Judgment U.N.Sinha, J. 1. This appeal has been filed by the defendant first party. It arises out of a suit instituted by the plaintiffs for declaration of their title to and for confirmation of their possession of .02 acre of land out of homestead plot No. 5550 of Mouza Rukhai, Tola Babhan Than, which had an area of .09 acre. In the alternative, the plaintiffs had also asked for a decree for recovery of possession. The plaintiffs had also asked, in the alternative, as a last resort, for a decree for Rs. 750 against their vendors, impleaded as defendants second party. The trial court had decreed the suit and had given a decree for confirmation of the plaintiffs possession. On appeal by the defendant first party, the decree passed by the trial court has been affirmed with a modification. The plaintiffs title has been accepted and in place of a decree for confirmation of possession, a decree has been passed in favour of the plaintiffs for joint possession. It has further been held that the plaintiffs are entitled to get separate possession of the property purchased by them after partition. 2. The facts are as follows:- -The plaintiffs alleged that one Jhaman Mahton of Babhan Than had two sons named Bhattu Mahton and Hittu Mahton alias Hitnarain. The properties of Jhaman had come to his sons and they had been recorded jointly in the survey record of rights. Bhattu had two sons named Ganesh Mahton, defendant No. 1 (the appellant in this appeal) and Shri Mahton defendant No. 3 Hittu was married to mosst. Pokhno Kuer daughter of Narain Choudhary of village Bhashmi Bigha. As Narain Choudhary had no other issue except this daughter, he had executed a deed of gift in respect of his properties at Bashmi Bigha in favour of his daughter, in 1940. As Hitnarain had no issue, Siri used to live at Bhashmi Bigha with Mosst, Pokhno Kuer, with his family. In due course, Bhattu and Hittu died and Ganesh and Siri came in possession of all the properties of Jhaman in Tola Babhan Than. Thereafter, Mosst. Pokhno also died, leaving Ganesh and Siri as her heirs. Thus Ganesh and Siri came in possession of the properties of village Bhashmi Bigha also. In due course, Bhattu and Hittu died and Ganesh and Siri came in possession of all the properties of Jhaman in Tola Babhan Than. Thereafter, Mosst. Pokhno also died, leaving Ganesh and Siri as her heirs. Thus Ganesh and Siri came in possession of the properties of village Bhashmi Bigha also. It was alleged that there was a partition between Ganesh and Siri about six years before the institution of the suit, by which Siri got the house and the land of village Bhashmi Bigha and 1.55 acres of culturable land and .04 acre of homestead land from the north of plot No. 5550 in village Rukhai. This property has been described in Schedule 3 of the plaint. It was said that Ganesh got 3.42 acres of land in Tola Babhan Than, including .05 acre of homestead land of plot No. 5550. This property has been described in Schedule 4 of the plaint. It was alleged that Siri Mahton sold .02 acre out of .04 acre of homestead land of plot No. 5550 to the plaintiffs by a registered sale deed dated the 19th November, 1953. This land has been described in Schedule 5 of the plaint. In this litigation, the contesting parties are not really concerned with another sale said to have been made by Siri of .02 acre of land of plot No. 5550 to the pro forma defendants, mentioned in Schedule 6 of the plaint. The plaintiffs alleged that they had come in possession over the disputed land purchased by them from Siri Mahton and there was interference with their possession for which this suit had to be instituted. 3. The suit was contested by defendant No. 1, who was the defendant first party. The substance of this defendants case was as follows: It was contended that Siri Mahton, defendant No. 3, had no concern with the family of Jhaman Mahton. Bhattu was said to have one son named Ganesh, The story of partition set up by the plaintiffs between Ganesh and Siri was denied. According to this defendant, Siri Mahton, defendant No. 3, had been falsely set up to be a member of this family. The plaintiffs case that Siri Mahton had put the plaintiffs in possession of the disputed portion of plot No. 5550 was denied. Thus, the plaintiffs suit was contested. 4. According to this defendant, Siri Mahton, defendant No. 3, had been falsely set up to be a member of this family. The plaintiffs case that Siri Mahton had put the plaintiffs in possession of the disputed portion of plot No. 5550 was denied. Thus, the plaintiffs suit was contested. 4. The trial court came to the conclusion that Siri Mahton defendant No. 3, was a brother of Ganesh Mahton, both being sons of Bhattu Mahton. The case of partition relied upon by the plaintiffs was accepted and the suit was decreed as stated above. The principal points formulated by the court of appeal below for determination were whether Siri Mahton, defendant No. 3, was brother of Ganesh Mahton or not, and whether the casa of partition put forward by the plaintiffs was true or false. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge, who has decided the appeal, has held, concurring with the trial court, that Siri Mahton was brother of Ganesh Mahton. But, upon the question of partition, the learned Judge has disagreed with conclusions of the trial court. The learned Judge has held that the plaintiffs had failed to prove their case of partition. As a matter of fact, the finding of the court of appeal below in this context is to the effect that there was no partition between Ganesh Mahton and Siri Mahton, and, therefore, the disputed land had not fallen to the share of Siri Mahton, so that he could have been in exclusive possession over it. On these conclusions, the learned Additional Subordinate Judge has held that Siri Mahton had valid title to the extent of his share in plot No. 5550 and he was in joint possession with Ganesh Mahton, and the plaintiffs have acquired valid title to the disputed property by virtue of the sale deed dated the 19th November, 1953. Thus, as indicated above, a decree for the plaintiffs confirmation of joint possession has been passed, holding that they are entitled to get separate possession after partition. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that on the conclusion arrived at by the learned Additional Subordinate Judge to the effect that there had not been any partition between Ganesh and Siri, as alleged by the plaintiffs, the purported sale by Siri on the 19th November, 1953 of any specific property was void. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that on the conclusion arrived at by the learned Additional Subordinate Judge to the effect that there had not been any partition between Ganesh and Siri, as alleged by the plaintiffs, the purported sale by Siri on the 19th November, 1953 of any specific property was void. According to the learned counsel, a decree passed in favour of the plaintiffs for joint possession of any specific joint family property, purported to have been sold by a member of the joint Hindu family was illegal and ought to be reversed. Prima facie, this contention raised by the learned counsel is of force, and the learned Advocate-General, appearing for the plaintiffs respondents, has put forward the following argument. It is urged that the word "partition" has two connotations, one of severance of status and the other of partition of properties by metes and bounds. It is contended that although there is a finding of the court of appeal below to the effect that there was no partition of properties between Ganesh and Siri, that finding is not tantamount to a finding that Ganesh and Siri were members of a joint family in 1953 or that there had not been a severance of status on the 19th November, 1963, when Siri Mahton had purported to sell the disputed property to the plaintiffs. Upon certain documents exhibited as Exhibits 2 series and Exhibits A series, which are sale deeds and deeds of Ladavi respectively, it is argued by the learned Advocate-General that there was surely a severance of status between Ganesh and Siri from the 19th November, 1953 at least. What is meant is that Siri Mahton had purported to sell certain properties on the 19th November, 1953, and (hereafter as a separated member, and, therefore, from that day onwards. Ganesh and Siri were no longer members of the erstwhile joint Hindu family. Therefore, it is argued, that the plaintiffs were entitled to be put in joint possession of .02 acre of plot No. 5550. In my opinion, however, the contentions raised by the learned Advocate-General for a decree in favour of the plaintiffs in respect of any portion of plot No. 5550 cannot be accepted as valid. The plaintiffs had never put forward a case that Siri and Ganesh were not members of a Hindu joint family on the 19th November, 1953 and as such. The plaintiffs had never put forward a case that Siri and Ganesh were not members of a Hindu joint family on the 19th November, 1953 and as such. Siri was entitled to sell a portion of plot No. 5550 as a tenant-in-common. The plaintiffs case as given in the plaint is clear and categorical that Ganesh and Siri were members of a joint Hindu family until they had partitioned their properties, about six years before the institution of the suit, by which the properties were allotted in the specific manner given in the plaint. The effect of the sale deeds said to have been executed by Siri Mahton and the Ladavi deeds by the purchasers has been considered by both the courts below, in the light of the respective cases of the parties, that is to say, for the purpose of finding out whether Ganesh and Siri had partitioned their properties by metes and bounds, a little before the institution of the suit, or not. In any view of the matter, learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the recitals in the sale deed of Siri Mahton, as fur example, in the very sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs Exhibit 2(d) were that Siri was purporting to sell specific properties, because they were his, by virtue of a private partition in the family. It is argued that on the finding of the court of appeal below to the effect, that there had never been any partition, as alleged by the plaintiffs, these assertions by Siri Mahton cannot he cons-trued to mean that Siri Mahton was making a unilateral declaration of his intention to sever the joint status from the 19th November, 1953 onwards. This contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is not without force. There is no other evidence on record, to which my attention has been drawn, from which it can be held that although Ganesh and Siri may not have partitioned their properties, as alleged by the plaintiffs, Siri was separate in status from Ganesh, when he sold the disputed property to the plaintiffs. Therefore, in my opinion, it is clear from the finding of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, disbelieving the plaintiffs case of partition, that the decree for confirmation of possession is unsustainable. 6. So far as the plaintiffs claim for re-fund of Rs. Therefore, in my opinion, it is clear from the finding of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, disbelieving the plaintiffs case of partition, that the decree for confirmation of possession is unsustainable. 6. So far as the plaintiffs claim for re-fund of Rs. 750 from the defendants second party is concerned, it is clear from the record that Siri Mahton as P.W. 8 had admitted that he had purported to sell .02 acre to the plaintiffs. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge has mentioned in paragraph 13 of his judgment, that P W. 8, Siri Mahton does not dispute that he had sold homestead to the plaintiffs. It is clear, therefore, that this Court can pass the decree in favour of the plaintiffs against the defendants second party, which ought to have been passed by the trial court. I would, therefore, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the court of appeal below and substitute therefor a decree for Rs. 750 in favour of the plaintiffs against the defendants second party. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge has stated that in this case the parties shoull bear their own costs throughout and I think that position should prevail and the parties should bear their own costs of this litigation throughout.