JUDGMENT : Misra, J. - The Petitioner, United Bank of India Limited, is the decree-holder in Execution Case No. 125 of 1958. Opposite party No. 1, Dolgobinda Sahu, is the decree-holder). Execution Case No. 15 of 1962 against the very judgment-debtor Nimai Charan Das, opposite party No. 2. The disputed property was put to sale in Execution Case No. 125 of 1958 and was purchased by a third party for Rs. 350/ - on 6-8-1954. One Fakir Charan Mohanty deposited the entire decretal dues of Rs. 244. 39 paise in full satisfaction with the five percent compensation money under Order 21, Rule 19, Code of Civil Procedure. The sale was set aside on 6-10-1964. Opposite party no 1 filed an application for rateable distribution of the amount deposited in Execution Case No. 15 of 1958 on the basis that the deposit constituted assets u/s 73 of the CPC Code. The Petitioner opposed the application asserting that the deposit made under Order 21, Rule 89 was not subject to rateable distribution. Opposite party No. l's application was allowed on 18-12-1964 with a direction that the deposit made under Order 21, Rule 39 would be rateably distributed between the Petitioner and opposite party No. 1. Against this order, the civil revision has been filed. 2. The only point raised by Mr. Roy is that the Court below acted illegally in exercise of its jurisdiction in holding that the deposit made under Order 21, Rule 89, was subject to treatable distribution u/s 73 of the Code. As there is conflict of authority on this point, it requires careful examination. 3. Section 7: of the Code deals with distribution of assets amongst rival creditors against the same judgment-debtor. Section 73, so far as is relevant, may be quoted Section 73(1) Where assets are held by a Court and more persons than one have, before the receipt of such assets, made application to the Court for the execution of decrees for the payment of money passed against the same judgment-debtor and have not obtained satisfaction thereof, the assets, after deducting the cost of realisation, shall be rateably distributed among all such persons. In this case, the Petitioner and opposite-party No. 1 have filed execution applications for the payment of money passed against the same judgment-debtor (opposite party No. 2) and have not obtained satisfaction of the decrees. In this case, the Petitioner and opposite-party No. 1 have filed execution applications for the payment of money passed against the same judgment-debtor (opposite party No. 2) and have not obtained satisfaction of the decrees. All the other conditions prescribed in Section 73 have thus been fully satisfied. The amount deposited under Order 21, Rule 89 is to be rateably contributed between the Petitioner and opposite party No. 1 only if it is construed as "assets held by a Court". The view which appealed to the learned Subordinate Judge was that "assets" are not qualified or restricted. Deposits under Order 21, Rule 86 are assets held by a Court. On the plain language of the Order, deposits made under Order 21, Rule 89 cannot be excluded from the ambit of the word "assets" Bhattoo Singh Vs. Raghunandan Prasad Singh and Another, supports such a view. Their Lordships observed that an money paid by a judgment debtor in Court under stress of execution before sale, whether to avoid attachment or whether made at an earlier or late stage, should be treated as assets held by the Court liable to rateable distribution u/s 73, and that the money paid into Court under Order 21, Rule 89 ought not to be exempted from this category. 4. The opposite view that the money paid under Order 21 Rule 89 does not come within the meaning of "assets" in Section 73, is represented by Pannalal v. Lakshona AIR 1952 Cat 240. According to this line of thought, the deposit under Order 21, Rule 89 is taken by the Court expressly for two specified objects as mentioned in the Rule. According to this line of thought, the deposit under Order 21, Rule 89 is taken by the Court expressly for two specified objects as mentioned in the Rule. To appreciate the conflict of thought, Order 21, Rule 89 with the Orissa Amendment, so far as is relevant, may be quoted Rule 89.(1) Where immovable property has been Bold in execution of a decree, the judgment-debtor or any person deriving title through the judgment-debtor or any person holding an interest in the property at the date of the application under this rule, may apply to have the sale set aside on his depositing in Court (a) for payment to the purchaser, a Sum equal to five per cent of the purchase-money, and (b) for payment to the decree-holder, the amount specified in the proclamation of sale as that for the recovery of which the sale was ordered, less any amount which may, since the date of such proclamation of sale, have been received by the decree-holder. The plain language of Order 21, Rule 89 shows that the deposit to be made to set aside the sale has two specified, objectives, namely, for payment to the purchaser a sum equal to five per cent of the purchase-money and for payment to the decree-holder the amount specified in the proclamation of sale as that for the recovery of which the sale was ordered. This clearly refers to the recovery of the amount as specified in the particular proclamation of sale on the basis of which the sale had taken place. Order 21, Rule 89 thus makes it unequivocally clear that the deposit made must be applied to the two objects enumerated in the rule and cannot be utilised for any other purpose. Section 73 is a general provision with regard to assets held by the Court. Order 21, Rule 89 is a special provision with regard to the deposit made under that rule. The special provision must be given full effect. Both the provisions must be read together. To give effect to both the provisions, the reasonable conclusion would be that the deposit made under Order 21, Rule 89 should be excluded from the ambit of Section 73. 5. The aforesaid conclusion is reinforced by a further consideration that in some other provisions in Order 21, specific reference has been made to rateable distribution unlike in Order 21, Rule 89. 5. The aforesaid conclusion is reinforced by a further consideration that in some other provisions in Order 21, specific reference has been made to rateable distribution unlike in Order 21, Rule 89. In Order 21, Rule 72(2) there is a clear reference to Section 72. It says that where the decree-holder purchases the property, the purchase money and the amount due on the decree may, subject to the provisions of Section 73, be set off against one another, and the Court executing the decree shall enter up satisfaction of the decree in whole or in part accordingly. In Order 21, Rule 83(2), there is a reference to Rule 72 which itself is subject to the provisions of Section 73. In Order 21, Rule 90, the language used is that any person entitled to share in a rateable distribution of assets can make an application. It would thus appear that where the decree- bolder is intended to include persons who are entitled to rateable distribution, clear provision is made in the Code. This is a very strong ground in support of the conclusion that the deposit made under Order 21, Rule 89 has been excluded from the ambit of assets in Section 73. 6. There is still more a stronger ground in support of this view. Under Order 21, Rule 82(1)(a), five per cent deposit shall be made to be paid as solatium or compensation to the purchaser in case the sale is set aside. Indisputably the decree-holder is not entitled to take this amount when the sale is set aside. This compensation is provided for the purchaser who suffers the loss on account of the sale being set aside and not confirmed in his favour. If the deposit under Order 21, Rule 89 would constitute "assets" within the ambit of Section 78, the decree-holders should also be entitled to rateable distribution of this amount. Law is, however, to the contrary. There is no particular reason to exclude a part of the deposit from the ambit of assets and to hold the other part coming within it. 7. The various reasons discussed above are very weighty and I am inclined to accept Bijoy Singh Vs. Bilasroy and Co., as laying;, down the correct law. The same view has been - taken in; AIR 1954 Mad 581 and D.C. Johar and Sons Ltd. Vs. 7. The various reasons discussed above are very weighty and I am inclined to accept Bijoy Singh Vs. Bilasroy and Co., as laying;, down the correct law. The same view has been - taken in; AIR 1954 Mad 581 and D.C. Johar and Sons Ltd. Vs. Mathew learned Single Judge has taken a different view in 1961 K.L.T. 767, that his attention was not drawn to the aforesaid Division Bench decision of that Court in AIR 1961 Ker 106 8. To sum up, the view that a deposit made under Order 21, Rule 89, CPC does not come with the ambit of assets in Section 73 of the Code is correct. Opposite party No. 1 is not, therefore, entitled to rateable distribution in the deposit made under Order 21, Rule 89. 9. In the result, the judgment of the learned Sub-ordinate Judge is set aside and the revision is allowed. As there is no appearance for opposite party No. 1, there will be no order as to costs. Revision allowed. Final Result : Allowed