JUDGMENT V. Bhargava, C.J. - This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against an order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated the 18th August, 1961 and an order passed by the Additional Commissioner in revision dated the 27th January, 1962 by which the Additional Commissioner dismissed the revision filed by the petitioners and upheld the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated the 18th August, 1961. The order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated the 18th August, 1961 was passed on an application made by the petitioners for permission to institute a suit for ejectment of opposite parties Nos. 4 and 5 under Sec. 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. The permission was sought on the ground that the petitioners needed the accommodation which was let out to opposite parties 4 and 5 for their own personal use. 2. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer made enquiries and came to the finding that the petitioners were living in such conditions that they genuinely needed residential accommodation for their own occupation and that, therefore, it would be fair that the petitioners should be allowed to occupy the residential portion of this accommodation. The petitioners also wanted permission to eject the tenants from the shops which also form part of the accommodation. With regard to this part of the claim the finding recorded was that there was no genuine need of the petitioners for shop accommodation whereas the shop accommodation was definitely needed by the opposite party No. 4 who had a well-established whole-sale business in those shops. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer further held that if the opposite parties were ejected from the shops, their business would very considerably suffer. In these circumstances, a compromise was suggested before him under which the opposite parties agreed to give up the residential accommodation subject to two conditions viz. that the rent payable by them should be proportionately reduced and that they should be reimbursed for the expenditure that they had incurred on improvements and additions to the accommodation with the permission of the original landlord from whom they had taken the premises on tenancy. The petitioners refused to agree to this compromise. that the rent payable by them should be proportionately reduced and that they should be reimbursed for the expenditure that they had incurred on improvements and additions to the accommodation with the permission of the original landlord from whom they had taken the premises on tenancy. The petitioners refused to agree to this compromise. Thereupon, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer disallowed the application for permission to sue for ejectment of the opposite parties but added that the petitioners will have the option to have the accommodation which the opposite parties had agreed to spare in the house in dispute and that in case the opposite parties went back on the compromise made the petitioners could apply afresh for permission. This was the very order that was upheld in revision by the Additional Commissioner. 3. In the course of submissions before us in this petition, it was not suggested that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the Additional Commissioner committed any error of jurisdiction in coming to their decisions. Consequently, we have to see whether there is any manifest error of law apparent on the face of the record in their orders. Under Sec. 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, the District Magistrate or the Rent Control and Eviction Officer exercising the powers of the District Magistrate has been given the power to grants permission to institute a suit for ejectment but no specific principles have been laid down indicating when permission should be granted and when it should be refused. Generally, permission has been granted where it has been found that the landlord needs the accommodation for his own use and there would be no serious prejudice to the tenant if such permission is granted. There are, however, no fixed principles of law governing the exercise of the discretion by the District Magistrate or the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in granting or refusing permission and, consequently, if on taking various factors into consideration, permission is refused it appears impossible to hold that any error of law will be committed. There are, however, no fixed principles of law governing the exercise of the discretion by the District Magistrate or the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in granting or refusing permission and, consequently, if on taking various factors into consideration, permission is refused it appears impossible to hold that any error of law will be committed. The matter being left to the discretion of the District Magistrate or the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, all that the Court at best can see is whether that discretion has been judicially exercised and in the present case we are unable to see that there is any such error in the exercise of this discretion by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. In fact, he went out of his way to arrange an equitable compromise between the parties. It is true that under the law a District Magistrate or a Rent Control and Eviction Officer cannot break the integrity of a contract of tenancy under his own powers. But there is no bar to an accommodation being broken up into two parts with his permission if both the landlord and the tenant agree and desire that, this be done. All contracts of tenancy can be altered by a landlord and the tenant agreeing together with the consent of the District Magistrate or the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. In this case, therefore, the compromise which was suggested could easily have been given effect to if the petitioners had agreed to that compromise. The petitioners did not agree to it and wanted that they should be permitted to eject the opposite parties from the entire accommodation including the shops which according to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer would have seriously prejudiced the business of the opposite parties. In these circumstances the Rent Control and Eviction Officer felt that the equities were not in favour of the petitioners and there was no sufficient ground for granting permission to the petitioners to eject the opposite parties from the entire accommodation. In doing so, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer naturally compared the relative needs of the petitioners and the opposite parties and based his order on the equities as they appeared to him. In doing so, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer naturally compared the relative needs of the petitioners and the opposite parties and based his order on the equities as they appeared to him. It is not for us to sit in judgment over the opinion of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer or the Additional Commissioner exercising revisional powers in the matter of deciding where equities in such a case lie. The discretion is with them and that discretion having been exercised on equitable grounds as they appeared to them, this court cannot now sit as an appellate Court and substitute its own opinion for their opinions. 4. In these circumstances, it was urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners before us that, once it was held that the need of the petitioners for residential accommodation was genuine, there was no option left to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer or the Additional Commissioner to refuse to grant the permission sought and for this proposition the learned counsel referred us to a Full Bench decision in the case of Ram Surat Singh v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, 1964 ALJ 412. It appears to us that decision is totally inapplicable to the present case. In that case, the Full Bench had to consider the manner in which, a Rent Control and Eviction Officer is to act when there is an application by a landlord under Rule 6 of the Rules framed under the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. It was not a case, where considerations for grant of permission under Sec. 3 of that Act had to be examined. So far as rule 6 is concerned, it comes into play when an accommodation is vacant or is likely to fall vacant and the persons wanting to occupy it are the landlord himself and other outsiders who desire to occupy it by being nominated as tenants for that accommodation. In those circumstances, it is clear that the claimants rival to the landlord have no existing rights at all in that accommodation. They only come as claimants who desire that the rights of tenancy should be conferred on them and it was held by this Court that in these circumstances there can be no comparison of the needs of the landlord and those persons. They only come as claimants who desire that the rights of tenancy should be conferred on them and it was held by this Court that in these circumstances there can be no comparison of the needs of the landlord and those persons. The decision was that if the need of the landlord was genuine and bona fide there was no option except to release the accommodation in favour of the landlord. The same principles do not apply where the lis is between a landlord and a person who is already in possession of the property as a tenant by virtue of existing rights. It is to be noticed that the U.P. (Temporary) Control and Eviction Act was self enacted mainly for the protection of tenants and the main protection was against ejectment by landlords. When there is an existing tenant in an accommodation his rights were sought to be protected by the enforcement of this Act and in this case what has been done by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the Additional Commissioner is to protect those rights of the existing tenants. When there is a tenant who already has existing rights in an accommodation and these rights are sought to be taken away by landlord by instituting a suit after obtaining permission under Sec. 3 of the Act, it is obvious that there must be a fair comparison of the rights of the two rival parties and permission should only be granted where it is considered justified that the rights of the tenant should be sacrificed in the interest of the rights of the landlord. In cases, where permission is to be granted under Sec. 3 of the Act, therefore, there has to be a comparison of the claims of the landlord and the existing tenant while there can be no such comparison in cases filed under Rule 6 where the landlord is the only person having existing rights in the property and the other rival claimants are persons who have no existing rights but desire that new rights should be conferred on them. The principles applicable to a decision on an application under Rule 6 cannot, therefore, be applied to an application under Sec. 3 for permission to file a suit. The decision cited on behalf of the petitioners mentioned by us above is, therefore, not applicable to the present case. 5. The principles applicable to a decision on an application under Rule 6 cannot, therefore, be applied to an application under Sec. 3 for permission to file a suit. The decision cited on behalf of the petitioners mentioned by us above is, therefore, not applicable to the present case. 5. No other error of law in the orders impugned was pointed to us. This case was referred to a Division Bench by a learned single Judge for consideration of one other point viz. whether the original petitioner Ram Lakhan Gupta having died his legal representatives can continue this petition. Since we are holding that on merits the petition has no force and fails, we do not think that we need go into this aspect at all. In he circumstances, the petition has no forehand is dismissed with costs.