Natesan, J.- This is an appeal by the plaintiffs whose suit questioning the validity of the inclusion of their institution “ Mia Sakah Sahib Durga” in the town of Tanjore as a wakf under the Wakf Act (XXIX of 1954) has been dismissed by the learned District Judge, West Tanjore. Section 4 of the Wakf Act provides for a preliminary survey of wakfs in the State, and, under section 5, provision is made for the publication in the Gazette a list of wakfs in the State containing prescribed particulars. In the Fort St. George Gazette dated 24th December, 1958, in the notification under the powers conferred by section 5 of the Wakf Act, " Mia Sakab Sahib Darga ", Gandhi Road, Tanjore Town, is shown as a wakf. The nature and object of the wakf are stated to be pious, religious, and charitable and for the maintenance of Durga and Aar sheriff and for conduct of Urus and fathia, to distribute money to the poor, etc. The contention of the plaintiffs is that the institution in question is not a wakf as defined in Act XXIX of 1954, and therefore shold not have been notified under the said Act. It is their case that properly speaking there is only a thaikal or burial place and that to the Thaikal was granted in inam the properties stated to be wakf, by the Hindu Maharatta King Ekoji Raja of Tanjore about the 18th century. The plaintiffs claim to be the descendants of the original grantee from the Maharatta King. According to the plaintiffs, in a portion of the properties of the Thaikal, there are tombs of the ancestors of the plaintiffs, and the grant is personal to their ancestor for the maintenance and upkeep of the family Kabarasthan (grave). The income from the properties were utilised by the plaintiff and their ancestors for their own purposes and there was never any dedication of the properties as a wakf. Portions of the properties had been alienated by way of sales and mortgages and repurchased or redeemed. The properties have been the subject of partitions in the family. At considerable cost buildings have been put up and houses constructed. The principal contention of the plaintiffs is that the original grant was by a person not professing Islam and therefore there is no wakf as defined under the Wakf Act. The properties have been the subject of partitions in the family. At considerable cost buildings have been put up and houses constructed. The principal contention of the plaintiffs is that the original grant was by a person not professing Islam and therefore there is no wakf as defined under the Wakf Act. The plaintiffs therefore prayed for a declaration that " Mia Sakab Sahib Durga " is not a wakf under Central Act XXIX of 1954, and for deletion of the Durga from the list of wakfs notified. The respondent, the State Wakf Board, in its written statement relied on such evidence of the original grant as was available and pleaded that the institution was at any rate a wakf by user. For the respondent it was further stated that a dedication of the properties as wakf could be found in the family partition evidenced by Exhibit B-3 deed 17th January, 1942. The learned District Judge was not inclined to accept the case of wakf by user, and was of the view that even if the original grant could not be held to constitute a valid wakf, from the terms of the partition deed, Exhibit B-3 a dedication to wakf could properly be inferred. The only evidence of the original grant is the extract from the Fair Inam Register, Exhibit A-5. Pending the inam enquiry in Fasli 1270, the property was placed under attachment, but, later it was struck off and no inam title deed was issued, as the Government ordered that the provisions of the Inams Act could not apply to the properties situate in Mokhasa village granted to the heirs of the last Maharaja of Tanjore in 1862 by way of retsoration of their personal properties. Even though no title deed has been issued, the Inam enquiry in this State is regarded as a land-mark and the record of the proceedings of the enquiry considred valuable evidence. In the Inam Register Extract, the class to which the grant belongs is noted as " devadayam". The word " devadayam ‘it has been held, indicates a gift for religious purposes, but does not necessarily connote anything more. In column 8 it is stated that the grant is for the support of a Thaikal or mosque at Pudupatnam kept up at the time of the enquiry. The word " devadayam ‘it has been held, indicates a gift for religious purposes, but does not necessarily connote anything more. In column 8 it is stated that the grant is for the support of a Thaikal or mosque at Pudupatnam kept up at the time of the enquiry. Pudupatnam is now part of Tanjore, but it is nobody’s case that the grant was for a mosque. In fact, it is noted in the remarks column that the inam is filled with Kabarasthan (graves) and that it appeared from enquiry that the inam was granted by Ekoji Raja to Miran Syed Mohammed Tazeem Tarak Khadir for the support of the Kabarastan which was efficiently maintained. There is no entry in the column. " by whom granted and in what year ". The name of the original grantee, it is stated, was shown as " Miya Sakab Sahib Takkai " in fasli 1216 and that was the name entered in the register prepared according to Regulation No. XXXI of 1802. The total extent is shown as 18 acres 8 cents and it is noted hat the excess 2.73 is filled with Kabarasthan. The Inam Register Extract records under column "Decision of the Inam Commissioner or his Assistant" that it is struck off. Exhibit A-4, the extract from the Paimash survey register for fasli 1216, shows that there were 100 samadies. The present survey numbers of the properties of the Thaikal are T.S. 65 and 74 and the Kabarastan in is T.S. 65. Thaikal is the corruption of the Persian word " Takia ". " Takia ", it is seen from the Principles of Muhamadan Law by D. F. Mulla, 15th Edition, means literally a resting place, and that a burial ground is sometimes called a takia. It is also noted at page 200 that the fact that a place is called a takia, does not prove that it is wakf property. The learned author notices that a man may take charge of graveyard and call himself a takiadar, but that does not show that the land is wakf or that he is the mutavalli; but according to the learned author, a takia may become wakf by long use. There can be no doubt that a public graveyard would be wakf property and private ownership or endowment of the same’ is incompatible with its very character. There can be no doubt that a public graveyard would be wakf property and private ownership or endowment of the same’ is incompatible with its very character. Reference to a site as Kabarasan will be prima facie evidence that it is a public graveyard in the sense understood in Mohamedan law. But the property involved in the case is an extent of over 18 acres, of which over an extent of about 2.73 acres only there were graves. We find from the Paimash Register for fasli 1216 that there were 100 samadies. Apart from the matters found recorded at the time of the inam enquiry, we have no other evidence of the original grant. It is not clear whether even by the time of the grant, the kabarastan was there as a public graveyard and had become a wakf or whether the grant itself was for a kabarastan and its support. At the inam enquiry, the area of the kabarastan was also shown as included in the extent of land granted. Central Act XXIX of 1954 as amended by Central Act XXXIV of 1964 by section 3 (1) defines "wakf" thus: " ‘Wakf’ means the permanent dedication by a person professing Islam of any moveable or immoveable property for any purpose recognised by the Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable and includes (i) a Wakf by user; (ii) grants (including mashrut-ul-khidmat) for any purpose recognised by the Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable; and (iii) a wakf-alal-aulad to the extent to which the property is dedicated for any purpose recognised by Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable; and ‘wakif ‘means any person making such dedication.‘ To be a valid wakf under this definition, the dedication must be by a person professing Islam. The only evidence we have as regards the grant in this case is that it was made by the Maharatta King Ekoji Raja for the support of a Kabarastan. In the report of the enquiry submitted with reference to the present institution under section 4 of the Wakf Act, Exhibit B-l, it is specifically noted in more than one place that the endowment is by a non-Muslim. It is unnecessary to consider the question whether the grant by a Hindu King for a Muslim graveyard would constitute a wakf under the common law. It is unnecessary to consider the question whether the grant by a Hindu King for a Muslim graveyard would constitute a wakf under the common law. In Ameer Ali’s Mohamadan law, Volume I, at page 200, it is stated: " Islam is not a necessary condition for the constitution of a wakf. Any person of whatever creed may create a wakf, but the law requires mat the object for which the dedication is made should he lawful according to the creed of the dedicator as well as the Islamic doctrines." It will be a moot question for consideration and this we find raised by the appellants whether there could be a valid gift or grant for worship at a graveyard by a Hindu, though Hindu king may properly set apart lands for use as graveyards by any class of his subjects. It is, however, not necessary to consider this aspect of the matter, as what we have to see here is whether the grant in question satisfies the requirements for a wakf under the Act. As stated, the dedication is not by a person professing Islam. Strictly, the grant will not come under the definition of ‘wakf. However, learned Counsel for the State Wakf Board contends that under the latter part of the interpretation clause, as a wakf by user or as a grant for any purpose recognised by the Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable, it would be a wakf and that there is no limitation in sub-clause (ii) of the definition that the grant must be by a person professing Islam. Learned Counsel contends that the requirement as to the grantor professing Islam is confined only to the first part of the definition and the latter part by which are included a wakf by user and grants for any purpose recognised by the Muslim aw as pious, religious or charitable, are not controlled by the requirement that the creator must profess Islam. The contention is rested on the well-known rule of statutory drafting that the inclusive definition is generally used to enlarge the content of the expressions in the body of the section and to take in what would otherwise be excluded. Our attention is drawn to the observation of Lord Wastson in Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps1. The contention is rested on the well-known rule of statutory drafting that the inclusive definition is generally used to enlarge the content of the expressions in the body of the section and to take in what would otherwise be excluded. Our attention is drawn to the observation of Lord Wastson in Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps1. “ The word ‘include ‘is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of Words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute; and when it is so used those words or phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things as they signify according to their natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declared, that they shall include.” To our view, the use of the expression ‘includes’ in the interpretation clause in the present context, is not to enlarge the meaning of the word ‘wakf ‘set out in the body of the statute, but only to illustrate the wakfs that even the restricted definition could take in. Sub-clause (ii) of section 3 (1), on which reliance is placed, was introduced by the Wakf (Amendment) Act of 1964. Prior to the amendment, by the sub-clause (ii) was included any “ mashrut-ul-khidmat”. There has been no amendment to the body of the section. Another important change is the introduction of section 66-C, which we shall be considering presently. Now the body of the section imposes a restriction as to the faith of the grantor and this has been retained even after the amendment. He must be a person professing Islam. There have been divergent views as to whether a non-Muslim can be the founder of a wakf. The requirement that the person making the dedication must be one professing the Muslim faith it is found in the Wakf Validating Act of 1913 also. It is in this background, that the definition specifically imposes a restriction on the faith of the person creating a wakf and section 66-C relaxes the rule in certain circumstances. The requirement that the person making the dedication must be one professing the Muslim faith it is found in the Wakf Validating Act of 1913 also. It is in this background, that the definition specifically imposes a restriction on the faith of the person creating a wakf and section 66-C relaxes the rule in certain circumstances. It is difficult to read in the context that that restriction is removed with reference to those wakf which are brought in by the inclusive clause, as the practical effect of such a reading will be to take away the restriction even from the body of the definition as dedications coming under the body of the section could also be brought in under sub-clause (ii) of the inclusive part as grants. It is not as if this restriction that the creator of the wakf must be a person professing Islam, cannot be insisted upon with reference to those wakfs which are brought in by the inclusive definition. If by the amendment to the inclusive part of the definition, it is intended to remove the restriction and expand the scope, why then should the interpretation clause start with an express limitation imposing the requirement that the dedication must be by a person professing islam? “ There is no need to impose this restriction in the first part of the interpretation clause and then expand the content of the inclusive definition, if there could be valid wakf, however and by whomsoever founded. The first part of the interpretation clause speak of a dedication. There is no essential formality or the need for use of any specified phrase or term prescribed for the constitution of a wakf. Where an effective dedication is intended, the law will give effect to it in whatever language it maybe expressed or in whatever terms the wish may be expressed or in whatever terms the wish may be formulated. A wakf may be made orally or by writing. A wakf normally requires express dedication but if land has been used from time immemorial for a religious purpose e.g., for a mosque or a burial ground or for the maintenance of a mosque, then the land is by user wakf, although there is no evidence of express dedication ; see Mullah’s Mohomedan Law, 15th Edition, page 166. User is evidence of dedication. User is evidence of dedication. A property may become wakf by immemorial user, although there is no evidence of an express dedication. The inclusive definition makes it clear that a wakf by user and a wakf-alalaulad, that is, a wakf for the benefit of the settlor’s family and his descendants will also be a wakf under the Act to the extent to which the property is dedicated for any purpose recognised by Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable. We are of the opinion that the word” includes ‘in the present case in section 3 (1) is not employed for the purpose of adding to the meaning of the expression ‘wakf in the body of the definition, grants by non-Muslims also. A reading of the relevant sections of the Act, sub-caluses (a) and (1) of section 3 and section 66-C shows that by the expression “ and includes” in section 3 (1), the content of the body of sub-clause (1) was not intended to be enlarged in the sense contended for. If we are to accept learned Counsel’s contention that in regard to wakfs brought in by sub-clause (ii), the limitation that the grantor must profess Islam is not applicable, section 66-C of the Act introduced by the Wakf (Amendment) Act of 1964, will become otiose. Section 66-C reads thus: “ Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act where any moveable or immoveable property has been given or donated by any person not professing Islam for the support of a wakf being (a) a mosque idgah, inambara, dargah, khangah or a maquars; (b) a Muslim graveyard; (c) a choultry or a musafarkhana, then such property shall be deemed to be comprised in that wakf and be dealt with in the same manner as the wakf in Which it is so comprised.” We cannot readily assume that this amendment is a surplusage when it has been solemnly introduced by the same amending Act which amended the interpretation of section 3. It will be seen that for the applicability of section 66-C there must be an existing wakf. If to an existing wakf, for any of the objects specified in section 66-C a person not professing Islam gifts property, then such property shall be deemed to be comprised in that wakf and dealt with in the same manner as the wakf in which it is so comprised. If to an existing wakf, for any of the objects specified in section 66-C a person not professing Islam gifts property, then such property shall be deemed to be comprised in that wakf and dealt with in the same manner as the wakf in which it is so comprised. In our view, the limitation that the creator of the wakf must be a person professing Islamic faith is removed only to a restricted extent under section 66-C of the Act. A grant in support of an ex sting wakf as defined under the Act, by whomsoever made, in made a wakf under the Act. When we read the definition section 3 (1) and section 66-C together, it is clear that for founding a wakf under the provisions of the Act in the first instance, that is for the original foundation, the grantor must be a person professing Islam. The statute, certainly, for understandable reasons it may not appeal to every one has excluded original foundations by non-Muslim from the operation of the Act. In this case, we have no evidence of the original grant except what has been recorded at the enquiry by the Inam Commissioner. The recording by the Inam Commissioner by itself certainly does not amount to any dedication. As pointed out at the outset, the entry in column 8 refers to the grant being for the support of Thaikal or mosque. There was no mosque in the locality. The remarks column refers to the grant being for the support of a kabarasthan. But, as discussed already, it does not appear that a wakf had come into being before the grant was made by the Hindu King. The grant includes the area of Kabarastan. In Vidya Varuthi V. Baluswami Aiyar1, it was observed: “ Considerable stress was laid on behalf of the respondents on the entry in the Inam Register that the dedication was for a specific purpose, viz., the Worship of the idol. The inam proceedings did not create any dedication. They were instituted simply with the object of investigating titles to hold lands revenue free as belonging to valid endowments. The gifts were made, long before the Inam proceedings, by the Hindu Kings or chiefs who then held the country. The purposes of the dedication must therefore be gathered from established usage and practice.” Evidence of practice and usage of the institution there is little. The gifts were made, long before the Inam proceedings, by the Hindu Kings or chiefs who then held the country. The purposes of the dedication must therefore be gathered from established usage and practice.” Evidence of practice and usage of the institution there is little. For immemorial use of the property as a wakf, the property can certainly become a wakf under the Act. But we have only evidence of dealings with the property by the descendants of the original grantee as if it was their private property. Exhibit A-6 is a deed of H banama (gift) dated 19th May, 1876. Exhibit A-7 evidences an othi dated 9th July 1894. There is no doubt reference in this to a Thaikal. Exhibit A-9 is the judgment of the District Court, West Tanjore, dated 18th November, 1896. and refers to the ownership of Thaikal lands in the family of the descendants of the original grantee. It is found that on a portion of the Thaikal land there are tombs. The only oral evidence is that of the first plaintiff aged about 60, as P.W.1. He refers to the properties being leased, mortgaged and sold as private properties and succession to the properties under the Muhammadan law. The income from the properties has now considerably gone up and he deposed that moneys are being spent for the private purposes of the members of the family. He admits to celebrating he death anniversary ceremony of saints entombed in the area and celebrating the Prophet’s day and the annual Khanduri festival. The poor, it is stated, are fed during the Khanduri festival and propaganda for Islam is done by P.W.1 ; but that is only for the past ten years. He deposed that no Muslim can interfere or had interfered With their management. P.W.1 admits that S. No. 65, is Kabarastan. In these circumstances, when the learned District Judge concluded that any user can only date from the date of the partition Exhibit B-3 in the family in 1942, we cannot say that he has gone far wrong. The evidence of user and practice are only the recitals in the document and the evidence of P.W.1 for what they are worth, and the user of this evidence not sufficiently long to infer therefrom the scope and object of the dedication. The evidence of user and practice are only the recitals in the document and the evidence of P.W.1 for what they are worth, and the user of this evidence not sufficiently long to infer therefrom the scope and object of the dedication. No doubt, in the partition deed, Exhibit B-3, which has been alternatively relied upon by the respondent as establishing a dedication, in more than one place, there is reference to the incurring of expenses for the durga as per custom and usage. As to what that custom and usage are, there are no details. However, whether a valid wakf was created at the origin by the Maharatta King or not, it is certainly open to the decendants of the grantee, who are Muslims to themselvess declare the wakf character of the properties and create a wakf, and here there can be no question that a wakf satisfying the requirements of the Wakf Act has come into existence during the partition in the family of the plaintiffs evidenced by the partition deed, (registration copy). Exhibit B-3 dated 17th January, 1942. There is a clear declaration of a wakf of specified properties. The instrument commences with the recital that the partition deed was is respect of the conduct of a trust. The preamble states that the division is of the family properties as also “ the net income left behind after meeting the expenses relating to the Durga as per custom and Anushtanam that are entitled to be partitioned from the income of the trust properties” mentioned. It is well settled that it is not even necessary to name the objects and specify the sum to be spent on any particular object. In the preamble it is stated that the other parties to the deed agree to the present first plaintiff managing the properties of the family situate in Tanjore Cusba, Durga known as Hazarath Syed Mian Sakab Sahib Kadri and the properties attached thereto. There is reference also to a durga at Chidambaram, but with that we are not concerned here. It is stated that the parties thought it proper to make arrangements for the durga. Among the properties, it is said, are included vacant site of Hazarath Miyan Sakab Khader, Tanjore and Kabarasthan vacant places attached to it, and buildings, etc. There is reference also to a durga at Chidambaram, but with that we are not concerned here. It is stated that the parties thought it proper to make arrangements for the durga. Among the properties, it is said, are included vacant site of Hazarath Miyan Sakab Khader, Tanjore and Kabarasthan vacant places attached to it, and buildings, etc. The schedules specify certain properties as trust properties and the ‘A ‘schedule one of the schedules allotted to the first plaintiff is headed as describing the properties belonging to Tanjore Hazarath Mian Sahib Thaikal. It contains portions in T.S. No. 74 and also T. S. No. 65 Hazarath Mian Sahib Kabarastan, garden, vacant site, etc. In T.S. No. 74 punja referred to as punja belonging to a Mian Sahib Thaikal, all the four sharers are given shares, as shares in trust properties and residential buildings are found included therein. The present first plaintiff is stated to have been acting as trustee and Mutavalli till then and managing the charities properly. It is provided that in future also he shall be the trustee and mutavalli, collect the income derived from the properties pertaining to the respective durga in the capacity of trustee and Mutavalli, utilise the amounts so collected for the improvement of the respective durga and for meeting the expenses in connection with Urs, Ashrasheriff, Fathia, etc., taking into consideration the customary practice and take the excess amount himself. The mutavalliship is to continue in the family of the first plaintiff hereditarily. While the document sets out in the schedule the properties to be held in trust, neither the scales of expenditure to be incurred for the charities and ceremonies with reference to the practice and usage referred to in the document nor the practice and usage are specified. The excess over the expenditure according to the custom and Anushtanams has to be taken by the Mutavalli. The properties are all made inalienable. The heirs of the sharers should similarly incur the expenses for the charities and take the excess. It may be that the wakf created in this case is a valid wakf-alal-aulad there being benefit for the family of the executants but not exclusively for their benefit. Such a wakf also is brought under the definition in sub-clause (iii) of section 3 (1) of the Act. It may be that the wakf created in this case is a valid wakf-alal-aulad there being benefit for the family of the executants but not exclusively for their benefit. Such a wakf also is brought under the definition in sub-clause (iii) of section 3 (1) of the Act. In the case of a wakf-alalaulad, it is a wakf under the Act only to the extent to which the property is dedicated for any purpose recognised by the Mohamedan Law as pious, religious or charitable That there is such a dedication, there can be no doubt. Such dedication can. be inferred from the evidence of P.W. 1 himself, apart from the express recitals and the general tenor of the partition deed. So far as the area occupied by the graves is concerned, there can be no question about its wakf character. Where a land has been set apart as a graveyard from time immemorial, a dedication of the land as wakf absolute may be presumed and it is not necessary in such a case to prove actual dedication as wakf. Once a property has become wakf, any amount of assertion of hostile title to the property by the Mutavalli or other persons entering into the management of the wakf property for the wakf will not take away its wakf character. As regards the rest of the properties, even if no ‘wakf’ in terms of the Wakf Act was created originally, by virtue of Exhibit P-3 we can hold that such a wakf as declared in Exhibit B-3 has come into existence. The prayer in the suit is for a declaration that the “ Mia Sakab Sahib Durga”, Tanjore town is not a wakf under Central Act XXIX of 1954 and that the inclusion thereof under section 5 (2) of the Act in the list of wakfs existing in the estate is invalid and for deletion of the institution from the list of Wakfs notified. This relief, on the findings above given, the plaintiffs are not entitled to. A wakf-alal-aulad would be a wakf to the extent to which the property is dedicated for recognised purposes, and the Wakf Board certainly would have only limited jurisdiction in the matter. The Board will be bound by the provisions of the partition deed as to the disposition of the income from the properties - see Ibrahim Sahib Trust v. State Wakf Board1. The Board will be bound by the provisions of the partition deed as to the disposition of the income from the properties - see Ibrahim Sahib Trust v. State Wakf Board1. If the Mutavalli for the time fails to distribute the income and spend the moneys for the religious and charitable purposes as per the usage and custom referred to in the deed, it may become necessary, at the instance of the Wakf Board or other interested parties, to have a scheme framed regulating the expenses and providing for the carrying out of the objects of the Wakf. The present is not a suit for quantifying the extent of the wakf in relation to the pious, religious and charitable purposes. The scope of the present suit is limited and on the findings the plaintiffs cannot have the relief prayed for deleting the “ Mia Sakab Sahib Durga” , Tanjore Town, from the list of wakfs notified under section 5 (2) of the Central Act XXIX of 1954. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. V.K. ----- Appeal dismissed..