Judgment :- VEERASWAMI J. This is a petition to revise an order of the Subordinate Judge of Devakottai dismissing an application of the petitioner, who is the plaintiff in a suit, to direct the Income-tax Officer, Third Circle, Karaikudi, to produce certain documents, the details of which were mentioned and which are alleged to have been filed during assessment proceedings relating to the first defendant for the assessment years 1941-42 to 1948-49. The petition in the first instance was posted before Natesan J. who thought that there was a conflict of opinion in regard to the effect of the repeal of section 137 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 The question is what precisely is the effect of the omission of section 137 from the Income-tax Act, 1961, by the Finance Act, 1964 ? The effect of a repeal--and we proceed on the assumption that omission of a section from the statute book is tantamount to a repeal--is, generally speaking, as if the repealed Act never existed except as to things completed or closed. But in view of this effect, the Indian Legislature enacted the General Clauses Act, 1897, which has been more or less modelled on the provisions of the English Interpretation Act. Section 6 of the Indian Act, which corresponds to section 38 of the Interpretation Act, defines the effect of the repeal, of which the part material for present purposes reads "Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not-- (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed. . ." * How this provision is to be applied has been indicated by the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh "The line of enquiry would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them. We cannot therefore subscribe to the broad proposition that section 6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out when there is repeal of an enactment followed by a fresh legislation. Section 6 would be applicable in such cases also unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the section. We cannot therefore subscribe to the broad proposition that section 6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out when there is repeal of an enactment followed by a fresh legislation. Section 6 would be applicable in such cases also unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the section. Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new law and the mere absence of a saving clause is by itself not material." * We should, therefore, bear in mind these principles in determining the effect of the omission of section 137 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The omission of section 137 is not followed by a re-enactment of that section in any form. But it does not follow that, on that account, the application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out, because, in the absence of any re-enactment, it cannot obviously be said that there is any intention to the contrary, namely, to destroy the rights which would otherwise have been preserved by application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Where there is no re-encatment, there is no question of the existence of any inconsistency or incompatibility, leaving the field clear to attract the interpretation clause, namely, section 6Sadasivam J. in Income-tax Officer, Central Circle, Madras v. Ramaratnam, however, found in section 138, as modified by the Finance Act, 1964, an intention to the contrary. The learned judge observed "Though section 137 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is repealed by the Finance Act of 1964, there is modified restriction by virtue of section 138, clause (2), introduced by the same Act." * This, according to the learned judge, is an indication of the intention to the contrary rendering section 6 of the General Clauses Act inapplicable Venkataraman J. was, however, of a different view in Ramakrishna Mudaliar v. Rajabu Fathima Bukari. He considered that section 138(2) was not incompatible or inconsistent with the effect of section 137 being continued notwithstanding its omission by reason of section 6 of the General Clauses Act. The learned judge took note of the fact that actually, as far as he was informed, there was no notified order under section 138(2). He considered that section 138(2) was not incompatible or inconsistent with the effect of section 137 being continued notwithstanding its omission by reason of section 6 of the General Clauses Act. The learned judge took note of the fact that actually, as far as he was informed, there was no notified order under section 138(2). The learned judge went further and thought that the matter covered by section 137 would fall within the ambit of section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act. He observed that the Income-tax Officer incurred an obligation when documents were filed before him and that obligation continued until repeal of that section, and that this obligation of the Income-tax Officer was to be correlated to the corresponding right of the assessee concerned to forbid the Income-tax Officer from giving evidence in relation to the documents filed before him In our opinion, Venkataraman J. was right when he said that section 138(2) does not contain any intention so as to eliminate the application of section 6. It is possible that partial or total prohibition against disclosure of stated particulars in specified documents filed before the Income-tax Officer under section 138(2) may be consistent or compatible with section 137(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 In our opinion, section 137 of the 1961 Act like its predecessor, section 54 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, neither created an obligation nor privilege or right which could be properly regarded as having been incurred, acquired or having accrued. Disclosure or non-disclosure appears to us to be a matter of public policy in public interest, especially from the standpoint of the revenue. Venkataraman J. himself noticed in the case cited that the prohibition against disclosure was enacted in public interest to enable a full and true disclosure to be made by the assessee. The same idea is to be found also in P. Kandiah Thevar v. Third Income-tax Officer, Tirunelveli. Now what is it that section 137(1) says ? It merely declares that the particulars specified should be treated as confidential. To our minds that in itself does not create any liability or right or privilege. We think that the declaration is not from the point of view of any particular individual. Such a declaration does not confer a right or impose an obligation on any specified person. It merely declares that the particulars specified should be treated as confidential. To our minds that in itself does not create any liability or right or privilege. We think that the declaration is not from the point of view of any particular individual. Such a declaration does not confer a right or impose an obligation on any specified person. No particular person can, by virture of this declaration, be said to have incurred an obligation or acquired a right or privilege. The confidence is directed to be kept in respect of the particulars not by any particular officer but it is attached to the very particulars. Likewise, the second part of sub-section (1), as it seems to us, contains but a bar on courts from summoning for the specified particulars. So too, sub-section (2) enjoins a prohibition against any public servant disclosing such particulars. Neither a mere bar on the court or on the scope of its jurisdiction nor the prohibition against any public servant from disclosing the particulars may by itself amount to an obligation incurred. We are inclined to think that not every obligation, however abstract, necessarily involves a corresponding right also in the abstract. The bar on courts really relates to the power of the court and the prohibition against any public officer disclosing such particulars is no more than forbidding him from divulging the particulars. To our minds, neither the bar nor the prohibition can be regarded at all as an obligation, in any case as an obligation incurred within the meaning of section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act. Where the court contravenes the bar, no particular person including the assessee, in whose assessment proceedings the particulars have been placed before the particular Income-tax Officer, has a cause of action against it. All that any one like the assessee may do in such a case would be to bring it to the notice of the court that it has contravened. So also, in the case of a public officer contravening the prohibition laid against him, any one can bring it to the notice of the authorities concerned, so that he may be visited with the penal consequences. So also, in the case of a public officer contravening the prohibition laid against him, any one can bring it to the notice of the authorities concerned, so that he may be visited with the penal consequences. It does not follow from it that the person who gives such information or brings to the notice of the court the non-adherence to the bar, does it in exercise of any right, as such vested or acquired by him. In our opinion, the right, privilege or obligation must be understood in the context of the following words, "acquired, accrued or incurred" in any enactment repealed. The right, privilege or obligation in section 6(c) appear to be related to particular individuals who by relative acts acquire or incur the right or obligation or to whom the privilege accrues. Section 6(c) does not comprehend a right in gross or in the abstract, but covers only specific right or obligation with reference to ascertainable persons as distinguished from the general public. We think that this view of ours receives support from Hamilton Gell v. White, a decision of the English Court of Appeal. Atkin L.J., one of the learned judges, was there concerned with the scope of section 38 of the Interpretation Act, 1889, which word for word corresponds to section 6(c) of the Indian Act. The learned judge expressed the view "It is obvious that that provision was not intended to preserve the abstract rights conferred by the repealed Act, such for instance as the right of compensation for disturbance conferred upon tenants generally under the Act of 1908, for, if it were, the repealing Act would be altogether inoperative. The learned judge expressed the view "It is obvious that that provision was not intended to preserve the abstract rights conferred by the repealed Act, such for instance as the right of compensation for disturbance conferred upon tenants generally under the Act of 1908, for, if it were, the repealing Act would be altogether inoperative. It only applies to the specific rights given to an individual upon the happening of one or other of the events specified in the statute." * The learned judge in that decision also quoted from Abbott v. Minister for Lands, the following observation which, we think, is pertinent to the present consideration "The mere right (assuming it to be properly so called) existing in the members of the community or any class of them to take advantage of an enactment, without any act done by an individual towards availing himself of that right, cannot properly be deemed to be a 'right accrued' within the meaning of the enactment." * It is no doubt true that an assessee who files documents before an Income-tax Officer may feel aggrieved by the disclosure by that officer of the particulars therein contained. But what he can do about it and what is his right in relation to it ? He cannot take any action by himself. All that he can do is to bring it to the notice of the proper authorities that there has been a contravention by the Income-tax Officer. But this fact is not peculiar or limited to the assessee, for it is open to any member of the public to bring such a contravention to the notice of the authorities. Hardly can it be said that this phenomenon is based on a right or privilege. When an offence has been committed under the Indian Penal Code or any other penal statute, any member of the public can furnish information about it. Can it be said that this is because a specific right has been acquired by the informant ? We clearly think not. The position, in our opinion, is more or less the same with reference to section 6(c) of the General Clauses ActWe are of opinion that section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act, which is the only clause relied on for the revenue, is not attracted to the omission of section 137. We clearly think not. The position, in our opinion, is more or less the same with reference to section 6(c) of the General Clauses ActWe are of opinion that section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act, which is the only clause relied on for the revenue, is not attracted to the omission of section 137. The consequence is that the general effect of repeal without reference to section 6(c) will apply. It follows that the conclusion of the subordinate judge is not correct The petition is allowed with costs. The court below will take suitable steps on the application to have the relative records summoned.