This is Hira defendant appellants second appeal against the judgment and decree of the Revenue Appellate Authority, Udaipur dated l7.12.64. Briefly the facts of the case are that Hakraj plaintiff-respondent filed a suit under sec. 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act against Hira and others for ejectment as a trespasser. The plaintiffs averment in the plaint was that the suit land was his khatedari land. He fell ill some eight years back. He took a loan of Rs. 400/-from defendant and as he did not return the loan the respondent took forcible possession of the suit land and hence he should be ejected. The defendant-appellants plea was that he was in possession of the suit land as a tenant since long. He never advanced any loan to the plaintiff-respondent. The trial court "decreed the suit of the plaintiff-respondent holding the defendant-appellant as trespasser and further imposing a penalty for his act of trespass. The first appellate court in appeal filed by defendant appellant came to the conclusion that the defendant-appellant took no forcible possession of the suit land but was in possession of the land in lieu of Rs. 400/- advanced by him to plaintiff respondent during his illness and therefore he invoked his powers u/sec. 209 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act of granting proper relief to the plaintiff-respondent by directing that the plaintiff-respondent should pay Rs. 400/- to the defendant-appellant and recover possession. It is against this judgment of the first appellate court that the defendant-appellant has come up in second appeal. The plaintiff-respondent did not appear and this appeal was heard ex parte. The counsel for the defendant-appellants only contention was that the first appellate court in coming to the conclusion that no trespass was committed made out a new case for the plaintiff-respondent by decreeing the suit for ejectment on payment of Rs. 400/- to the defendant appellant. The counsel urged that the proper course for the first appellate court was that when no elements of trespass were proved the suit should have been dismissed. We have perused the record and considered the contention raised by the counsel for the appellant. Both the subordinate courts have come to a clear finding of fact that the plaintiff-respondent was the khatedar tenant of the suit land. We have perused the record and considered the contention raised by the counsel for the appellant. Both the subordinate courts have come to a clear finding of fact that the plaintiff-respondent was the khatedar tenant of the suit land. The counsel for the appellant, however, made a feeble attempt to counter this finding of the two subordinate courts on the ground that the plaintiff-respondent was not the khatedar tenant of the suit land. In fact, the defendant-appellant was in possession of the suit land. This contention of the counsel for the appellant cannot be upheld. The entries in the khasra girdawri in which the early columns are the transcriptions of the Jamabandi which is the Record of Right clearly shows that the plaintiff-respondent was the khatedar of the suit land. In fact, it was the admission of the defendant-appellant in his statement on oath that he paid Rs.400,- to the plaintiff respondent by way of sale. This statement binds the appellant. It clearly shows that he had no interest in the land and that he did pay Rs.400/- to the plaintiff-respondent and went into possession of the suit land. On the consideration of these matters, we can definitely support the finding of fact by the two subordinate courts that the plaintiff-respondent was the khatedar of the suit land. The second point for consideration is whether payment of Rs. 400/- was made by defendant-appellant to the plaintiff-respondent, and if so, for what purpose. The plaintiff-respondent admits receiving Rs. 400/- during his illness and the defendant-appellant also says that he paid Rs. 400/- as a sale price of the land in his statement on oath. This clearly shows that Rs. 400/- were in fact paid by defendant-appellant to plaintiff respondent. This plea of sale by defendant-appellant was not taken in his written statement and therefore the first appellate court while appreciating the evidence came to a clear finding of fact that the plaintiff-respondent took a loan of Rs. 400/- and therefore it was probable that the defendant-appellant was admitted to the holding temporarily till the repayment of his loan was made. It, therefore, appears to reason that the first suit filed by plaintiff-respondent was for redemption of the mortgage but he withdrew that suit with permission of the court to file the present suit based on a different cause of action. It, therefore, appears to reason that the first suit filed by plaintiff-respondent was for redemption of the mortgage but he withdrew that suit with permission of the court to file the present suit based on a different cause of action. Therefore, we concur in the finding of the fact by the first appellate court that the defendant-appellant went into possession of the holding to enforce the repayment of the loan advanced. The question now remains is whether the defendant appellant was a trespasser and he should be ejected as such or not. A trespasser is defined in sec. 5(44) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, as follows— "(44) "Trespasser" shall mean a person who takes or retains possession of land without authority or who prevents another person from occupying land duly let out to him." Sec. 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act runs as follows — "(183) Ejectment of certain trespassers—(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any provision of this Act, a trespasser who has taken or retained possession of any land without lawful authority shall be liable to ejectment......" It therefore appears that although the defendant-appellant may have taken possession of the land in dispute with the consent and willingness of the plaintiff-respondent in order to ensure repayment of his loan, but when the appellant was ready and willing to pay the loan of Rs. 400/- already taken by him, he should have vacated the possession thereof. The defendant-appellants taking over possession of the suit land was no doubt initially lawful, but his refusal to part with the possession on the willingness of the plaintiff respondent to repay his loan and retaining it was clearly unlawful and it amounts to a clear act of trespass. In the definition of term trespasser a person not only who takes possession without lawful authority is included but it also contains those persons who retain possession of land without any authority. Therefore the moment the plaintiff-respondent terminated the defendant-appellants authority to retain the land the defendant-appellant clearly became a trespasser and was liable to ejectment under sec. 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. It is also true as the facts go that the relation of mortgagor and mortgagee were created between the plaintiff-respondent and the defendant-appellant but it was not on this basis that the plaintiff-respondant filed this suit having withdrawn his first suit. 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. It is also true as the facts go that the relation of mortgagor and mortgagee were created between the plaintiff-respondent and the defendant-appellant but it was not on this basis that the plaintiff-respondant filed this suit having withdrawn his first suit. Therefore, the trial court rightly adjudged the defendant-appellant as a trespasser. The first appellant court in our opinion in decreeing the plaintiffs suit on different grounds were misled and they only provided relief to the plaintiff respondent by taking recourse to sec. 209 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. In our opinion it was hardly necessary to do so. It was a clear case of a trespass by the defendant-appellant and he should have been ejected as such. Although there is no appeal on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent and defendant-appellant has only come in appeal aggrieved by the judgment passed against him yet this appellate court has ample power under O. 41., r. 33 C. P. C. to pass appropriate orders which ought to have been passed by the subordinate court. We, therefore, in exercise of this power would like to modify the decree issued by the first appellate court and eject, the defendant-appellant as a trespasser only and thus confirm the decree of the trial court. We, therefore, for reasons given above, reject the appeal of the appellant and as stated above modify the decree of the first appellate court in conformity with the trial court and order that the defendant-appellant be ejected as a trespasser. Further, in view of the fact that the plaintiff-respondent has yet to return the man already advanced, we do not propose to impose any penalty on the defendant-appellant for his trespass.