ORDER.- In all these Writ Petitions a common question of law is raised and therefore can be conveniently dealt with together. Mr. Venugopal learned Counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the delegation of the power of the Regional Transport Authority under section 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act to suspend a permit to the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, is invalid and unsustainable in law. Shortly put, the contention of the learned Counsel is that while under section 44 (5) of the Act the Regional Transport Authority may delegate the power of cancellation and suspension of a permit to the Secretary, he cannot delegate only the power of suspension without the power of cancellation. Section 44 (1) empowers the State Government to constitute Regional Transport Authorities to exercise and discharge in the areas specified the powers and functions conferred on those authorities. Section 45 prescribes that an application for a permit shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which it is proposed to use the vehicle or vehicles. Section 60 of the Act provides that the transport authority which granted a permit may cancel the permit or may suspend it for such period as it thinks fit on the grounds specified in clauses (a) to (f) of section 60 (1). It may be noted that the transport authority has the power to cancel a permit or suspend it. Section 44 (5) of the Act empowers the Regional Transport Authority, if authorised by Rules made under section 68, to delegate such of its powers and functions to such authority or person and subject to such restrictions, limitations and conditions as may be prescribed by the said Rules. Section 68 confers on the State Government the power to make Rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of Chapter IV of the Act. Clause (zz) empowers the Government to frame Rules in any other matter which is to be or may be prescribed. Rule 134 (a), which is impugned, is one of the rules framed in exercise of the rule-making powers vested in the Government by section 68 (zz) of the Act. It is unnecessary to consider the validity of section 44 (5) or the validity of rule 134-A (xi) for the question has been elaborately considered by a Bench of this Court in Dhanmull Sowcar v. Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Vellore1. It is unnecessary to consider the validity of section 44 (5) or the validity of rule 134-A (xi) for the question has been elaborately considered by a Bench of this Court in Dhanmull Sowcar v. Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Vellore1. The Bench held that rule 134-A item (xi) fell within the scope of section 68 of the Act and it is a rule prescribed for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of Chapter IV within the meaning of section 68(1) of the Act. It also agreed with the decision reported in Krishnan v. Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Chittoor2, where it was held that rule 134-A was valid. It cited with approval an unreported Bench decision of this Court in Star Transport, Ltd. v. Regional Transport Authority, Kurnool3, where it was held that the Regional Transport Officer was acting well within the scope of the provisions of the Act in passing the order of suspension and once a function is among those prescribed by the Rules, the delegation cannot be challenged. Mr. Venugopal, in view of the decisions quoted above, did not seek to question the validity of rule 134-A (xi) on any of the grounds raised before the Bench. But he contended that the power conferred on the Regional Transport Authority under section 60 (1) for cancellation as well as suspension of the permit is an integral power and cannot be split as a power to cancel a permit and a power to suspend a permit. It was submitted that the power to take action against a permit and cancel it or suspend it for breach of any of the conditions is enumerated in clauses (a) to (f) of section 60 (1). Cancellation or suspension it was contended is only a punishment and not an exercise of power. Learned Counsel also pointed out that section 44(5) empowers the Regional Transport Authority to delegate such of its powers to a particular authority. The powers that can be delegated can only be, it was submitted, to take action by it by cancellation and by suspension. I am unable to appreciate the contention that the power to cancel and the power to suspend is an integral one and cannot be separately delegated. Section 60 clearly provides for imposing the punishment of cancellation as well as suspension. I am unable to appreciate the contention that the power to cancel and the power to suspend is an integral one and cannot be separately delegated. Section 60 clearly provides for imposing the punishment of cancellation as well as suspension. There can be no objection to one authority being empowered to cancel and another authority being empowered to suspend. As already observed, rule 134-A (xi) delegating the power to suspend a permit has been upheld by this Court. Learned Counsel next relied on an unreported decision of this Court in W.P. Nos. 730 and 734 of 1951 where it was held that the power of granting stay cannot be delegated to a different authority from an authority exercising the power of revision, as the power of revision and the power to grant stay is an integral part of the revision and could not be split. This decision cannot be of any assistance to the petitioner, for, the wording of sub-section (1) of section 134 which provides that an appeal or an application for revision shall not operate as a stay of the order passed by the original authority and such order shall remain in force pending the disposal of the appeal or the application for revision, unless the prescribed appellate authority or revisional authority otherwise directs. So far as the powers of cancellation and suspension are concerned they ate entirely different and cannot be compared with the power of entertaining revision and granting stay. It was next contended by Mr. Venugopal, learned Counsel for the petitioner, that rule 134-A (xi) renders the entire procedure unworkable and creates considerable difficulty, and as such the Legislature could not have intended it. He sub. mitted that when the Regional Transport Authority delegated the power to suspend, it is divested of the power to deal with cases of suspension, and therefore when he finds that the case is not a fit case for cancelling the licence, he cannot proceed to suspend the licence. In support of his contention that when once a power is delegated the principal is divested of that power, learned Counsel relied on the decision reported in Blackpool Corporation v. Locker1. The facts of the case as given in the headnote are as follows. On 20th June, 1946, a requisition notice was served on the defendant under Reg. In support of his contention that when once a power is delegated the principal is divested of that power, learned Counsel relied on the decision reported in Blackpool Corporation v. Locker1. The facts of the case as given in the headnote are as follows. On 20th June, 1946, a requisition notice was served on the defendant under Reg. 51 (1) stating that the Town Clerk of B. had that day taken possession of the premises. A substantial quantity of the defendant’s furniture remained on the premises, but the requisition notice contained no direction as to its disposal. The proposed purchaser withdrew from the transaction, and on 26th June, the defendant went into occupation of the house, intimating to the Town Clerk that he intended to use it as his own residence. On 29th July, in the course of correspondence which ensued, the Town Clerk stated that the Minister of Health wished him to emphasise that the defendant had committed an offence under the Defence Regulations, that he was a trespasser, and that the premises must be vacated forthwith. On 20th August, in a letter to the defendant’s Solicitors, the Minister of Health purported to confirm the Town Clerk’s actions, and on 28th November, the Minister, by letter to the Town Clerk, purported to ratify all the actions of the Town Clerk in connection with the premises. On the facts of the case, it was held that the original attempt at requisition on 20th June, was inoperative because, in breach of the conditions or limitations applicable to the delegated powers, the notice purported to requisition the house and its contents and contained no direction as to the exclusion or disposal of the chattels. It was further held that the result of the letters of 29th July, and 20th August, was not to effect a requisitioning of the premises by the Minister himself, because (a) the Minister had not in his sub-delegated legislation reserved power so to act ; and (b) the Minister did not, in fact, then requisition or take possession of the premises, and the Minister, when delegating his powers, had for the time being divested himself of those powers, and, therefore, he had no power to ratify the purported requisition of 20th June. At page 96, Scott, L.J. observed as follows:- “ In any area of local Government, where the Minister had by his Legislation transferred such powers to the local authority, he for the time being divested himself of those powers, and, out of the extremely wide executive powers, which the primary delegated legislation contained in Reg: 51 (1) had conferred on him to be exercised at his discretion, retained only those powers which in his subdelegated legislation he had expressly or impliedly reserved for himself.” This observation will have to be read in the context of the case, that is, the Minister cannot act in a particular case which he delegated to the Town Clerk. It does not support the view of the learned Counsel that when once there is a delegation, the authority that delegated the power is divested of all its powers. A Bench of this Court in a decision reported in P. Ramiah v. Chief Secretary2, did not accept the view propounded by Scott, L.J., but preferred the view expressed by Coleridge, C.J., and Wills, J., in Huth v. Clarke3, and held that merely because a person is authorised by the Government to exercise the power, the Government is not deprived of its powers. The notion that the use of the word ‘delegate ‘implies that the executive committee parted with their own authority is misconceived. It was sought to be contended that the view expressed by the Bench is in the nature of obiter. But I have no hesitation in respectfully accepting the view expressed by the Bench. The submissions of the learned Counsel that there will be considerable difficulty in the working of this rule is not made out. The Regional Transport Authority can deal with the case of cancellation as well as suspension, whereas the Secretary can only deal with the case of suspension. Even granting that this provision may lead to some working difficulties, that will not be a ground for holding that the delegation is not valid. All the contentions of the learned Counsel fail and all the Writ Petitions except W.P. No. 4397 of 1965 are dismissed with costs. Counsel’s fee Rs. 100 in each of the petitions. Even granting that this provision may lead to some working difficulties, that will not be a ground for holding that the delegation is not valid. All the contentions of the learned Counsel fail and all the Writ Petitions except W.P. No. 4397 of 1965 are dismissed with costs. Counsel’s fee Rs. 100 in each of the petitions. In addition to the points raised in the batch of petitions, in W.P. No. 4397 of 1965 it was contended that a warning was issued by the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority and that the issue of the warning cannot be sustained as it is not one of the punishments which the Regional Transport Authority’s Secretary is empowered to make. The order therefore will have to be set aside as being made without jurisdiction. But the matter will be remitted to the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, for fresh disposal. He will take the case afresh and dispose it of according to law after supplying all the documents and the information to which the petitioner is entitled to. There will be no order as to costs. R.M. ---------- All the Petitions except W.P.No. 4397 of 1963 dismissed.