JUDGMENT 1. THIS is a rule under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure obtained by the plaintiff, the valuation of whose suit for a declaration of his and a proforma defendant's title to two bata dags admeasuring between themselves 2. 98 acres, say 9 bighas, a little more or a little less, and for a permanent injunction restraining the principal defendants from holding the annual 'urush Mela' thereon, has been enhanced by the learned Munsif, Asansol, from Rs. 199 to Rs 30,000. 2. THE very first thing to do in a problem of this type is to classify the suit. That the suit out of which this rule arises comes under section 7 (iv), clause (c), of the Court Fees Act, 7 of 1870, is patent. Indeed, on that we all agree - Mr. Dutta, who appears for the petitioner, Mr. Das, who appears for the opposite party, and I, Once the classification is so, the court-fee payable, will be according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint. Thus, the standard to go by is the value of the relief sought, not the value of the subject-matter of the suit as in s. 7 (v) ibid. In other words, the subject-matter of the suit is not the subject-matter in suit. That, indeed, is trite, but it had to be emphasized by a Bench decision of this Court: (1) Biraja charan Nanda v. Sailaja Charan Nanda, (1938) 42 C. W. N, 667. In the case in hand, the relief sought has been valued in the plaint at Rs. 199. No doubt, it is subject to an inquiry by the court under section 8c ibid, for determining the correct valuation. Mr. Das emphasizes the existence of such a provision as section 8c. To my thinking, however, section 8c appears to be nothing like so germane as has been imagined. Because, section BC or no section 8c, the court has always the power to revive the valuation put in by the suing party. So section 8c is there ex abundanti cautela as pointed out by a recent Bench decision of this Court : (2) Amritalal chatterjee v. Hiralal Chatterjee, (1966)70 C. W. N. 857. 3. THAT is not the real question here. The court's power to revise the valuation is always there. The real question is - a question -Mr. So section 8c is there ex abundanti cautela as pointed out by a recent Bench decision of this Court : (2) Amritalal chatterjee v. Hiralal Chatterjee, (1966)70 C. W. N. 857. 3. THAT is not the real question here. The court's power to revise the valuation is always there. The real question is - a question -Mr. Dutt emphasizes : Does the court find any objective standard on the foot of which it can come to a satisfactory valuation of its own ? 4. FIRST to statute law. The suit, be it remembered, has been classified as one under section 7 (iv), clause (c), ibid, So soon as that is said, section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, 7 of 1877, is attracted But no rules there are as yet thereunder. Result: there is no standard either, for the court to go by in a case of the type I am now seized of. No doubt, Edgley, J. evolved a way of his own in coming to the determination of valuation in some cases of this nature. (3) Sourish Chandra Ray v. Shaikh Gopal Ostagar, I. L. R. (1939)2 Cal. 20, is a case in point. And this is the case Mr. Das is good enough to cite. That was a suit by certain mahomedans for a declaration that they were entitled to perform certain religious ceremonies on the occasion of the muharram every year in the courtyard attached to the palace of Maharaja sourish Chandra Ray. The formula which the learned Judge evolved was : first ascertain the extent to which the maharaja's property Will be depreciated. Then the extent of the depreciation will be the value of the benefit the plaintiffs seek to obtain in their suit. With respect, how the loss of the defendant will be gain to the suing party, the plaintiffs, is more than what I can understand. Even then, it is there to be seen that the learned Judge is not really interpreting the law but legislating. He is framing, if I may say so, with respect again, a statutory instrument of his own. 5. TO the same effect is another decision of the same learned Judge in (4) Mir Akhatdr Hossain v. Gurupada haldar and another, (1940) 44 C. W. N. 591. He is framing, if I may say so, with respect again, a statutory instrument of his own. 5. TO the same effect is another decision of the same learned Judge in (4) Mir Akhatdr Hossain v. Gurupada haldar and another, (1940) 44 C. W. N. 591. In the same volume, however, namely, at page 1038, there is a Bench decision: (5) Binod Behari Mukherji and others v. K. C. Biswas and company and others, where the sort of formula evolved by Edgley, J. did not find favour. One of the members of that Bench, Mukherjea, J. as his lordship then was, plainly pointed out that the difference in the values of the land when valued as land with a permanent tenancy right and again when valued as land with only under-raiyati right could not be the objective standard on the basis of which the court could revise the valuation under section 8c ibid. It, therefore, appears to be clear that the view enunciated by edgley, J. can no longer be regarded as good law. 6. MR. Dutt refers me to another case, also a Bench decision : (6)Pannalal Lala v. Abdul Gani and others, (1929) 34 C. W. N. 321, where it has been conceded that the plaintiff's valuation of the relief claimed may at times appear arbitrary or too low, at the same time it has been pointed out that the assessment of the real value may often be no less arbitrary and almost an impossibility. That is exactly the case before me. The learned munsif finds the net realization from tolls etc., as the result of the Mela to be Rs. 20,000. From that, by a rule of thumb and most arbitrarily, if I may say so, he takes the figure o Rs. 2,000 as the annual income. He does not stop there even. He multiplies it by 15 and comes to the sum of Rs. 30,000 at which he assesses the value of the suit. Where does the learned munsif get 15 times from ? it is not in section 7 (iv ). It is not in sec. 9 of the Suits Valuation Act. It is in section 7 (v) of the Court-fees Act. But when you classify a suit under section 7 (iv) (c), you cannot travel to section 7 (v). Where does the learned munsif get 15 times from ? it is not in section 7 (iv ). It is not in sec. 9 of the Suits Valuation Act. It is in section 7 (v) of the Court-fees Act. But when you classify a suit under section 7 (iv) (c), you cannot travel to section 7 (v). So, the observation of the Bench decision in Pannalai's case, (supra), appears to have been literally to instated into action by the learned munsif here. Surely, with a view to stopping arbitrarianess on the part of a suitor, the judge himself will not reach the perfection of arbitrariness. That is neither law nor common sense. 7. MR. Das has been good enough to refer me to two other cases. Case is (7) Anath Nath Banerjee and a hers v. Kalimata Thakurain, (1937)4 C. W. N. 504 All that is to be seen in that Bench decision is a remit to the subordinate judge with a view to revising the valuations and determinig the correct, valuations for purposes of court-fees under section 8c of the court-fees Act, i! he finds that they have been wrongly valued. What the ultimate upshot was is not known. It is no authority for solution of the difficulty I am up against. The difficulty is that, in a case of this type, I do not find any abjective standard and, accordingly, I cannot come to a valuation either. The other case is reported in the same volume, but at page 192 : (8) Urmila Bala Biswas v. Binapani biswas and others. But that was a suit or declaration of title to a certain proident fund money coupling with an injunction restraining the defendant from withdrawing the same. So soon as hat is said, an objective standard emerges as a matter of course. That can hardly be said of the case in hand. Net realization might be Rs. 20,000. But that can scarcely furnish an objective standard to go by: Still less does it give rise to the inference that the income will be Rs. 2,000 a year. And even if it be that, what is that to the suing party before me ? The land is his. What his adversary gains becomes irrelevant, so far he, the suing party and the owner of the land in controversy, is concerned, 8. 2,000 a year. And even if it be that, what is that to the suing party before me ? The land is his. What his adversary gains becomes irrelevant, so far he, the suing party and the owner of the land in controversy, is concerned, 8. HAVING regard to the foregoing considerations I am clear in my mind that the learned munsif has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law, and that he has acted too with illegality in the exercise of his jurisdiction, It remains for me to note that Mr. Das originally took a preliminary point about the maintainability of the instant application under section 115. I overruled him governing myself by the Supreme Court decision in (9)Major S. S. Khanna v. Brig. F. J. Dillon, a. I. R. 1964 S. C. 497, where it has been held that ultimately if an appeal lies to the High Court from an appellate order, the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain an application under section 115. But here no such appeal lies. The order was no doubt appealable under order 43, rule 1, clause (a), of the procedure Code. But that is neither here nor there. The hard fact remains that no second appeal lies to this Court from an appellate order. Therefore, a revisional application under section 115 does lie. 9. IN the result, the rule succeeds and be made absolute with costs, 10. THE records be sent down to the court below with the utmost expedition.