ORDER Gangeshwar Prasad, J. - These are two connected Execution Appeals, Appeal No. 704 of 1953 has been filed by the decree-holder whereas Appeal No. 1809 of 1955 has been filed by the judgment-debtor. Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava obtained a decree for profits against Chaubey Rudra Dutta in suit No. 12 of 1938 and Chaubey Rudra Dutta obtained, a decree for profits against Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava in suit No. 14 of 1938. On 10-2-1942 Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava made an application for the execution, of the decree passed in his favour in suit No. 12 of 1938 and prayed that the decree against him in suit No. 14 of 1938 be attached. Chaubey Rudra Datta objected to execution of the decree on the ground that the decree had been satisfied as a result of an adjustment out of court which was incorporated in what was described as order No. 91 dated 28-2-1939 of the estate of Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava known, as the Nawal Kishore Estate and contended that the decree was no longer executable. The Assistant Collector held that the adjustment did not cover the decree in question and overruled the objection, but on appeal the decision of the Assistant Collector was reversed; by the Civil Judge who held that the decree had been satisfied as a result of an adjustment and was not (sic) of being executed. Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava decree-holder has come up in appeal to this Court against the above order of the Civil Judge, Chaubey Rudra Dutta judgment-debtor died during the pendency of the appeal in this Court and his re-preventatives have been brought on record in his place. 2. It is no, longer in dispute that an adjustment was effected between the, parties by means of order No. 91 of 28-2-1939 and that the adjustment covered the decree in question. It is also not in dispute that the amount which, under the terms of the adjustment, the judgment-debtor was required to pay to the decree-holder in complete satisfaction of all the claims that the latter had against the former was paid within, the agreed period of time. The contention on behalf of the decree holder, however, is that the decree is executable in spite of the adjustment. The grounds on which this contention is advanced; are two. The contention on behalf of the decree holder, however, is that the decree is executable in spite of the adjustment. The grounds on which this contention is advanced; are two. Firstly, the adjustment was hot certified or recorded under Or XXI, Rule 2(1) or Rule 2(2), CPC and consequently it cannot be recognised by the court: executing the, decree. Secondly, since under the adjustment all claims of the judgment-debtor against the decree-holder including claims under decrees were also treated as fully satisfied and since, in disregard of the terms of the adjustment, the judgment-debtor had executed the decree passed in his favour in suit No. 14 of 1938, the degree-holder was no longer bound by the adjustment and could execute his own decree. 3. In reply to the first ground reliance on behalf of the judgment debtor is placed on the statement made by the decree-holder in his application for execution and it is urged that the Statement amounted to a certification and the question of any bar to its recognition by the court executing the decree does not therefore, arise. The entry in column. 5 of the application for execution is to the effect that there was a mutual adjustment between the parties by means of order No. 91 of 28-2-1939 but as the, judgment-debtor did not abide by and accept its terms and executed his decree of suit; No. 14 of 1938 in disregard of the adjustment, the adjustment became void, in effective and extinct and the decree-holder was, relegated to the rights which he had prior to the adjustment. I may here point out that the original application for execution was amended and substituted by another application dated 21-3-1942, arid the entry in column 5, of the second application is more detailed and explicit 4. This statement of the decree-holder unmistakably shows that the decree-holder admitted the fact of the adjustment having been arrived at and intimated it to the courts. It is true that, according to the statement, the decree-holder regarded himself as no longer bound by the adjustment, but he undoubtedly affirmed that an adjustment did come into existence. This statement of the decree-holder unmistakably shows that the decree-holder admitted the fact of the adjustment having been arrived at and intimated it to the courts. It is true that, according to the statement, the decree-holder regarded himself as no longer bound by the adjustment, but he undoubtedly affirmed that an adjustment did come into existence. Indeed, the statement that as a result of the judgment-debtor having acted contrary to the terms of the adjustment the decree-holder could exercise the rights which he possessed under the decree and the adjustment had lost all force and effect emphasised the fact that an adjustment had been reached and had become operative. Mr. G.P. Bhargava learned Counsel for the decree-holder, submitted that the entry in Col. 5 of the execution application amounts to an averment of a mere inchoate arrangement and not of a completed adjustment. The words used in the application, however, preclude such a construction. What, then, is the effect of the statement so for as the requirement of certification is concerned? 5. It cannot be disputed that there is no period of limitation prescribed for a certification by the decree-holder. Reference may be made to the decision of the Privy Council in AIR 1929 19 (Privy Council) and to the Full Bench decision of this Court in Vidyadhar Vs. Ramzan and Another, AIR 1952 All 715 . B. Malik, C.J., who delivered the judgment of the Full Bench, after referring to the Privy Council decision mentioned above observed: The decision, therefore, makes it abundantly clear that there is no provision in the Limitation Act for a certification by a decree-holder and that the decree-holder can certify such payment even after the period of limitation even if the execution of the decree is barred but for such payment. His Lordship further said: As we have already pointed out Order XXI, Rule 2, CPC does not require any application to be filed by the decree-holder, nor is the court required to issue any notice or enquire into the validity or correctness of the certificate. 6. The contention of Mr. G.P. Bhargava is that even if a certification by a decree-holder may by made at any time and is not subject to any provision of limitation a statement made in the execution application regarding an adjustment would not constitute a certification. 6. The contention of Mr. G.P. Bhargava is that even if a certification by a decree-holder may by made at any time and is not subject to any provision of limitation a statement made in the execution application regarding an adjustment would not constitute a certification. According to the learned Counsel the court executing the decree can recognise only such certification by the decree-holder as has been made prior to the execution of the decree--I am, however, unable to discover any basis for this requirement. No particular form of certification by the decree-holder has been prescribed by the code and it would be an unjustified extension of the bar imposed by Order XXI, Rule 3, CPC to hold that the certification by the decree-holder should be in a particular form or should have been made before the execution application is filed. Indeed, a statement duly made in column 5 of the execution application should stand on a better footing than an information regarding payment or adjustment otherwise conveyed to the court. It is on the basis of an application for execution that proceedings for execution commence and the decree-holder is required to state in column 5 of his application whether any payment or adjustment has been made. It cannot, therefore, be legitimately urged that the executing court may recognise only an intimation of payment or adjustment given by the decree-holder before the filing of the execution application and should refuse to recognise a payment or adjustment mentioned in the execution application itself. The principle underlying the bar created by Order XXI, Rule 3, CPC appears to be that the executing court should not be called upon to investigate payment or adjustments which have not been certified or recorded in accordance with Order XXI, Rule 2(1) or Rule 2(2), Code of Civil Procedure. Surely, if the decree-holder states in the execution application itself that a payment has been made or an adjustment has been effected an investigation of the fact of payment or adjustment is rendered wholly unnecessary. I am, therefore, clearly of the opinion that a statement as to payment or adjustment made in Column 5 of an execution application is a proper certification and the executing court is not precluded from recognising it by Order XXI, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure. I may here draw attention to Ram Sarup Vs. I am, therefore, clearly of the opinion that a statement as to payment or adjustment made in Column 5 of an execution application is a proper certification and the executing court is not precluded from recognising it by Order XXI, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure. I may here draw attention to Ram Sarup Vs. Mahomed Ubaidulla Khan where the same view was taken and it was held that a mention in column 5 of the application for execution is sufficient certification under the law. Mr. G.P. Bhargava sought to place reliance on two cases of this Court in support of his arguments, but they do not appear to be of any assistance to him. These cases are: Mst. Champi Bai v. Pearey Lal 1937 AWR. 1200 and Abid Husain v. Kunj Behari Lal 1939 AWR (HC) 635. In the first case Allsop, J. observed that where the decree-holder certifies adjustment the court to whom the certificate is supplied is not required to go into the question whether there has or has not been an adjustment as stated and the learned Judge proceeded to laydown that the certificate of the decree-holder is sufficient and all that the court need do is to say that the certificate shall be kept on the record of the proceedings. Obviously, this case does not bear on the question under consideration. In the second case it was held by Verma, (as he then was) that a certificate of payments by the decree-holder must be made before the controversy has arisen and not after the judgment-debtor has filed his objection stating that he has made such payments. In the instant case, however, the entry in Col. 5 was made by the decree-holder before the controversy regarding the adjustment arose. I may here note that the decision in the case of Ram Swarup v. Mohmmed Ubaidulla Khan (Supra) was cited before Verma, J. (as he then was) and he expressed his agreement with it. The result is that the adjustment effected between the parties on 28-2-1939 must be regarded as having been certified by the decree-holder and the court executing the decree was not barred from recognising it. The result is that the adjustment effected between the parties on 28-2-1939 must be regarded as having been certified by the decree-holder and the court executing the decree was not barred from recognising it. Whether an adjustment lost its binding force and effect on account of a subsequent event is a matter different from whether an adjustment had been made and the fact that the decree-holder asserts that the adjustment lost its force and effect does not amount to a denial or detrect from his affirmation that an adjustment had been made. 7. I may now proceed to deal with the second ground on which Mr. G.P. Bhargava has rested his contention that the decree is capable of being executed. It does appear that the judgment-debtor executed the decree obtained by him in suit No. 14 of 1938 against the decree-holder, although his claim under the decree had been wiped of by the adjustment. But the question is whether that conduct of the judgment-debtor could have the effect of nullifying the adjustment and reviving the claim of the decree-holder under his decree. The answer appears to be plainly in the negative. The adjustment operated as an immediate extinction of the claims that the parties had against each other. Under its terms the judgment-debtor was required to make certain payments to the decree-holder and he did so. The adjustment was, therefore, not in the nature of a mere contract of which the judgment-debtor committed a breach by putting his own decree into execution. Under the adjustment there was not merely an obligation imposed upon the judgment-debtor not to execute his decree against the decree-holder but there; was a complete effacement then and there of the claim of the judgment-debtor under that decree as also of all claims that the parties had against each other. In taking out execution of the decree passed in suit No. 14 of 1938 the judgment-debtor did not repudiate a contract but tried to enforce a claim which had ceased to exist and to execute a decree which had become satisfied. The argument that the decree-holder may now ignore the adjustment and execute his decree is, therefore, unsound. In taking out execution of the decree passed in suit No. 14 of 1938 the judgment-debtor did not repudiate a contract but tried to enforce a claim which had ceased to exist and to execute a decree which had become satisfied. The argument that the decree-holder may now ignore the adjustment and execute his decree is, therefore, unsound. The fact that one party has attempted to enforce a claim which had ceased to exist on account of an adjustment cannot entitle the other party to enforce another claim which had likewise ceased to exist as a result of that adjustment. An adjustment cannot be equated with a mere contract which may be rescinded or be put an end to by one party by reason of the fact that the other party has repudiated it or refused to abide by it and carry it out. Mr. G.P. Bhargava did not specifically refer to Section 39 of the Contract Act but it appears that he had in mind the principle embodied in that section when he urged that the conduct of the judgment-debtor empowered the decree-holder to regard the adjustment as having been obliterated and to execute his decree against the judgment-debtor. Section 39 of the Contract Act runs as follows: When a party to a contract has refused to perform or disabled himself from performing his promise in its entirety, the promise may put to end to the contract, unless he has signified, by words or conduct, his acquiescence in its continuance. It is obvious that the adjustment by virtue of which a claim is deemed to be satisfied and is wiped off is not a contract which needs performance. I may only refer in this connection to Sheikh Sultan Ahmad Vs. Syed Maksad Hussain @ Bhakur and Another, AIR 1944 Patna 3 , where it was held by a Division Bench that the section applies to cases of what are called 'executory' contracts and not to 'executed' contracts. 8. For the reasons stated above I hold that the decree obtained by the decree-holder in suit No. 12 of 1938 has been satisfied and his application for execution has rightly been dismissed. 9. Execution Second Appeal No. 1809 of 1955 arises in the following circumstances. 8. For the reasons stated above I hold that the decree obtained by the decree-holder in suit No. 12 of 1938 has been satisfied and his application for execution has rightly been dismissed. 9. Execution Second Appeal No. 1809 of 1955 arises in the following circumstances. In 1951 the decree-holder made an application in the execution proceedings started on the application dated 10-2-1942, praying for attachment of an immovable property belonging to the judgment-debtor. The judgment-debtor filed an objection contending that the application was not maintainable, having been filed beyond twelve years from the date of the decree. Both the courts below have dismissed the objection and the execution has been directed to proceed. In view of the fact that the decree has been satisfied and is no longer capable of being executed it is not necessary to decide whether the application for attachment of the immovable property of the judgment-debtor was barred by time. The appeal filed by the judgment-debtor has to be allowed on the basis that the decree is not capable of being executed. 10. In the result Execution Second Appeal No. 704 of 1953 is dismissed and Execution Second Appeal No. 1809 of 1955 is allowed. In the circumstances of the case the parties are directed to bear their own costs in all the courts in both the cases.