JUDGMENT T.S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer, J. 1. This appeal filed by defendants 1,2, 12 and 13 arises put of a suit instituted by the plaintiff for the recovery of the plaint schedule buildings which consist of a residential building, a Charthu and a further extension referred to in this judgment as the out house. The suit was concurrently decreed by the two courts below. The plaint buildings are situated within the municipal limits of Cochin to which the Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950 and Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1959 (Act 16 of 1959) applied. The title of the plaintiff to plaint schedule buildings excepting the out-house is admitted. 2. The facts necessary for the disposal of the second appeal are stated below. Defendants 1 to 11 are the legal representatives of Dr. Raman Nair who died in Medom 1124. According to the plaintiff the plaint buildings were leased to Dr. Raman Nair. The contention of the defendants was that the lease to Dr. Raman Nair was only of the main building and the Charthu and not of the outhouse which was constructed by Dr. Raman Nair. The title of the plaintiff and his predecessors-in-interest to the out-house was denied by the defendants. The plaintiff filed Rent Control Petition 41 of 1953 in the Rent Control Court., Cochin, for the eviction of the defendants from the plaint buildings. This was transferred to the Cochin Munsiff's Court and re-numbered Rent Control Petition No. 59 of 1957. The Rent Control Petition was filed under rule 9, sub-rule (2), clauses (i), (ii) (a), and (vi) of the Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950. The grounds for eviction mentioned in the petition by the plaintiff were that the defendants did not pay the rent due in spite of the issue of registered notice, a portion of the building was sublet by defendants 1 to 11 to the 12th defendant after the commencement of the Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act XXIV of 1124 without his written consent, that the second defendant denied the landlord's title to the out-house without any bona fides and defendants 1 to 12 were guilty of waste. The Rent Control Petition was dismissed by Ext. P-11 order of the Rent Controller dated 13th November 1957. The Rent Control Petition was dismissed by Ext. P-11 order of the Rent Controller dated 13th November 1957. The appeal filed against the decision of the Rent Controller by the plaintiff was also dismissed by the order Ext. P-18 dated 7th March 1958. Though it was found in Ext. P-11 that there was no default in the payment of rent by the defendants, that there was no sub-lease and there was no waste by the defendants, it was held that the denial of title of the plaintiff by the defendants to the out-house was bona fide. These findings were confirmed by the appellate court in Ext. P-18. The suit which has given rise to the second appeal was instituted by the plaintiff in view of the second proviso to rule 9 (I) of the Travancore-Cochin (Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950. Rule 9(1) with the provisos is reproduced below : "9(1) A tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of this clause:- Provided that nothing contained in this clause shall apply to a tenant whose landlord is Government: Provided further that where the tenant denies the title of the landlord or claims right of permanent tenancy, the Controller shall decide whether the denial or claim is bona fide and if he records a finding to that effect, the landlord shall be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a civil court and the court may pass a decree for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in this clause notwithstanding that the court finds that such denial docs not involve forfeiture of the lease or that the claim is unfounded." 3. The grounds mentioned by the plaintiff in the suit for the eviction of the defendants were that defendants 1 to 11 subleased a portion of the building to the 12th defendant without the written consent of the landlord after the commencement of the Cochin Act XXIV of 1124 and that the tenants denied the title of the landlord to the outhouse without any bona fides.4. It was contended by the defendants that the outhouse belonged to the second defendants, that the sublease in favour of the 12th defendant is not a fact, and that the findings in Exts. P-11 and P-18 would operate as a bar on the question of the sublease. It was contended by the defendants that the outhouse belonged to the second defendants, that the sublease in favour of the 12th defendant is not a fact, and that the findings in Exts. P-11 and P-18 would operate as a bar on the question of the sublease. Though the learned Munsiff found that there was a sub-lease in respect of a portion of the building as alleged by the plaintiff, the learned Judge did not enter any finding on this point. Both the courts below found that the out-house belonged to the plaintiff and that the defendants denied the plaintiff's title to the out-house without any bona fides. The suit was therefore decreed by the two courts below. 4. The Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950, was repealed by the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Ordinance, 1959, (Ordinance No. 3 of 1959) which Came in to force On 17th January 1959. The Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1959 (Act 16 of 1959) was passed on the 28th May 1959 with retrospective effect from 3rd April 1959. Section 11, clause (4) (i) of the Act read as follows : "(4) A landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building, (i) if the tenant has without the consent of the landlord transferred his right under the lease or sublet the entire building or any portion thereof, if the lease does not confer on him any right to do so, or the landlord has not consented to such subletting ; or " Act 16 of 1959 was amended by the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Amendment Act, 1961 (Act 29 of 1961) with retrospective effect from 3rd April 1959. Section 11, sub-section (4), clause (i) of Act 16 of 1959 was substituted by Act 29 of 1961 as follows : "(V) A landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building, (i) if the tenant after the commencement of this Act, without the consent of the landlord, transfers his right under the lease or sublets the entire building or any portion thereof, if the lease does not confer on him any right to do so ; or " It is also necessary to mention that Act 16 of 1959 which was a temporary Statute expired by efflux of time and the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (Act 2 of 1965) was passed with retrospective effect from 1st April 1965. 5. Though denial of title of the landlord to the building by the tenant was a ground for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building under the Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950, it was not a ground for the passing of such an order under Ordinance 3 of 1959 and Act 16 of 1959 as amended in 1961 or by the Act of 1965. 6. Though in the suit under appeal eviction was sought by the plaintiff, also on the ground of denial of title of the landlord by the tenant to the out-house which was possible under the Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950, it was conceded that such a ground was not available to the plaintiff in view of Act 16 of 1959 which was in force when the suit was disposed of. Even apart from the concession made by the learned advocate for the appellant the legal position is the same. Section 33, clause (1) of Act 16 of 1959 was as follows "All proceedings commenced or deemed to have been commenced and all actions taken or deemed to have been taken under the Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950 or the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949 and pending at the commencement of this Act, shall, so far as may, be deemed to have been commenced or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act and be continued subject to the provisions of this Act. " Section 11, sub-section (1) of the Act 16 of 1959 read thus : "(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract a tenant shall not be evicted, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of this Act : Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply to a tenant whose landlord is the State Government or the Central Government or other public authority notified under this Act: Provided further that where the tenant denies the title of the landlord or claims right of permanent tenancy, the Rent Control Court shall decide whether the denial or claim is bona fide and if it records a finding to that effect, the landlord shall be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a Civil Court and such Court may pass a decree for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in this section, notwithstanding that the Court finds that such denial does not involve forfeiture of the lease or that the claim is unfounded." A suit instituted by the landlord for eviction of the tenant in a civil court in accordance with the second proviso to rule 9 (1) to the Travancore-Cochin (Buildings Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950 is a proceeding commenced under the said Order within the meaning of section 33 of Act 16 of 1959 and shall therefore by force of Act 16 of 1959 be deemed to have been commenced under the second proviso to section 11(1) of Act 16 of 1959 and can be continued only subject to the provisions of Act 16 of 1959 and the court can pass a decree for eviction only on any of the grounds mentioned in section II of Act 16 of 1959. Denial of title of the landlord to the building by the tenant without any bona fides was not one of the ground is. We therefore hold that proceedings for eviction of the tenant commenced under the Travancore-Cochin Building (Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950, and pending on the date of Act 16 of 1959 and which could be continued under Act 16 of 1959 can be ordered in favour of the landlord only on grounds mentioned in Act 16 of 1959 and not otherwise. The above view taken by us gains support from section 34 of Act 16 of 1959 which is reproduced: "34(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, any order of eviction passed, between 12th February, 1958, and the date of coming into force of this Act on grounds which would not have been available if this Act were in force during the said period shall be voidable at the option of the tenant. (2) If any tenant has actually been evicted in pursuance of an order referred to in sub-section (1) the Accommodation Controller shall, on a petition presented to him for the purpose within three months from the coming into force of this Act restore the tenant to the possession of that building: Provided that the tenant shall not be entitled to be restored to possession in cases where a lease has been granted bona fide to a third party and possession given in pursuance thereof before the 13th December 1958." 7. Orders of eviction passed between 12th February 1958 and 3rd April 1959, the date of coming into force of Act 16 of 1959 on grounds other than those mentioned in Act 16 of 1959 are voidable at the option of the tenant and if any tenant was evicted in pursuance to such an order he could have claimed restoration of possession within three months of the date on which Act 16 of 1959 came into force. When the legislature made the orders for eviction passed during the period referred to above on grounds not available under Act 16 of 1959 voidable at the option of the tenant, it naturally follows that the legislature did not want to preserve the rights of the landlord to seek eviction on grounds other than those mentioned in Act 16 of 1959 as amended by Act 29 of 1961 even in proceedings commenced when the said order was in force and pending on the date of Act 16 of 1959. 8. The main contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff was that the suit giving rise to the second appeal should be decided according to the provisions of Act 16 of 1959 without taking note of the amendments introduced by Act 29 of 1961. 8. The main contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff was that the suit giving rise to the second appeal should be decided according to the provisions of Act 16 of 1959 without taking note of the amendments introduced by Act 29 of 1961. Under section 11, sub-section (4), clause (1) of Act 16 of 1959 before its amendment the landlord had the right to get an, order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession if the tenant sublet the building or any portion thereof, if the landlord did not consent to such subletting. The Kerala Act 29 of 1961, which amended the provisions of Act 16 of 1959 restricted the right of the landlord and enabled him to get an order directing the tenant to put him in possession only if the subletting was after the commencement of the parent Act, namely 3rd April 1959 arid without the consent of the landlord. The submission of the learned advocate for the appellant was that the amendment introduced by Act 29 of 1961 cannot affect those proceedings already commenced and pending when Act 29 of 1961 came into force. We do not think that there is any force in the contention of the learned counsel. Sub-section (2) of section 1 of Act 29 of 1961 which gave retrospective operation to the said enactment, provided that the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Amendment Act, 1961, should be deemed to have come into force on the 3rd day of April 1959, the date from which retrospective operation was given to Act 16 of 1959. By express enactment, therefore, Act 29 of 1961 was made retrospective. It is true that every statute which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws or creates a new obligation, or imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect of transactions or considerations already past, must be presumed, out of respect to the legislature, to be intended not to have a retrospective operation. It cannot also be disputed that in general when the law is altered during the pendency of an action, the rights of the parties are decided according to the law as it stood when the action was begun, unless the new statute shows a clear intention to vary such rights. It cannot also be disputed that in general when the law is altered during the pendency of an action, the rights of the parties are decided according to the law as it stood when the action was begun, unless the new statute shows a clear intention to vary such rights. But whenever the intention is clear that the Act should have a retrospective operation, it must unquestionably be so construed, even though the consequences may appear unjust or harsh. It is competent for the legislature in its wisdom to make the provisions of an Act operate retrospectively. In considering an identical question Vaidialingam, J. in Kunji Raman v. Lalji P. Kathiya 1962 K.L.J.1129 overruled a similar contention in the following words: "In my view, sub-section (1) of section 33 will not give assistance to Mr. Gopalan Nambiyar in his contention that the Legislature has clearly made the provisions of the Kerala Act retrospective and also preserved the rights of persons like the petitioner who have already taken action under the provisions of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949. In fact the expression used in section 33 (1) is so far as may be' and that is very significant. So that only in respect of rights or matters which are already dealt with in the question and also identically recognised under the new enactment, there is a preservation of those rights which have been taken under the earlier enactment referred to in section 33 (1) and Mr. D. A. Krishna Warrier is also well founded in his contention that the Legislature by express words in sub-section (2) of section 33 has clearly recognized only to a qualified extent in section 33 (1) actions or decisions already arrived at and based on enactments referred to therein. Therefore, I am not inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that section 33 (1) of the Kerala Act has preserved the rights of the petitioner which have already accrued to him under the Madras enactment to ask for eviction on the ground that there has been a sub-letting after 23rd October, 1945, though the sub-letting which is required to found a cause of action under the Kerala Act should have been after the coming into force of the Kerala Act." 6. The plaintiff has no case that subletting of a portion of the plaint building by the tenants was after the commencement of Act 16 of 1959. We therefore hold that the plaintiff cannot rely on section 11, sub-section (4), clause (i) of Act 16 of 1959 as it stood before the amendment for an order directing the tenants to put him in possession of the buildings. 7. It was then contended for the plaintiff that the expression "tenant" in clause (i) sub-section (4) of section 11 means only a contractual tenant and not a statutory tenant. "Tenant" is denned under sub-section (6) of section 2 meaning "any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building and includes the surviving spouse, or any son or daughter, of a deceased tenant who had been living with the tenant in the building as a member of the tenant's family up to death of the tenant and a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour, but does not include a Kudikidappukaran as defined in the Kerala Stay of Eviction Proceedings Act, 1957 (Act 1 of 1957) or a person placed in occupation of a building by its tenant or a person to whom the collocation of rents or fees in a public market, cart-stand or slaughter-House or of rents for shops has been farmed out or leased by a Municipal Council or local board or Panchayat or Corporation." 8. The above definition takes in a person continuing in possession of the building after the termination of the tenancy in his favour. According to the learned advocate for the plaintiff, a tenant who is in possession after the termination of the tenancy and against whom a petition for eviction was pending on the date of the commencement of Act 16 of 1959 is not a tenant within the meaning of section 11, sub-section (4), clause (i). Even if this interpretation is accepted it does not help the appellant because the effect of accepting such an interpretation is that a transfer of right by a lessee under the lease or subletting of the building or any portion thereof by a statutory tenant will not be a ground for an order directing the tenant to Iput the landlord in possession of the building. The resultant position will be that while transfer or subletting without the consent of the landlord will be a ground for eviction in the case of a contractual tenant while it will not be so against a tenant whose tenancy was terminated and against whom an application under the Travancore-Cochin Order of 1950 was pending, on the date of Act 16 of 1959.We do not think that the legislature Would have intended such a result by enacting section 11 sub-section (4) clause (i). In support of his contention the learned advocate relied on the decision in Anand Nivas Private Ltd. v. Anandji Kalyanji's Pedhi A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 414. The following observations of Shah, J. at page 422 was referred to by the learned advocate for the appellants to substantiate his position: " A person remaining in occupation of the premises let to him after the determination of or expiry of the period of the tenancy is commonly though in law not accurately, called 'a statutory tenant'. Such a person is not a tenant at all, he has no estate or interest in the premises occupied by him. He has merely the protection of the statute in that he cannot be turned out so long as he pays the standard rent and permitted increases, if any, and performs the other conditions of the tenancy. His right to remain in possession after the determination of the contractual tenancy is personal; it is not capable of being transferred or assigned, and devolves on his death only in the manner provided by the statute. The right of a lessee from a landlord on the other hand is an estate or interest in the premises and in the absence of a contract to the contrary is transferable and the premises may be sublet by him. But with the determination of the lease; unless the tenant acquires the right of a tenant holding over, by acceptance of rent or by assent to his continuing in possession by the landlord, the terms and conditions of the lease are extinguished, and the rights of such, a. person remaining in possession are governed by the statute alone. But with the determination of the lease; unless the tenant acquires the right of a tenant holding over, by acceptance of rent or by assent to his continuing in possession by the landlord, the terms and conditions of the lease are extinguished, and the rights of such, a. person remaining in possession are governed by the statute alone. Section 12(1) of the Act merely recognises his right to remain in possession so long as he pays or is ready and willing to pay the standard rent and permitted increases and performs the other conditions of the tenancy, but not the right to enforce the terms and conditions of the original tenancy after it is determined." 9. Based on the above observations it was argued by the learned advocate for the plaintiff that the tenant referred to in clause (i) sub-section (4) of section 11 of the Act can only be a tenant who is competent to execute a sub-lease and if the expression "tenant" is interpreted to include also tenants whose tenancy has been terminated and who are entitled to continue in possession by paying rent on account of the force of the statute it will amount to saying that the legislature has recognised even in such people a right to transfer or to execute a sub-lease. In view of the definition of the term " tenant'' in Act 16 of 1959 the position contended for by the learned advocate for the plaintiff will not be reached. The decision in Anand Nivas Private Ltd. v. Anandji Kalyanji's Pedhi A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 414 does not help the plaintiff. Its facts were completely different. The point that arose for consideration in that case was whether the sub-lessee from a tenant remaining in possession after the termination of the original tenancy by virtue of the statute can acquire the rights of a tenant under section 14 of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act and the decision proceeded on the interpretation of section 14 and the prior provisions contained in the said enactment. It does not in any way support the position contended for by the learned advocate for the plaintiff. We therefore overrule this contention also. 10. The only ground advanced by the learned advocate for the plaintiff in support of the suit for eviction was the execution of the sub-lease. It does not in any way support the position contended for by the learned advocate for the plaintiff. We therefore overrule this contention also. 10. The only ground advanced by the learned advocate for the plaintiff in support of the suit for eviction was the execution of the sub-lease. Since the case of the plaintiff was that the sub-lease was executed before the commencement of Act 16 of 1959 it could not afford any cause of action to the plaintiff in the suit. The argument that though the sub-lease was before the Act, the continuance in possession by the sub-lessee after the Act, is sufficient for the purpose of section 11, sub-section (4) (i) is without substance and has only to be rejected. The decree for eviction therefore passed by the courts below cannot be sustained. In the result, the judgments and decrees of the courts below are set aside and the second appeal is allowed dismissing the suit. Since the tenants succeeded in view of the subsequent legislation the parties will bear their costs throughout.