JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - This appeal is by the defendants. It arises out of a suit for an injunction. 2. The plaintiff alleged that he is the sirdar of a holding consisting of plot Nos. 57, 66, 69, 70, 71, 76, 78, 112, 114 and 115 in village Dohar, district Jalaun. In plot No. 109 a well is in existence for a long time, and the plaintiff and before him his predecessors, have been irrigating the plots aforesaid from this well for more than twenty years prior to the suit, that he has acquired a right of easement for that purpose. The defendants stopped the irrigation on 25-2-1958 without any right. Hence the suit for restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiff's right of irrigating his plots from the well situate in plot No. 109. The relief was claimed in respect of six plots only i.e. plot Nos. 71, 76, 78, 112, 114 and 115 in which crop had been sown and was standing. 3. In defence the plaintiff's right was denied. The defendants averred that the well in plot No. 109 was never used for irrigating the plots of the plaintiff's holding. They contended that plot Nos. 71 and 76 are abadi plots, plot No. 112 belongs to the defendants and not to the plaintiff, plot Nos. 114 and 115 were in possession of one Smt. Indrani and the plaintiff had no concern with them, and that the remaining plot No. 78 was in fact, irrigated from the well situate in plot No. 77 and so suit was misconceived. 4. The trial court framed two issues i.e. (1) Whether the plaintiff has easementary right to take water for irrigation from the well in suit ? (2) To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled ? 5. It is thus clear that the special pleas advanced in respect for the various plots claimed by the plaintiff as constituting his holding, were not tried. The plaintiff's claim was put in issue on the ground of the prescriptive right of easement. The trial court held that the plaintiff has not acquired a right of easement to irrigate his holding from the well in the plot No. 109 and that he is not entitled to any relief. The suit was thus, dismissed. 6. The plaintiff went up in appeal. The learned Additional Civil Judge, Oral reversed the decree. The trial court held that the plaintiff has not acquired a right of easement to irrigate his holding from the well in the plot No. 109 and that he is not entitled to any relief. The suit was thus, dismissed. 6. The plaintiff went up in appeal. The learned Additional Civil Judge, Oral reversed the decree. He held that the plaintiff has established the acquisition of a right of easement and that he is also entitled to the benefit of Sec. 7(aa) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act with respect to his right to irrigate his fields from the disputed well. The learned Judge discarded the oral evidence of both the parties as being not of any help. He based his finding on the documentary evidence alone. The plaintiffs appeal was allowed and the suit was decreed as prayed. 7. Aggrieved the defendants have come to this Court in second appeal. In order to appreciate the contentions raised, a few facts may be mentioned. 8. Originally the plots constituting the plaintiffs holding and also the well in plot No. 109 belonged to one Kashi Ram Kachi. In execution of a civil court decree against the said Kachi the well was sold and became the property of the defendants. Possession of the well was delivered to the defendants on 8-2-1901. Since then the defendants are the owners of the well. By a lease deed dated 28-3-1949 (Ex. 6) the Kachi aforesaid, demised the holding to the plaintiff-respondent. The documentary evidence on the record shows that the Kachis irrigated the plots now constituting the plaintiff's holding, from the well in plot No. 109, upto the year 1901, i.e. so long as the Kachis were the owners of this plot. There is no record of such irrigation continuing from 1901 till 1949 when the lease was executed in favour of the plaintiff, except that in the Khasra of the year 1354F it is mentioned that these plots were irrigated from the well in plot No. 109. From 1949 onwards again the revenue records mention that the plaintiffs holding was irrigated from this well. 9. From 1949 onwards again the revenue records mention that the plaintiffs holding was irrigated from this well. 9. The trial court negatived the plaintiff's right of easement on the ground that the plaintiff himself had used the well for irrigation for about nine years only prior to the suit, which was filed in 1958, and that the documentary evidence does not sustain the plea that the plaintiff's predecessor i.e. Kashi Ram Kachi, had been irrigating these plots from the well in plot No. 109. The trial court observed that the Khasra for the year 1354F. does not establish irrigation of these plots for a clear period of about fifty years from 1901 to 1949. It by itself does not establish that the plaintiff's predecessor continuously used this well for irrigation for at least eleven years prior to 1949 so as to make a period of twenty years. 10. The appellate court,; on the other hand, construed these entries to establish that, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff had a right to irrigate these plots from the disputed well. The learned Judge observed : "The plaintiff-appellant filed a number of extracts from the revenue papers in support of his contention. Some of these extracts relate to the period prior to the year 1901 while the others relate to the period after the year 1949 when these plots were let to the plaintiff Exhibit 13 however, is the extract of Khasra of the year 1354F. This clearly shows that the plots in question used to be irrigated from the disputed well. The other extracts referred to above also clearly show that these plots used to be irrigated from the disputed well. It is true that the entries in these extracts do not establish that the plaintiff and the predecessors were irrigating these plots since before 1949. However, this is also true that these extracts undoubtedly show that these plots used to be irrigated from the disputed well. In case the plaintiff had no right or interest in the disputed well it is difficult to understand that he could have irrigated his fields from the disputed well. My irresistible conclusion, therefore, is that the plaintiff-appellant irrigated his fields from the disputed well under his rights to take water from this well as used to be done by bis predecessor. My irresistible conclusion, therefore, is that the plaintiff-appellant irrigated his fields from the disputed well under his rights to take water from this well as used to be done by bis predecessor. These are not isolated and stray entries but consistently record the irrigation of these plots from the disputed well. It cannot therefore, be said that these plots could never have been irrigated from the disputed well since after 1901." The learned Judge was considering the question whether the plaintiff has acquired a right of easement. The fact that prior to 1901, the owners of the well were using it for irrigating their own plots is irrelevant for adjudicating the question of easement. The acquisition of a right of easement can commence only after the title in the servant tenement has ceased. A person cannot acquire an easement in his own property. The entries in the revenue records that prior to 1901 the plots were being irrigated from this well affords no evidence on this question. They cannot hence, be relied upon. If these extracts are excluded from consideration only one piece of evidence is left i.e. the Khasra of 1354F. (1946-47). This solitary entry has not been relied upon by the appellate court as being enough to sustain a finding that the plaintiff's predecessors irrigated these plots from this well for the requisite minimum peri od of eleven years prior to 1949. This entry by itself does not refer at all to this long period. It relates only to the year 1354F. It is in this connection relevant to remember that the learned Judge discarded the entire oral evidence. He held that "the oral evidence is not of any help in coming to any conclusion as it consists for highly interested persons who have every reason to depose against the other party." 11. There was thus no evidence for the finding that the plaintiff and his predecessor-in-interest acquired an easement by user of over twenty years ending within two years next prior to the suit. Actually the learned Judge himself noted : "It is true that the entries in these extracts do not establish that the plaintiff and the predecessors were irrigating these plots since before 1949." 12. Actually the learned Judge himself noted : "It is true that the entries in these extracts do not establish that the plaintiff and the predecessors were irrigating these plots since before 1949." 12. The learned Judge posed the question that in case the plaintiff had no right or interest in the disputed well it is difficult to understand that he could have irrigated his fields from the disputed well. This is begging the question. Whenever a person seeks to acquire an easement, he uses the land in a claim of right but he has no right or interest for a period of twenty years. The fact that a person is using the land for a number of years, is no evidence that he has any existence of right or interest in it, because the law recognises acquisition of a right as an easement only after a twenty years user. The finding of the learned Judge that the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff had acquired a right of easement to irrigate these plots from the disputed well and that the plaintiff, therefore, succeeded to the same right, is contrary to law, and cannot be accepted. 13. The next question relates to the construction of Sec. 7 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Sec. 7 may usefully be read. The relevant part runs as follows: - "Sec. 7. Saving in respect of certain rights. Nothing contained in this Chapter shall, in any way, affect the right of any person - (a)..................... (aa) Being an adhivasi, sirdar, bhumidhar or asami to continue to enjoy any easement or any similar right for the more beneficial enjoyment of the land, as he was enjoying on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting. (b) ....." 14. The plaintiff had not relied upon this provision in his pleadings or before the trial court. This point seems to have been taken for the first time in the appellate court. The learned Judge held that the plaintiff was enjoying a right to irrigate his fields from the disputed well prior to the date of vesting and is entitled to continue to enjoy such a right. This point seems to have been taken for the first time in the appellate court. The learned Judge held that the plaintiff was enjoying a right to irrigate his fields from the disputed well prior to the date of vesting and is entitled to continue to enjoy such a right. He repelled the defendants contention that the word "right" in this provision does not contemplate a mere user for a short time, and as the plaintiff had used the well only for three years prior to the date of vesting, which was 1.7.1952, they had acquired no right. The learned Judge observed : "I have already held that the plaintiff was irrigating his fields from the disputed well from the time of his predecessor. It, therefore, follows that the plaintiff has a right to irrigate his fields from the disputed well on the date of the vesting like his predecessor." 15. The finding of the learned Judge that the plaintiffs predecessor had acquired a right, having been found to be bad, the very basis of the finding that the plaintiff had acquired a right under Sec. 7 (aa) also falls to the ground. 16. Learned counsel for the respondent, has none the less submitted that the fact that the plaintiff had been enjoying a right of irrigation on the dale immediately the date of vesting is in law enough to establish that he was entitled to continue to enjoy it under Sec. 7(aa), even though his enjoyment had extended only for about three years prior to the date of vesting. He has urged that Sec. 7 (aa) speaks of two kinds of rights; easement and any similar right. For easement alone an enjoyment of twenty years is a pre-requisite. The other similar right need not be enjoyed for any long time. If it was being enjoyed on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting, the provision guarantees its continuity. 17. It has been held that the phrase "any similar right" in Sec. 7 (aa) is not to be read ejusdem generis with "any easement". See Raja Ram v. State of U. P., 1964 ALJ 307. It was held there that this case represents rights different than easements. 17. It has been held that the phrase "any similar right" in Sec. 7 (aa) is not to be read ejusdem generis with "any easement". See Raja Ram v. State of U. P., 1964 ALJ 307. It was held there that this case represents rights different than easements. They denote the various users which are the requirements of beneficient cultivation, like 1964 A. L. J. 307 using a piece of land as a threshing floor for properly husbanding the crop after harvesting it, to put manure heaps, to construct cattle-shed etc. Sugarcane cultivators use plots in the abadi for putting a sugarcane crusher, or for a fire place for boiling the cane juice. 18. User of a well for irrigating plots of land is equally a requirement of beneficial enjoyment of the land. Such rights differ from easements in their nature and character. Their enjoyment for any length of time is not necessary. Another point of distinction is that an easement cannot be acquired by a tenant in the other land of his landlord. The tenants interest is derivative. He, in law, represents the owner to the extent of his tenancy interest in the leased land. The tenants possession of the leased land is constructively the possession of the owner himself. Just as an owner cannot acquire, a prescriptive right of easement in his own land, so also a tenant, as he is only a representative of the owner qua the owners other lands. The point is well settled. Two Full Benches of our Court say so. See Udit Singh v. Kashi Ram, ILR 14 All. 185 (F.B.), Abdul Rashid v. Brahm Saran, 1938 ALJ 436 (F.B.). 19. But there are exceptions to this rule. A tenant can claim a right of user of other land of his landlord through, some recognised and valid local custom. He can claim rights under the presumption of a lost grant as well. In Bhola Nath v. Midnapur, A.I.R. 1931 P.C. 128 the Privy Council held that a tenant may claim rights in the other land of his landlord in cases where he has enjoyed the alleged right openly, continuously and notoriously for such a period as raises a presumption of a lost grant, in his favour, or where the circumstances point to a valid grant of the right having been made in his favour by the landlord himself. 20. 20. When a landlord makes a lease of a holding to a tenant for agricultural purposes the law raises a presumption that he will enable the tenant to carry on the agricultural business beneficially; and at the commencement of the tenancy, give him use of some land for the ancillary purposes like tying cattle, keeping manure, having a threshing floor etc. 21. In Babu Lal v. Ram Prasad, 1938 ALJ 1088 (F.B.) a Full Bench of this Court considered this problem. It was held that the plot of land which is used for purposes requisite for the convenient occupation and possession of the holding becomes appurtenant to the holding in the sense that it is usually enjoyed with the holding. It becomes an adjunct to or an integral part of holding. A plot becomes appurtenant to an agricultural holding only if it is proved or the true facts justify the inference, that the tenant was allowed the use of the plot on the express or implied understanding that he would be entitled to hold possession of the plot so long as he continues to be the tenant of the holding. The source for such user giving rise to a right to continue to so use, is a grant which the law presumes. Bennet, A. C.J., in his judgment held that where the origin of the tenancy and the origin of the user of the land in the village site for agricultural purposes, or neither of them, are known the court should presume that the landlord allowed the tenant user of the land in the village site as appurtenant to the agricultural holding from the time the tenancy began. In such a case the tenant cannot be deprived of the user of the land in the village site as long as the tenancy lasts. But where the origin for the user is shown to be of -a later date than the origin of the tenancy, then the user is a mere licence and may be terminated by the landlord. In the absence of an express agreement or grant or local custom the user has to be for a sufficient length in point of time to enable the court to raise a presumption that the source of the user was an implied grant by the landlord at the commencement of the tenancy. In the absence of an express agreement or grant or local custom the user has to be for a sufficient length in point of time to enable the court to raise a presumption that the source of the user was an implied grant by the landlord at the commencement of the tenancy. A user of three years is, in my opinion, wholly insufficient. Moreover, all such rights i.e. either by a lost grant or by a presumption grant, as an appurtenance, can arise and be claimed only in some other land of the landlord. These are all matters incidental to the grant of tenancy. They govern the landlord and the tenant inter se. They have no relevance when the question arises between a tenant and a stranger. A tenant cannot on these principles claim any right of user of land belonging to a stranger. 22. In the instant case the plaintiff obtained the holding from the Kachi. The defendants were never the landlords. The well in suit belongs to the defendants with whom the plaintiff has no relationship of landlord and tenant. 23. In the case of Raja Ram, 1964 ALJ 307 the right of a zamindar to continue to enjoy user of land for the more beneficial enjoyment of the holding under Sec. 7(aa) was recognised. The zamindar may set apart some land of his own for such incidental agricultural purposes. If his title to such latter land disappears, as it did under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. It was held in that case, that he would have a right to continue to enjoy such plots for those purposes, as before. Even this point of view does not help the appellant. The evidence does show that the Kachi was irrigating the holding from the well in dispute. But this continued only so long as he was the owner. When in 1901 the Kachi lost title to the well, there is no evidence that he continued the use of the well. A gap of nearly fifty years, from 1901 to 1949, for which there is no evidence that the Kachi had continued to use the well for irrigation purposes leads to an inference that the Kachi's tight to use the well, if any, had extinguished or in any case, had not become appurtenant to the holding. A gap of nearly fifty years, from 1901 to 1949, for which there is no evidence that the Kachi had continued to use the well for irrigation purposes leads to an inference that the Kachi's tight to use the well, if any, had extinguished or in any case, had not become appurtenant to the holding. When the present holding was demised to the plaintiff in 1949 there was no existing right of irrigation from this well. The plaintiff cannot thus claim relief on this ground. 24. The phrase "any similar right" in Sec. 7(aa) denotes rights different in their nature and character from easements. The parties went to trial in the instant case on the specific issue whether the plaintiff has acquired any prescriptive right of easement. The pleadings and the issues therefore do not give rise to a contest on any other kind of rights arising under a custom, lost or implied grant. The question whether the plaintiff has such other rights is a mixed question of fact and law. The defendants can legitimately complain that they had had no opportunity to meet such a case and lead evidence to disprove such a right. The lower appellate court was, therefore, not justified in permitting the plaintiff to raise such a question for the first time in appeal. 25. The plaintiff, thus, was not entitled to any relief, either on the ground that he has acquired an easement, or that he had "any similar right" of irrigating his holding from the well in plot No. 109. 26. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The decree is set aside and the suit is dismissed. In view of the fact that the defendants prevented the plaintiff from using the well, after he had used it for nearly nine years, the defendants-respondents shall bear their own costs in all the courts. Appeal allowed.