JUDGMENT : Misra, J. - Banchhanidhi Sarna died on 31-12-1951. His widow Kuntala died on 17-2-1952. Kashinath (Plaintiff) claims to be the adopted son of Banchhanidhi. Radiani, admittedly the daughter of Banchhanidhi, predeceased him. Radiani's daughter Satyabhama (original Defendant No. 1) died during the pendency of the suit leaving behind Kangali (Defendant No. 2) and Golak (Defendant No. 1), the son of Kangali. Plaintiff's suit is for permanent injunction. Eight items of properties are involved in the suit. Plaintiff's case was that these properties belonged to Bachhanidhi and were not the Stridhan of Kuntala and that Defendant No. 1 had no interest in these properties. Defendant No. 1, on the other hand, contested the suit alleging that all these properties belonged to Kuntala as her stridhan. 2. The trial court found that all these properties belonged to Banchhanidhi and were not the Stridhan I of Kuntala. On the finding that the Plaintiff was in possession of them, the suit for permanent injunction was decreed. The legal representatives of Satyabhama filed an appeal. The lower appellate court held that out of eight items, only item No. 4 was the Stridhan property of Kuntala. It accordingly dismissed the appeal in respect of all items except item No. 4. As the Plaintiff's suit was dismissed with regard to item No. 4, he has filed the second appeal while the Defendants have filed the cross objection with regard to other seven items in respect of which Plaintiff's claim was upheld. 3. In the cross-objection, Mr. Ray raised two contentions: (i) The concurrent finding of fact that the Plaintiff was the adopted son of Banchhanidhi is contrary to law; and (ii) The concurrent finding of the Courts below that seven items of that properties are not the Stridhan of Kuntala is against the materials on record and is contrary to law. Both the contentions are concluded by pure findings of facts. Mr. Ray was permitted to canvass these questions. After having heard him patiently I do not find any substance in these contentions. The cross-objection is accordingly dismissed. 4. So far as the second appeal is concerned, Mr. Both the contentions are concluded by pure findings of facts. Mr. Ray was permitted to canvass these questions. After having heard him patiently I do not find any substance in these contentions. The cross-objection is accordingly dismissed. 4. So far as the second appeal is concerned, Mr. Das raised two contentions: (i) Item No. 4 recorded in the settlement in the name of Kuntala must be presumed to have been purchased from out of joint family funds, and as such, it has no Stridhan character in the technical sense and must be inherited by the heirs of her husband; and (ii) even assuming that it was the Stridhan property of Kuntala, on her death in 1952, Satyabhama inherited it as a limited owner. On Satyabhama's death in 1958, it would be inherited by the Plaintiff. Reliance is placed on the order of succession as given in Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act. 5. The first contention has no force. There is no evidence on either side as to how the property (item No. 4:) was purchased and who paid the consideration. One fact is, however, admitted that in the settlement Khatian it stands in the name of Kuntala. This is the only piece of evidence on record to decide whether the property is Stridhan or not. The matter is concluded by a Division Bench decision of this Court in Changhala Devi v. Puri Bank Ltd. ILR 1950 Cutt. 464. Their Lordships observed: When a plea of Benami purchase is raised, the ostensible title cannot be displaced except on clear and cogent proof of the Benami character of the purchase. Tile burden of proving this lies on the person asserting the Benami character. The source of the purchase money is always a primary and crucial factor. The same burden of proof applies equally to a case where a sale deed stands in the name of a female. There is no presumption in law that merely because the female had a husband at the time of the purchase, the sale deed must be presumed' to be Benami for the husband. Neither is there any presumption that a married woman has no funds of her own to be available as consideration for purchase. The only evidence available in this case is that item No. 4 stands in the name of Kuntala in the settlement Khatian. Neither is there any presumption that a married woman has no funds of her own to be available as consideration for purchase. The only evidence available in this case is that item No. 4 stands in the name of Kuntala in the settlement Khatian. On the basis of the aforesaid decision, conclusion is irresistible that this item of property is Stridhan of Kuntala. Plaintiff failed to make out a case that the property either belonged to the husband or to the joint family. The first contention must be rejected. 6. The next question for consideration is who would inherit the Stridhan, property (Item No. 4) of Kuntala. The trial court finds that after her death, the Plaintiff is in possession of the property and not Satyabhama. The suit having been filed in 1955, Plaintiff had not acquired title to Item No. 4 by description. Plaintiff if, therefore, a trespasser in possession without acquiring a title. Satyabhama inherited the property in 1952 from her mother's mother. It was, however, a limited and not absolute interest as she was not in possession of the property on the date of the passing of the Hindu Succession Act (herein after referred to as the Act). She had title and the right to possession. The question is whether she had acquired a limited or absolute interest therein. Mr. Ray contends that the word "possessed" in Section 14(1) of the Act is wide enough to take within its sweep "the right to possess". Reliance is placed on Subbalakshmi Ammal Vs. Ramalakshmi Ammal and Others. The contention is untenable. 7. The possession of a trespasser is not on behalf of the limited owner but is adverse to her. Before the trespasser acquires a title by prescription, the limited owner has the title and right to possess. If she files a suit for recovery of possession and gets possession of the property, her right get enlarged and she would acquire an absolute interest therein from the date of actual possession. But until the possession is recovered, she cannot be said to be possessed of the property u/s 14(1) of the Act. This position of law was fully clarified in Sausir Patelin v. Satyabadi Naik ILR 1957 Cutt. 700, and Ganesh Mahanto v. Sukria Bewa ILR 1963 Cutt. 575. But until the possession is recovered, she cannot be said to be possessed of the property u/s 14(1) of the Act. This position of law was fully clarified in Sausir Patelin v. Satyabadi Naik ILR 1957 Cutt. 700, and Ganesh Mahanto v. Sukria Bewa ILR 1963 Cutt. 575. the same view has been taken in a recent Beach decision of the Patna High Court in Nathuni Prasad Singh and Another Vs. Mst. Kachnar Kuer and Others, . The conclusion reached in Subbalakshmi Ammal Vs. Ramalakshmi Ammal and Others is correct on its own facts in that case, the question was whether the interest devolving upon the widow on the death of the husband in a joint Hindu family before 1956 would be absolute or limited after the passing of the Act. The interest of the widow on the death of the husband is the same which her husband had. Partition merely works out her interest in separate and distinct properties. Before partition, she had the undivided interest which her husband had in the joint family properties. She was in fact in actual possession of the properties like any other members of the family having interest therein. It is not an illustration of a case where she was not in possession. She was either in actual physical possession or, at any rate, in constructive possession of the property. In that case, the concept of having the right to possess, while deprived of possession, does not arise for consideration. The observation of his Lordship to the effect "possession includes right to possession" is obiter and too broadly stated. If the decision purports to mean that the right to possess of a limited owner against a trespasser comes within the meaning of "possessed of" in Section 14(1) of the Act, I am unable to accept it as laying down good law. 8. On the aforesaid analysis of Satyabhama was in possession of Item No. 4, she would get the property as an absolute owner and, on her death, it would be inherited by her heirs u/s 15(1)(a) of the Act which in this case would be her son Golak, Defendant No. 1. If on the other hand, she was not in possession of the property, on her death, the property reverts to Kuntala and u/s 15(1)(a) of the Act it would devolve upon the Plaintiff as an heir of Kuntala. 9. If on the other hand, she was not in possession of the property, on her death, the property reverts to Kuntala and u/s 15(1)(a) of the Act it would devolve upon the Plaintiff as an heir of Kuntala. 9. This necessitates examination of the question as to who was in possession of Item No. 4 on the date of the passing of the Act. The learned lower appellate Court has not applied his mind to this aspect of the case and has not recorded any finding whether the Plaintiff or possession. Item No. 4 would devolve upon him and the suit is to be decreed. If, on the other hand, Satyabhama was in possession on that date, Plaintiff has no title to that item of property and the suit must be dismissed. The result of the litigation would depend upon the finding of possession. 10. In the result, the cross-objection is dismissed and the appeal is allowed. The case is remanded to the lower appellate Court who would record a finding on the factum of possession of Item No. 4 on the date of the passing of the Act dispose of the case in accordance with law and the observations made above. Parties to bear their own costs throughout upto this date. The appeal before the lower appellate Court is thus confined to I tern No. 4 only. Appeal allowed Cross Objection dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed