JUDGMENT M. Madhavan Nair, J. 1. This appeal is by the State of Kerala against acquittal of two Directors of the National Tyre and Rubber Co. (India), Ltd., Kottayam, in a charge under S.5 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947-1960. (hereafter 'the Act'). The facts are thus: The 1st accused is the Managing Director and the 2nd accused one of the Directors put in charge of the Bombay office of the National Tyre and Rubber Co. (India), Ltd., Kottayam (hereafter 'the Company'), which was granted three licences (Exts. P4, P7 and P10) for import of rubber with the express condition, "This licence is issued subject to the condition that the goods will be utilized only for consumption as materials or accessories in the licence holders' factory and that no portion thereof will be sold to or permitted to be utilized by any other party or be pledged with any financier." The applications (Exts. P1, P5 and P8) submitted by the Company for a the grant of a those licences mention the Company's factory as one situate at Muttambalamat Kottayam, Kerala. As per the said licences large quantities of 'reclaimed rubber' and 'synthetic rubber' were imported by the Company in the period March 2 to November 9, 1960, through the Port of Cochin. Subsequently the Company entered contracts with certain factories in Bombay for manufacture of goods for itself; and, for utilization in such manufacture, the accused, working in unison, shipped to Bombay part of the rubber imported. As such utilization by another Company in their factory would be a contravention of the condition of the import licences the Customs authorities at Bombay were alerted and they, on arrival of the shipment in the Port of Bombay, intercepted them. When the Company came to know of it, it collected the goods from the Customs House through the 2nd accused. On these facts the accused were prosecuted under S.5 of the Act. They contended inter alia that the allegations of the prosecution did not constitute an offence on their part and that has been accepted by the District Magistrate, who has acquitted them thereupon. Hence this appeal by the State Government under S.417 (1) Crl. P. C. 2. On these facts the accused were prosecuted under S.5 of the Act. They contended inter alia that the allegations of the prosecution did not constitute an offence on their part and that has been accepted by the District Magistrate, who has acquitted them thereupon. Hence this appeal by the State Government under S.417 (1) Crl. P. C. 2. The question here is whether, assuming without deciding that the goods shipped by the Company to Bombay were part of the goods imported under the aforesaid licences, the accused are liable to punishment under S.5 of the Act. The conditions of the licence are that the imported goods shall be utilized only in the Company's factory, and that they should not be sold to or pledged with or permitted to be utilized by another party. The licence does not stipulate the factory at which the goods imported under it may be utilized. It conditions merely 'that the goods will be utilized only...in the licence holders' 'factory'. A transport of the imparted goods from one place to another is not within the prohibition of the conditions of the licence. So much so. if the Company hired a factory at Bombay and transported the goods to Bombay for utilization therein it might not be a contravention of the conditions. There is no case here that any part of the imported goods has been sold to or pledged with another. So the only question is whether any portion of the imported goods had been permitted to be utilized by another party. 3. The learned Advocate General contends that when agreements were made by the Company with parties in Bombay for the manufacture of goods with the imported rubber, it permitted a portion of the imported rubber to be utilized by another party and has thereby contravened a condition of its import licences; and that, when the accused, in furtherance of the agreement, shipped part of the imported goods to Bombay, they have abetted that contravention The contention appears attractive, but I am afraid it may not bear scrutiny. It is based on a grammatical construction of the condition of the licence, laying stress on the word 'permitted' rather than on the words 'be utilized'. But grammar is not the sole criterion in statutory construction. It is based on a grammatical construction of the condition of the licence, laying stress on the word 'permitted' rather than on the words 'be utilized'. But grammar is not the sole criterion in statutory construction. Context, very often, plays an important role in this regard; and here the context is imposition of a penal liability, where the four stages of a crime intention, preparation, attempt and commission have to be kept in view. Permitting utilization in future is, in strict terminology, permitting to be taken for utilization and not permitting to be utilized. To fasten a penal liability or to constitute an offence, the act concerned must be an accomplished one. Otherwise it will amount only to an attempt to commit an offence or even short of that. The act of 'permitting to be utilized' will be a completed act when utilization has taken place with permission and not earlier. Even if permission has once been given unconditionally and some act not amounting to utilization here, shipping has been done in furtherance of that permission, it will still be possible for the licensee to cancel the permission and recall the goods and thereby prevent utilization by another and utilize them in its own factory. In other words, unless there has been actual utilization of a part of the goods by another with permission of the licensee, the licensee cannot be said to have permitted the goods to be utilized by another party. I therefore hold that a contravention of the condition of the licence does not occur before actual utilization of the imported goods or part thereof by another with permission of the licensee. As there had been, even according to the prosecution, no utilization of any part of the imported rubber by another, a contravention of the conditions of the licence has not taken place; the Company can be said only to have attempted to contravene a condition of its licences. 4. It is next contended by the learned Advocate General that, under S.5 of the Act, a contravention of the condition of a licence, an attempt at such contravention and an abetment of such contravention have all been made offences of the same degree. The section reads: "5. 4. It is next contended by the learned Advocate General that, under S.5 of the Act, a contravention of the condition of a licence, an attempt at such contravention and an abetment of such contravention have all been made offences of the same degree. The section reads: "5. If any person contravenes, or attempts to contravene, or abets a contravention of, any order made or deemed to have been made under this Act or any condition of a licence granted under any such order, he shall, without prejudice to any confiscation or penalty to which he may be liable under the provisions of the Sea Customs Act, 1870. as applied by sub-section 2 of S.3, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both." Obviously, this Section does not define any offence; it provides only penalties for certain things. It may be that the commission of an offence, an attempt to commit the offence and the abetment of the offence are penalised to the same extent by imposition of the same penalty for all of them; nonetheless neither attempt nor abetment can be said to constitute the same thing as the commission of the offence itself. The offence contemplated in S.5 of the Act is the contravention of an order made or of a condition of a licence granted under the Act. When the licence is granted to a Company, a condition of the licence, as observed by the Supreme Court in Abdul Aziz v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1963 SC 1470 Para.15) can be contravened only by the licensee company. If a contravention can be by licensee alone, it follows axiomatically that an attempt to contravene can also be by the licensee alone. The licensee, the Company, is not before Court in this case; only its Managing Director and another Director are accused here. The law has not stated that the principal officers of a Company will be personally liable for any acts they do on behalf of the Company in contravention of the orders or conditions mentioned in S.5 of the Act. All that the Directors of the Company, even though they be the principal men through whom the Company does its acts, can in their personal capacity do is to aid or abet a contravention by the Company. All that the Directors of the Company, even though they be the principal men through whom the Company does its acts, can in their personal capacity do is to aid or abet a contravention by the Company. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1954 SC 621 Para.16) the conviction of one for abetment of an offence would necessarily imply a definite finding that another is guilty of commission of the offence concerned, which would be unfair to that other if he or it is not before the Court. 5. The learned Advocate General urged that abetment of a contravention of a condition of the licence is by itself punishable under S.5 of the Act and that therefore the accused can be punished even though the licensee Company escaped prosecution. I am afraid that what is made punishable under S.5 of the Act is an abetment of a contravention and not an abetment of an attempt to contravene the conditions of a licence. As mentioned already, the facts put forth by the prosecution do not make out an actual contravention of the conditions of the licence by the licensee Company, but only an attempt at such contravention. It follows that the Directors of the Company can be said only to have abetted an attempt to contravene a condition of the import licences. As the same has not been made punishable under S.5, no liability can be fastened on the accused here. In the result, the order of acquittal passed by the District Magistrate in this case appears to me right. This appeal fails and is dismissed hereby.