Judgment R.L.Narasimham, J. 1. This is a Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment of a Single Judge of this court (Rai J.) in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 353 of 1957 by the unsuccessful party in an objection under Sec. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. The material facts are as follows. One Gaibi Dss (Respondent No. 1) obtained a money decree in Money Suit No. 230 of 1951 in the court of the Munsif, 2nd court, Bhagalpur, against a firm known as Chowdhary Silk Mills and its partners Bibhuli Bhman Chowdhry and Ajit Kumar Chowdhry. That decree was put in execution in Execution Case No. 105 of 1953 and the properties in dispute were auction-sold and purchased by the- decree-holder on the 17th March, 1954. The judgment-debtors, however, on the 12th March, 1954, filed a petition under sec. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code, which was registered as Miscellaneous Case No. 35 of 1954. One Kumud Kant Chowdhry, father of Bibhuti Bhushan Chowdhary and Ajit Kumar Chowdhry, filed a petition under Order 21, Rule 58, Civil Procedure Code, against the attachment of that property and that was numbered as Miscellaneous Case No, 36 of 1954. Later on Miscellaneous Case No. 35 of 1954 was compromised and Miscellaneous Case No. 36 of 1954 was withdrawn, on the undertaking that the entire money would be deposited by the 15th December, 1954, failing which the sale was to be confirmed and the claim case was to stand dismissed. As the money was not deposited on the due date, the sale in favour of Gaibi Das was made absolute on the 15th December, 1954. 2. The appellant Batik was also one of the creditors of the said Silk Mills and its partners. It also obtained a decree in Money Suit No. 146 of 1951, and in Execution Case No. 89 of 1953 purchased the property on the 12th April, 1951 The sale was confirmed on the 25th May, 1954, and delivery of possession was also obtained on the 4th June, 1954. Thus, though Gaibi Dass sale was earlier, namely, the 17th March, 1954, it was confirmed only on the 15th December, 1954, whereas the appellants sale though later, was confirmed earlier, i. e. on the 25th May, 1954. Gaibi Das claiming to be the representative in interest of the judgment-debtors, filed a petition under sec. Thus, though Gaibi Dass sale was earlier, namely, the 17th March, 1954, it was confirmed only on the 15th December, 1954, whereas the appellants sale though later, was confirmed earlier, i. e. on the 25th May, 1954. Gaibi Das claiming to be the representative in interest of the judgment-debtors, filed a petition under sec. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code in the Banks Execution case No. 89 of 1953. This was registered as Miscellaneous Case No. 21 of 1957. A preliminary objection was taken by the Bank to the maintainability of that petition on the ground that after the sale in favour of the Bank had been confirmed on the 25th May, 1954, and delivery of possession also had been taken on the 4th June, 1954, there could ba no further depute about the satisfaction of the decree, and that, consequently, Sec. 47, Civil Procedure Code, had no application. This and other matters were disposed of by the learned Subordinate Judge of Bhagalpur (the executing court) by an order dated the 20tli fune, 1957. He hold that though Money Execution Case No. 89 of 1953 was disposed of on full satisfaction by the Executing court, nevertheless a person claiming to be the successor-in-interest of the judgment-debtors could challenge the entire sale under Sec. 47 on the ground that on the date of the sale the judgment-debtors had no saleable interest and the entire sale was, therefore, void ab initio. According to the learned Subordinate Judge, the only restriction on his right is that provided by the law of limitation, namely, three years from the date of the sale, and so long as he was within this period of limitation, his right to challenge the sale by a petition under Sec. 47 was not taken away merely because the sale was confirmed and delivery of possession was also taken by the decree-holder-auction-purchaser. As already pointed out the learned subordinate Judge passed a distinct order respecting the preliminary objection on the ground of maintainability on the 20th June, 1957. In a subsequent order dated the 20th August, 1957, the learned Subordinate Judge discussed the main question of fact as to whether the disputed property belonged to the firm, namely Chowdhary Silk Mills, or else whether it was the self acquired property of Kumud Kant Chowdhry, the father of Bibhuti and Ajit Chowdhry. In a subsequent order dated the 20th August, 1957, the learned Subordinate Judge discussed the main question of fact as to whether the disputed property belonged to the firm, namely Chowdhary Silk Mills, or else whether it was the self acquired property of Kumud Kant Chowdhry, the father of Bibhuti and Ajit Chowdhry. He held that both the father and his two sons had interest in the Chowdhry Silk Mills which was one of the judgment-debtors in the decree obtained by Gaibi Das, and that, consequently though Kumud Kant Chowdhry was not a judgment-debtor in Gaibi Dass Execution case No. 105 of 1953 nevertheless as the Chowdhry Silk Mills was a party and he was one of the partners of the said Mills, his interest in the property also was extinguished by the sale. He further observed that Kumud Kant Chowdhrys conduct it) the claim case filed by him under Order 21, Rule 58, Civil Procedure Code (registered as Miscellaneous case No. 36 of 1954) was sufficient to show that he disclaimed all interest in the property. I have already pointed out that this claim case was withdrawn on the understanding that if the entire decretal money was not paid by the 15th December, 1954, the sale in favour of Gaibi Das would be confirmed and the claim case would be dismissed. Thus the claim case was dismissed and admittedly no suit was filed under Order 21, Rule 63, Civil Procedure Code. The learned Subordinate Judge, therefore, held that as Gaibi Das sale was earlier than that of the Bank, even though confirmed later, it must prevail, 3. The Bank filed an appeal which was heard by the learned Single Judge and dismissed on the 16th November, 1959. The appeal was against the order of the Subordinate Judge dated the 20th August, 1957, and it purported to be also an appeal against the order of the Subordinate Judge dated the 20th June, 1957, rejecting the preliminary objection as regards the maintainability of the appeal. 4. The appeal was against the order of the Subordinate Judge dated the 20th August, 1957, and it purported to be also an appeal against the order of the Subordinate Judge dated the 20th June, 1957, rejecting the preliminary objection as regards the maintainability of the appeal. 4. A perusal of the judgment of the learned Single Judge shows that the points taken up before the learned Judge were (1) That the property should have been held to be the personal properly of the father, Kumud Kant Chowdhry, and that as he was not a party to the litigation of Gaibi Das he was not bound by the sale in execution of the decree obtained by Gaibi Das. (2) That notwithstanding the bar of Order 21, Rule 63, the Bank was entitled to show in the proceeding under Sec. 47, Code of Civil Procedure, that the dismissal of the claim case of Kumud Kant Chowdhry (Miscellaneous case No. 36 of 1954) was collusive inasmuch as Kumud Kant Chowdhry had lost interest in the property by the time that claim case was disposed of. The learned Single Judge rejected both these contentions. He held that the Banks position was merely that of a successor-in-interest of the Chowdhurys by virtue of the sale in execution case No. 89 of 1953, which was confirmed on the 25th May, 1954, and as it did not institute a suit under Order 21, Rule 63, when Kumud Kant Chowdhrys claim case was dismissed as withdrawn its right to the property was completely extinguished. He further held that the Bank must have been aware of the pendency of Gaibi Dass execution case No. 105 of 1953 as early as the 24th September, 1953, and that, consequently, if the Bank wanted to preserve its interest as auction-purchaser, it should have entered appearance and fought out the claim case under Order 21, Rule 58, Code of Civil Procedure, either before the executing court or by a subsequent suit under Order 21, Rule 63, Code of Civil Procedure. 5. In view of the Full Bench decision in 1965 BLJR 300 = ( AIR 1965 PAT 472 ), this court while hearing Letters Patent Appeal cannot enter into questions of fact. The finding of the original court that the disputed property was not the self-acquired property of Kumud Kant Chowdhry and that Kumud Kant Chowdhry and his two sons. 5. In view of the Full Bench decision in 1965 BLJR 300 = ( AIR 1965 PAT 472 ), this court while hearing Letters Patent Appeal cannot enter into questions of fact. The finding of the original court that the disputed property was not the self-acquired property of Kumud Kant Chowdhry and that Kumud Kant Chowdhry and his two sons. Bibhuti Bhusan Chowdhry and Ajit Kumar Chowdhry, were partners of Chowdhry Silk Mills, which was one of the parties in Gaibi Dass execution case, is a finding of fact which cannot be agitated here. Moreover, the very fact that Kumud Kant Chowdhry after filing the claim case under order 21, rule 58, allowed it to be dismissed as withdrawn, thereby permitting the sale in favour of Gaibi Das to be confirmed on the 15th December, 1954, and did not agitate the matter by a separate suit under Order 21, Rule 63, showed that he disclaimed all interest in the property. The appellant Bank became the successor-in-interest of the Chowdhrys by virtue of the sale on the 12th April, 1954, in its Execution Case No. 89 of 1953. On the finding of the learned Single Judge that the Bank was aware of Gaibi Dass execution case as early at the 24th September, 1953, the Bank should have entered appearance and fought out the claim case under Order 21, Rule 58, or, at any rate, filed a suit under Order 21, Rule 63. Its failure to do so will completely bar its rights to the property. 6. Mr. Roy for the appellant wanted to raise once again the question about the maintainability of Gaibi Dass petition under Sec. 47, Code of Civil Procedure. He urged, relying on some observations in Ramnandan V/s. Jatan, ILR 33 Pat 894, that a money decree was satisfied and the execution case came to an end with the sale of the properties and their purchase by the decree-holder, and that, consequently, no application under Sec. 47, Civil Procedure Code, would lie. In that decision a distinction was made between the money decree or mortgage decree on the one hand and a decree for possession on the other. In that decision a distinction was made between the money decree or mortgage decree on the one hand and a decree for possession on the other. This view seems to be based on a Full Bench decision in Tribeni Prasad Singh V/s. Ramasray Prasad Chaudhari, AIR 1931 Pat 241 where it was held that a decree-holder-purchaser of the properties of a judgment-debtor in execution of a money decree is not precluded from filing a suit to obtain posession of the properties and that such a suit would not be barred by Sec. 47. The principle of this decision cannot apply here, because Gaibi Das was not the decree-holder-purchaser in Execution Case No, 89 of 1953, where he filed the objection under Sec. 47, Civil Procedure Code. He filed that in his capacity as the successor-in-interest of the judgment-debtors by virtue of the court sale in his Execution Case No. 105 of 1953, and so long as he was within the period of limitation his right cannot be taken away. In a subsequent decision in Jadunandan Prasad V/s. Bhagwat Mahton, 1955 BLJR 253 : ( AIR 1955 Pat 350 ) the same two judges who gave their decision in Ramnandans case, (1954) ILR 83 Pat 894 have held that where one of the judgment-debtors wanted in challenge the sale of his property by the executing court in satisfaction of the decree in an execution proceeding to which he was not made a party, his remedy was only by way of an application under Sec. 47, Civil Procedure Code, and not by a separate suit. To a similar effect is another Bench decision in Rajendra Prasad V/s. Jai Prakash Pandey, 1957 BLJR 440: ( AIR 1957 Pat 700 ). I may also refer to M. Ramanna V/s. Nallaparaju, AIR 1956 SC 87 at p. 91 where it was held that when a sale in execution of a decree is impugned on the ground that it is not warranted by the terms thereof, that question can be agitated between the parties to the decree or their successors-in-interest only under Sec. 47, Civil Procedure Code. Gaibi Das became a party to the decree as a representative-in-interest of the judgment-debtors and that the application under Sec. 47, Code of Civil Procedure, was within time. 7. Gaibi Das became a party to the decree as a representative-in-interest of the judgment-debtors and that the application under Sec. 47, Code of Civil Procedure, was within time. 7. Apart from the aforesaid reasons, I should point out that this question was not taken up before the learned Single Judge. Nevertheless we allowed the appellant to raise it as it deals with the question of jurisdiction. 8. It was next contended that the objection under Sec. 47, Civil Procedure Code, filed by Gaibi Das was barred by limitation. According to Mr. Roy, the appropriate Article was Article 166 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, and that the application should have been filed within one month of the date of the sale. The trial court, however, applied the residuary Article 181. Though this point also was not taken up before the learned Single Judge, we allowed Mr. Roy to raise the same. The question depends on whether the sale in favour of the Rank will be a nullity, or else, whether it has to be set aside by an aggrieved party. Gaibi Dass case all along was that on the date of the sale in favour of the Bank, namely on the 12th April, 1954, the Chowdharys had no saleable interest in the property, and that, consequently, the sale was a nullity. It does not therefore, require to be set aside so as to attract Article 166 of the Limitation Act. The Privy Council Judgment in Kedar Nath Goenka V/s. Ram Narain Lal, AIR 1935 PC 139 is sufficient to show that where property was sold as being the property of the judgment-debtor, but at the time of the sale the title to the property sold was not in the judgment-debtor but in another, the sale was a nullity. Mr. Roy, however, relied on a Full Bench decision of this court in Surendra Kumar V/s. Srichand, AIR 1936 Pat 97 where it was held that as between the judgment-debtor and the decree-holder or auction-purchaser sale of immovable property in which the judgment-debtor had no interest at the date of the sale was not a nullity. Mr. Roy, however, relied on a Full Bench decision of this court in Surendra Kumar V/s. Srichand, AIR 1936 Pat 97 where it was held that as between the judgment-debtor and the decree-holder or auction-purchaser sale of immovable property in which the judgment-debtor had no interest at the date of the sale was not a nullity. Rut their Lordships at page 100 took care to refer to the aforesaid Privy Council judgment and distinguished that case on the ground that that dealt with the relations between the earlier and the later purchaser and not between the later purchaser and the judgment-debtor himself. Here the position of Gaibi Das was that of an earlier purchaser of the property. That Full Bench case, therefore, has no application here. In AIR 1956 SC 87 at p. 91 it was further pointed out that where a sale was a nullity on the ground that the property sold was not that of the judgment-debtor, the correct Article to apply was Article 181 of the Limitation Act and not Article 166. The previous decisions on the subject have all been referred to therein and a distinction was made between a sale which has to be set aside and a sale which was a nullity. Article 166 of the Limitation Act would apply for the former sale and Article 181 for a sale of the latter type. I must, therefore, hold that the learned Single Judge was right in dismissing the appeal. The Bank lost all its rights by not filing a suit under Order 21, Rule 63, though it was fully aware of Gaibi Dass execution case. The appeal is dismissed with costs. A.B.N.Sinha, J. 9 I agree.