JUDGMENT B. Dayal, J. - This writ petition and the second appeal have been referred to this Division Bench by a learned single Judge of this Court because there was a conflict of opinion regarding the effect of Sec. 240-J of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. In the writ petition the question arose in the following circumstances. The dispute related to plot No. 207 which according to the petitioners was their bhumidhari land. In suit No. 1251 of 1951 it was declared by the Munsif that a permanent lease executed in favour of the respondent was void and was cancelled by judgment dated 3rd May 1954. After this declaration the land remained parti but proceedings under Chapter IX-A of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act were started and this land was, without serving a notice on the applicant, wrongly included in the compensation statement as land in which adhivasi rights existed in favour of the respondents. The petitioner however, on coming to know about, it filed an objection under Sec. 240-G of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The Compensation Officer instead of referring this objection to a competent court under Sec. 240-H(2) or deciding it on the basis of Munsifs decision himself, dismissed it on the ground that it did not relate to the plot in dispute because he read the -number of the plot in the objection as 807 and not 207. The figures of 2 and 8 are so similar in Hindi script that this ground was clearly wrong for rejecting the objection when there was no other plot in dispute between the parties. This decision of the Compensation Officer was wholly without jurisdiction and was obviously wrong. By such a dismissal of the objection filed by the petitioners the rights of the petitioners could not be defeated and new rights could not be vested in the respondent, who in fact was not an adhivasi of the land and the patta in whose favour had already been cancelled by a competent court on 3rd of May 1954. The respondent having taken forcible possession of the land after the dismissal of the petitioners objection under Sec. 240-G the petitioners had to file a regular suit under Secs. The respondent having taken forcible possession of the land after the dismissal of the petitioners objection under Sec. 240-G the petitioners had to file a regular suit under Secs. 209 and 229-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act for ejectment of the respondent as a trespasser and for declaration of their rights as Bhumidhar. This suit was decreed by the trial court on the 1st of December 1958. An appeal by the respondent was also dismissed by the Additional Commissioner on the 18th of May 1959 but a second appeal filed by the respondent in the Board of Revenue succeeded on the ground that the dismissal of petitioners objection under Sec. 240-G became final between the parties. Against that order of the Board of Revenue the present writ petition has been filed. 2. In the second appeal a suit had been filed by the respondent under Sec. 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Ac which was dismissed by the trial court but was decreed by the lower appellate court and a second appeal was filed by the defendants in this Court. While this second appeal was pending proceeding under Chapter IX-A of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act are said to have been finalised and no objection having been filed by the respondent regarding his rights in those proceedings the land was included in the compensation statement and it is now pleaded in the appeal that the publication o the notice under Sec. 240-J make; the compensation statement final and it has become binding and the-appeal must, therefore, be allowed and the plaintiffs suit dismissed. 3. The respondent has opposed this application on the ground that no notice of proceedings under Chapter IX-A of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was served on him nor did he come to know of the proceedings. No certified copy of the notice or order served on the respondent has been filed to prove the fact. On mere affidavits the fact of service cannot be taken to be proved as positive evidence of service could be filed but has not been filed. 4. No certified copy of the notice or order served on the respondent has been filed to prove the fact. On mere affidavits the fact of service cannot be taken to be proved as positive evidence of service could be filed but has not been filed. 4. In this way the common question for decision in both the matters is where under Sec. 240-J of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act if a compensation statement has become final whether the matter about the acquisition of sirdari rights can be raised in a subsequent suit as in the writ petition here or can be decided in a pending suit or appeal during the pendency of which the compensation statement became final, even in cases where provisions of the Act have not been strictly complied with. 5. After hearing learned counsel for both the sides and considering the whole scheme of Chapter IX-A added to the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act we are of opinion that the finality which attaches to the compensation statement under Sec. 240-J does not bar the decision as to the rights either of the landholder or of the asami or adhivasi of the land in every case. Sec. 240-A in substance provides that upon a notification having been published in the gazette declaring a date from which rights of the landholders in such lands on which adhivasi rights existed immediately before that date would be abolished and the adhivasi of those lands would become sirdhars. The result of this section is that upon the dates specified being notified for a particular area all adhivasis became sirdars and the interests of the landholders ceased for which compensation is to be paid by the Government. The question as to a particular plot of land, whether it was a land held by an adhivasi or not, has to be decided by some authority if a dispute arises on that point. The section itself is an automatic operating section. Where there is no dispute the adhivasi holding the land would become sirdar and the rights of the landholder would cease but if either the landholder says that the land is not such which is held by an adhivasi or the person in possession says that he is an adhivasi, this dispute has to be decided and unless decided the operation of Sec. 240-A will not be known. Under Sec. 240-B the consequences of the notification have been enumerated. Under Sec. 240-C the landholder is declared entitled to compensation for such land as is mentioned in Sec. 240-A, i.e. land which is held by an adhivasi. Under Sec. 240-D a compensation statement has to be prepared for paying compensation to the landholder whose rights have vested in the state under Sec. 240-A. After such a statement is prepared it is to be published under Sec. 240-F and a copy of it is directed to be sent to the landholder concerned. No provision is however made for service of personal notice on the person claiming adhivasi rights. It is difficult therefore to hold that any orders passed in his absence can unless expressly so provided, bind him. The land holder, however, having received that copy can file an objection under Sec. 240-G within a period of one month from the date of its publication. Sec. 240-LI(2) is as follows: - "(2) Where the objection filed under sub-Sec. (1) - (a) is that the land is not land referred to in sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 240-A, the Compensation Officer shall frame an issue to that effect and refer it for disposal to the Court which would have jurisdiction to decide a suit under Sec. 229-B read with Sec. 234-A in respect of the land and thereupon all the provisions relating to the hearing and disposal of such suits shall apply to the reference as if it were a suit: (b) involves a question of title and such question has not already been determined by a competent Court, the Compensation Officer shall, except in cases in which Sec. 240-H applies, refer the question for determination to the court of competent jurisdiction." ............. 6. Under this section as quoted above the Compensation Officer has no right to decide such an objection himself as is referred to in Sec. 240-H(2). He is bound to refer it to a competent court and in such competent court it has to be decided as a suit. Such a procedure was not adopted in any of the two cases before us. In the writ petition the objection which was filed was dismissed by the Compensation Officer himself making no reference to a competent court. In the second appeal no objection was filed at all as no notice was served on the landholder. Such a procedure was not adopted in any of the two cases before us. In the writ petition the objection which was filed was dismissed by the Compensation Officer himself making no reference to a competent court. In the second appeal no objection was filed at all as no notice was served on the landholder. In either of the cases there was no decision in accordance with the procedure laid down by the law. There being no decision on the question of title, the compensation statement even though declared to be final under Sec. 240-J cannot finally determine the rights of the parties. Sec. 240-J is as follows : - "(1) Where no objection has been filed in regard to the compensation statement published in pursuance of Sec. 240-F or where such objections are filed and have been finally disposed of, the statement shall where necessary be amended, altered or modified. The Compensation Officer shall sign the statement and affix his seal thereto. (2) The statement so signed and sealed shall become final. (3) A copy of the final statement shall be supplied free of charge to the land holder concerned." 7. It is obvious that the purpose of this section merely is to provide that the compensation statement prepared shall not be altered by the Compensation Officer, and no appeal or review is provided for. There is no provision in this Chapter prohibiting suits being filed for the decision of their rights. Secs. 330 and 331 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act which bar the filing of suits do not apply to compensation statements prepared under Chapter IX-A. Sec. 330 refers to compensation assessment rolls. Such a compensation assessment roll is only prepared under Part I of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Under Chapter IX-A which has been added in Part II of the Act the word used is compensation statement and not compensation assessment roll and, therefore, Sec. 330 does not bar a suit in respect of anything mentioned in the compensation statement prepared under Chapter IX-A added to the Act. Sec. 331 merely bars the jurisdiction of the civil court in respect of suits and applications provided for in the second schedule added to the Act. There being no provision for any application or suit in Chapter IX-A the question of bar of a suit does not arise. Sec. 331 merely bars the jurisdiction of the civil court in respect of suits and applications provided for in the second schedule added to the Act. There being no provision for any application or suit in Chapter IX-A the question of bar of a suit does not arise. The position, therefore, is that the Act does not bar the filing of a suit and does not authorise the Compensation Officer to decide the rights of the parties. He is only authorised to assess compensation which is to be paid to the land-holder. That is a matter between the Government and the landholder and not one between the landholder and the person claiming to be the adhivasi. 8. Now the effect of finality of the compensation statement on the acquisition of sirdari rights in particular plot can arise in three kinds of cases : (1) Where an objection to that effect has been filed and having been referred to a competent court is heard and decided according to law, in such a case the decision of the competent court would bar that issue, on principles of res judicata, in any other collateral proceeding and it will not be necessary to invoke the effect of Sec. 240-J under which finality attaches to the compensation statement. (2) Where the procedure provided by the Act in Chapter IX-A has not been strictly followed and thereby a party is prevented from filing an objection or a reference to the competent court has wrongly not been made, with the result that a decision of the competent court has not been obtained. In such cases also there can be little doubt that the finality attaching to the compensation statement under Sec. 240-J cannot prevent a party from reagitating the matter in a competent court. And (3) Where in spite of notice either no objection raising the question is filed or if filed is properly disposed of without the decision of the point by a competent court, The real difficulty arises only in such cases. The cases before us fall in class (2) and we need not, for purposes of these cases, decide the question in cases falling under this class (3). But in view of the learned arguments advanced at the bar we may, without deciding the point,express our views very shortly. The cases before us fall in class (2) and we need not, for purposes of these cases, decide the question in cases falling under this class (3). But in view of the learned arguments advanced at the bar we may, without deciding the point,express our views very shortly. (a) The Act does not provide for notice to the person claiming adhivasi rights nor is such a person empowered to file an objection that a particular plot not included in the statement "is land referred to in sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 240-A". It is important to note here that Sec. 240-H(2) quoted above only deals with negative objections "that the land is not land referred to in sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 240-A. . . " Which can only be filed by the land-holder in respect of land included in the statement. It is therefore not intended to prevent a claimant adhivasi from filing a suit for declaration of his rights or having it otherwise decided by a Competent Court. (b) There is no provision ousting the jurisdiction of competent court and such jurisdiction cannot be deemed ousted by implication, only on account of orders of Compensation Officer when he has no jurisdiction to decide this matter. (c) The compensation statement can be deemed final only in respect of matters included in it. It cannot be deemed final on matters not included in it. So where some plots of land are not included in such statement it would be difficult to hold that in respect of such plots also parties will be barred from getting a decision of their rights in another proceeding. If it is found in such subsequent proceedings that the actual cultivator was an adhivasi on the relevant date and acquired sirdari rights, the land-holder will lose his rights and such rights will be deemed to have been vested in the state on the date notified under Sec. 240-A. 9. In all these cases mentioned above and cases where the law has been violated the compensation statement will have to be altered suitably after the decision in a competent court and we see no good reason for holding that in cases falling in class (3) the person aggrieved cannot get his rights decided in a separate proceeding simply because it would involve alteration of the statement which has become final. To our mind the bar can only be invoked on principles of res judicata where the matter has been heard and finally decided according to law. But as stated above we do not decide this wider question in these cases. 10. We shall now proceed to consider the decided cases. The Board of Revenue in its decision has referred to its own previous judgments to the effect that the dismissal of an objection under Sec. 240-G finally disposes of the rights of the parties which cannot be reagitated under Sec. 209 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act but we find that the decision of this Court are consistently against this view. In Kameshwar Nath Dubey v. Ram Sarup Ahir, 1963 R.D. 137 a learned single Judge of this Court had to decide a case where no objection had been filed in proceedings under Chapter IX-A of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act by the person claiming to be an adhivasi and the land was not included in the Compensation statement. He subsequently filed a suit for a declaration that he was an adhivasi of the land and by virtue of Sec. 240-A had become a sirdar and it was pleaded that his land not having been included in the compensation statement he lost his rights. This Court did not accept this contention and held that the rights having been acquired under Sec. 240-A could not be defeated merely on account of the absence of this land being mentioned in the compensation statement. In Smt. Jamuna v. Dy. Director, 1965 A.W.R. 806 another learned single Judge of this Court had to decide a case where an objection filed by the land-holder that the land was not held by an adhivasi was dismissed by the Compensation Officer as timebarred and thereafter the compensation statement was finalised. The question arose in consolidation proceedings, when the landholder again filed an objection, whether the dismissal of his objection filed under Sec. 240-G of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was a bar to his agitating the matter in consolidation proceedings again. The question arose in consolidation proceedings, when the landholder again filed an objection, whether the dismissal of his objection filed under Sec. 240-G of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was a bar to his agitating the matter in consolidation proceedings again. The revenue courts held that he was so barred but in a writ filed in this Court and decided by a learned single Judge the decision was set aside and it was held that there was no bar to the question being agitated and decided in the consolidation proceedings. 11. In another unreported decision of this Court in Baladin v. The Board of Revenue, Civ. Misc. Writ No. 208 of 1960 D/d. 6.5.1965 a learned single Judge who gave the judgment in that writ petition had to consider whether a separate suit lay for a declaration that the plaintiff had become sirdar after the coming into force of Chapter IX-A of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act it having been pleaded that there was bar of res judicata on account of decision of an objection under Sec. 240-G of the same Act. The learned Judge did not agree with this contention. The Compensation Officer in that case not having followed the procedure prescribed and not having sent the issue to be decided by a competent court it was held that there was no decision on the point and could not bar a suit. 12. The learned counsel, however, contended that a case reported in B. R. Singh v. Commissioner, 1964 ALJ 910 was a contrary decision. We have gone through that case carefully and found that the learned Judge who decided this case on the ground that the correctness or validity of the proceedings under Chapter IX-A of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act had not been challenged either before the Consolidation Officer or in the writ petition. That point was therefore not allowed to be raised. The language of learned Judge is not very apt because a notification under Sec. 240-A does not relate to individual plots. It is the compensation statement made under the Act which refers to plots. This case is, therefore, not contrary authority on the question arising in these cases before us. 13. The result, therefore, is that the writ petition is allowed and the order of the Board of Revenue Uttar Pradesh in second appeal no. It is the compensation statement made under the Act which refers to plots. This case is, therefore, not contrary authority on the question arising in these cases before us. 13. The result, therefore, is that the writ petition is allowed and the order of the Board of Revenue Uttar Pradesh in second appeal no. 1061 of 1959 Jhansi dated 22-4-1960/4-5-1960 is quashed. The parties will bear their own costs. 14. In the second appeal apart from the question we have decided above some other questions of law have also been raised which may now be disposed of. The first question of law raised in the appeal is that the appeal before the learned District Judge was barred by limitation. In this case an appeal had first been filed before the Commissioner. The Commissioner returned the appeal as his opinion was that he had no jurisdiction to entertain it. It was then filed before the District Judge. The learned District Judge condoned the delay under Sec. 5 and entertained the appeal. We see no reason to take a different view. 15. The second question raised was that this suit being a suit under Sec. 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act ought to have been stayed under rules 4 and 5 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules. We do not agree with this contention. Under rule 4 sub-rule (v) suits filed by tenants are made an exception and are not stayed. The contention of learned counsel that the last clause in which rights have not accrued to the defendant under Sec. 16 or any other section of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act also applies to suits filed by tenants and in this case since the defendant had claimed to have acquired rights the suit should have been stayed. As we read the rule this part of the section only applies to suits relating to sir or khudkasht land or groves of the intermediaries and not to tenants suits. We, therefore, see no force in this contention also. 16. The last contention of learned counsel was that the plaintiff had not paid any court fee on the amount of damages which he claimed and, therefore, no damages could be decreed. This suit was filed under Item No. 18 of Group B of the Fourth Schedule attached to the U.P. Tenancy Act. 16. The last contention of learned counsel was that the plaintiff had not paid any court fee on the amount of damages which he claimed and, therefore, no damages could be decreed. This suit was filed under Item No. 18 of Group B of the Fourth Schedule attached to the U.P. Tenancy Act. That item provides for suits under Sec. 180 and in the third column the provision is for the ejectment of a person occupying land without title and for damages ..... This item, therefore, refers to suits for ejectment as well as for damages and for such suits the provisions regarding court fee is made in the last column which is as follows : "As in the Court Fees Act, 1870, on the rent payable." 17. Therefore, the special law prescribes one court fee according to the rent payable on the land. It does not say that this court fee on the rent payable will be payable only on the relief of ejectment and extra court fee will have to be paid on die relief for damages. The court fee has, therefore, to be charged on the whole suit for ejectment as well as for damages according to this special provision. The reference to the Court Fees Act in the last column was necessary only to find out the amount of court fee payable and this cannot be read to refer to extra court fee on the valuation according to the damages claimed. 18. We, therefore, see no force in this second appeal and dismiss the same with costs.