JUDGMENT W. Broome, J. - This writ petition challenges an order passed by the S.D.O., Jansath (district Muzaffarnagar) on May 3, 1961 (Annexure C), rejecting certain objections filed by the petitioners to allotments of land made by the Land Management Committee of Mandaur on the ground that a similar objection involving the same facts had already been dismissed. 2. The impugned order is clearly erroneous, being based on a misconception, for the other objection, the dismissal of which served as a basis for the dismissal of the petitioners' objection, raised quite different points. That other objection had been filed by Qabool Singh (petitioner no. 6) in his individual capacity claiming that a certain piece of land allotted by the Land Management Committee to someone else actually belonged to him. The objection filed by the petitioners jointly as members of the land Management Committee, however, assailed the allotment on the ground that the procedure adopted for convening the meeting at which the allotment was made was irregular, since proper notices were not sent to all the members and no proper announcement was made about the meeting. On the merits therefore this petition must succeed, because the S.D.O. has unjustifiably refused to give proper consideration to the petitioners' objections. 3. Learned counsel for the contesting respondents (the Pradhan Bhim Sen and the allottee's who are said to be his relations) has argued, however, that this writ petition is not maintainable. In the first place, he contends that the petitioners had the alternative remedy of filing a revision to the Board of Revenue under Section 333 of the Z.A. and L.R. Act; secondly he argues that constructions having been made by the allottee's on the land allotted to them, the allotment made in their favour should not be disturbed, and thirdly he maintains that rule 115-N of the Z.A. and L.R. Rules, under which the S.D.O. is being asked to consider the petitioner's objections against the allotments made by the Land Management Committee, is ultra vires. 4. There is obviously little force in the first two contentions put forward on behalf of the respondents. A revision lies to the Board of Revenue under Section 333 only against decisions of a subordinate court; and it cannot be said that the S.D.O. acting under Rule 115-N functions as a court. 4. There is obviously little force in the first two contentions put forward on behalf of the respondents. A revision lies to the Board of Revenue under Section 333 only against decisions of a subordinate court; and it cannot be said that the S.D.O. acting under Rule 115-N functions as a court. And even if the allottee's have made constructions on the land allotted to them, that circumstance by itself would not validate the allotments, if they were illegal, and would not prevent the land being resumed by the lawful authorities and re-allotted in accordance with law. 5. We are left therefore with the third point raised by learned counsel for the respondents, namely that rule 115-N is ultra vires. This rule runs as follows :- "115-N. (1) The Assistant Collector in-charge of the sub-division shall, on the application of any person interested, filed within three months of the date of auction, and may, at any time on his own motion, cancel for reasons to be recorded in writing the allotment order on one or more of the following grounds : (1) the bid accepted was inadequate; (ii) the auction was collusive or unfair; (iii) the auction proceedings were not followed in accordance with the rules; (iv) any other ground. (2) No Order under sub-rule (1) shall be passed unless the allottee has been given an opportunity to show cause against the proposed action." The rule has been promulgated by the State Government under the rule-making power conferred by Section 128 of the Z.A. and L.R. Act; and it is contended that the provisions of Section 128 do not contemplate any rule of this nature. Section 128 is in two parts. The first part empowers the State Government generally to make rules "for the purposes of carrying into effect the provisions of this Chapter" (i.e. Ch. VII of the Act); and the second part, "without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power" sets forth certain specific subjects on which rules may be framed. Section 128 is in two parts. The first part empowers the State Government generally to make rules "for the purposes of carrying into effect the provisions of this Chapter" (i.e. Ch. VII of the Act); and the second part, "without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power" sets forth certain specific subjects on which rules may be framed. Among these specific clauses the only one relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioners is Clause (d), which permits rules to be made to provide for : "the manner and the procedure for the discharge of its duties, performance of its functions and exercise of its powers by the Land Management Committee." But this clause is only concerned with the actions and functions of the Land Management Committee, whereas the impugned rule relates to the functions of the S.D.O. in the matter of control or revision of allotment orders passed by the Land Management Committee. I find that none of the clauses detailed in sub-section (2) of Section 128 can be said to relate specifically to the subject matter of rule 115-N. But it must be borne in mind that these clauses are 'without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power' conferred by Sub-Section (1), which is wide enough to cover all rules made for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of Ch. VII. This Chapter (comprising Sections 113 to 128) deals inter alia with the functions of the Land Management Committee, as defined in the Panchayat Raj Act.; and Sections 28-A and 28-B of the latter Act show that this Committee is charged with the management, preservation and control of all property (including abadi sites) vesting in the Gaon Sabha under Section 117 of the Z.A. and L.R. Act. But Ch. VII of the Z.A. and L.R. Act does not envisage the exercise of absolute and unfettered power by the Land Management Committee, as is clear from Section 126, which lays down that the Committee shall carry out all orders and comply with all directions that may be issued by the State Government on the ground that they "appear to be necessary for the purposes of this Act". The scheme of the Act (and in particular of Ch. The scheme of the Act (and in particular of Ch. VII) therefore is that checks and controls are to be imposed on the exercise by the Land Management Committee of its powers; and a rule promulgated with the idea of enforcing some such check or control would consequently be valid, in view of the general power conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 128. A somewhat analogous case has been dealt with by the Supreme Court in Banarsi Das v. Cane Commissioner, U.P. and another, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1417, in which the Act under consideration (U.P. Sugar Factories Control Act) merely provided for disputes to be dealt with by the Cane Commissioner, or by arbitrators, whereas the rules which were made "to carry out the provisions of the Act" further provided for an appeal to the Divisional Commissioner, and it was held that this provision in the rules was within the rule making power conferred on the State Government by the Act. In my view, therefore, rule 115-N of the Z.A. and L.R. Rules, which sets up the S.D.O. as a controlling or revising authority over the Land Management Committee in the matter of the allotment of land, is a rule carrying into effect the provisions of the Act and cannot be held to be ultra vires. 6. The objections raised on behalf of the contesting respondents having failed, this petition must succeed. It is accordingly allowed, with costs, the order of the S.D.O. dated May 3, 1961, by which he summarily rejected the petitioners' objections, is quashed and he is directed to rehear those objections and dispose of them according to law.