JUDGMENT Rajeshwari Prasad, J. - This is a plaintiffs first appeal arising out of Suit No. 12 of 1951 of the court of Civil Judge, Hamirpur. 2. Sri Guman Behari, an idol installed in the Rainpur temple at Charkhari is the first plaintiff which sued through the Collector, Hamirpur, as the Manager of the temple. State of Uttar Pradesh is the second plaintiff. 3. Plaintiffs filed this suit against Raja Mahipal Singh, defendant-respondent described as ruler of Sarila, Pargana Rath, district Hamirpur, for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 35,310/-. 4. The facts of the case as disclosed by the plaintiffs are, that the first plaintiff is a deity installed in the temple known as Rainpur temple, and it was managed by trustees appointed by the ruler of the former Charkhari State. Charkhari State subsequently ceased to exist, by virtue of the provisions of the Provinces and Estates (Absorption of Enclaves) Order, 1950, and its territories were absolved in the State of Uttar Pradesh, which now is part of Hamirpur district. The Collector, Hamirpur was the person who managed the temple thereafter. It was alleged that the defendant borrowed, in his personal capacity and for his private purposes connected with the marriage of his dependants, the sum of Rs. 15,000/- from the temple on 10th April 1948 and likewise borrowed another sum of Rs. 15,000/- on 21st April 1948. The amounts were repayable by the 30th June 1948 along with interest at 6 per cent per annum. The defendant failed to repay the loans thus advance to him. Consequently, the present suit was filed for the recovery of the aforesaid amount. 5. The claim of the plaintiffs was contested by the defendant on various grounds. One of the pleas raised by the defendant was that the amounts were borrowed by him, not in his personal capacity, nor for his personal benefit. The defendant was the ruler of Sarila estate and it was he who was to manage the estate. In 1948, the Prajamandal had started a movement against Sarila Darbar for non-payment of rents and the result was, that the Sarila State did not have any income during those days. With a view to meet the budget of State Expenses, Sarila Darbar was put to the necessity of taking the loan of Rs. 30,000/- from plaintiff No. 1. In 1948, the Prajamandal had started a movement against Sarila Darbar for non-payment of rents and the result was, that the Sarila State did not have any income during those days. With a view to meet the budget of State Expenses, Sarila Darbar was put to the necessity of taking the loan of Rs. 30,000/- from plaintiff No. 1. In taking the loan,the defendant acted in his capacity as the ruler of former Sarila State, and the amount so borrowed was spent in accordance with the State budget. It is further alleged that when the United States of Vindhya Pradesh was formed, these was a covenant between the Government of India and the ruler of the former States in Bundelkhand and Baghelkhand, according to which all liabilities of the Sarila Darbar were taken over by the United States of Vindhya Pradesh. The suit was bad for non-joinder of the United States of Vindhya Pradesh. It was then alleged that ultimately Sarila State was absorbed in the State of Uttar Pradesh and the liability to pay the loan had consequently devolved on the State of Uttar Pradesh. The other defence raised was that the suit was barred by Sec. 87-B of the Code of Civil Procedure as no sanction of the Government of India to file the suit against the defendant, who was a ruler of the former Sarila State, had been obtained. The privileges, dignities and titles etc. of the ruler of the Sarila State have been guaranteed by the said covenant. There were other pleas raised in defence with regard to interest and costs of the suit on the basis of the provisions of the ,U.P. Agriculturists Relief, but those pleas are now no more relevant for the purposes of the present first appeal. 6. The court below framed necessary issues that arose on the pleadings of the parties. The important findings returned by the court below are, that the loan were not taken by the defendant in his personal capacity, State of Uttar Pradesh was not liable for its repayment; suit was not bad for want of previous sanction from the Government to sue; suit was not barred by limitation; and that the State of Uttar Pradesh was not entitled to sue. On such findings, the court below dismissed the plaintiffs suit with costs. 7. On such findings, the court below dismissed the plaintiffs suit with costs. 7. Aggrieved by the said decision, the plaintiff has come up to this court and has filed the instant first appeal. One of the contentions made by the learned counsel for the respondent is that apart from the finding of the lower appellate court that the defendant not having borrowed the sum in his personal capacity, and was not liable to pay the sum, the suit was liable to be dismissed on account of the provisions of Sec. 87-B of the Code of Civil Procedure. 8. Suit was filed on 27th March 1951. Sec. 87-B was brought on the Statute-Book by an Amending Act which came into force from 1st April 1951. Four days before Sec. 87-B. came into force, suit had already been filed. Sec. 87-B reads as follows: - "The provisions of Sec. 85 and of sub-Secs. (1) and (3) of Sec. 86 shall apply in relation to the Rules of any former Indian State as they apply in relation to the Ruler of foreign State . . . ." Sec. 86 sub-Clause (1) lays down:- "86. (1) No Ruler of a foreign State may be sued in any Court otherwise competent to try the suit except with the consent of the Central Government certified in writing by a Secretary to that Government..........." 9. The contention made by the learned counsel for the respondent is that though it is true that the suit had been filed prior to the enforcement of Sec. 87-B, in view of the language used in Sec. 86, it was necessary to obtain consent of the Central Government before the defendant could be sued, inasmuch as the suit was pending on the date when Sec. 87-B came into force According to him, the phrase "may be sued" does not refer only to the act of instituting the suit but also to the act of continuing the suit. Consequently, the continuance of a suit without the consent of the Central Government from the 1st April 1951 was not legally possible. The sole question for determination that arises is, whether the word "sued" refers only to the institution of the suit or it also covers the continuance of suit. We are definitely of the opinion that so long as the suit is pending, the defendant remains sued within the meaning of Sec. 86. The sole question for determination that arises is, whether the word "sued" refers only to the institution of the suit or it also covers the continuance of suit. We are definitely of the opinion that so long as the suit is pending, the defendant remains sued within the meaning of Sec. 86. This was the view taken in the case of Mohan Lal Jain v. Sir Sawai Mansinghji Saheb, A.I.R. 1953 Ajmer 56. The same view has been taken by the Supreme Court in the case Mohan Lal Jain v. His Highness Maharaj Shri Sawai Man Singh, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 73. This being so, it is clear, that the suit, which may have been properly instituted on the date on which it was so instituted, became incompetent from 1st April 1951, for want of consent of the Government of India and the suit, therefore, ceased to be maintainable in court thereafter. As the plaintiff did not take steps to obtain in the consent of the Government of India for continuing the suit after 1st of April 1951, his suit was liable to be dismissed. The view of law taken by the court below on this part of the case, does not appear to be correct. Court below relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Thakore Saheb Kashori Khanji v. Gulam Rasul Chandbhai, A.I.R. 1955 Bom. 449. The question that has arisen in the present case, did not arise in the case before their Lordships of the Bombay High Court. In that case, it was the institution of the suit, the validity of which was in question. Therefore, the point whether the continuance of the suit was invalid, really did not arise in that case. 10. In view of our finding that the suit ceased to be maintainable from 1st April 1951, no other question relating to the merits of the case would be gone into by the court below. 11. The appeal, therefore, must be dismissed. 12. The appeal is dismissed with cost.