JUDGMENT S.S. Dhavan, J. - This is a plaintiff's second appeal from the concurrent decisions of the courts below rejecting her suit for the refund of a security. The plaintiff-appellants are Ludko Devi and Chandra Bhan - the widow and son of Seth Kalyan Chand who was a contractor. He made a tender for the supply of certain commodities to the Mechanised State Farm. This tender was in response to a notice issued by the Director of the Farm inviting tenders. Seth Kalyan Chand submitted a tender for the supply of three commodities, Lake-salt, linseed cakes, and wheat bran. He deposited a sum of Rs. 2,000/- which was treated by the Director of the Farm as security for the supply of linseed cakes. He was asked to deposit a further sum of Rs. 1,030/- as security for the supply of wheat bran but it is common ground that he did not deposit this amount. After the acceptance of his tender, Seth Kalyan Chand commenced the supplies of the aforesaid three commodities but ran into difficulties, particularly in the matter of supplying wheat bran. There was correspondence between him and the Government during which he pointed out that he was finding it difficult to supply wheat bran because of circumstances beyond his control, and he asked for certain concessions with regard to the supply of wagons and other matters. The Government while granting the request for some of these concessions, warned him that he would be responsible for the non-supply of any commodity and his security might be forfeited. After some time, Seth Kalyan Chand informed the Government that he was unable to supply wheat bran. Thereupon they forfeited his security. He then filed this suit for the recovery of the amount on the ground that the forfeiture was illegal. During the pendency of the suit he died and his widow and son, the present appellants, were brought on the record. 2. The plaintiff contended in his plaint that he had supplied the entire quantity of linseed cakes and lake salt according to the contract, and that his inability to supply wheat bran was due to the fact that this commodity was not available in the local markets because of Government control over the flour mills. He pleaded that the contract for the supply of wheat bran had become impossible due to Government action. He pleaded that the contract for the supply of wheat bran had become impossible due to Government action. and the plaintiff was not liable for the non-performance of this part of the contract. He alleged that the Government withheld his security, and after he had served a notice on them, informed him that it had been forfeited because of his failure to supply the commodities according to contract. Thereupon he filed this suit for the recovery of Rs. 2,000/- deposited by him as security. 3. The Government resisted the suit and contended that the plaintiff having failed to supply the commodities, his security deposit was forfeited. Government contended that it had the right under the terms of the contract to forfeit the amount. 4. The trial court held that the plaintiff was guilty of breach of contract with regard to the supply of all the two commodities - namely linseed cakes and wheat bran and therefore his security had been rightly forfeited. The lower appellate court hold, modifying the finding of the trial court held that the plaintiff was guilty of breach of contract only with respect to one commodity - namely wheat bran, but agreed with the trial court that this entitled the Government to forfeit the security. The plaintiff has now come here in second appeal. 5. Mr. Radha Krishna advanced the following arguments in support of this Appeal. First he contended that as no security was deposited for the supply of wheat bran the Government could not forfeit any security for the supply of the other two commodities. Secondly, he argued that, even assuming that there was a term providing for the forfeiture of security, it was a stipulation by way of penalty and the Government could only receive such damage as it had actually suffered, not exceeding the amounts stipulated by way of penalty. Thirdly, learned counsel argued that even assuming everything against the appellant, a forfeiture of security can only be pro rata and not for the entire amount. He contended that even assuming that the security was for the supply of all the three commodities, the court having found that the plaintiff had failed to supply one commodity, it should have held that Government was entitled to forfeit only one-third of the security. 6. On the other hand Mr. He contended that even assuming that the security was for the supply of all the three commodities, the court having found that the plaintiff had failed to supply one commodity, it should have held that Government was entitled to forfeit only one-third of the security. 6. On the other hand Mr. B. D. Agarwal for the State contended that the Government was entitled to forfeit the entire amount even if the plaintiff had failed to supply all the three commodities. 7. I have heard learned counsel for both the sides at some length. In my opinion this appeal can be decided on two short points. The first whether the agreement between the contractor and the Government contained any term conferring on the latter the right to forfeit security. In my opinion such a right must be conferred expressly or clearly implied from the terms of the agreement. In this case there was a tender by the Contractor which was accepted by the Government, tender in law is an offer which is accepted when the tender is accepted. An offer after acceptance becomes a promise. Therefore any right to forfeit the security must be found in the terms of the tender which was accepted by the Government. I have read these terms and they contain no stipulation for forfeiture of security. This was conceded by the learned counsel for the State. But he contended that the tender must be read along with the notice of tender published by the Government in response to which it was submitted. Paragraph No. 7 this of notice - Exhibit A-1-4 contains the following sentences: "A tenderer whose tender has been accepted will be required to deposit a security at 10 percent of the total cost of supply allotted to him within a week of the receipt of order to start the work for the due fulfilment of his contract and to sign an agreement bond. Failure to deposit the security and to sign the agreement bond may lead to the rejection of his tender and forfeiture of his earnest money. His earnest money will be included in the amount of security. The security will be refunded after six months of the satisfactory completion of the supplies or earlier at the discretion the undersigned." 8. Failure to deposit the security and to sign the agreement bond may lead to the rejection of his tender and forfeiture of his earnest money. His earnest money will be included in the amount of security. The security will be refunded after six months of the satisfactory completion of the supplies or earlier at the discretion the undersigned." 8. Learned counsel argued that the conditions laid down in this paragraph must be deemed to have become a part of the tender made by the contractor and when this tender was accepted the Government acquired a right to forfeit the security in case of the unsatisfactory completion of the supplies. He relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Jawahar Lal v. Burman, A.I.R. 1962 SC 378. In that case the question before the court was whether there was a contract between the parties, and in deciding it the court observed: "It is common ground that the tender thus submitted was subject to the conditions of contract governing the department of supply contracts which were set out in the Government publication form WSB-133. Clauses 4 (a) (b) of these conditions are relevant. They deal with the security deposit. Clause 4(a) provides that on the acceptance of the tender the contractor shall at the option of the Secretary, Department of Supplies and within the period specified by him, deposit with him a security deposit therein specified. Clause 4(b) provides that if the contractor is called upon by the purchaser to deposit security and the contractor fails to provide the security within the period such failure will constitute a breach of the contract and the Secretary, Department of Supplies shall be entitled to make other arrangements at the risk and acceptance of the contractor. It is thus obvious that the tender offered by the appellant submitted to these terms and that on these terms the security deposit is a condition subsequent and not a condition precedent." 9. Learned counsel relied on this observation in support of his argument that the court can go outside the terms of the tender which may be made subject to certain other terms contained in some other document of a general nature. But I do not think that the observation of the Supreme Court applies to the Case before me. Learned counsel relied on this observation in support of his argument that the court can go outside the terms of the tender which may be made subject to certain other terms contained in some other document of a general nature. But I do not think that the observation of the Supreme Court applies to the Case before me. In that case Government had published certain general terms which were made applicable to all contracts between itself and the contractors. Therefore these terms were automatically included in the tender submitted by every contractor and become a part of it. But a notice inviting tenders, is merely a general invitation to make offers and is not necessarily a notice containing general terms to be included in every contract made by the Government. Whether such a notice includes any terms which will be deemed to be a part of the tender depends upon its language. 10. In my opinion para. 7 of the tender notice does not contain any term conferring upon the Government the right to forfeit security. It merely said that the tenderer would be required to deposit a security and the failure to make this deposit would lead to the rejection of his tender and forfeiture of his earnest money. It is significant that though the right of forfeiture was mentioned it was confined to the earnest money. As regards the security deposit, the paragraph says that "the tenderer shall be required to deposit a security .... for the due fulfilment of his contract " and that "the security shall be refunded after six months of the satisfactory completion of the contract," but it does not confer any power on the Department to forfeit the security. Nor can such a drastic power be inferred from such vague language. "Satisfactory completion of the contract" is a matter of opinion. The paragraph does not specify whose opinion, nor does it say that the opinion of the Department shall be conclusive. 11. There is another reason why Government are not entitled to forfeit the security in the present case. It is common ground that a sum of Rs, 2,000/- was deposited by Seth Kalyan Chand as security for the due performance of his obligation to supply linseed cakes but no security was deposited for the supply of wheat bran and lake salt. There is another reason why Government are not entitled to forfeit the security in the present case. It is common ground that a sum of Rs, 2,000/- was deposited by Seth Kalyan Chand as security for the due performance of his obligation to supply linseed cakes but no security was deposited for the supply of wheat bran and lake salt. This is clear from the two letters written by the authorities to Seth Kalyan Chand, Exhibits 2 and A-9. The first was a letter sent by the Director of Machanised State Farm on 21st July 1949 to Seth Kalyan Chand, in which it was stated "you have deposited a security of Rs. 2,000/- against the supply of linseed cakes through a fixed deposit receipt of (I. B. I.) in my favour. Please deposit the security at 2 per cent for the supply of bran and salt which amounts to Rs. 1,030/-." The second letter was sent by the Deputy Director of the Farm to Seth Kalyan Chand in which it was stated "you have not yet filled up the agreement bond and deposit separate security for salt and bran which should also be please complied with." Subsequently, Government treated the security deposit for the supply of linseed cakes as covering the other two commodities as well, and on the failure of the contractor to supply wheat bran, it forfeited that security. In my opinion, the Government was not entitled to do so. If the purpose of the security is stated, the Government cannot enlarge that purpose. If the security is for the due performance of a particular contract, it cannot be forfeited for the non-performance of any other contract, unless there is an express provision entitling the Government to treat it as a general security for the due performance of all contracts between the depositor and Government. There is no such provision in the present case. In view of my findings above it is not necessary to decide the other argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant - namely, whether a term providing for the forfeiture of security is a stipulation by way of penalty and whether Government is entitled to forfeit the security without proof of actual loss. But the argument is not without force and is supported by a decision of this court in Union of India v. Shyam Sunder, 1963 ALJ 251. 12. But the argument is not without force and is supported by a decision of this court in Union of India v. Shyam Sunder, 1963 ALJ 251. 12. This appeal must succeed. 13. I set aside the order of the court below and decree the appellant's suit for the recovery of the security of Rs. 2,000/-. He shall have his costs from the respondents in all courts.