Order.- This petition is filed for the issue of a writ of certiorari for calling for the records of the Board of Revenue in B.P. Rt. No. 2684 (A), dated 4th May, 1964 and that of the State of Madras in Memorandum No. 43358-V-2/64-12 dated 26th November, 1965, and for quashing the same. The permanent Village Headman of Kaduvetti Village in Musiri Taluk, one Krishna Pillai, died on 20th August, 1958. Before his death, the 3rd respondent was acting as the temporary Village Headman during the leave of Krishna Pillai. After the death of Krishna Pillai, the 3rd respondent, continued to function as the Village Headman. The vacancy in the office of the Village Headman was notified and applications were received. The petitioner, the 3rd respondent and one Thirunavukkarasu applied. The Revenue Divisional Officer, Musiri, selected the petitioner for the post on 8th March, 1959. There were appeals by the aggrieved candidates to the Collector of Tiruchirapalli, and the Collector remanded the case for fresh consideration. Pending these proceedings the service of the 3rd respondent, who was acting as the Village Headman was terminated by the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer on 31st December, 1960 on the ground that certain acts of misappropriation were committed by him. The Revenue Divisional Officer after remand considered the claims of the three applicants, and on 31st December, 1960, selected the petitioner. The 3rd respondent and Thirunavukkarasu filed appeals to the District Revenue Officer. The District Revenue Officer dismissed the two appeals and confirmed the appointment of the petitioner as the permanent Headman on 30th June, 1961. The appeal filed by the 3rd respondent against the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer terminating his services as acting Village Headman was also dismissed. The 3rd respondent and Thirunavukkarasu filed revision petitions to the Board of Revenue against the order of the District Revenue Officer confirming the appointment of the petitioner as Village Headman. The 3rd respondent also filed a petition against the order of the District Revenue Officer, confirming his termination. The Board on 28th May, 1962 considered both the revision petitions filed by the 3rd respondent and Thirunavukkarasu and also the petition filed by the 3rd respondent against the order of the District Revenue Officer, confirming his termination and passed a common order on 28th May, 1962. The contents of the order will be referred to in detail later. The Board on 28th May, 1962 considered both the revision petitions filed by the 3rd respondent and Thirunavukkarasu and also the petition filed by the 3rd respondent against the order of the District Revenue Officer, confirming his termination and passed a common order on 28th May, 1962. The contents of the order will be referred to in detail later. The charges against the 3rd respondent were again enquired into and the Revenue Divisional Officer found that, so far as the first charge against the 3rd respondent was concerned, which related to collection of Rs. 2 and not bringing it to account, it had been made out and the 3rd respondent was let off with a warning. The other charges against the 3rd respondent were dropped. After the conclusion of this enquiry, the 3rd respondent filed a petition on 19th February, 1964, before the Board requesting it to take up the revision petitions filed by him against the order appointing the petitioner as the permanent Village Headman. The Board heard the petitions and passed orders appointing the 3rd respondent as the permanent Headman on 4th May, 1964. Against the said order the petitioner filed a revision petition to the Government and the Government rejected the petition by its order dated 26th November, 1965. The present petition is filed for the issue of a -writ of certiorari for quashing the order of the Board of Revenue in B.P. Rt. No 2683 (A), dated 4th May, 1964, and that of the Government in Memo. No 43358-V 2 dated 26th November, 1965. Mr. K. Rajah Aiyar, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order of the Board of Revenue was without jurisdiction and was liable to be quashed on the ground that the revision petition by the 3rd respondent against the appointment of the petitioner as a permanent Headman by the District Revenue Officer was disposed of by the Board of Revenue on 28th May, 1962, and therefore it had no power to review the order again on 4th May, 1964. It was contended that in any event the power of the Board is prescribed under B.S.O. No. 156 (1), clause (iii) of the Board Standing Orders and it acted in excess of its jurisdiction by going into the merits. On behalf of the 3rd respondent Mr. It was contended that in any event the power of the Board is prescribed under B.S.O. No. 156 (1), clause (iii) of the Board Standing Orders and it acted in excess of its jurisdiction by going into the merits. On behalf of the 3rd respondent Mr. V.P. Raman, learned Counsel submitted that the order fell within the scope of B.S.O. No. 156-A (1) and that in any event the petitioner should not be allowed to canvass the jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue, as he did not take the objection as to want of jurisdiction and submitted himself to a decision on the facts of the case. In disposing of the two revision petitions of the 3rd respondent and Thirunavukkarasu against the order of the appointment of the petitioner as the permanent Headman by the District Revenue Officer, and the revision petition filed by the 3rd respondent against the order terminating his temporary appointment the Board of Revenue passed a common order on 28th May, 1962. In paragraph 2, the Board dealt with the termination of the services of the 3rd respondent and found that proper procedure had not been followed. It set aside the orders of the District Revenue Officer and the Revenue Divisional Officer and directed a full and proper enquiry regarding the removal of the 3rd respondent In paragraph 4 the Board directed that the 3rd respondent would remain out of office during the fresh proceedings of the case, that he would not be permitted to rejoin and that he would be given a chance to vindicate his grievance and that if he succeeded he would be eligible for feeing considered for future appointment in temporary or permanent vacancies It will be seen that the Board has not dealt with the revision petitions against the appointment of the petitioner as the permanent Village Headman. Mr. Rajah Aiyar, therefore, justifiably complained that there was nothing to indicate that the matter was kept pending He submitted that an indication that the revision petitions were also disposed of would be seen from the fact that a copy of the order of the Board was sent to the petitioner also. Mr. Rajah Aiyar, therefore, justifiably complained that there was nothing to indicate that the matter was kept pending He submitted that an indication that the revision petitions were also disposed of would be seen from the fact that a copy of the order of the Board was sent to the petitioner also. Though there is nothing to indicate that the consideration of the two revision petitions against the appointment were deferred, as the petitions had not been disposed of, I am unable to say that the Board of Revenue was in error in taking the two revision petitions for consideration when the 3rd respondent filed a petition after the disposal of the charges against him. In disposing of the revision petitions by the 3rd respondent and Thirunavukkarasu the Board in its order dated 4th May, 1964, considered the merits and arrived at the conclusion that the 3rd respondent had to be preferred. The Board holding that the 3rd respondent had sufficient property, qualifications and was a young man, fully qualified, found him more suitable. It also held that so far as the charges against the 3rd respondent were concerned, it could not disqualify him from pressing his candidature for the office. The power of the Board in dealing with revision against the order of the District Revenue Officer is specified in B.S.O. No 156-A. The Government in respect of an order passed by the Board of Revenue and the Board of Revenue in respect of an order passed by any authority subordinate to it may either suo motu or on the application of an aggrieved party and for reasons to be recorded in writing, annul, modify reverse or remit for reconsideration such order on any of the grounds mentioned in clauses (i) to (iv) of B.S.O. No. 156-A. Clauses (it) to (iv) are not applicable to this case and therefore we are concerned only with clause (i). The Government and the Board can interfere if the order is vitiated by illegality, material irregularity obvious error resulting in miscarriage of justice or want of jurisdiction. Obviously none of the conditions is available in this case, though Mr. V.P. Raman learned Counsel, submitted that the Revenue Divisional Officer in his order dated 31st December, 1960 erroneously referred to the fact of the removal of the 3rd respondent from the post of acting Headman. Obviously none of the conditions is available in this case, though Mr. V.P. Raman learned Counsel, submitted that the Revenue Divisional Officer in his order dated 31st December, 1960 erroneously referred to the fact of the removal of the 3rd respondent from the post of acting Headman. What is stated in the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer is correct, for on that date the 3rd respondent had been removed The fact that subsequently the 3rd respondent was found guilty of one charge and let off with a warning would not make the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer illegal or one which is obviously erroneous resulting in miscarriage of justice. A Bench of this Court in Rathnaswami Padayachi v. Mani Pilli1, dealing win the powers of the Board of Revenue under B.S.O. No. 156-A held that the Board in passing the orders under B.S.O. No. 156-A was acting judicially and as such its orders were subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court observed at page 203: “ It is clear therefore that the Government travelled beyond the limits; of their jurisdiction in holding that on the merits the appellant was better qualified for the office than the respondent. We entirely agree with the learned Judge, Balakrishna Ayyar, J., that it was not open to the Government to make a comparative estimate of the qualifications of candidates and to decide in favour of the candidate, who, according to them, was the best qualified.” This statement of law is applicable with equal force to the powers of the Board of Revenue. The order of the Board of Revenue suffers from want of jurisdiction. Mr. V.P. Raman, learned Counsel for the 3rd respondent submitted that, even if the order of the Board of Revenue was without jurisdiction, this Court will not interfere by means of a writ of certiorari, as the petitioner did not object to the jurisdiction of the Board in taking into consideration the comparative merits of the candidates and deciding the case on merits. Learned Counsel placed considerable reliance on a decision of the Full Bench in Lakshmanan Chettiar v. Commissioner of Corporation of Madras2. Learned Counsel placed considerable reliance on a decision of the Full Bench in Lakshmanan Chettiar v. Commissioner of Corporation of Madras2. In that case a writ was applied for on the ground that the Commissioner of Corporation of Madras and the Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes, Madras, acted without jurisdiction, in that when they were only empowered to inquire into disabilities appearing on the face of the nomination paper, they in fact travelled outside that jurisdiction and went into a matter of substance which was arguable only on grounds not appearing on the face of the nomination paper. Upholding the preliminary objection to the availability of a writ on the ground that the petitioner by his conduct in taking the chance of a pronouncement in his favour on the merits had forfeited his rights, the Full Bench held that when a petitioner armed with a point either of law or of fact which would oust the jurisdiction of the lower Court had elected to argue the case on merits before that Court, he could not be allowed afterwards to seek to repudiate that jurisdiction by filing a writ petition. The Full Bench after referring to various English decisions summed up the position thus: “ The English authorities which were cited prima facie establish the proposition that in such circumstances the applicant cannot obtain a writ of certiotari ex debito justitiae but the Court is exercising a purely discretionary power.” This decision was cited and approved by the Supreme Court in Messrs. Pannalal Binjraj V. Union of India3. The Full Bench has not ruled that when an objection to the jurisdiction has not been taken before the lower Court, the High Court has no power to interfere. According to the practice of the English Courts the petitioner will not as of right be entitled to a writ in the circumstances. In fact the Full Bench understood the English cases to have laid down that in such circumstances an applicant could not obtain a writ of certiorari ex debito justitiae. This statement would mean that the Court is powerless and that it cannot issue a writ even if it is convinced that a writ should issue in spite of the fact that an objection to the jurisdiction was not taken before the lower tribunal. This statement would mean that the Court is powerless and that it cannot issue a writ even if it is convinced that a writ should issue in spite of the fact that an objection to the jurisdiction was not taken before the lower tribunal. If that were so, it will be opposed to the powers granted to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The decision in Lakshmanan Chettiar v. Commissioner of Corporation of Madras2 was rendered before the Constitution came into effect. In Basappa v. Nagappa4, Mukherjea, J., at page 256 dealing with the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution stated the position thus: “ The language used in Articles 32 and 226 of our Constitution is very wide and the powers of the Supreme Court as well as of all the High Courts in India extend to issuing of orders, writs or directions including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, prohibition and certiorari as may be considered necessary for enforcement of the fundamental rights and in the case of the High Courts, for other purposes as well. In view of the express provisions in our Constitution we need not now look back to the early history or the procedural technicalities of these writs in English law, nor feel oppressed by any difference or change of opinion expressed in particular cases by English Judges.” This view was again affirmed by the Supreme Court in Kochunni v. State of Madras1. Before the Board of Revenue the petitioner questioned its jurisdiction on the ground that by its previous order dated 28th May, 1962, the Board had disposed of the revision petitions against the order of appointment of the petitioner and therefore the Board had no jurisdiction. Having questioned its jurisdiction the petitioner also argued on merits. It would not follow that the petitioner acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the Board and was willing to take a decision on merits. Even so, as the jurisdiction of the Board was challenged and as the order passed on merits is clearly beyond the powers of the Board under B.S.O. No. 156-A, the petitioner cannot be said to have forfeited his right to approach this Court. Taking all the circumstances into consideration I am satisfied that this is a fit case in which a writ should be issued. Taking all the circumstances into consideration I am satisfied that this is a fit case in which a writ should be issued. The orders of the Board of Revenue and the Government are quashed, and the Board of Revenue is directed to take up the matter on its file and dispose if of according to law. There will be no order as to costs. V.K. ------------- Petition allowed.