JUDGMENT P. Govindan Nair, J. 1. Two interesting questions have been raised in this writ appeal and they turn respectively on the interpretation of section 68F (1) and section 57 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act. 2. A scheme in supplementation of existing transport services on the route Kottayam-Moolamittam in the Kottayam District was notified as required by section 68-C of Chapter IV-A of the Motor Vehicles Act on 19th October 1965. 3. A copy of that scheme has been produced along with the writ application. The scheme was approved by the Government under section 68-D (2) of the Act on 23rd March 1966 and was duly notified under sub-section (3) of section 68-D on 10th May 1966. In between the last mentioned two dates, that is, on 21st April 1966 an application was made by the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation (Ext. P-3) to the Regional Transport Authority. A letter was also written by the District Transport Officer forwarding that application and that letter is Ext. P-4. It is mentioned in that letter that pursuant to the application dated 21st April 1966 permits maybe issued as early as possible for four vehicles and it is not disputed that this is in accordance with the scheme. These applications were granted and permits were sanctioned by Ext. P-6 order dated 21st May 1966. The permits however were issued pursuant to the order Ext. P-6 only on the 1st July, 1966. 4. The contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner before the learned Judge are that application made on 21st April 1966 cannot be deemed to be an application envisaged by section 68-F (1) and therefore cannot form the foundation for the sanction of any permit. Section 68-F(1) is in these terms: "68-F. Issue of permits to State, Transport undertakings.” (1) Where, in pursuance of an approved scheme, any State Transport undertaking applied in the manner specified in Chapter IV for a stage carriage permit or a public carrier's permit or a contract carriage permit in respect of a notified area or notified route, the Regional Transport Authority shall issue such permit to the State Transport undertaking, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in Chapter IV." 5. The question is whether the application is in pursuance of an approved scheme. 6. The question is whether the application is in pursuance of an approved scheme. 6. Section 68-D (3) states : " The scheme as approved or modified under sub-section (2) shall then be published in the Official Gazette by the State Government and the same shall thereupon become final and shall be called the approved scheme. " he argument " approved scheme " in this case came into existence only on 10th May 1966 and so the application dated 21st April 1966 is not in pursuance of the approved scheme. If the words " in pursuance of " in section 68-F mean that the application must be for the implementation of the approved scheme an application can only be made after the publication of the scheme under section 68-D (3). Justice Kapur in writing the dissenting judgment in Shrinivasa Reddy v State of Mysore A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 350 reported in 1960 S.C 350 had occasion to deal with this section and His Lordships observed : " The use of the words ' in pursuance' in S. 68-F only means that applications are made to give effect to the scheme or in execution of the scheme." In the light of the above, there can be no doubt that the application made on 21st April 1965 was at the time it was made not one in pursuance of the scheme that has been published. 7. We do not think that this answer can dispose of the matter completely for the application dated 21st April 1966 was not dismissed or rejected but remained on the file of the Regional Transport Authority till 10th May 1966. The approved scheme was published as required by sub-section (3) of section 68-D on that day. If the Regional Transport Authority considered that the application was sustainable as one made on 10th May 1966 and dealt with it, we are not prepared to say that there has been such an error of jurisdiction that this Court is entitled to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution. 8. The other point arising, for determination is whether the application made by the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation which is Ext. P-3 is against the provisions of section 57 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act. 8. The other point arising, for determination is whether the application made by the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation which is Ext. P-3 is against the provisions of section 57 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 57 (2) runs thus: " An application for a stage carriage permit or a public carrier's permit shall be made not less than six weeks before the date on which it is desired that the permit shall take effect, or, if the Regional Transport Authority appoints dates for the receipt of such applications, on such dates." The application does not mention any date within which the permits granted pursuant to that application should take effect. The letter Ext. P-4 along with which the application was forwarded mentioned that the permit may be issued as early as possible. This has been construed by the learned Judge to mean as early as possible consistent with the provisions of the statute. This interpretation cannot be said to be wrong. The application therefore cannot be said to be against the terms of section 57 (2). This being so, the passage relied on by counsel for the appellant in the decision of the Supreme Court to which we have already referred to reading thus " We consider it unnecessary to go into this matter for it is not disputed that the applications for permits in this case were not made at least six weeks before the date for which the permits were to take effect. In the circumstances the applications being not in the manner provided in Chapter IV and being actually in breach of S. 57 (2) no permits could be issued on such applications." can have no application. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, we are unable to say that the application in this case was in breach of section 57 (2). We are not satisfied that we should interfere with the discretion exercised by the Learned Judge in refusing to interfere with the sanction of the permits. We dismiss this appeal but make no order as to costs.