JUDGMENT - This criminal revision application has been filed by the original accused No.2. Accused No.2, his father accused No.1, and 5 other persons were tried by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Murud for offences of house trespass and lurking house trespass punishable under ss. 448 and 454 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Magistrate convicted accused Nos. 1 and 2 under s. 448 of the Indian Penal Code, and sentenced each of them, to pay a fine of Rs. 125 and in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one month. The remaining accused were acquitted by the learned Magistrate. Accused Nos. 1 and 2 went in appeal to the Sessions Court of Kolaba. Accused No.1 died during the pendency of the appeal. The learned Sessions Judge of Kolaba confirmed the order of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Magistrate and dismissed the appeal. From this order accused No. 2 has approached this Court in revision. 2. The alleged trespass was in Municipal House No. 11-59 situate at Murud in Kolaba District. The facts found by the Courts below are that the complainant Prabhakar Ramchandra Karkhanis had been in possession of this house for a number of years. He was in occupation of the house when he was staying at Murud, and after he was transferred from Murud, his friend Bapu Bhagat managed the property for him. Bapu Bhagat leased out the property to certain tenants and those tenants were paying rent at the rate of Rs. 15 per month. After the tenants left, the house was looked and the key of the lock was with Bapu Bhagat on behalf of the complainant. In the year 1939, the house had stood in the name of accused No. 1 as its owner in the Municipal records. From the year 1942-43, however, the Municipal records showed the complainant as the owner of the house. The complainant was paying the property tax to the Municipality in respect of the house, and even after the house remained locked, articles belonging to the complainant were admittedly in the house. While the complainant claimed to be the owner of the house, the contention of accused No. 2 was that the house was purchased by his grand-father in 1916 and that his father accused No.1 was the owner of the house at the time of the alleged offence. While the complainant claimed to be the owner of the house, the contention of accused No. 2 was that the house was purchased by his grand-father in 1916 and that his father accused No.1 was the owner of the house at the time of the alleged offence. On November 4, 1964, accused No.1 gave a notice to the complainants father, the complainant, and the complainants brothers, that they were merely licensees in the house, that their licence was terminated by the notice, that they should vacate the house within four days, and that the necessary legal steps would be, taken if they failed to do so. On the day of the alleged offence, which took place on November 27, 1964-, accused Nos. 1 and 2 along with some other persons went to the house with a view to break open the lock and effect an entry therein. Bapu Bhagat, who was looking after the house on behalf of the complainant, came to the spot and protested to the accused. But despite his protests accused Nos. 1 and 2 broke open the lock, entered into the house, collected and put the articles belonging to the complainant in one room and sealed the room, and took possession of the house. Bapu Bhagat sent a telegram to the complainant of what had happened; whereupon the complainant went to Murud, made enquiries, arid filed a com. plaint which resulted in the trial and conviction of accused Nos. 1 and 2 as stated above. 3. The defence of accused Nos. 1 and 2 was that they did not receive any reply to the notice dated November 4, 1964, that accused No.2 went thereafter to Bombay and met the complainants father, that the complainants father asked accused No.2 to take possession of the house and keep the complainants articles aside at one place, and that therefore the entry effected by accused Nos. 1 and 2 into the house did not constitute the offence of criminal trespass. Alternatively, it was contended on behalf of the accused that accused No. I was the owner of the house and that the alleged trespass of the accused did not amount to a criminal offence as the accused acted in a bona fide assertion of their title to the house. In convicting accused Nos. Alternatively, it was contended on behalf of the accused that accused No. I was the owner of the house and that the alleged trespass of the accused did not amount to a criminal offence as the accused acted in a bona fide assertion of their title to the house. In convicting accused Nos. 1 and 2 under s. 448 of the Indian penal Code and in confirming their conviction, these defences were negatived by the learned Magistrate and the learned Sessions Judge respectively. 4. On behalf of the accused Mr. Karnik strenuously urged before me that accused Nos. 1 and 2 had acted in bona fide assertion of their title to the house, and that it was therefore wrong in law to hold that their act amounted to a criminal trespass. In this connection Mr. Karnik pointed out that the complainant did not produce any sale-deed in respect of his claim to the owner. ship of the house, and that, although the accused also had not produced any sale-deed of the house, it was in evidence that the house stood in the name of accused No. 1 in the Municipal records in 1939, and there was also some evidence to the effect that the father of the complainant had been in the service of the accused. Mr. Karnik argued that the above evidence was sufficient to establish that accused Nos. 1 and 2 had a bona fide claim to the title of the house and that the entry effected by them in the house in assertion of that right cannot amount to criminal trespass. 5. I do not find it possible to accept these contentions of Mr. Karnik. It cannot be disputed that the house had been in the possession of the complainant for a number of years. The complaint used to occupy the house, and after he was transferred from Murud, the house was in the occupation of, his tenants. At the time of the alleged offence the house was closed and locked" and the key of the lock was with the complainants agent Bapu Bhagat. The house stood in the name of the complainant in the Municipal records for about 22 years prior to the date of the offence. The property tax of the house was also being paid by the complainant. Now, it may be that despite these fact accused Nos. The house stood in the name of the complainant in the Municipal records for about 22 years prior to the date of the offence. The property tax of the house was also being paid by the complainant. Now, it may be that despite these fact accused Nos. 1 and 2 might have believed bona fide that the title of the house still vested in them. The question, however, is whether they had any bona fide belief that they were entitled to effect an entry in the name. In the" circumstances of the case, it is impossible to hold that any such belief was entertained by the accused. On the contrary, the accused must have known that they were not entitled to enter the house except by due process of law. There, was no dispute in this case as to which party was in actual possession of the house. Since accused Nos. 1 and 2 were well aware that they had no right to effect an entry by breaking open the lock of the house, their action in effecting such an entry cannot be held to be in assertion of a bona fide claim. Accused Nos. 1 and 2, therefore, were rightly convicted under s. 448 of the Indian Penal Code. 6. In support of his argument, Mr. Karnik placed reliance on the following well-known passage from the judgment of the Privy Council in Sinnasamy v. The King:1 “Entry upon land, made under a bona fide claim of right, however ill founded, in law the claim may be, does not become criminal merely because a foreseen consequence of the entry is annoyance to the occupant. To establish criminal trespass " the prosecution must prove that the real or dominant intent of the entry was to commit an offence or to insult, intimidate or annoy the occupant, and that an1 claim of right was a mere cloak to cover the real intent, or at any rate constituted no more than a subsidiary intent." 7. It is obvious from the above passage that the "bona fide claim of right," which according to their Lordships prevents a trespass from being a. criminal offence, must be a claim with regard to the right to enter upon the: land. It is obvious from the above passage that the "bona fide claim of right," which according to their Lordships prevents a trespass from being a. criminal offence, must be a claim with regard to the right to enter upon the: land. It is the entry upon the land which must have been made under a bona fide claim of right in order that the entry may not amount to a criminal trespass. It follows that the defence of a bona fide claim of right is open only to a person who has a bona fide belief that he has a right to enter upon a land in question. In the present case the trespass of accused Nos. 1 and 2 would not have amounted to a criminal trespass if at the time when they effected an entry into the house they had believed bona fide that they were entitled to enter, into the house. As stated by me above they did not have any such bona fide belief. On the contrary, they must have been well aware that they were not; entitled to enter into the house except by due process of law. 8. Reliance was also placed by Mr. Karnik on an observation or Mr. Justice Raju in Marotrao Ganpatrao v. State.2 There a finding of the trial Magistrate that there was no prima facie case of an offence of criminal trespass under s. 447 of the Indian Penal Code was upheld by the learned Judge. The complainant in that case claimed to be the tenant of a certain land, and the accused was a servant of the owner of the land. The accused bad gone with bullocks and implements to the land and ploughed it in the absence of the complainant. The reason why the trial Magistrate held that there was no prima facie case of an offence of criminal trespass was that the complainant was not the tenant of the land but was granted the mere right of taking away the grass growing on the land. It is clear from the judgment of Mr. Justice Raju that he concurred with this finding of the learned Magistrate. It is clear from the judgment of Mr. Justice Raju that he concurred with this finding of the learned Magistrate. If the complainant was not a tenant of the land, or if there was bona fide dispute as to whether he was a tenant of the land, it would follow that the owner of the land or his servant (the accused in the case) had a bona fide claim to enter upon the land and to plough it. Thus the decision of Mr. Justice Raju is not at variance with the view which I am inclined to take in the present case. In his judgment, however, Mr. Justice Raju made the following observation on which reliance was placed by Mr. Karnik (p.50l): “……The dominant intention of the landlord must have been to take possession of the field for his own pecuniary advantage and not to insult, intimidate or annoy the complainant." 9. In view of what I have stated about the ratio of the case, this observation of the learned Judge must be looked upon as an obiter remark. If the learned Judge intended to say that a person who takes possession of immoveable property for his Own pecuniary advantage does not have the intention to insult, intimidate or annoy an occupant, and is therefore not guilty of criminal trespass, I am, with respect, not in agreement with that view. In most oases of criminal trespass the motive of the trespasser is to secure some pecuniary advantage for himself. His action does not cease to be an offence on account of the selfishness of his motive. It is necessary in such cases to make a distinction between motive and intention. A trespasser may have the motive to secure a pecuniary advantage for himself and yet in the absence of a bona fills claim to possession of the property in question, his intention in effecting an entry on the property may be to insult, intimidate or annoy the occupant. In the presets case, since accused Nos. 1 and 2 had no bona fide claim to the possession of the house, they must be held to have intended to annoy the complainant or the complainants agent, who was looking after the house. 10. The learned trial Magistrate had ordered in the present Case that possession of the house should be restored to the complainant under s. 522 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 10. The learned trial Magistrate had ordered in the present Case that possession of the house should be restored to the complainant under s. 522 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Mr. Karnik argued that this order was not justified because the alleged offence of accused Nos. 1 and 2 was not attended by criminal force or show of force or criminal intimidation. The finding of the learned Magistrate, however, was that accused Nos. 1 and 2 effected an entry into the house by show of force against the complainants agent Bapu Bhagat, and I do not see any reason to depart from that finding. 11. In the result this revision application fails and is dismissed. Application dismissed.