Mohd. Rasul v. Mata Din Singhania — 1966 DIGILAW 203 (ALL)

JUDGMENT Jagdish Sahai, J. - This special appeal is directed against the judgment of Gyan Chand Mathur, J. dated the 20th of April, 1966, allowing writ Petition No. 142 of 1966 filed by the respondent Mata Din Singhania (hereinafter referred to as Singhania). 2. The writ petition relates to proceedings for a motion of no confidence against Singhania who was elected President of the Municipal Board of Mughalsarai on the 30th of November, 1964. On the 10th of December, 1964, he was administered oath in the following form, by a Deputy Collector nominated by the Collector of the District (Varanasi) "I, Mata Din Singhania, having been elected President of the Municipal Board of Moghalsarai do make oath and say/solemnly affirm that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established and that I will faithfully and honestly discharge the duties of my office." 3. This form of oath was not prescribed by the U.P. Municipalities Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, but was provided by notification No. 1974/11A-566-48 dated September 22, 1951. On the 30th of November, 1964, an amendment was made to the Act and Sec. 43-D was inserted in it. Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 43-D provides the form in which the President would be required to take oath of office. That form is as follows : - "1, A. B. having been elected a member/President of this board do swear in the name of God/solemnly affirm that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established that I will uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India, and that I will faithfully and conscientiously discharge the duties upon which I am about to enter." 4. Clearly the provisions of Sec. 43-D of the Act were not in the mind of the District Magistrate of Varanasi or of Singhania on the 10th of December, 1964, when Singhania took oath of office in the form prescribed by the notification before a Deputy Collector nominated by the District Magistrate of the district. On the 28th of December, 1964, admittedly Singhania took a fresh oath in accordance with the form provided under Sec. 43D(1) of the Act in a meeting formally convened by the District Magistrate and in his presence. 5. On the 28th of December, 1964, admittedly Singhania took a fresh oath in accordance with the form provided under Sec. 43D(1) of the Act in a meeting formally convened by the District Magistrate and in his presence. 5. On the 23rd of December, 1965, the appellants Sarvsri Mohammad Rasul, Panna Lal Seth, Badri Prasad, Bhagwati Prasad, Narottam Prasad and some other members of the Municipal Board of Moghalsarai handed over to the District Magistrate of Varanasi a notice of the invention to make a motion expressing non-confidence against Singhania. The District Magistrate convened a meeting of the Municipal Board for the 22nd of January, 1966. That meeting was duly held and was presided over by a Judicial Officer as required by the provisions of Sec. 87-A of the Act. In that meeting admittedly a notice of non-confidence was passed against Singhania. 6. Singhania then moved Writ Petition No. 142 of 1966 to this court which, as already stated earlier, has given rise to the instant special appeal. That writ petition, as already stated, was allowed by Gyan Chand Mathur, J. on the 20th of April, 1966, on the following two findings : - (1) that Sec. 87-A(14) of the Act had been infringed inasmuch as the notice for the meeting handed over to the District Magistrate, Varanasi on 23-12-1965 was not within 12 months from the date on which Singhania took fresh oath of office, e., 28-12-64; and (2) that the oath administered by the Deputy Collector to Singhania on 10-12-1964 was of no consequence, firstly, because it was not in the form provided for by Sec. 43-D (1) of the Act, and secondly, because that oath had not been administered in a meeting of the Municipal Board duly convened by the District Magistrate. 7. Section 87-A(14) reads: "No notice of a motion of non-confidence under this section shall be received within twelve months of the assumption of office by a President." 8. The question for consideration is on what date Singhania assumed office as President of the Municipal Board of Moghalsarai. The expression "assumption of office" has not been defined in the Act. Its meaning, therefore, has to be found out from the scheme of the Act as disclosed by its various provision. Secs. 9 and 10-A of the Act read: "9. The question for consideration is on what date Singhania assumed office as President of the Municipal Board of Moghalsarai. The expression "assumption of office" has not been defined in the Act. Its meaning, therefore, has to be found out from the scheme of the Act as disclosed by its various provision. Secs. 9 and 10-A of the Act read: "9. Normal composition of the Board - Except as otherwise provided by Sec. 10, a board shall consist of: (a) The President, and (b) the elected members who shall be not less than 10 and not more than 40 as the State Government may, by notification in the official gazette specify." "10-A. Term of Board. - (1) Except as provided in Sec. 31 or 31-A, the term of every board shall be five years: Provided that the State Government may, by notification in the official gazette, extend from time to time the term of all or any of the board, so, however, that the total extension in the case of any board does not in the aggregate exceed two years. (2) The term of a board shall begin from the date of notification issued in pursuance of Sec. 56 that the board has been constituted." Reading these two provisions together it clearly follows that the term of the new board (board includes the President) begins from the date on which the notification under Sec. 56 is issued and the term of the old board comes to an end on that date. There is thus a statutory declaration that the term of the President begins from the date of the notification made under Sec. 56 of the Act. In the present case the notification was issued on 10-12-1964. The term of office of Singhania, therefore, began on 10th of December, 1964. Inasmuch as his term began on that date it must be held that he assumed office on that date. A Municipal Board is a body corporate having automatic and perpetual succession (see Sec. 6 of the Act). The expression "Board" includes the President and members of the Board (see Secs. 2(1) and 9 of the Act). The Act, therefore, contemplates automatic and perpetual succession of statutory officers like President and members also with the result that there can be no time gap between the retirement of a President or a member and the assumption of office by his successor. 2(1) and 9 of the Act). The Act, therefore, contemplates automatic and perpetual succession of statutory officers like President and members also with the result that there can be no time gap between the retirement of a President or a member and the assumption of office by his successor. The assumption of office by the new President and the new members, therefore, must coincide with the beginning of the term of the new Board and the new President) and the ending of the term of the retiring Board and the retiring President. 9. It was contended by Mr. Khare that assumption of office would be deemed to have taken place on the date on which the President or the Members make oath. Admittedly Sec. 87-A (14) has been existing in the Act for a long time past whereas Sec. 43-D of the Act has been inserted in it on 30th of November, 1964. Before "Sec. 43-D of the Act was introduced in the Act there was no statutory provision requiring the making or subscribing of oath or solemn affirmation and yet the provisions of Sec. 87-A (14) and the words "assumption of office" occurring therein were fully operative. It is, therefore, clear that the expression "assumption of office" cannot be co-related to the taking of oath. 10. At this stage I would like to reproduce Sec. 43-D of the Act which runs as follows : "Oath of allegiance and office - (1) The President and every member of a board shall, before taking his seat, make and subscribe at a meeting of the board an oath or affirmation of his allegiance to the Constitution in the following form : 1, A. B., having been elected a member/President of this board do swear in the name of God/solemnly affirm that will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established that I will uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India, and that I will faithfully and conscientiously discharge the duties upon which I am about to enter. (2) The President or the member who fails to make, within three months of the date on which his term of office commences or at any one of the first three meetings of the board held after the said date, whichever is later, unless this period is extended by the District Magistrate, the oath or affirmation laid down in and required to be taken by sub-Sec. (1) shall cease to hold his office and his seat shall be deemed to have become vacant. (3) Any person required under sub-Sec. (1) to make an oath or affirmation shall not take his seat at a meeting of the board or do any act as a member or President of the board unless he has made and subscribed an oath or affirmation as laid down under sub-Sec. (1). (4) as soon as may be after the constitution of the board, the District Magistrate shall convene a meeting of the board for the administration of oath or affirmation under this section in the manner prescribed and such meeting shall be presided over by the District Magistrate or in his absence, by a Deputy Collector nominated by him in this behalf. (5) The Executive Officer shall, as soon as may be, report to the District Magistrate the name of the President or member, if any, who ceases to hold his office under sub-Sec. (2)." 11. The words used in sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 43-D are "within three months of the date on which his term of office commences." From this it follows that for the purposes of Sec. 43-D also the term of Singhania began on 10th of December, 1964. If his term even for purposes of Sec. 43-D began on the date of the notification under Sec. 56 of the Act and Sec. 43-D (2) of the Act permits making of the oath even later than the date on which the term commences it is obvious that the date of making the oath cannot be treated to be the date of assumption of office. Sub-Sec. (4) of Sec. 43-D provides that as soon as may be after the constitution of the board the District Magistrate shall convene a meeting for the purpose of administering oath. The expression "as soon as may be" means as soon as convenient to the District Magistrate or as soon as possible for the District Magistrate to do so. Sub-Sec. (4) of Sec. 43-D provides that as soon as may be after the constitution of the board the District Magistrate shall convene a meeting for the purpose of administering oath. The expression "as soon as may be" means as soon as convenient to the District Magistrate or as soon as possible for the District Magistrate to do so. It, therefore, clearly follows from sub-Sec. (4) of Sec. 43-D of the Act that a meeting for administering oath to the members or president may not be held immediately after the Board has been constituted but as soon as convenient for the District Magistrate to do so or as soon as it is possible for him to do so. The law, therefore, does envisage a gap between the start of the term of the members and the President and their actually taking oath. Sub-Sec. (2) clearly permits a President or a member to make oath of office at any of the first three meetings of the Board held after his term of office commences" or during such extended period as the District Magistrate may allow. From this also it clearly follows that there can be considerable lapse of time between the date of the commencement of the term and the date on which oath is made with the result that making of oath or solemn affirmation cannot be co-related to the commencement of the term or assumption of office by a member of the President of a Municipal Board. 12. Mr. Khare contends that sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 43-D clearly provides that no member or President shall take his seat at a meeting or do any act as member or President unless he has made and subscribed an oath or affirmation as laid down in sub-Sec. (1) and, therefore, the taking of oath is a condition precedent to the assumption of office with the result that office cannot be assumed without making oath. 13. In my judgment there is a clear difference between formally assuming office and performing the functions of that office. Consequently, even if the interpretation of sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 43-D of the Act made by Mr. Khare be accepted all that follows is that the President or the member would not be able to discharge the functions of his office or take his seat until he had made the oath. Consequently, even if the interpretation of sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 43-D of the Act made by Mr. Khare be accepted all that follows is that the President or the member would not be able to discharge the functions of his office or take his seat until he had made the oath. But from this it does not follow that he has not assumed office or his term has not begun. 14. Sec. 43-D is very inartistically worded. On a cursory reading it may even appear that some of its provisions are contradictory or mutually exclusive. But when the whole provision is read harmoniously the scheme of the Act becomes apparent and the making of oath does not seem to be a condition precedent. However, I will deal with this aspect of the matter a little later. 15. It would be noticed that sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 10-A provides that the term of every board shall be five years. Sub-Sec. (2) provides that the term shall begin from the date of notification issued in pursuance of Sec. 56 that the board has been constituted. In the instant case, the notification was issued on 10th of December, 1964. Therefore, the term of office of Singhania would be five years commencing from 10th of December, 1964 and ending with 9th of December, 1969. It is admitted and it is also clear that merely because he took oath in correct form on 23rd of December, 1964, would not result in his term being extended upto the 22nd of December, 1969. Singhania had (if not removed by a vote of non-confidence earlier) to function for five years and since his term admittedly would expire on 9th of December 1969, he must be held to have assumed office on 10-12-1964. 16. It may also be pointed out that there is no provision in the Act requiring a formal charge to be taken over either by members or by the President. If the intention of the law was that assumption of office would not be automatic on the issuance of notification under Sec. 56 of the Act a provision would have been made for taking over formal charge. Such a provision is omitted from the Act only because the effect of Secs. If the intention of the law was that assumption of office would not be automatic on the issuance of notification under Sec. 56 of the Act a provision would have been made for taking over formal charge. Such a provision is omitted from the Act only because the effect of Secs. 9 and 10-A of the Act read together is that there is statutory declaration that the members and President have assumed office on the date of the notification. 17. In the present case admittedly Singhania took oath of office on 10th of December, 1964, though in the old form. Therefore he continued working throughout until the motion of no-confidence was passed against him. In other words, he worked and discharged the functions of the office of the President even during the period beginning 10-12-1964 when he took oath in the old form and ending with 23-12-1964 when he made oath in the new form. If he started working as a President, as he actually did in this case on 10-12-1964 it must be held that he assumed office of the President on that date. Consequently, the notice of resolution of non-confidence was handed over to the District Magistrate after the period of 12 months from the date of assumption of office had expired. 18. I would also like to point out that relief by way of writ is purely discretionary and is based upon equitable considerations. Apart from everything else inasmuch as admittedly Singhania had taken up the position that he was sworn in on 10th of December, 1964 he cannot wriggle out of that position in the present writ proceedings. Therefore, quite apart from the legal position Singhania cannot be heard to say in this case that he assumed office not on 10th of December, 1964, but on 23rd of December, 1964. 19. There is another way of looking at the matter. Under the provisions of Sec. 50 of the Act certain powers, duties and functions of a municipal board "may be exercised and shall be performed or discharged by the President of the Board and subject to the provision of Sec. 53 and 53-A and not otherwise." This provision clearly shows that the President is the executive head of the municipal board. Neither the Board nor any of its committees nor the executive officer nor any other officer of the Board can perform the functions of the President mentioned in Cl. (a) to (e) of Sec. 50 of the Act. Cl. (bb) of this provision confers on the President the duty of general supervision over all officers and works of the Board. If there is no executive officer and only a secretary he (the President) is required also to perform the functions which would have been performed by the executive officer if there had been one. The duties assigned to the President are such (hat the administration of the Board would irreparably suffer if no one is performing the functions of the President for a period however, short it may be. In other words, the law does not contemplate a vacuum in the succession to the office of the President (we are not concerned with members in this case). I have already pointed out earlier that in some cases the oath taking by the President may follow several months after the Board has been constituted and the term of the President started. If the assumption of office by the President would be treated to have been made on the date he takes oath and not on the date of the publication of the notification under Sec. 56 of the Act the result would be that in some cases for long period there would be no President and the administration of the Board would be paralysed. This obviously could not be the intention of the legislature. 20. Mr. Khare contends that no such vacuum will, in fact, occur because the executive officer can continue to carry on the daily administration of the Board. In the first place there are Boards in which there is no executive officer but only a secretary and under Sec. 50 of the Act in such cases the President. would be required to perform the functions which would have been performed by the executive officer if there was one. In the first place there are Boards in which there is no executive officer but only a secretary and under Sec. 50 of the Act in such cases the President. would be required to perform the functions which would have been performed by the executive officer if there was one. Under Sec.127 of the Act the authority on which money may be paid from the municipal fund; the condition on which property may be required by the board or on which property vested in the Board may be transferred by sale, mortgage, lease, exchange or otherwise; and other matters relating to municipal fund or municipal property shall be governed by rules framed under Sec. 296 of the Act. Under the rules framed certain cheques and other documents are required to be signed by the President. In other words, without there being a President functioning the administration of the Board cannot run. It is this consideration also which leads to the conclusion that no vacuum was contemplated between retirement of one President and the succession by the other and that with the notification under Sec. 56 of the Act the old President would automatically retire and a new one would automatically assume office. Mr. Khare has also contended that the feared vacuum need not really occur in view of the provisions of Sec. 54-A of the Act. I am unable to agree. Even though Sec. 54-A speaks of "a person on being elected President fails or refuses to function or is otherwise not able to function or a casual vacancy occurs in the office of the President," in my opinion it only deals with cases where the Board has started functioning in the normal course and not where the members and the President are under the disability created by sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 40-D of the Act. This conclusion I derive from the language of Sec. 54-A of the Act and specially from the circumstance that it contemplates the functioning of the Vice-President in the event of the President not being able to function. Sec. 54-A also provides that if there is no Vice-President elected then the Collector shall perform the functions of the President until the Vice-President is elected. 21. Sec. 54-A also provides that if there is no Vice-President elected then the Collector shall perform the functions of the President until the Vice-President is elected. 21. In my view the provisions of Sec. 54-A of the Act do not provide an answer to the argument of vacuum being created if the assumption of office is equated with the making of oath. That the assumption of office by a President does not synchronise with or start with the making of oath of his office is apparent from Sec. 46 of the Act which reads: - "Term of office of President. - The term of office of a President elected in a casual vacancy shall commence from the declaration of his election under the Act and shall be the remainder of the term of the board. 22. This section deals with the terms of the President elected in a casual vacancy and clearly provides that the term shall commence from the date of declaration of his election and shall be the reminder of the term of the board, that is, the remaining portion of the five years term. If the idea was that the office is assumed on the date on which oath is taken the words would have been "shall commence from the date of his making oath and shall be the remainder of the term of the board". 23. It is true that sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 43-D of the Act creates a bar against a member or a President taking seat or acting as such until he has made oath of his office, but this subsection cannot be read in isolation and must be read along with other parts of this section. Sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 43-D clearly permits the President or the member to make oath in any one of the first three meetings of the board after the commencement of the term or during such extended period as the District Magistrate may allow. Sub-Sec. (2), therefore, must be read as a proviso to sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 43-D of the Act. Sub-Sec. (2), therefore, must be read as a proviso to sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 43-D of the Act. Reading all the parts of this section harmoniously, it must be held that the intention of the legislature is to insist that a member or a President should first must make oath of office before actually performing the duties of the office, but if the oath is made within the period contemplated by sub-Sec. (2), all the acts of the member or the President shall stand ratified, and the assumption of his office on the date of notification affirmed. It is, therefore, not possible to hold that sub-Sec. (3) embodies an inflexible rule or a condition precedent. It appears to me that the provisions of sub-Sec. (3) are subject to the provisions of sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 43-D of the Act 24. The words "shall cease to hold his office" occurring in sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 43-D of the Act suggest that the office was already held from the date of the notification under Sec. 56 of the Act and that the consequence of oath not being made as required by sub-Secs. (1) and (2) of Sec. 43-D of the Act would be that the person concerned shall cease to hold the office that he was holding Again, the words "and his seat shall be deemed to have become vacant occurring in sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 43-D of the Act clearly suggest that the office is full, but by the legal fiction (introduced by the word deemed) it will be treated to be vacant. The use of these words is only consistent with the legal position that the office was assumed by the member or the President immediately the notification under Sec. 56 was issued but as a penalty for not making oath as provided by sub-Sec. (2) read with sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 43-D of the Act, the person concerned ceases to hold the office and by a legal fiction the office would be treated to be vacant. If Mr. If Mr. Khare's argument that until oath is made "the office is not assumed" or "is not full" or "is not held" were correct, the words "shall cease to hold his office" or "shall be deemed to have become vacant" could never have been used these words being consistent only with the office having been assumed but subsequently lost due to the non-compliance of the provisions of Sec. 43-D (2) of the Act. 25. Mr. Khare has relied upon certain reported decisions none of which are under the Municipalities Act or deal with Sec. 43-D of the Act. 26. The first case is Shabbir v. State, 1964 ALJ 315. This case was decided by a division Bench of which I was a member. That was a case where some of the Judges appointed to this Court had originally taken oath in accordance with the form provided in the Constitution before the, 16th Amendment was introduced, and later on took oath of office in accordance with the form introduced by the 16th Amendment. The decision rests on the language of Article 219 of the Constitution of India which reads : "Every person appointed to be a Judge of a High Court shall, before he enters upon his office, makes and subscribes before the Governor of State or some person appointed in that behalf by him, an oath or affirmation according to the form set out for the purpose in the Third Schedule." 27. We observed as follows : - "It would be noticed that Article 219 of the Constitution uses the words every person appointed to be a Judge of a High Court and not every person appointed a Judge of a High Court which would indicate that a person appointed to be a Judge becomes one only after oath has been made and subscribed by him. Before that he is, what may be called, a Judge designate. That article also provides that the oath should be according to the form set out for that purpose in the Third Schedule. The expression shall before he enters upon his office make and subscribe. . . . clearly shows that making and subscribing of oath is a condition precedent to the assumption of office," 28. The language of Sec. 43-D is in marked contract to the language of Article 219 of the Constitution of India. The expression shall before he enters upon his office make and subscribe. . . . clearly shows that making and subscribing of oath is a condition precedent to the assumption of office," 28. The language of Sec. 43-D is in marked contract to the language of Article 219 of the Constitution of India. The words to be have not been used, nor the words shall before he enters upon his office make and subscribe have been used. Besides, there is no provision similar to Secs. 9 and 10-A of the Act in the Constitution. Shabbir's case, 1964 ALJ 315 therefore, does not provide us any precedent. 29. The next case is Sheo Dayal Tewari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1953 ALJ 405. In that case it was held by a Bench of this Court that the date on which the Chairman of a municipal board assumes office would depend upon the facts of that case. The facts of that case were very different from those before us. In that case on the 2nd of June, 1951, a member of the Municipal Board of Lalitpur was elected Chairman of the Board in the casual vacancy caused by the removal of the former Chairman. The notification with regard to the election of this person as Chairman was published in the Gazette dated the 14th July, 1951, even though that person had in fact assumed charge on the 2nd of June, 1951, immediately after his election. The learned Judges, therefore, had to consider on what date in the circumstances of that particular case charge was assumed by that person and they held that the date of assumption of charge would be the one on which he was elected and on which he actually started functioning. This case also is. therefore, clearly distinguishable. 30. The third case is Shri Ganesh Prasad Chaturvedi v. The District Magistrate, Jalaun, 1956 ALJ 58. In this case a completely different point from the one raised before us was raised. This case also is. therefore, clearly distinguishable. 30. The third case is Shri Ganesh Prasad Chaturvedi v. The District Magistrate, Jalaun, 1956 ALJ 58. In this case a completely different point from the one raised before us was raised. A person was elected as a member of the Municipal Board and the question was whether that member before taking oath of office required by the notification issued by the State Government under Sec. 296 of the Municipalities Act could or could not vote at a meeting or sign a requisition for convening a meeting for passing a vote of non-confidence against the President under Sec. 87-A of the Act. The Division Bench held that even though the person had not taken oath he having been elected as a member could sign the notice under sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 87-A of the Act. 31. The fourth case is Sharafatullah Khan v. State of U. P., 1962 ALJ 930. In that case a person, who was already a Senior Vice-President, was declared elected President in a casual vacancy. The question was as to whether he continued to work as Senior Vice-President even after his election until his election was notified in the State Gazette or he assumed office of the President immediately on his election. It was held that notwithstanding the fact that he was the Vice-President at the time of the election and was holding the office of President in that capacity in the absence of the President, he ceased to be Vice-President on the date on which he was elected as the President and even during the period between the date of his election and the date of the notification he ceased to be the Vice-President and was the President. The case is clearly distinguishable, but the following observations made by the learned Judges in that case support the view that I am taking: - "If we were to accept the contention put forward on behalf of the appellant, the result would be that, even though the law declares that the term of office of the appellant as President of the Board commenced on the 8th of October, 1960, he will be treated as not having assumed office until a much later date. It will be anomalous to hold that the term of office of any person can begin before he assumes that office." 32. It will be anomalous to hold that the term of office of any person can begin before he assumes that office." 32. Sunil Kumar Bose v. The Chief Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, AIR 1950 Calcutta 274 at 283 and Peter Pender v. The King, (1725) IER 953 were also cited. These cases are based upon the statutory provisions applicable to the facts of those cases and cannot provide any precedent for the decision of this case. It is not necessary to give the facts of those cases because I am resting my decision on the statutory provisions confined in the Municipalities Act and not on the provisions of the Constitution which were applicable to the first case and to the English Statute which was applicable to the second case. 33. Mr. Khare also placed reliance upon some passages from May's Parliamentary practice, 16th Edn. page 289; Corpus Juris Secondum, Vol. 62, page 929, para. 498; and Halsbury's Laws of England, Simonds Edition, Vol. 9, page 34, para. 59, in support of the proposition that when law requires that the making of oath or solemn affirmation is a condition precedent to assumption of office, the office would not be deemed to have been occupied or assumed until oath or solemn affirmation is made. I have already stated earlier that the question can only be answered on the basis of statutory provisions contained in the Act in or under which the appointment or election is made, and there can be no hard and fast rule of universal application in such matters. As already stated earlier I am resting my decision not on any general principles but on the basis of statutory provisions contained in the Act. It is well settled that when he text is explicit the text is conclusive and if the meaning of the statute s clear then the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning and cannot depart from it on the basis of the so-called general principles. It is well settled that when he text is explicit the text is conclusive and if the meaning of the statute s clear then the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning and cannot depart from it on the basis of the so-called general principles. If the Act permitted the President and the members to start functioning immediately after the publication of the notification under Sec. 56 of the Act and permitted the taking of oath of office even during the period provided by Sec. 43-D (2) of the Act the courts cannot refuse to give affect to the provision nor they read anything in the provision which is not supported by its language. 34. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that the view taken by Gyan Chand Mathur, J. that the notice given under sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 87-A of the Act was (not ?) within 12 months of the date of the assumption of office by Singhania is incorrect. 35. I would, therefore, allow the appeal with costs, set aside the judgment of Gyan Chand Mathur, J. dated the 20th of April, 1966, and dismiss the writ petition. B. D. Gupta, J. - I agree with the order proposed by my learned brother. 2. I express no opinion on the question whether the petitioner-respondent should be deemed to have assumed the office of President on the 10th of December, 1964, by reason of the fact that a notification under Sec. 56 of the U.P. Municipalities Act was published in the official Gazette of that date. I, however, agree with my learned brother that as a result of the proceedings that took place on the 10th of December, 1964, viz., the taking of oath by the petitioner-respondent, though in the old form, the petitioner-respondent must be deemed to have assumed office of the President on the 10th of December, 1964, within the meaning of the expression assumption of office in Cl. (14) of Sec. 87-A of the Act. 3. (14) of Sec. 87-A of the Act. 3. I also agree that in the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction conferred on this Court by Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioner-respondent should not be permitted to seek relief on the assertion that even though the petitioner-respondent did, in fact, take an oath on the 10th of December, 1964, and started functioning as President, the period of twelve months immunity from a motion of non-confidence, should not be held to have begun on the 10th of December, 1964, but later when the petitioner-respondent took oath in the prescribed form. By The Court - This special appeal is allowed, the judgment of G.C. Mathur, J., dated the 20th of April, 1966, is set aside and the Writ Petition No. 142 of 1966 is dismissed with costs.