Judgment :- 1. This motion is for revision of a conviction under S.112 read with S.89 (a) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.. 2. The facts are not in dispute here. At about 9 p. m. on December 8, 1964, the petitioner was driving a jeep of the Armed Reserve Police at a place three miles from the Police Station, Cannanore, when it collided with one Karunakaran who died in the hospital at 11.30 p. m. same night. The petitioner drove the jeep without stopping. He was charged under S.304A, I. P. C. and S.112/89 (a) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The District Magistrate found: "It is seen from the prosecution evidence itself that the accused was driving the vehicle at normal speed ... Karunakaran suddenly darted in front of the jeep. It was impossible for the accused to avoid collision... The accused is not guilty under S.304 A I. P. C." But, on the other count, he held: "The accused did not take Karunakaran to the hospital. He proceeded to Cannanore without stopping the jeep. The accused submits that if he had stopped there, he would have been assaulted by the crowd. P. W. 5 swears that it was on account of this fear that the accused failed to stop after the accident. P. W.1 swears: "Many people shouted for catching the driver. The jeep was not stopped." He swears that if the accused had stopped the jeep, he would have been assaulted. In the first information statement given by the accused, he stated that it was on account of this fear that he did not stop the jeep and take steps for rendering medical attention to the deceased. But this is not a sufficient explanation for not discharging the statutory duty cast under S.89 (a) of the Motor Vehicles Act. Nothing stated in S.89 (a) enables the driver to get over the duty cast on him under that section. I therefore find the accused guilty under S.112 of the Motor Vehicles Act for contravening the provisions of S.89 (a) of the same Act." and fined him Rs. 40 with two weeks' simple imprisonment in default. Hence this motion. 3. It is apparent that, in the District Magistrate's view, an apprehension of assault from an angry mob will be no defence to a contravention of S.89 (a) of the Motor Vehicles Act. 40 with two weeks' simple imprisonment in default. Hence this motion. 3. It is apparent that, in the District Magistrate's view, an apprehension of assault from an angry mob will be no defence to a contravention of S.89 (a) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The law does not require one to save another at risk of one's own personal safety. On the other hand, everyone is conceded a right of defence of the body even to the extent of causing death to others if the occasion is one of reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt to oneself. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Amjad Khan v. The State (AIR. 1952 S. C. 165) such apprehension need not be the result of an actual assault but may arise from a threat to injure, what would entitle a person to kill another must necessarily permit him to leave another to die for want of attention. The command in S.89 (a) of the Motor Vehicles Act is only to "take reasonable steps to - secure medical attention for the injured person". What steps are reasonable will depend upon the circumstances of the case at hand. If there are good grounds for an apprehension of death or grievous hurt to the driver, it would not be reasonable to insist on him to face the same and render aid to the injured. On the finding of the Court below, that an angry crowd began to gather at the spot shouting cries for attack as soon as the incident took place, the petitioner's non-attention on the injured has to be excused. 4. The learned State Prosecutor contended that, even if the petitioner apprehended grievous hurt to him and therefore had to flee for safety, he could have taken steps from a distance to secure medical attention to the injured, which he had not done and therefore his conviction is warranted. The circumstances brought to proof in this case and found by the Court below are that the moment the incident took place many persons rushed to the spot and that they were apparently angry towards the petitioner for the injury caused to Karunakaran. The circumstances brought to proof in this case and found by the Court below are that the moment the incident took place many persons rushed to the spot and that they were apparently angry towards the petitioner for the injury caused to Karunakaran. It follows that the petitioner could well have expected that they would take interest in Karunakaran and remove him promptly to hospital for medical attention and that after reaching Cannanore even if he sent a taxi to take Karunakaran to hospital it would be too late to be useful. S.89 (a) says that if the injured person or his guardian does not want the driver to take the injured to hospital the driver is not obliged to render aid to the injured. It shows that what the law insists is that prompt medical attention should be assured to the injured, and if the driver has good grounds to believe that it is assured to the injured by others he has not to bother. The facts of this case show no real contravention of S.89 (a) by the petitioner. 5. In the circumstances of this case, I set aside the conviction and sentence imposed on the petitioner and acquit him. The fine, if any realised, will be refunded to the petitioner. Allowed.