JUDGMENT P. Govinda Menon, J. 1. These appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge of Tellicherry in Sessions Case 18 of 1965. There were six accused in the case. Accused 1 and 2 were charged for the offence of murder punishable under section 302 read with section 34 I.P.C., and accused 3 to 6 were charged for the offence of abetment of the said murder, offence punishable under section 302 read with section 109 I.P.C. There was the further charge of criminal conspiracy under section 120-B I.P.C., against all the accused. 2. The prosecution case was that in pursuance of the conspiracy accused 1 and 2 caused the death of one Kariappa Rai of Kattukukke village in Kasargod taluk at about noon on 25th August 1964 by beating him with areca splinters. ******** After discussing some of the evidence Their Lordships continue: On a consideration of the evidence learned. Sessions Judge found that the offence under section 120-B, I.P.C. has not been made out and acquitted all the accused of that charge. Learned Judge found that there was no satisfactory proof of abetment against accused 3 to 5 and acquitted them of the offence. Learned Judge however found that the prosecution has satisfactorily proved that accused 1 and 2 were the persons who had inflicted the injuries on Kariappa Rai resulting in his death and found them guilty under section 326 read with section 34 I.P.C., acquitting them of the offence of murder. The sixth accused was found guilty of the offence under section 326 read with section 109 I.P.C. 3. Criminal Appeal 209/65 is filed by the first accused, Criminal Appeal 210/65 is by the second accused and Criminal Appeal 186/65 is by the sixth accused against their conviction. The sixth accused was found guilty of the offence under section 326 read with section 109 I.P.C. 3. Criminal Appeal 209/65 is filed by the first accused, Criminal Appeal 210/65 is by the second accused and Criminal Appeal 186/65 is by the sixth accused against their conviction. Criminal Appeal 238/65 is filed by the State against the acquittal of accused 1 to 6 of the offence under section 120-B, of the acquittal of accused 1 and 2 of the offence under section 302 read with section 34 I.P.C. and accused 3 to 6 of the offence under section 302 read with section 109 I.P.C. On a perusal of the calendar this court had issued notice to accused 1 and 2 to show cause why their acquittal under section 302 I.P.C. should not be set aside and in any case why the sentence awarded under section 326 I. P. C., should not be enhanced. Notice was also issued to the sixth accused to show cause why his acquittal under section 302 read with section 109 should not be set aside and in any case why the sentence awarded to him should not be enhanced. This is calendar revision 4 of 1965. * * * * * After dealing with further evidence Their Lordships continue: 4. Then we come to the evidence of the two boys P.Ws. 5 and 8. P.W. 5 Venkappa is aged 12 and P.W. 8 Ayithu is aged 8 years. They are the children of P.W. 9. They have deposed that on that day noon they saw the deceased Kariappa Rai and P.W. 4 the Konkini going along the foot-path, accused 1 and 2 suddenly running out of the house with sticks hidden underneath their shirt, the first accused beating first the konkini and when he ran away both of them beating Kariappa Rai several times with the sticks which they had. Learned Sessions Judge has put certain preliminary questions to both the boys and after satisfying that they could understand the questions put to them and give rational answers, administered oath to them and examined them. It is now argued that the learned Judge has not asked any question to ascertain whether they know the significance of oath and in the absence of a certificate that the children who were examined understand the duty of speaking truth, their evidence is rendered inadmissible. It is now argued that the learned Judge has not asked any question to ascertain whether they know the significance of oath and in the absence of a certificate that the children who were examined understand the duty of speaking truth, their evidence is rendered inadmissible. A similar question arose in the case in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 54. In that case a Judge who recorded the statement of a girl of seven or eight years certified that she did not understand the sanctity of oath and accordingly did not administer oath to her, but failed to certify that the child understood the duty of speaking the truth. The question was whether this omission rendered her evidence inadmissible. It was held that: "An omission to administer an oath, even to an adult, goes only to the credibility of the witness and not his competency. The question of competency is dealt with in section 118 Evidence Act. The Oaths Act does not deal with competency and under section 13 of the Act omission to take oath does not affect the admissibility of the evidence. It therefore follows that the irregularity in question cannot affect the admissibility of the evidence of the girl."t Their Lordships however observed that it is desirable that Judges and Magistrates should always record their opinion that the child understands the duty of speaking the truth. 5. In this case even though no specific questions were put and there is no certificate, the learned Judge was satisfied that the boys knew the significance of oath and the duty of speaking the truth and that must have been the reason why oath was administered to them. A stated by the Privy Council in Mohammed Sugal Esa v. The King, A.I.R. 1946 P.C. 3. "It is not to be supposed that any Judge would accept as a witness a person who he considered was incapable not only of understanding the nature of an oath but also the necessity of speaking the truth when examined as a witness."t There is, therefore, impediment to the admissibility of their evidence. Another argument that was raised was that children are a most untrustworthy class of witnesses who could easily be tutored or threatened to depose what others want them to do. Another argument that was raised was that children are a most untrustworthy class of witnesses who could easily be tutored or threatened to depose what others want them to do. In childhood the faculties of observation and memory are usually more active than in after life, while the motive for falsehood are then less numerous and powerful. The experience and artlessness which, in a great measure must accompany tender years, render a child incapable of sustaining consistent perjury while the same causes operate powerfully in preventing his true testimony from being shaken by the adroitness of counsel. 6. The next question is whether corroboration is necessary for accepting their testimony. Lord Goddard stated in Muhamed Sugal Esa v. The King, A.I.R. 1946 P.C. 3. (cited supra) that while no corroboration is needed in Indian law for the evidence of a child witness, it is a sound rule in practice not to act on the uncorroborated evidence of a child, whether sworn or unsworn, but this is a rule of prudence and not of law. It is more a rule of caution. If after scrutiny no infirmities are found and there is an impress of truth, there is nothing in the way of acceptance of the evidence of a child witness. Corroboration of the sworn evidence of a child is not necessary as a matter of law, it is only by way of caution that we look for corroboration. It was alleged that the evidence of these two boys would show that they are giving tutored testimony, but nobody was interested in getting up a false case against the accused. Their evidence is fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 4 which has been accepted by us. It is true that there are a few contradictions and discrepancies in their evidence, but they are such as can be expected when such young children are subjected to severe cross-examination. We have carefully gone through their evidence keeping in mind that they are children who could have been tutored, but on a close scrutiny of their evidence we entertain no doubt that their evidence is substantially true and that they had deposed only as to what they had seen. We have carefully gone through their evidence keeping in mind that they are children who could have been tutored, but on a close scrutiny of their evidence we entertain no doubt that their evidence is substantially true and that they had deposed only as to what they had seen. The accused were living in their house and having seen them earlier, it is unlikely that they could have committed any mistake in the identity of the persons who had so mercilessly beaten the deceased. Both of them have correctly identified the two accused at the parade conducted by P.W. 35. 7. To further corroborate the evidence of the eye-witnesses, we have the evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 9. P.W. 2, Appayya Naika is the son of Choma Naika. He has sworn that he was employed by the sixth accused as servant since the last few years. He has deposed that in the house of the sixth accused his wife, his mother P.W. 30 his younger sister Gulabi and their grand-mother Angare are living. He sleeps in the out-house of the sixth accused. While so on the Saturday prior to the death of Kariappa Rai the sixth accused came in the night and woke him up. So he lighted the lamp and found two persons with the sixth accused. They were accused 1 and 2. The sixth accused told him that they had come to keep watch over the garden of the fifth accused and they may remain there for two days and that he should attend to their needs. They were given a mat to sleep. He further disposed that next day morning the sixth accused left the house for Kadeshwalaya with his wife and his younger sister Gulabi. That day accused 1 and 2 wanted two areca splinters which he gave them. As directed by the sixth accused he took accused 1 and 2 to his father house on Monday morning. While going accused 1 and 2 had taken the areca sticks hidden underneath their shirt. On taken P.W. 9 house he told his father that the two persons had come to watch the garden of the fifth accused and that the sixth accused wanted them to remain in their house for one day. He then left for the fifth accused house. On taken P.W. 9 house he told his father that the two persons had come to watch the garden of the fifth accused and that the sixth accused wanted them to remain in their house for one day. He then left for the fifth accused house. On Tuesday while he was coming to his father house he saw the dead body of Kariappa Rai in the footpath and ran up to the house. His father was not there, but he met his brothers P.Ws. 5 and 8 and on asking where accused 1 and 2 were, they told him that accused 1 and 2 beat Kariappa Rai and had run away. They also told him that Rama Naika P.W. 4 was with the deceased and that he was first beaten and so he had run away. On getting this information the witness went to the sixth accused house and told P.W. 30 that accused 1 and 2 had beaten Kariappa Rai and had run away. P.W. 30 asked him to go to the fifth accused house and give information to the third accused and when he went and told the third accused what had happened he asked him to go home and not to divulge to anybody what he had heard. He has identified M.Os. 16 and 17 as the areca splinters which he had supplied to the accused. Later he identified accused 1 and 2 at the identification parade held by the Sub Magistrate. His evidence gains corroboration from the evidence of his father P.W. 9. He has deposed how accused 1 and 2 were brought by P.W. 2 on Monday, the deceased Kariappa Rai proceeding along the road in front of his house to Perla side on Tuesday morning with P.W. 15 and Iswara Naika, the first accused enquiring who they were and his telling them that the man who was walking in the middle was Kariappa Rai. He has further deposed that in the evening when he returned home after sun set his children P.Ws. 5 and 8 told him that accused 1 and 2 had beaten and killed Kariappa Rai and run away. The evidence of these material witnesses have been seriously criticised by counsel for the defence. He has further deposed that in the evening when he returned home after sun set his children P.Ws. 5 and 8 told him that accused 1 and 2 had beaten and killed Kariappa Rai and run away. The evidence of these material witnesses have been seriously criticised by counsel for the defence. It is stated that it is unlikely that P.W. 30 and the 6th accused who were not very rich would have engaged a servant and a discrepancy between the evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 9 was pointed out as to when P.W. 2 ceased to be a servant. But P.W. 30 the mother herself has admitted that P.W. 2 used to be engaged for work occasionally. We are, therefore, unable to distrust the testimony of P.Ws. 2 and 9 when they say that P.W. 2 was a servant under the sixth accused. Comment was then made about their conduct in not reporting about the occurrence to the Village Officer who lives within a furlong or two from their house. Immediately on knowing about the occurrence P.W. 2 went to the house of his master the 6th accused and met P.W. 30 his mother and told her about the incident. She asked him to go to the house of the 5th accused and tell the third accused who would be there and accordingly P.W. 2 went and reported the matter to the third accused. This is all what anybody in his position would have done and by that time information had already been conveyed to the deceased wife. Nothing material has been pointed out in the evidence of P.W. 2 to throw any the slightest doubt on the truth of his testimony. Both of them are disinterested witnesses with no axe to grind against the accused. We therefore accept their evidence. 8. We have then a few other witnesses whose evidence also may lend assurance to the evidence of the eye-witnesses. One of such witnesses is P.W. 16 Kunhali. He is a trader in Adkastala. In between his shop and Perlathadke there is a river and during rainy season, it is stated, motor vehicles cannot cross the river and so people from come and wait near his shop to go to Perla. One of such witnesses is P.W. 16 Kunhali. He is a trader in Adkastala. In between his shop and Perlathadke there is a river and during rainy season, it is stated, motor vehicles cannot cross the river and so people from come and wait near his shop to go to Perla. He has deposed that he heard about the murder of Kariappa Rai, that on the Saturday prior to the murder the sixth accused went to his shop at night and sat there and when questioned where he was going he said that he was waiting for some people and at about 9.30 p.m. a car came, the sixth accused went near the car, that 2 or 3 people got down from the car and the sixth accused went along with them in the direction of Parlathadke. Who the persons were who had got down from the car, the witness does not say, but his evidence corroborates in a way the evidence of P.W. 2 that on the Saturday night prior to the date of occurrence the sixth accused came along with accused 1 and 2 to his house. The next day again the witness met the sixth accused near his shop and he left with his wife and sister in P.W. 18 Krishnan car. P.W. 18 Krishna is a driver of car M.Y.S. 2589 belonging to one Somappa. He says he had known the sixth accused and that on Sunday prior to the date of occurrence the 6th accused had got into his car with his wife and another lady and he had taken them to Kalladka. According to P.W. 2 after putting accused 1 and 2 in his charge the sixth accused left the house the next day with his wife and children. P.W. 18 has further given evidence that on Tuesday he met accused 1 and 2 at Vittal where he had parked the car. The first accused represented that he wanted to go to Panamangalore as he had information that his mother was dead. The witness has stated that both accused 1 and 2 got into the car and he dropped them at Panamangalore, 8 or 9 miles away from Vittal. He is also one of the witnesses who has identified accused 1 and 2 at the identification parade. The witness has stated that both accused 1 and 2 got into the car and he dropped them at Panamangalore, 8 or 9 miles away from Vittal. He is also one of the witnesses who has identified accused 1 and 2 at the identification parade. It is true that none of these drivers were prepared to own that they were letting out their cars for hire, but their cars not having been registered as taxis their prevarication regarding this matter is easily understandable. It is difficult to accept the argument of the learned counsel that all these witnesses have been got at by the police. The witness has satisfactorily explained as to how he happened to be at Vittal. P.W. 17 Gopala Shetty is another driver, who had also identified accused 1 and 2 as persons who had travelled his car from Adyanadke to Vittal about 8 months prior to his examination. P.W. 19, Abdul Sathar, another driver has sworn that one day while he had parked his car near Panamangalore temple, four people came and told him that they wanted to go to Adkastala, that they were accused 1 to 4, that the second accused represented that a person was seriously ill and that they wanted to take him to Mangalore. The witness agreed and accused 1 and 2 got into the car and he took them near the shop of P.W. 16. It was here that the 6th accused was waiting and the persons who came in the car alighted and went along with the 6th accused. 9. The evidence of P.W. 35 the Judicial Sub Magistrate shows that the identification parade was properly conducted. He has sworn that on 24th October 1964 he received a requisition for conducting an identification parade. Accused 1 and 2 were then in the sub-jail, Kasaragode, the second accused having been arrested on 28th September 1964 and the first accused on 24th October 1964. The parade was fixed on 26th October 1964. Accused 1 and 2 were produced along 10 other under-trial prisoners. They were all wearing mundu and shirt like accused 1 and 2 and the Magistrate has stated that they were all of the same age. Besides these 12 persons the Magistrate got four other outsiders also to be in the parade. The parade was fixed on 26th October 1964. Accused 1 and 2 were produced along 10 other under-trial prisoners. They were all wearing mundu and shirt like accused 1 and 2 and the Magistrate has stated that they were all of the same age. Besides these 12 persons the Magistrate got four other outsiders also to be in the parade. The witnesses who were to identify the assailants were kept separate from where the 16 persons standing in the parade could not be seen. As and when each witness identified there was a reshuffle and the persons in the parade were rearranged. Peons were deputed to fetch each witness and after the parade they were kept in a separate place. The Magistrate has deposed that P.Ws. 2, 4, 5, 8 and PWs. 17 and 18 correctly identified accused 1 and 2. P.W. 9 correctly identified accused 1, but made a mistake in the case of accused No. 2, Ext. P-24 is the proceedings drawn up at the time the parade was held and Ext. P-25 is the memorandum. Delay in conducting the parade was commented upon and it was stated by the 2nd accused that at the Badiadka police station he had been pointed out to the witnesses before the parade. But it is significant that none of the witnesses were questioned whether they were taken to the Badiadka police station. No records have been pointed out to show that the second accused had been kept at the Badiadka police station. The substantive evidence of a witness is his statement in court that he identifies a particular person and the purpose of an identification parade is to test that evidence. The safe rule is that the sworn testimony of witnesses in court as to the identity of the accused who are perfect strangers to the witnesses, generally speaking, requires corroboration which is in the form of an earlier identification proceedings. The value of identification depends on two most important factors, namely, that the persons who identify an accused should not have an opportunity of seeing him after the commission of the crime, and secondly that no mistakes are made. Here these tests have been satisfied. All things considered the identification of accused 1 and 2 by these witnesses is a very important circumstance which goes against them. 10. Here these tests have been satisfied. All things considered the identification of accused 1 and 2 by these witnesses is a very important circumstance which goes against them. 10. On a consideration of all this evidence there cannot be the slightest doubt that it was accused 1 and 7 who had inflicted the injuries on deceased Kariappa Rai resulting in his death. It may be that there was no personal enmity between accused 1 and 2 and the deceased. They belong to far off places and were strangers to Kattukukke and they must have been engaged by somebody for this job. Whoever they may be, there can be no doubt regarding the participation of accused 1 and 2. None of the witnesses have any animus against accused 1 and 2 to implicate them falsely in the case. The case against them is proved beyond the shadow of a doubt. 11. The next question is, what is the offence that they have committed. The question has been considered in paragraph 65 of the Judgment. The reasoning given for finding that only an offence under section 326 I.P.C. is made out, does not appeal to us and the view taken by the learned Judge is clearly wrong. The offence committed amounts to one of murder, under section 302 I.P.C. In a recent case Anda v. The State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 148 where four accused beat a person so severely and the man died of the cumulative effect of the injuries sustained, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered the question as to what was the offence that was committed. Their Lordships referred to section 299 which defines what is culpable homicide and section 300 which tells us when the offence is murder and when it is culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Section 300 begins by setting out the circumstances when culpable homicide turns into murder which is punishable under section 302 and the exceptions in the same section tell us when the offence is not murder, but culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The existence of one of four conditions turns culpable homicide into murder while the special exceptions reduce the offence of murder into culpable homicide not amounting to murder. We are not concerned with any exceptions in this case. We may also exclude clauses 1 and 2. The existence of one of four conditions turns culpable homicide into murder while the special exceptions reduce the offence of murder into culpable homicide not amounting to murder. We are not concerned with any exceptions in this case. We may also exclude clauses 1 and 2. Regarding clause 3 Their Lordships of the Supreme Court stated as follows: It speaks of an intention to cause bodily injury which is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The emphasis here is on the sufficiency of the injury in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The sufficiency is the high probability of death in the ordinary way of nature and when this exists and death ensues and the causing of such injury is intended the offence is murder. Sometimes the nature of the weapon used, sometimes the part of the body on which the injury is caused, and sometimes both are relevant. The determinant factor is the intentional injury which must be sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. If the intended injury cannot be said to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, that is to say, the probability of death is not so high, the offence does not fall within murder but within culpable homicide not amounting to murder or something less. The illustration appended to the clause thirdly reads: (c) A intentionally gives Z a sword-cut or club-wound sufficient to cause the death of a man in the ordinary course of nature. Z dies in consequence. Here A is guilty of murder, although he may not have intended to cause Z death.t The sufficiency of an intentional injury to cause death in the ordinary way of nature is the gist of the clause irrespective of an intention to cause death. The principle has been laid down in an earlier case in Vira Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 465. In a case lit where a number of persons participate in the commission of a criminal act each person may be gulity of a different offence or all of them may be liable for the total result produced depending on the intention and knowledge of the participants. Section 34 applies where there is a common intention and for a criminal act done in furtherence of the common intention of all, every one equally responsible. Section 34 applies where there is a common intention and for a criminal act done in furtherence of the common intention of all, every one equally responsible. Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we find on an examination of the evidence that the two accused were present in P.W. 9 house by design and knowing that Kariappa Rai had gone to the bazaar and would be returning home by the very same way, were practically lying-in-wait to beat him up. This intention was obviously shared by the two accused and was the result of prior arrangement. That there was a common intention among them is found by the learned Judge. It may be that no sharp edged weapons were used and only sticks were used to beat the deceased. So probably we may not be quite right and it will not be safe in holding that there was the requisite intention required under clause 1 of section 300. At the same time the injuries show that the deceased was violently and mercilessly beaten on vulnerable parts of his body and his skull bones were smashed to pieces exposing the brain matter. The weapons used, M.Os. 16 and 17 areca splinters, could certainly be considered as deadly weapons and the Doctor has stated that injury No. 2 corresponding to the internal injury to the left parietal bone is sufficient to cause the death of the person. The external injury and the internal injury to the skull, the Doctor further stated, would have necessarily caused death of the person. Any person using such deadly weapons must necessarily have known that if they were to indiscriminately beat a person with such weapons death would be the ordinary result. So looking at the injuries caused in furtherance of the common intention of both the accused it is clear that the injuries intended to be caused were sufficient to cause his death in the ordinary course of nature even if it cannot be said that his death was intended. This is sufficient to bring the case within clause 3 of section 300. The Additional Sessions Judge has considered the matter only from the view point of clause 1 of section 300 and overlooked clause 3 to section 300. This is sufficient to bring the case within clause 3 of section 300. The Additional Sessions Judge has considered the matter only from the view point of clause 1 of section 300 and overlooked clause 3 to section 300. So we have no doubt that the offence committed by accused 1 and 2 in this case is clearly one of murder punishable under section 302 I.P.C. In the interests of justice, therefore, the appeal filed by the State has to be allowed to this extent and we have to alter the conviction of accused 1 and 2 from section 326 I.P.C. to one under section 302 read with section 34 I.P.C. ***** After a discussion of further evidence Their Lordships continue: According to section 107 of the Penal Code a person is said to abet the doing of a thing, if he instigates any person to do that thing or intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing and explanation 2 says, whoever either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act. Again the explanation to section 109 I.P.C. says that: An act or offence is said to be committed in consequence of abetment, when it is committed in consequence of the instigation of in pursuance of the conspiracy, or with the aid which constitutes the abetment. Abetment can be by conspiracy also but whether there is acceptable evidence to infer conspiracy or not the 6th accused did aid accused 1 and 2 as it was he who brought them to his house, who got them to stay in P.W. 2 house on the side of the road through which the deceased has to pass for going to the bazaar. But for the sixth accused's help it would not have been possible for accused 1 and 2 to stay in P.W. 2 house and conveniently pounce upon the deceased and beat him to death. There need not be any direct evidence of any instigation or aid. It is a matter which could be deduced from the circumstances of each case. Any facility afforded to the doing of an act is, as the explanation would say, equivalent to aiding in the doing of the act. There need not be any direct evidence of any instigation or aid. It is a matter which could be deduced from the circumstances of each case. Any facility afforded to the doing of an act is, as the explanation would say, equivalent to aiding in the doing of the act. There can, therefore, be no doubt that the 6th accused instigated and aided accused 1 and 2 and thereby abetted the commission of the offence. 12. Learned counsel was right in his submission that a person instigating one offence cannot be held responsible for the commission of an offence wholly different from that which he had instigated even though an abetor is liable for the probable consequence of his abetment. Here the learned counsel referred to the evidence of P.W. 26 and submitted that if his evidence is to be believed in toto what accused 5 and 6 wanted was only that Kariappa Rai should be thrashed and there is nothing in the evidence of any of the witnesses to show that they really formed any intention to murder him and, therefore, they could not have instigated accused 1 and 2 to commit either the offence of murder or of grievous hurt. If the 6th accused had been present at the time when accused 1 and 2 demanded areca splinters and when they were supplied by P.W. 2, then the 6th accused could have known that beating with such weapons would end up in fatal results. He could not have known that accused 1 and 2 would get themselves armed with such deadly weapons and beat the deceased to death. It cannot, therefore, be said that the offence of murder committed by accused 1 and 2 was the necessary or probable consequence of the abetment of the 6th accused. We, therefore, find it safer to hold the 6th accused guilty only of the offence of abetment of an offence under section 323 I.P.C. 13. In the result, we dismiss Criminal Appeal Nos. 209 and 210 of 1965 filed by accused 1 and 2 respectively and allowing the State Appeal, alter the conviction of accused 1 and 2 from section 326 read with section 34 I.P.C., to one under section 302 read with section 34 I.P.C. and sentence each of them to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life. The State appeal against the acquittal of accused 3, 4 and 5 is dismissed. The State appeal against the acquittal of accused 3, 4 and 5 is dismissed. 14. We alter the conviction of the sixth accused from section 326 read with section 109 I.P.C. to one under section 323 read with section 109 I.P.C., and reduce the sentence to one of rigorous imprisonment for one year. With this modification Criminal Appeal 186 of 1965 filed by him is dismissed. Calendar revision 4 of 1965 is answered as above.