Judgment G.N.Prasad, J. 1. This application in revision is directed against an order of remand passed by the Additional Subordinate Judge of Hazaribagh in Title Appeal No. 38/44 of 1963/1964, which had been preferred by the defendants against the decision of the Munsif of Hazaribagh decreeing Title Suit No. 127 of 1959, which had been instituted by the plaintiffs 2. It is common ground that there were four branches in the family of Dalo Mahton, who left behind four sons Fakir, Sardar, Manik and Chuna Ram. The plaintiffs are the descendants of Chuna Ram, defendants 1 to 14 are the descendants of Fakir and defendants 15 to 31 are the descendants of Sardar. It is also common ground that the last surviving member of Maniks branch was Budhan, who died sometime in 1951 The dispute between the parties is with regard to a tank and its Pind recorded under Khata No. 5 in village Ghaghra. The plaintiffs have instituted the suit for declaration of their title and for joint possession over the disputed property claiming that besides their one-fourth interest therein, they have also acquired the one-fourth interest of Maniks branch upon Budhans death, since the nearest heirs on Budhans death upon Maniks line having become extinct, were Harlal and Lalo (Plaintiffs Nos. 14 and 15). In other words, the plaintiffs claim half interest in the suit property. 3. The relevant defence put forward by the contesting defendants was that neither Maniks nor Chuna Rams branch had interest in the suit property since the sixteen annas interest therein vested in the members of the other two branches, namely, those of Fakir and Sardar. According to the defendants, therefore, the plaintiffs were not entitled to any decree in the suit 4. Upon the pleadings of the parties nine issues were framed. Issue Not. 4 to 8 were taken up by the learned Munsif for decision together. The issues were in the following terms: "4. Is the suit barred by limitation and adverse possession? 5. Is the suit properties joint properties of the four sons of Dalo Mahton? 6. Is the suit properties exclusive properties of all defendants? 7. Have the plaintiffs any title or possession over the suit properties? 8. Who is the heirs of Budhan Mahton?" 5. Is the suit barred by limitation and adverse possession? 5. Is the suit properties joint properties of the four sons of Dalo Mahton? 6. Is the suit properties exclusive properties of all defendants? 7. Have the plaintiffs any title or possession over the suit properties? 8. Who is the heirs of Budhan Mahton?" 5. Upon a consideration of the evldenct on the record, the Court below recorded the following findings in paragraph 20 of its judgment: (i) Chuna Ram and Manik had each one-fourth share in the suit property and the heirs of Chuna Ram, namely, the plaintiffs were in possession of their shares of the suit tanks. (ii) Manik had a share in the suit tanks and the defendants case that Manik had no share is unacceptable. (iii) The defendants cannot maintain that they had inherited the share of Manik and their case on this point has got to be disbelieved. Upon these findings, the trial Court recorded his findings on issue Nos. 4 to 8 in the following terms: "I accordingly hold that the plaintiffs have title and possession over half of the suit tanks and decide these issues in favour of the plaintiffs accordingly." In the result, the trial Court decreed the plaintiffs suit as laid. 6 Against this decree, the defendants preferred Title Appeal No. 38 of 1963, which has been remanded by the lower appellate Court, as indicated already, and the trial Court has been directed to give a fresh decision after deciding all the issues involved in the suit 7. The main ground in support of the remand order has been stated to be that the reasoning given by the learned Munsif for not accepting the defendants case about their inheritance of the share of Budhan is peculiar. The lower appellate Court has observed that the learned Munsif should have decided as to who were the heirs of Budhan Mahto on his death The lower appellate Court emphasised the importance of deciding this question, saving that if plaintiffs Nos. 14 and 15 only were the heirs of Budhan, then the plaintiffs would certainly have eight annas share in the disputed property But if Barju and Gulab were the only heirs or also the heirs of Budhan, in that case the plaintiffs could not have eight annas share in the disputed property. 14 and 15 only were the heirs of Budhan, then the plaintiffs would certainly have eight annas share in the disputed property But if Barju and Gulab were the only heirs or also the heirs of Budhan, in that case the plaintiffs could not have eight annas share in the disputed property. Having emphasised the importance of this question, the lower appellate Court has proceeded to observe "It is thus necessary to find out as to who were the heirs of Budhan Ram Mahto on his death in order to do complete justice in this suit. I would have myself decided this question as to who were the heirs of Budhan Ram Mahto when he died. But as the learned Advocate for the appellants submitted that no name had been framed as to who were the heirs of Budhan Ram Mahto on his death by the learned Munsif, so the parties could not focus their attention to adduce proper evidence on the point as to who were the heirs of Budhan Ram Mahto and that being so, it is better to send the case to the Court below for giving a fresh finding as to who were the heirs of Budhan Ram Mahto on his death. In my opinion, the submission seems to have some substance. Under the circumstances. I think it is better to remand the case for a finding as to who was or were the heirs of Budhan Ram Mahto on his death. The learned Munsif should frame an issue on the point as to who were the heirs of Budhan Mahto on his death and should give an opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence, if they like, so far this issue is concerned." Then follows another direction which the lower appellate Court has made in the remand order in the following terms: "After having done so, he should give a fresh finding on all the issues involved in this suit." In the order portion, the lower appellate Court has stated: "The judgment and the decree of the Court below are hereby set aside. The suit is remanded to the Court below for fresh decision according to law in the light of the observation given above." 8. I am clearly of the opinion that the order of remand cannot be supported for a moment. The suit is remanded to the Court below for fresh decision according to law in the light of the observation given above." 8. I am clearly of the opinion that the order of remand cannot be supported for a moment. It is manifestly wrong to say that the trial Court had not framed the necessary issue on the question as to who were the heirs of Budhan Mahto. Issue No. 8 was an issue on the point. Of course, it was not framed with the concluding words "on his death", but merely on that ground, it cannot legitimately be maintained that issue No. 8 was not the relevant issue for decision on the question referred to by the lower appellate Court. Evidently, the attention of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge was not drawn to the issue in question, although the issues had been mentioned in extenso in paragraph 9 of the trial Court judgment, because in that case, the Court below would not have observed that it would itself have otherwise decided the question as to the heirship of Budhanram Mahto. Since an issue had been framed on the point, there is no reason why the lower appellate Court should not have proceeded to deal with the question upon the materials on the record. 9. The lower appellate Court seems to have been misled into thinking that on account of omission to frame an issue with regard to the surviving heirs of Budhanram Mahto, the parties were unable to adduce proper evidence in support of their respective cases. As I have already indicated, the 8th issue framed in the suit was sufficient notice to the parties as to the nature of evidence which they had to adduce in support of their respective cases. 10. As I have already indicated, the 8th issue framed in the suit was sufficient notice to the parties as to the nature of evidence which they had to adduce in support of their respective cases. 10. If the lower appellate Court thought that, in spite of the fact that Issue No. 8 had been framed in the trial Court, it was necessary for a proper decision of the case that a particular piece of evidence or pieces of evidence which might be in existence ought to be brought on the record, then the duty of the lower appellate Court was to have proceeded in accordance with Rules 27 and 28 of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that is to say, the lower appellate Court might have either taken such evidence itself or directed the trial Court to take such evidence and to send it to the lower appellate Court, when taken, under Rule 28 of Order 41. Thereafter, the lower appellate Court could have proceeded to dispose of the appeal after considering all the materials on the record, namely, those already on the record and those brought by way of additional evidence. The point to be emphasised is that the ground that additional evidence is necessary for a proper decision of the case, is not a valid ground for remanding a case to the trial Court which has recorded its decision on all the relevant Issues upon the materials already on the record and has disposed of the suit on merits. 11. The appellate Court can exercise powers of remand only under the circumstances mentioned in Rules 23 and 25 of Order 41 of the Code. It is true that Sec.107 of the Code provides that the appellate Court has a power to remand a case and to frame issues and refer them for trial. But these powers have to be exercised, as the opening words of Sec.107 clearly indicate, subject to the conditions and limitations prescribed in the body of the Code. 12. Rule 23 of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure could, under no circumstances, have been attracted to the present case, since, it was not a case where the trial Court had disposed of the suit upon a preliminary point. 12. Rule 23 of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure could, under no circumstances, have been attracted to the present case, since, it was not a case where the trial Court had disposed of the suit upon a preliminary point. Rule 25 could be attracted provided, as the lower appellate Court thought erroneously, as I have indicated, that the trial Court had omitted to frame or try any issue, or to determine any question of fact, which the lower appellate Court thought essential for the right decision of the suit upon the merits. It is unnecessary to repeat that issue No. 8 was the relevant issue which had already been framed and tried by the trial Court in its own way. Therefore, merely by erroneously mentioning that the relevant issue had not been framed or tried by the trial Court, the lower appellate Court could not bring Rule 25 into its aid. The only other provision under which an order of this kind could be passed would perhaps be the inherent powers of the Court saved by Sec.161 of the Code. But it has been repeatedly pointed out by this Court that the inherent powers of the Court saved by Sec.151 are not meant to be resorted to in respect of matters regarding which there are specific provisions in the body of the Code. In the instant case, as already indicated, the relevant provisions are to be found in the various rules of Order 41, to which I have made reference. Therefore, as an order purported to be one under Sec.161 of the Code, the order of the lower appellate Court is illegal and without jurisdiction. 13. I will now turn to the second direction given by the lower appellate Court, namely, requiring the trial Court to record a fresh finding on all the issues involved in the suit. I have stated sufficiently that the trial Court had recorded its finding on each of the nine issues framed in the suit The lower appellate Court has nothing to say with regard to the findings recorded by the learned Munsif on the issues other than issue No. 8. I, therefore, fail to appreciate how the lower appellate Court thought it necessary that upon the same materials, the trial Court should record a fresh finding after having elaborately dealt with the various issues in the suit. I, therefore, fail to appreciate how the lower appellate Court thought it necessary that upon the same materials, the trial Court should record a fresh finding after having elaborately dealt with the various issues in the suit. If at all, the learned lower appellate Court felt that the findings of the trial Court were not satisfactory, then the obvious course which the lower appellate Court should have adopted was to reappraise the entire evidence on the different issues and record its own findings thereon. By calling upon the trial Court to give a fresh finding on all the issues involved in the suit, the lower appellate Court has failed to discharge the function of an appellate Court. 14. For the aforesaid reasons, I set aside the impugned order of the lower appellate Court and direct that the appeal preferred by the defendants be disposed of by the lower appellate Court itself exercising if it thinks necessary, its powers under Rules 27 and 28 of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The case is, accordingly, sent back for disposal to the lower appellate Court according to law. The application is allowed: but in the circumstances of the case, there will he no order as to costs.