JUDGMENT Jagdish Sahai, J. - This special appeal by Sri Rameshwar, who has been assessed to sales tax by the Sales Tax Officer and whose appeal to the Sales Tax Judge has been dismissed, is filed against the judgment of Brijlal Gupta, J. dated 30-10-1961 dismissing writ petition No. 3036 of 1960 filed by the appellant. 2. One of the questions raised before the learned single Judge, and sought to be raised in this appeal, is whether the petitioner-appellant was a purchasing agent. The learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that it involved a question of fact as also on the ground that the alternative remedy of revision was open to the petitioner-appellant, which he should have availed of. 3. We have heard Mr. Kunzru in support of this special appeal. In our judgment the learned single Judge was right in not investigating questions of fact in exercise of his writ jurisdiction. Admittedly there is a provision for filing a revision application in the U.P. Sales Tax Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). That provision is Sec. 10 of the Act which so far as relevant for our purposes, reads: - "10. Power of Revision. (1) The State Government shall appoint as Revising Authority a person qualified under Cl. (2) of Article 217 of the Constitution for appointment as Judge of a High Court. (2) The appellate authority appointed under Sec. 9 shall be under the superintendence and control of the Revising Authority. (3) (i) The revising authority or any Additional Revising Authority may, for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any order made by any appellate or assessing authority under this Act, is its discretion, call for and examine, either on its own motion or on the application of the Commissioner of Sales Tax or the persons aggrieved, the record of such order as it thinks fit: Provided that no such application shall be entertained in any case where an appeal lay against the of order, but was not preferred." .................." 4. Merely because the section is headed as "revision" does not mean that the powers of the revising authority are not co-extensive with that of the appellate authority. Merely because the section is headed as "revision" does not mean that the powers of the revising authority are not co-extensive with that of the appellate authority. It is well settled that nothing depends upon the use of the word appeal or revision and what is required to be found is as to what are really the contents of the power See Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 308. While dealing with the powers of the appellate authority and the revising authority in that case their Lordships observed:- "There is no indication that they make any distinction between the grounds of interference on appeal and in revision. That being so, the powers of the Appellate Authorities in the matter of settlement, would be co-extensive with the powers of the primary authority, namely, the District Collector or the Sub-Divisional Officer." 5. Sec. 10 of the Act confers powers on the revising authority not only to go into the legality of an order, but also to consider its propriety. In other words the power is not hedged by any conditions and the words of the widest amplitude have been used. It is, therefore, clear that the powers of the revising authority in the present case are co-extensive with that of the appellate authority and the revising authority was competent to go into the questions which were sought to be raised in the writ, petition and are sought to be raised before us. 6. Sec. 7-F of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act, which is headed as revision, is similarly worded as Sec. 10 of the Act. In Gyan Chand Bhatia v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Lucknow, 1965 ALJ 924 a Full Bench of this Court had to consider whether the provisions of Sec. 7-F of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, were an alternative remedy for the purposes of deciding the question whether or not to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Their Lordships held that it was an alternative remedy. 7. It is true that Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not hedged in by any limitations and that its language permits a High Court to investigate questions of fact and also to entertain a writ petition irrespective of an alternative remedy. Their Lordships held that it was an alternative remedy. 7. It is true that Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not hedged in by any limitations and that its language permits a High Court to investigate questions of fact and also to entertain a writ petition irrespective of an alternative remedy. But that provision has come up for judicial interpretation on several occasions and certain rules of practice have been evolved by which High Courts imposed on their own powers certain restraints. One of the restraints is that the High Court would not normally investigate a question of fact and another is that it would not interfere when an alternative remedy is available. The view that we are taking finds support from Sales Tax Officer, Jodhpur v. Shiv Ratan G. Mohatta, (1965) 16 S.T.C. 599 and C. A. Abraham v. Income-Tax Officer, Kottayam, 41 ITR 425 (also relied upon by the learned single Judge). The case of the Sales Tax Officer, Jodhpur, (1965) 16 STC 599 was one where the High Court of Rajasthan in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India had interfered with an order of assessment and the Supreme Court held that it was not a proper use of the discretion conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 8. For the reasons mentioned above we are satisfied that the view taken by Brijlal Gupta, J. is correct and does not require any interference. 9. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed, but we direct the parties to bear their own costs.