JUDGMENT 1. THIS appeal is by the tenant defendant and it arises out of a suit for ejectment. 2. THE suit was brought on February 6, 1962. It is, admittedly, governed by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, and the ground, taken for ejectment under that Act, was the ground of the plaintiff's reasonable requirement of the disputed premises for building and re-building, or, more accurately, for his own use and occupation after building and rebuilding. The suit was contested by the defendant, whose defence inter alia was that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between him and the present plaintiff and that, accordingly, the notice of ejectment was bad and invalid in law and that, further, the plaintiff's case of reasonable requirement, as alleged by him, was not true. 3. THE learned trial Judge overruled the above defences and decreed the plaintiffs suit. Hence this appeal by the defendant. 4. IT appears from the materials before us that the defendant was a tenant in the disputed premises for about three or four decades and his tenancy began under the plaintiff's predecessor, who was the owner of the old promises Nos. 40 and 42, W. C. Bonerjee Street, Calcutta, within which the present disputed premises was comprised On the death of the said original owner Prosanna Kumar Bose, the said premises Nos. 40 and 42, W. C. Bonerjee Street devolved upon his two sons, Anukul and Atul, and thereafter there was a partition between them, under which the disputed premises, which is now numbered as 40/a, W. C. Bonerjee Street, Calcutta, was allotted exclusively to the present plaintiff Anukul and the defendant's tenanted portion, which was comprised within this premises, continued to be held by the defendant as tenant under him. In support of the appeal, Mr. Mukherjee. appearing for the defendant appellant, has raised before us three contentions, namely, (1) that by the above partition, there was no transfer of title and, accordingly. In support of the appeal, Mr. Mukherjee. appearing for the defendant appellant, has raised before us three contentions, namely, (1) that by the above partition, there was no transfer of title and, accordingly. the plaintiff did not become solely entitled to the disputed premises nor did he become the sole landlord of the defendant ; (2) that, in any event, as there was no attornment by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff, the plaintiff could not claim thee defendant's sole landlord and (3) that, the plaintiffs story of reasonable requirement, the pleaded by him in this plaint by him in his plaint, has not been established. 5. AS we have already indicated hereinbefore, the learned trial Judge negatived all the above contentions and, in cur view, his conclusions on the points are sound and ought to be upheld. It will be too much to say that partition is not transfer so as to confer exclusive title on the allottee in respect of his portion. Indeed, the effect of partition, when there is a valid partition, is to convert joint title of the parties into the exclusive title of the particular allottee, to whom the particular property is allotted and along with it, to convert joint possession into his exclusive possession. It may be that for certain special purposes, partition is not regarded as a transfer or that, as to the process, by which this transfer takes effect or as to the nature of this transfer for purposes of the Transfer of Property Act, there has been some divergence of judicial opinion but all the authorities are agreed that it effects a transfer and converts the original joint title into the separate title of the allottee. In this view we are clearly of the opinion that, by the partition the plaintiff got exclusive title to the disputed property and often that is accepted, by privity of estate, he became the defendant's sole landlord, 6. In this view we are clearly of the opinion that, by the partition the plaintiff got exclusive title to the disputed property and often that is accepted, by privity of estate, he became the defendant's sole landlord, 6. ON the question of attornment, the materials on record clearly show that the defendant accepted the plaintiff as his landlord by taking rent receipts from him with the description that he was the sole landlord and, even apart from that, the only effect of absence of any attornment would be that, if any rent had been paid in the meaning to the old landlords, for the said rent, the defendant would have no further liability to the plaintiff as the new landlord. It cannot, however, affect the exclusive title of the plaintiff or the relationship of landlord and tenant between the present parties. In the above view, we overrule also the second contention of Mr. Mukherjee. On the last question, namely, the question of reasonable requirement, the records before us contain abundant materials to indicate that the plaintiff has succeeded in establishing his case on the point. It will be a reasonable requirement on the part of the plaintiff to require accommodation for his son, who is now living apart, to enable him to live with his parents, particularly in the circumstances of the instant case, and, for that purpose, further constructions or additions would be necessary and, as the plan, made for the purpose by the plaintiff, seems to be reasonable, the requirement on the basis of this plan would also be reasonable. Construction according to that plan for purposes of a valid sanction would require a side space of 4 ft. which cannot be provided except by demolishing the shed, now occupied by the defendant. The plaintiff has also proved that he has sufficient means for purposes of the said intended construction. In short, on this particular question, we fully agree with the learned trial Judge, who has given full reasons for his conclusion on the point and those reasons commend themselves to us. We would, accordingly, hold that the plaintiff has also been able to make out a case of reasonable requirement, as pleaded by him in the plaint. 7. IN view of the above findings the decision of the learned trial Judge will have to be upheld and this appeal will fail. 8. We would, accordingly, hold that the plaintiff has also been able to make out a case of reasonable requirement, as pleaded by him in the plaint. 7. IN view of the above findings the decision of the learned trial Judge will have to be upheld and this appeal will fail. 8. HAVING regard, however, to the circumstances of the parties in the instant case and the situation, now prevailing in the matter of accommodation in this city, and the further fact that the defendant has occupied the disputed premises for about three or four decades and has been earning his livelihood from this place, we are inclined to grant the defendant appellant a reasonably long time to vacate the disputed premises. We, accordingly, dismiss this appeal subject to this that the defendant appellant will have time till the end of November, 1967, to quit and vacate the disputed premises and make over vacant and peaceful possession of the same to the plaintiff respondent, provided he files, in this Court, within a week from this date, an appropriate undertaking to the effect that he will quit and vacate the disputed premises and deliver up vacant and peaceful possession of the same to the plaintiff decree holder within November, 1967, and provided further that he goes on depositing, in the trial court, to the credit of the plaintiff decree holder, a sum, equivalent to the rental rate, month by month, regularly, according to the English calendar, within the 15th of the next succeeding month according to the same calendar, on account of current mesne profits and, in default of the above deposit for any three months, this decree for eviction will become executable at once and the above provision for time will automatically lapse. If any amount be deposited in pursuance of this order, the respondent decree holder will have the liberty to withdraw the same without furnishing any security therefor and without prejudice to any of his rights under the law. There will be no order for costs, so far as this Court is concerned.