JUDGMENT D.P. Uniyal, J. - This revision is directed against an order of discharge. 2. It is not disputed that there was a free fight between the parties in the afternoon of the 10th October, 1959 in the course of which knives and other lethal weapons were used, resulting in serious injuries to members of both the parties and death of a member of the opposite party. 3. Both parties were challenged by the police and two cross-cases were initiated, one against the applicant and his associates and another against six persons belonging to the opposite party. The case against the party of the applicant ended in acquittal, while the case against six persons belonging to the opposite party was pending trial. 4. The applicant filed a complaint against fourteen persons of the opposite party including the six challaned by the police. The Magistrate committed six of them only for trial and discharged the remaining eight persons. Against the order of discharge the complainant filed a revision before the Sessions Judge who upheld the order of the Magistrate on the ground that there were not sufficient grounds for committing the aforesaid eight persons for trial. 5. It has been contended by the learned counsel that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to assess and weigh the evidence in order to find out whether there were sufficient grounds for committing the accused persons for trial. It is said that the function of the Magistrate was merely to see if there were reasonable grounds to believe that the prosecution evidence was reliable. The Magistrate, so it was contended, had entered into the merits of the evidence as if he were trying the case himself. This, it was urged, he was not entitled to do. 6. Now three situations may arise when a Magistrate is called upon to decide whether the case before him is a fit one to be committed for trial. (1) Where the evidence is of a reliable character and there is no doubt about the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, the Magistrate has no option but to commit the accused for trial to the court of sessions. (1) Where the evidence is of a reliable character and there is no doubt about the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, the Magistrate has no option but to commit the accused for trial to the court of sessions. (2) Where the prosecution evidence is of a tainted character and, therefore, unreliable, the Magistrate will have no difficulty to refuse to accept the evidence and discharge the accused- (3) Lastly, where the prosecution evidence is of a conflicting nature and the Magistrate is in doubt whether the accused has committed the offence charged. In such circumstances it is his clear duty not to resolve the doubt but to commit the accused. 7. In the last mentioned case the determination as to whether the accused ought to be committed for trial or not will depend on the answer to the question whether on the probabilities of the case the evidence of the prosecution should be believed. This, in the very nature of things, is the function of the trial court and not of the committing court. It is not for the Magistrate to decide the case on the balance of the probabilities and to resolve the doubt created in his mind about the reliability of certain pieces of evidence. 8. It was contended by the learned counsel for the complainant that it was not open to the Magistrate to examine the evidence of the prosecution so as to assess it for the purpose of deciding whether the accused ought to be committed for trial or not. It seems to me that this contention ignores the important words of Sec. 209 (1), Cr. P. C. That section reads: Sec. 209(1) "When the evidence referred to in section 208, sub-Secs. (1) and (3), has been taken and he has (if necessary) examined the accused for the purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him, such Magistrate shall, if he finds that there are not sufficient grounds for committing the accused, person for trial, record his reasons and discharge him . . . ." 9. (1) and (3), has been taken and he has (if necessary) examined the accused for the purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him, such Magistrate shall, if he finds that there are not sufficient grounds for committing the accused, person for trial, record his reasons and discharge him . . . ." 9. By this section the Magistrate is required to decide as to whether there are "sufficient grounds for committing the accused person for trial." In this connection it is useful to refer to the language employed in sub-Sec. (6) of Sec. 207-A where it is provided that if the Magistrate is of the opinion that the evidence and documents "disclose no grounds for committing the accused persons for trial," he shall record his reasons and discharge them. Under sub-Sec. (6) of Sec. 207-A the Magistrate may make an order of discharge if he is of opinion that there are no grounds which can form basis for the committal of the accused. But where the 'Magistrate is of opinion that there are grounds to believe that the accused has committed the offence charged he ought to commit, even though the grounds for doing so may not be sufficient. The difference in the phraseology of the two sections is, therefore, of material significance. It goes to show that under Sec. 209 (1) the Magistrate has to record a finding that in his opinion there is evidence which, if believed, would establish a prima facie case: Bipat Gope v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1195.The sufficiency of the grounds is, therefore, a material factor, under Sec. 209 in deciding as to whether the accused ought to be committed or discharged. Surely a Magistrate can do this only by the method of examining the evidence in the light of its reliability or not otherwise. 10. The findings recorded by the Magistrate in the instant case were as follows : "There are two sets of witnesses in the present case. First of all I take up the second set as mentioned above, i.e., I will first take up the evidence of P. Ws. 5 to 8 and 10 to 11. Out of these witnesses, none of them named the accused in the present case." 11. First of all I take up the second set as mentioned above, i.e., I will first take up the evidence of P. Ws. 5 to 8 and 10 to 11. Out of these witnesses, none of them named the accused in the present case." 11. As regards the second set of witnesses, tie Magistrate held that no value could be attached to their statements as they v/ere partisans, and had figured as accused in the cross-case. It was on these grounds that the Magistrate discharged the accused. The Sessions Judge upheld the order of the Magistrate in these words: "There are salient features which per se demolished the complainant's case against the opposite parties. The complaint itself was highly delayed. The incident took place on 10th October, 1959 while the complaint was filed more than seven months after it on 25th May, 1960." Learned counsel for the complainant vehemently contended that the Magistrate had virtually tried the case and analysed the prosecution evidence as if it were a trial court.I am unable to accede to the contention of the learned counsel, for although the Magistrate had considered the evidence of the prosecution in sufficient detail he had not, usurped the function of the trial court. Had the prosecution evidence been partly reliable and partly unreliable it could have been reasonably argued that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to make an order of discharge. According to the findings of the Magistrate, which had been upheld by the sessions judge, the prosecution evidence was wholly unreliable, in the sense that no tribunal could have come to any other conclusion than that there was not sufficient evidence to commit the accused for trial. That' being so, I am of the opinion that the order of discharge passed by the Magistrate is legally valid. 12. I, therefore, see no force in this revision which is accordingly rejected.