Judgment :- 1. The petitioners filed an application for a permit for cutting the trees on selection felling basis from the property in question under S.3 (2) of the M. P. P. F. Act before the 2nd respondent alleging that they are owners within the definition of the term'owner' in S.2(b) of the Act. The 2nd respondent, the Collector, dismissed the application by Ext. P-2 order stating that since the property from which the trees are sought to be cut belongs to two European planters who have since deceased, escheat proceedings have been initiated by Government, that the question of the ownership of the property is under consideration by Government, and therefore the petitioners cannot be deemed to be the owners. Against this order the petitioners filed an appeal before Government. Ext. P-4 is a copy of the order passed by Government. The Government agreed with the 2nd respondent and dismissed the appeal stating that "Themalavaram in respect of which the permission has been sought for is a portion of 'Kombian Mala', and which is the subject matter of escheat proceedings, and that a notification calling on claimants to the property if any to file their claims has already been published". The petitioners seek to quash Exts. P-2 and P-4 orders and, for consequential reliefs. 2. Petitioners' counsel submitted that the petitioners-are lessees of the property and therefore they would come within the definition of the term'owner' in S.2 (b) of the Act. According to Government the Malavaram from which the trees are sought to be cut is a portion of Kombian Mala, that escheat proceedings have been initiated in respect of the property and that until the proceedings are completed it cannot be said that the petitioners are the "owners". The petitioners filed a writ petition to quash the escheat proceedings. The writ petition was dismissed. An appeal was filed against that order. That was dismissed in limine. 3. The petitioners filed a writ petition to quash the escheat proceedings. The writ petition was dismissed. An appeal was filed against that order. That was dismissed in limine. 3. Government contend that the properties included in the escheat notification belonged originally to Padmayya Tharakan of Wynad Taluk, that Tharakan sold his rights to George Longford Young and Lopes, that these persons died sometime in 1916 intestate and without heirs, that in the year 1920 one Pozhuthana Edathil Narayani Mooppilamma executed a lease in favour of her husband Achutha Kurup in respect of these properties and some other properties for 99 years, that the lease was surrendered in the next year by Achutha Kurup in favour of Narayani Mooppilamma, that thereafter she and her children executed another lease in favour of one L. S. Krishnan for 99 years, and that by successive transfers the leasehold interest devolved on the petitioners. The Government contend that the petitioners have no right under the lease as the persons who executed the lease had no title in respect of the property. 4. Petitioners' counsel submitted that at any rate since the petitioners were in possession of the property for the last 40 years and had made considerable improvements it should be assumed that they have a right to be in possession and would come within the ambit of the definition of the word 'owner' in S.2 (b). Counsel relied upon the rulings in Rev. Fr. Alexander v. N. S. S. Ltd ,1966 KLT. 333 and Kuttan Narayanan v. Thomman Mathai (1956 KLT. 1) and submitted that a person in possession of a property even though wrongfully, has a right to continue in possession until he is evicted in due course of law, and therefore, the petitioners being in possession have a right to be in possession until they are evicted in due course of law. 5. The definition of 'owner' in'Sec. 2 (b) is as follows: "2. In this Act unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, (b) 'owner' in relation to a forest includes a mortgagee, lessee or other person having right to possession and enjoyment of the forest;" The rulings cited by counsel only say that if a person is in possession of a property he can continue in possession even as against the true owner until he is ousted in due course of law. That does not mean that the possession is rightful. It only means that the true owner should not take the law into his own hands and try to recover possession otherwise than in due course of law. Possession as such is a neutral fact though rights may flow from it. If a person remains in possession for a sufficiently long time he may acquire a title by prescription. He may also be entitled to recover back possession from the true owner, if he is dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law. But it does not follow that possession of a person, not entitled to it, is rightful. The reason why mere possession without a right to it, is protected is that law abhors violence. "As mere possession is not a legal relation, disturbance of it is not a breach of the law and it only becomes so when some other right is violated at the same time. But when a disturbance of possession is effected by force, a breach of the law is committed, because all violence is illegal; and this is an injury against which redress may be obtained by an interdict (See 'Possession in the Civil Law' by Von Savigny, compiled by J. Kelleher, page 3). Whoever has merely possession of a thing, does not thereby acquire any right to detention, but he has a right of demanding that no one else shall use force against him; and if the possession is forcibly invaded, he. may protect himself by instituting a suit under S.9 of the Specific Relief Act, the counterpart of the relevant interdict in Roman Law, or if the period for filing the same has expired by a suit under the the general law in certain circumstances. In 'Common Law' pages 206, 207, 0. W. Holmes Jr. considers the question 'why possession is protected by the law when the possessor is not also the owner. He refers to the theory of Kant that freedom of the will is the essence of man and an end in itself, and which is absolutely to be respected. Possession is to be protected because a man by taking possession of an object has brought it within the sphere of his will. He has extended his personality into or over that object. Possession is to be protected because a man by taking possession of an object has brought it within the sphere of his will. He has extended his personality into or over that object. Holmes considers the theory of Savigny as discredited on the ground that possession is protected not only against force but also fraud. In Rogers v. Spence (13 M. & W. 571, 581) Lord Denman, C. J., laid down that protection of possession was, an extension,of the protection which the laws throws around the person and on that ground said that tresspass quare clausum fregit did not pass to an assignee in bankruptcy. Pollock in his 'First book of jurisprudence' says at page 181: "But possession, as a fact, is interesting to lawyers only so far as legal results and incidents may attach to it; and to give definite rights to a possessor because lie is in possession is to admit individual rights of exclusive use and enjoyment. We say because be is in possession. A system of law which merely forbade personal violence might incidentally protect possession so far as any one who used actual violence in dispossessing another might thereby render himself liable to a penalty or damages. This would not be saying anything of possession except that it was not a crime which deprived the possessor of his ordinary personal rights, or a condition in itself odious to the law. Still less does this involve any connection of possession with title. When possession as such is regarded as a proper subject of protection, that is to say, when dispossession without just cause (apart from any violence or physical damage incidental to the act) is treated as calling for a remedy, then the relation to ownership becomes apparent. If a person out of possession is to have a standing-point at all, possession must be capable of being wrongful as well as rightful. There must be rights to possess, or to be put in possession, that can be severed from present possession." Protection by the law of the possessor against dispossession does not by itself create a right in him to continue in possession since the reason for the protection is not that his possession is rightful but because the law would not allow dispossession by force or fraud. Therefore the possession of the petitioners by itself creates no right to possession and enjoyment of the forest within the meaning of S.2 (b). Unless they establish that the persons who executed the lease in favour of their predecessor were the owners, or persons deriving authority from the owner, it is not possible to say that the petitioners have a right to possession and enjoyment of the forest within the meaning of the term'owner' in S.2 (b). Their present possession is one thing and the right to possession is another. If the latter is not established by them they are not entitled to the permit. Therefore I see no error of law apparent on the face of the record. I dismiss the petition. No costs. Dismissed.