was a code according to which the large surplus of officers corning on from different States was to be disposed of in a manner least inconvenient to the individuals, and in all cases with some pension or gratuity calculated in accordance with the same rules. 6. Anyway, by 1952 this plaintiff was working as Sub-Inspector of Police at a place called Bhilsa. On 11-11-52 an order was passed by the D.I.G. of Police at Ujjain retrenching him from service with effect from 1952 under what was described as Category No. (2). There was of course provision for his gratuity on retirement on the general formula applicable to all the servants. On his appeal to the I.G. Police the latter found that besides the Category (2) there were two more headings namely, (4) and (7) under which he could be retired and accordingly he modified the order removing him under the three categories (2), (4) and (7) and dismissing the appeal. The point to note is that the categorization as numbered (2) was not satisfied in terms of Article 311. 7. It will be convenient at this stage to note the categories: "(1) Principles to govern the selection of Government Servants for retrenchment...... (2) ......Those whose record of service is consistently bad...... (4) Those who do not possess the minimum qualification prescribed for the post held by them......... (7) Government servants who are treated as surplus to requirements either because to posts held by them have ceased to exist, or because they cannot, for reasons-considered adequate by the Government, be absorbed in Madhya Bharat Services......" If this plaintiff could at all be categorized under (7) it would be under the second half of that heading, actually overlapping to some extent that numbered (2). 8. After the order of the D.I.G. the plaintiff tried to move the Government and again to ask for a review all unsuccessfully after which on 23-10-1956 that is, more than two years after his appeal, he filed the writ petition, the results of which have already been indicated above. 8. After the order of the D.I.G. the plaintiff tried to move the Government and again to ask for a review all unsuccessfully after which on 23-10-1956 that is, more than two years after his appeal, he filed the writ petition, the results of which have already been indicated above. The writ petition itself being dismissed on 22-10-1959 be noticed the Government under section 80 Civil Procedure Code on 29-12-1959 and filed the suit on 2-3-1960, that is beyond three years, but within six years from the date of the dismissal of his appeal. His basic contention was that this was a punishment and not retrenchment proper and as the requirements of Article 311 had not been observed, it was illegal and accordingly he still had his status as a Sub-Inspector under the Government with a right to all the privileges and pay; in effect he supported this contention, and successfully in the opinion of the trial Court, by quoting the decision of the High Court in the writ petition upon his categorization under (2). There was of course categorization under (4) which was quite independent of No. (2) and involving an objective fact; but as that ground had not been taken by Government in its return in the writ petition there was no discussion on its legality and sufficiency in the judgment in that case. This aspect of the matter has to a large extent been overlooked by the trial Court which has been guided by the comments of the High Court on the categorization under (2) which was of course illegal and improper for nonobservance of the requirements of the said Article. In effect, as the categorization under (2) was illegal, the trial Court has opined that the one under (4) was also illegal. 9. The Government and the other defendants who are the I.G. of Police and two of the D.I.Gs. contested the suit on various grounds, in particular, non-justiciability of the reasons for the dismissal of the Government Servants, jurisdictional in competency of the particular trial Court, limitation and on the merits, the sufficiency for retrenchment of the categorization under heading (4) if not under (7) as well, that is, one on minimum qualification altogether independently of the categorization under (2). Both the parties seem to have toyed with the notion of res judicata the plaintiff contending that the finding on the invalidity of the removal or retrenchment recorded by the High Court in the writ petition was final and binding, and the defendants pointing out that after all the writ petition was dismissed, and this decision is res judicata. 10. I shall dispose of on brief consideration the questions regarding the competency of a civil suit, territorial jurisdiction and limitation. "The old rule of English Law that a civil servant cannot maintain a suit against the State or against the Crown for the recovery of arrears of salary does not prevail in this country. It has been negatived by the provisions of statutes in India," This has been held in The State of Bihar v, Abdul Majid AIR 1954 SC 245 . Lately there have been quite a number of suits in nearly every State and no Court has held that these are not maintainable in the light of the old English doctrine. Quite on the contrary the decisions after 1950 expressly enable the employee to ask not only for the status but also claim the pay. This being well established it is unnecessary to say anything more on this subject. The question of territorial jurisdiction has not been pressed in this Court and accordingly it is unnecessary to go into that. 11. Coming to limitation, the position taken by the defendants is that the one year period under old Article 14 of the Limitation Act, or looking at it as a claim for wages not otherwise expressly provided for, three years again under Article 102 has been provided As against it the trial Court has accepted the plaintiff's contention that as far as the declaration goes it is one of six years under the residuary Article 120, there being no express provision in this regard. As regards the arrear pay it is certainly three years but having succeeded in getting the declaration sought, the plaintiff would be entitled to get that part of the arrear pay which is not time barred under the three years' rule Article 14 runs thus: "14 To set aside any One year The date of the act or order of act or order." an officer of Government in his official capacity not herein otherwise provided for In comparable cases Courts have held that Article 14 cannot apply when the jurisdictional competency of the officer is questioned; for example, in Jagdish Prasad v. United Provinces Government AIR 1956 All. 114 , it was held”- Article 14 of the Limitation Act does not apply to those cases where the act or order of any officer is "ultra vires" or without jurisdiction or is otherwise a nullity. That article applies only to such cases where there is no question of the ultra vires of the order or of the want of jurisdiction of the person making the order but where the order is sought to be set aside on some other ground." In a recent case from Patna where a retired employee was seeking a declaration that his retirement was invalid the High Court examined the question of limitation. For the consequential reliefs they held that Article 102 and not Articles 115 or 120 applied, Ramanugrah v. State of Bihar AIR 1966 Pat. 97 . But there was no separate investigation of the limitation for the prayer for declaration, that Court having presumably treated the whole as one prayer. 12. In the Madhya Pradesh High Court itself we have a Divisional Bench judgment reported in Tilakram v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1965 JLJ 1106 = 1955 MPLJ 982 = AIR 1966 MP 154 . "The provisions of section 23 of the Limitation Act do not apply ; but the plaintiff can come within six years under Article 120". In that particular case the plaintiff had come beyond the six years period, and accordingly it was held that his prayer for the declaration was time-barred. It was also decided that the declaration itself being time-barred the plaintiff could not ask for arrear pay a claim which was only consequential. In that particular case the plaintiff had come beyond the six years period, and accordingly it was held that his prayer for the declaration was time-barred. It was also decided that the declaration itself being time-barred the plaintiff could not ask for arrear pay a claim which was only consequential. In the instant case, therefore, the trial Court was right in holding that the declaration could be asked within six years and that part of the money could be decreed on application of Article 102 of the Limitation Act. 13. This takes us to what I have called the central issue in this case. There is a quantity of case law which has been cited to establish that when the employee is being sent out of service with a black mark it is a case of punishment, and accordingly the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution should apply, that is, a regular proceeding, with an opportunity for showing cause against the allegations and yet another opportunity of showing cause against the punishment proposed. All these rulings apply to cases where the employee is being punished. But mere retrenchment or retirement or stoppage of promotion to which the employee is not entitled being held not to be punishment. But there have been cases where the action taken by the Government, while not being in form a removal by way of punishment, has on the facts of those cases been found in fact to be punishment. Naturally one party has cited the first type of cases where there was an element of punishment and the procedure of Article 311 not being followed the Courts declared the removal invalid; and the other all those cases where there was no element of punishment, and accordingly the Courts found that Article 311 could not be invoked. The Government and the departments themselves, including the Government of the Madhya Bharat seem to have been for several years under the impression that when the employment was provisional or temporary it would be unnecessary in any case to draw up proceedings in accordance with Article 311, or the local rules, containing the same principles. But this has been made clear in the ruling reported in Purshottam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India AIR 1958 S.C 36 , which has as it were, become the charter for the temporary or other provisional employees of the Government. But this has been made clear in the ruling reported in Purshottam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India AIR 1958 S.C 36 , which has as it were, become the charter for the temporary or other provisional employees of the Government. The same ruling has been followed in quite a number of subsequent decisions both of the High Courts and of the Supreme Court itself, and the basic principle has not been varied. The variation, however, is in the light of circumstances of each case whether in the particular set of circumstances there was really an element of punishment. The rationale behind this principle has also been indicated by different Courts including this High Court in the judgment on the writ petition of this very plaintiff, Gajraj Singh v. State of M.B. 1962 JLJ 61 = 1960 MPLJ 892 = AIR 1960 MP 299 . That is to the effect that even a temporary employee may not be tarred while being sent out: "The test is not, whether the employment is provisional or temporary, but whether the employee is sent away for some reason beyond his volition at that time, such as the rules or the terms of the contract, or whether he is sent away for something which involves a black mark of inefficiency or undesirability. The reason is not far to seek. In the one case, he would be able to hold his head high or face a possible future employer. In the other event, he has already been tarred, as it were, without being heard, and starts a new life with a serious disadvantage which he could have prevented if he had been given an opportunity to explain." We shall certainly consider in time whether the Civil Court can only remove the black mark by declaring that it was not justified or whether simply becomes of the black-mark it can ignore some other good reason for the removal or retrenchment which does not attract Article 311. 14. It is in this connection that both parties have tried as already noted to urge that this or that portion of the judgment on the writ petition is final and binding. As far as the plaintiff is concerned that writ petition ended in an order of dismissal, in other words, refusal on the part of the Court to give the direction sought by him. As far as the plaintiff is concerned that writ petition ended in an order of dismissal, in other words, refusal on the part of the Court to give the direction sought by him. That does not prevent him from seeking remedy in the regular Courts on merits of his case. But parts of an order of dismissal cannot be used against the winning party because that party could not have had any occasion of taking the matter to an appellate Court. However, I would endorse the view taken by the trial Court, namely, that no part of the judgment being res judicata the decision there on the questions actually canvassed on that occasion would become a precedent. The question that was canvassed was the propriety and legality of the categorization under (2) "of a consistently bad record." As stated in that very judgment- "In this case, for example, the retrenchment rules amply enabled the Government to dispense with the service of the provisional employee on grounds of his not having the prescribed minimum educational qualifications of the Government's decision that there were no adequate reasons for retaining him in the service under sub-rule (7). If nevertheless the authorities chose to terminate the service on the ground of negligence, inefficiency or other disqualifications, then it is really punishing the employee who, in that event, is entitled to the benefit of Article 311." 15. As a matter of fact the Government has given as one of the reasons for the removal the fact of this employee's not having the minimum qualification. That point had not been mentioned in the return and not seriously pressed in the argument either. This to some extent was unfortunate because it had given the impression to the trial Court that the Government could not in any case seriously point out that also as the reason for the retrenchment and invite it to decide whether it was not by itself sufficient to justify the retrenchment without any reference to inefficiency or bad service. That question was open to the scrutiny of the Court as to whether it is a subsequent device or was the all the time to the knowledge of the employee. But the judgment in the writ case is no decision on the sufficiency or propriety or otherwise of the categorization of the plaintiffs (petitioner three) under any heading other than (2). But the judgment in the writ case is no decision on the sufficiency or propriety or otherwise of the categorization of the plaintiffs (petitioner three) under any heading other than (2). Any reference to that topic in that judgment is perfunctory for the simple reason that it was not there for consideration as a ground for either party. 16. Broadly speaking when an administration removes an employee and gives more than one reason, I would consider the sufficiency and legality of each of them separately. I would also examine whether the application of one of the reasons is so inextricably linked with the application of the other, and there is such mutual entailment that it is impossible to make a separation. If no separation is possible or if the good reason is so largely coloured by the bad I would hold that the entire reasoning is unacceptable. If, on the other hand, such a separation is possible, and there is no entailment and no mutual colouring, then I would evaluate each of the reasons separately. A similar situation was pointed out even in the writ case judgment with reference to the rulings reported in Shyamlal v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 369 and State of Bombay v. Sabhagchand AIR 1957 SC 892 , Though they were cases before the pronouncement of Purshottam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India (supra), there was a variation of emphasis which is more or less similar to the situation arising in a case of the present nature. 17. On behalf of the respondent quite a number of decisions of the Supreme Court have been cited; but in none of the cases the principle I have formulated for my guidance has been assailed. Most of those cases were ones where there was only one reason and that being one about the moral turpitude or in competency of the employee was of the nature of punishment and attracted the requirements of Article 311. In none of them was there an alternative and independent reason that was objectively assessable. Most of those cases were ones where there was only one reason and that being one about the moral turpitude or in competency of the employee was of the nature of punishment and attracted the requirements of Article 311. In none of them was there an alternative and independent reason that was objectively assessable. For example, in State of Bihar v. Gopi Kishore Prasad AIR 1960 SC 689 the Bihar Government discharged a probationer as being unsuitable on grounds of "notoriety for corruption and unsatisfactory work." In other words, it was a speaking order made without conforming to Article 311 and their was no other ground which itself could be adequate for the removal of the probationer, though that class of officers could be removed with comparatively little formality. Similarly in the case reported in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Chintaman 1961 JLJ 702 = AIR 1961 SC 1628 it was held that- “On the allegations the employee was entitled to the benefit of Article 311 and on the facts the inquiry that had actually been conducted did not confirm to it." There was no occasion in that case for the application of any other rule which would not attract that article. 18. The defendants appellants have cited quite a number of rulings where it was held that the removal was not punishment and was in accordance with the rule. They need not be set out because that proposition is unexceptionable. But what does happen in some cases is a mixing of the good with bad reasons when the Courts are obliged to sift a situation not unlike the one in ordinary cases where we assess the evidence eliminating the false and the super-additions and assessing the effect of the true and the basis. No doubt, there may be cases where the element of falsehood is so overwhelming that the particles of truth cannot be separated, But the principle is that we should try to separate, and after rejecting the false, evaluate the effect of the true. Similarly whenever possible we should reject the legally unsound grounds for the removal of the employee from service, and examine if that could be justified by the ground that is valid and legally unexceptionable. In the instant case as pointed out even in the judgment on the writ petition the categorization under (4) was a specific objective fact. Similarly whenever possible we should reject the legally unsound grounds for the removal of the employee from service, and examine if that could be justified by the ground that is valid and legally unexceptionable. In the instant case as pointed out even in the judgment on the writ petition the categorization under (4) was a specific objective fact. The employee was altogether unfit to fill the post in accordance with the rules of the new State. The old State did keep him in employment though he was not educated but that employment ended with the State and during the interval between the merger and his retrenchment, the plaintiff was on a provisionally temporary job with no rights to permanent employment. Certainly if he was to be sent out he was entitled to be seat out quietly without a black mark; but that is another matter. When it was found that he did not have the minimum educational qualification the Government was within its powers in retrenching him. The fact that they officiously went a step farther and described his services "as consistently bad" without following the proper procedure does not affect the factual correctness of this independent disqualification. 19. Whether the bad reason has also coloured a reason which by itself could be good and sufficient is a question of fact depending on the circum, stances of each case. It is certainly conceivable that even the good reason for removal becomes bad because it is interlinked with the bad reason; but it is not necessarily and invariably so. This may happen where even in the good reason there is an element of opinion, and that opinion is coloured by the prejudice already evidenced by the authority ordering the retrenchment or removal displayed in its ex-parte comments on the moral quality of the officer or the nature of his work. But where the good reason is a straight objective fact this question does not at all arise. As against this line it has been urged by the respondent that there was an element of choice even here. This was because there were quite a large number of police officers at that time who did not possess the minimum qualification and by selecting the respondent the administration was allowing its opinion about his work to colour the decision to retrench him. 20. This was because there were quite a large number of police officers at that time who did not possess the minimum qualification and by selecting the respondent the administration was allowing its opinion about his work to colour the decision to retrench him. 20. This had been touched upon in a passage in the judgment of the writ petition; but all references to the disqualification in that order are necessarily incomplete and inconclusive for the very simple reason that the administration had not taken that stand. In this suit they have squarely based their decision on this disqualification, and it has to be examined independently of any casual references in that judgment. The answer to the charge of selection is that the administration already informed such officers that they were all going to be retrenched, and if one was taken before the other it was inevitable because they had to begin somewhere, and complete the process of weeding out the unqualified as soon as qualified officers were recruited. Thus on the facts of this case I would not hold that the application of the want of qualification, which is an objective fact, has been coloured by what has been said and quite unnecessarily said about the nature of the plaintiff's work. 21. A retrenched employee in the position of the present plaintiff is certainly entitled to know whether the civil Court cannot remove the black mark officiously put on him by the administration without the procedure. As noted even in the judgment on the writ petition an employee removed without recourse to the procedure under Article 311 is entitled to walk out of service with a clean record. As pointed out by the Supreme Court itself in Shyamlal v. State of Uttar Pradesh. "There can be no doubt that removal (using the term synonymously with dismissal) generally implies that the officer is regarded as in some manner blameworthy or deficient, that is to say, that he has been guilty of some misconduct or is lacking in ability or capacity or the will to discharge his duties as he should do." Any such general impression is beyond correction by the Court. But if the removal or retrenchment order which the employee is expected to carry with him, and show to a prospective new employer, contains anything derogatory made behind his back the civil Court can certainly correct it by declaring it to be illegal. When that is the only ground of the removal this correction necessarily implies that the removal itself is illegal; but if it is one out of the several grounds of removal, and the others are able to stand by themselves this declaration of the illegality of one of the grounds cannot go farther than that ground itself. In other words, the employee, if confronted by the future employer with the comments that are derogatory, can show the latter that the civil Court has declared them illegal. That, in my opinion, is the position here. 22. The result of the discussion is this:-That the remarks made about "the consistently bad record" of the plaintiff were illegal, but his retrenchment is justified on the ground of his being unqualified which is an objective fact unconnected with the ground of "consistently bad record". Since that alone was sufficient to justify the retrenchment it cannot be held that the removal was itself illegal for repugnancy to Article 311 of the Constitution. Accordingly, I would allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court. In the very special circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs throughout.