ORDER.- The twenty-six petitioners herein were charged by the Police before the learned Special Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Tiruchirappalli, for offences under sections 147, 148, 454, 454 read with section 149, 427, 435 and 435 read with section 149, Indian Penal Code. The main allegation against them was as follows: "On 10th February, 1965 at about 11 a.m. at Jawahar Bazaar, Karur Town, the petitioners Were members of an unlawful assembly, that in prosecution of the common objects of such assembly, viz., the resisting of the execution of law by defying the order passed under section 144, Criminal Procedure Code, in breaking open Kalyani Ready-made Stores belonging to Govindarajulu Pillai and causing mischief and mischief by fire, committed the offence of rioting, that at that time accused 10 was armed with a crowbar and accused 7 and 21 with iron rods and that thereby accused 1 to 6,8,9, 11 to 20 and 22 to 26 committed an offence punishable under section 147, Indian Penal Code and that accused 7, 10 and 21 committed an offence punishable under section 148, Indian Penal Code“. After ten out of the 68 prosecution witnesses were examined, the petitioners filed an application before the Magistrate for dropping the proceedings on the ground that they were void for want of a complaint from the Deputy Tahsildar-Magistrate who had passed the prohibitory order under section 144, Criminal Procedure Code, prohibiting meetings and demonstrations for a period of fifteen days from 3rd February, 1965. The learned Magistrate overruled this objection. This revision case has been filed against that order. Sri P. R. Gokulakrishnan, the learned Counsel for the petitioners, points out that the charge-sheet filed by the Police itself proceeds on the basis that the offences were committed in the course of defying the order passed under section 144, Criminal Procedure Code, and accordingly the defiance of that order would amount to an offence under section 188, Indian Penal Code, which could be taken cognizance of by the Court under section 195 (1) (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure only on the complaint of the Deputy Tahsildar or some other superior officer. The learned Counsel urges that the other offences attributed to the petitioners are only incidental and that the provisions of section 195 (1) (a), Criminal Procedure Code, cannot be allowed to be evaded by omitting the offence under section 188, Indian Penal Code. The learned Counsel urges that the other offences attributed to the petitioners are only incidental and that the provisions of section 195 (1) (a), Criminal Procedure Code, cannot be allowed to be evaded by omitting the offence under section 188, Indian Penal Code. There are two decisions of the Supreme Court which lay down the principles to be observed in such cases. The first is Basir-ul-Huq and others v. The State of West Bengal1, and the other is Chandrika Sao v. State of Bihar2. In the first case, the appellant Nurul Huda gave false information to the Police that one Dhirendra Nath had murdered his mother and he brought the Police to the cremation ground. The corpse was removed when it was found that the complaint was false. Thereupon, Dhirendra Nath filed a complaint against Nurul Huda and others under section 297, Indian Penal Code (trespass upon cremation ground) and section 500, Indian Penal Code (defamation). Nurul Huda and others objected that the proceedings were void because the offence under section 182, Indian Penal Code; had been committed in laying false information to the Police and the offence under section 182, Indian Penal Code, could be taken cognizance under section 193 (1) (a), Criminal Procedure Code, only on the complaint of the particular Police Officer. This contention was negatived. In respect of the offence under section 297, Indian Penal Code, it was pointed out that the offence was committed after the false information was given and was therefore a distinct offence. So far as the offence under section 500, Indian Penal Code, was concerned, it was recognised that it was contained in the very false complaint made to the Police. Nevertheless, it was held that the case under section 500, Indian Penal Code, could be taken cognizance of separately, though there was no complaint to the Police in respect of the offence under section 182, Indian Penal Code. The decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Narayana Ayyar v. Veerappa Pillai3was approved. The first principle laid down was that section 195, Criminal Procedure Code, does not bar the trial of an accused for a distinct offence disclosed by the same facts and which is not included within the ambit of that section. The second principle was that the provisions of section 195, Criminal Procedure Code, could not be evaded by resorting: to devices or camouflages. The second principle was that the provisions of section 195, Criminal Procedure Code, could not be evaded by resorting: to devices or camouflages. It was observed: ”The test whether there is evasion of section or not is whether the facts disclose primarily and essentially an offence for Which a complaint of the Court or of the public servant is required. In. other Words, the provisions of the section cannot be evaded by the device of charging a person with an offence to which that section does not apply and then convicting him of an offence to Which it does, upon the ground that such latter offence is a minor offence of the same character, or by describing the offence as being one punishable under some other section of the Indian Penal Code, though in truth and substance the offence falls in the category of sections mentioned in section 195 Criminal Procedure Code. Merely by changing the garb or label of an offence which is essentially an offence by the provisions of section 195 prosecution for such an offence cannot be taken cognizance of by misdescribing it or by putting a wrong label on it." In Chandrika Sao v. State of Bihar1, the accused caused obstruction to the Assistant Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, when the latter wanted to take his books of accounts. This was an offence under section 26 (1) (h) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947. The accused also assaulted the officer and that was an offence under section 353, Indian Penal Code. The prosecution of the offence under section 26 (1) (h) of the Sales Tax Act required the previous sanction of the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and no such sanction had been obtained and there was no complaint in respect of that offence. It was held that the conviction under section 353, Indian Penal Code, could stand. The prosecution of the offence under section 26 (1) (h) of the Sales Tax Act required the previous sanction of the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and no such sanction had been obtained and there was no complaint in respect of that offence. It was held that the conviction under section 353, Indian Penal Code, could stand. Their Lordships proceeded on the footing that the same act of the accused amounted to an offence under section 26 (1) (h) of the Sales Tax Act and also an offence under section 353, Indian Penal Code They stated: "He could be prosecuted for either or both these offences at the discretion of the prosecution It may be that he Was not prosecuted in respect of both the offences and the prosecution Was restricted to the offence under section 353, Indian Penal Code, only to obviate the necessity of obtaining the Commissioner’s sanction. Even so, the prosecution cannot be said to have done something Which is unwarranted by law. An offence under section 353, Indian Penal Code, is a graver offence than the offence under section 26 (1) (h) of the Act........" Reference may also be made to Joghi Mahato v. Ananta Lal Ghosh2. There the accused along with some others had been restrained by a Magistrate by order under section 144, Criminal Procedure Code, from going upon a particular plot of land They went to the land and did something further, with which the Magistrate’s order had no concern, namely, they stole the crops of the complainant. It was held that the offence under section 379, Indian Penal Code, could be enquired into even though there was no complaint by the Magistrate for disobedience of the order under section 144, Criminal Procedure Code. At page 369 the following illustration is given: " A man may be injuncted by a Police order under section 144 of the Code from going with five or six persons through the streets of Calcutta and if that order is violated by a body of hooligans and they commit mass murders, then in the interpretation that is now sought to be put upon Mr Justice Sen’s decision, the Magistrate Would be precluded from going into the case of mass murder simply because of the violation of the order of the Commissioner of Police Which is also an offence under section 188 of the Indian Penal Code. The present case is a good illustration. Theft has nothing to do With trespass. Even if there had been no order by the Magistrate under section 188 of the Indian. Penal Code the offence Would still be theft in the present case for taking away the complainant’s crop if the facts are proved." Sri K. A. Panchapakesan has referred also to some other decisions, namely Chandra Rao v. Sambayya3, Kashi Nath Pathak v. Kitu Rajwar4, and the decision of Sadasivam, J., in Cr.M.P. No. 799 of 1965. Sri P. R. Gokulakrishnan has, for his part, relied on the following decisions ; Ramswarup v. The State5, Magandhai v. State of M.P.6, Makaradhwaj Shahu v. The State7, and In re V. V. L. Narasimhamurthy8. I am clearly of the opinion that the circumstances of the present case brine it within the ambit of the decisions cited by Sri K. A. Panchapakesan and that the decisions cited by Sri P. R. Gokulakrishnan are distinguishable. The offences under sections 147, 148, 454, 427 and 435, Indian Penal Code, are distinct offences from the alleged violation of the prohibitory order. In fact, I doubt whether there was any violation of the prohibitory order to constitute an offence under section 188 Indian Penal Code. Even on the footing that an offence under section 188 Indian Penal Code, had been committed, the want of complaint by the Tahsildar relating to that would not bar the Magistrate from taking cognizance of the other offences which are distinct and separate offences, and in fact graver offences. Those offences could stand independently, whether there had been an order under section 144, Criminal Procedure Code, or not. There is no attempt by the prosecution to circumvent the provisions of section 195 (1) (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, the revision case is dismissed. R.M. ------------- Revision dismissed.