JUDGMENT S.S. Dhavan, J. - This is a tenant's second appeal from the concurrent decisions of the Courts below decreeing the landlord's suit for his ejectment. The appellant Tikkam Ram was the tenant of a shop in Aligarh of which the respondent Prakash Chandra is the owner and landlord. The agreed rent was Rs. 10/- per month. The respondent alleged in his plaint that the appellant fall into arrears of rent and a sum of Rs. 80/- became due from him as ten months rent. He served on the appellant a combined notice of demand and termination of tenancy but the appellant did not pay up; hence the suit. The appellant resisted the suit and denied that he had committed any default. He also denied having received any notice and alleged that the respondent procured a fictitious endorsement "refused" in collusion with the postman. He also alleged that the notice could not have been served on him, as at the time he was away on a visit to his brother-in-law in Gunah, Bihar. He also contended that the notice terminating the tenancy was invalid as it did not expressly state that the tenancy was being terminated, and also because a material alteration had been made in the notice after it was returned to the respondent with the fiictitious endorsement "refused." He alleged that the words "ap ki kirayadari samapt ki jati hai" were interpolated by the respondent after the notice was returned to him by the post office. 2. Both the Courts below completely disbelieved the appellant's version. They held that he had committed default in the payment of rent and had refused the notice of demand which was served on him personally by the postman. They also rejected his evidence that he was out of station when the notice was served on him. They believed the postman who had testified that he tendered the registered notice to the appellant but he refused it. They also held that the respondent had not made any alteration in the notice. They also rejected the appellant's plea that the notice was invalid because it did not use the express words, "the tenancy is terminated." 3. In second appeal, Mr. B. L. Chaturvedi argued that the respondent's suit should have been dismissed because his plaint did not aver that he had terminated the tenancy before filing the suit for ejectment. They also rejected the appellant's plea that the notice was invalid because it did not use the express words, "the tenancy is terminated." 3. In second appeal, Mr. B. L. Chaturvedi argued that the respondent's suit should have been dismissed because his plaint did not aver that he had terminated the tenancy before filing the suit for ejectment. Counsel argued that without such an averment a suit for ejectment by the landlord must be dismissed as incompetent. The short answer to this argument is that the plaint does contain this averment. In para. 4, the respondent alleged that he had served a notice on the appellant that the tenancy was no longer acceptable to him and had further demanded (in the notice) that the appellant should vacate the premises on the expiry of 30 days from the service of notice. Mr. Chaturvedi contended that this was not enough, and the notice should have expressly stated that the tenancy was being terminated. I cannot agree. No particular words have been prescribed under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act as amended by the U.P. Legislature, which merely provides that "a lease .... shall be terminable on the part of either lessor or lessee by one month's notice." Sec. 111 (h) of the same Act provides that "a lease of immovable property determines . . (h) on the expiry of a notice to determine the lease, or to quit or of intention to quit, the property leased, duly given by one party to another." 4. D. F. Mulla in his commentary on the Transfer of Property Act, 4th edition, has observed, ". . . . the notice to quit must indicate in substance and with reasonable clarity an intention on the part of the person giving it to determine the existing tenancy at a certain time." (p. 619). The same author has observed, "a liberal construction is therefore put on a notice to quit in order that it should not be defeated by inaccuracies either in the description of the premises or the name of the tenant, or the date of expiry of notice. The author's observation is based on authorities cited in the footnote on this page. 5. Thus the crucial test is (1) whether the language of the notice indicates a clear intention to terminate the tenancy, and (2) whether the date of determination of the tenancy is certain. The author's observation is based on authorities cited in the footnote on this page. 5. Thus the crucial test is (1) whether the language of the notice indicates a clear intention to terminate the tenancy, and (2) whether the date of determination of the tenancy is certain. 6. Applying these principles and tests to the notice in the present case, I think it is a valid notice of termination. If a landlord writes to the tenant, "I am no longer willing to continue this tenancy, you are therefore given notice that you should vacate the premises on the expiry of one m of nth which is the time limit prescribed by law failing which 1 shall file a suit for your ejectment," this indicates a clear intention to terminate the tenancy on the expiry of the period of one month. 7. Mr. B. L. Chaturvedi cited a decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Baredley v. Atkinson, ILR 7 All. 899 in which it was held that a notice in the following terms was invalid as it did not indicate a clear intention to determine the tenancy: "If the rooms you occupy in the house No. 5, Thornhill Road are not vacated within one month from the date, I will file a suit against you for ejectment as well as recovery of rent at the enhanced rate." It was held that a mere demand for possession by the landlord was not necessarily a notice to quit. This decision which was delivered more than 80 years ago, may have to be re-considered some day. But in any case, it was based on the language of the notice in that case. The Full Bench did not lay down that a notice terminating the tenancy must use the word "termination". In the present case, the words, "I am no longer willing to continue this tenancy," followed by a notice that the tenant should quit on the expiry of the period prescribed by law is a clear indication of an intention to terminate the tenancy. 8. Mr. Chaturvedi then tried to argue that the courts below did not consider the appellant's plea that he had spent money on repairs which he was entitled to adjust against rent. But the judgments of the both the courts below indicate that the plea was never pressed. Mr. 8. Mr. Chaturvedi then tried to argue that the courts below did not consider the appellant's plea that he had spent money on repairs which he was entitled to adjust against rent. But the judgments of the both the courts below indicate that the plea was never pressed. Mr. Chaturvedi pointed out that it was taken in the written statement. But that is not conclusive. Very often pleas are taken in the pleadings which are given up or not pressed during the trial. If a defendant, after taking a plea in the written statement, goes to trial without asking for an issue on it and does not raise it before the lower appellate court, and the judgments of both the courts below give no indication that the plea was raised, the High Court in second appeal will presume, in the absence of any convincing evidence to the contrary, that the plea was not taken up during the trial. 9. Mr. Chaturvedi then argued that this Court should exercise its power to grant relief against the landlord's forfeiture of the lease for non-payment of rent. He contents that the court's power to grant such relief is not confined to the cases falling within Sec. 114 of the Transfer of Property Act, and he relied on a number of decisions. Jabab Vellalhi v. Smt. Kaderved Thayammal, A.I.R. 1958 Mad. 232. Sri Kishan Lal v. Ramnath Janaki Prasad, A.I.R. 1944 Nag. 229 and Malappa Venkatesh Shatti v. Janardan Govinda Mahab, ILR 1950 Bom. 450. In all these cases, the court exercised its equitable power to grant relief against forfeiture, though the case did not fall within Sec. 114. But the power to grant relief against forfeiture, whether equitable or under Sec. 114, can be exercised by the Court only if there has been a forfeiture on the ground of non-payment of rent. But where there is no forfeiture and the landlord has terminated the lease under his right under Sec. 106, the question of granting relief against forfeiture does not arise. A suit for ejectment by the landlord after determining the lease under Sec. 106 is not based on forfeiture of the lease, but on the landlord's ordinary right to terminate the lease and eject the tenant. A suit for ejectment by the landlord after determining the lease under Sec. 106 is not based on forfeiture of the lease, but on the landlord's ordinary right to terminate the lease and eject the tenant. This right is restricted by Sec. 3(1) (a) of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act, but as soon as the tenant loses the protection of this Section, the landlord's right to determine his lease and eject him is freed of all restrictions. The tenant cannot in such a case ask the Court to exercise its equitable power against a forfeiture, for the simple reason that there is no forfeiture to give relief against. 10. No other point was argued. 11. The appeal is dismissed with costs. 12. The record of the case shall be returned forthwith to enable the respondent to execute the decree for ejectment. The stay order passed this Court is discharged.